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Abstract 	  China’s	   increasing	   involvement	   in	   Africa	   during	   this	   past	   decade	   is	   one	   of	   the	  most	   controversial	   and	   hotly	   debated	   issues	   in	   the	   region,	   maybe	   even	  worldwide.	   It	   appears	   to	   contradict	   not	   only	   the	   idea	   of	   an	   internationally	  marginalized	   Africa,	   but	   also	   the	   traditional	   North-­‐South	   engagement	   pattern;	  specifically,	   humanitarian	   intervention	   and	   foreign	   aid	  mechanism.	  On	   the	   one	  hand,	  China	  has	  brought	  significant	  economic	  and	  political	  opportunities	   to	   the	  continent	   with	   large	   amounts	   of	   investment	   and	   infrastructure.	   While	   on	   the	  other	   hand,	   China’s	   interests	   in	   Africa	   -­‐	   including	   international	   strategy	   for	  multipolarity,	   a	   boom	   in	   China-­‐Africa	   trade,	   and	   a	   strategic	   focus	   on	   energy	   –	  have	  been	  challenged	  as	  a	  form	  of	  neo-­‐colonialism	  and	  support	  for	  authoritarian	  governments	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   human	   rights,	   the	   environment	   and	   good	  governance.	   Comparing	   these	   two	   arguments,	   it	   shows	   that	   there	   is	   a	   lack	   of	  appropriate	  criteria	  with	  which	  to	  evaluate	  China’s	  impact	  on	  African	  countries.	   	  	  The	  existing	  literature	  has	  presented	  two	  faces	  of	  China	  in	  Africa:	  it	  has	  provided	  an	  alternative	  source	  and	  approach	   to	  conditional	  Western	  aid,	  but	  a	  generally	  asymmetrical	   relationship	   has	   made	   China-­‐Africa	   links	   little	   different	   from	  previous	  Western-­‐African	  relations.	  This	   thesis	  argues	   that	   the	  Western	  way	   is	  not	   the	  best	  criteria	   for	  evaluating	  China-­‐Africa	  engagement,	  when	  considering	  the	   emerging	   power’s	   new	   role	   as	   a	   donor	   Instead,	   it	   attempts	   to	   establish	   a	  reasonable	   standard	   for	   a	   state	   being	   responsible	   in	   international	   society,	   and	  employs	   five	   standards	   on	   China-­‐Africa	   involvement	   to	   analyse	   China’s	  responsibility	   in	   Africa,	   in	   terms	   of	   good	   governance,	   China’s	   African	   policy,	  policy	   implementation,	   feedback	   from	   host	   countries,	   and	   comments	   from	  international	   society.	   Since	   the	   good	   governance	   is	   considered	   to	   be	   an	   inner	  responsibility,	  the	  rest	  four	  criteria	  will	  be	  mainly	  discussed.	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To	  assess	  whether	  China	  is	  responsible	  to	  Africa	  is	  a	  difficult	  question.	  In	  order	  to	  clarify	  China’s	  role	  in	  Africa,	  this	  thesis	  has	  divided	  China-­‐Africa	  involvement	  into	  two	  parts,	  the	  factors	  that	  shape	  China’s	  responsibility	  in	  Africa	  at	  the	  policy	  level	  and	  the	  factors	  that	  impact	  China	  in	  Africa	  (policy	  implementation).	   	  	  In	  general,	  three	  factors	  have	  shaped	  China’s	  responsibility	  in	  Africa	  at	  the	  policy	  level:	   China’s	   Africa	   policy	   motivation,	   Africa’s	   demands	   and	   international	  expectation.	   It	   has	   been	   concluded	   that	   China	   holds	   a	   different	   approach	   and	  political	  philosophy	  for	  helping	  Africa’s	  development,	  but	  it	  shows	  willingness	  to	  cooperate	   with	   the	   traditional	   players	   on	   the	   continent,	   and	   its	   own	   African	  policy	  is	  not	  always	  incompatible	  with	  Africa’s	  demands.	   	  	  Moreover,	   the	   factors	   at	   policy	   implementation	   level	   are	   diverse,	   including	  Chinese	   governmental	   branches,	   Chinese	   enterprises,	   and	   the	   host	   African	  countries’	   environment.	   At	   this	   level,	   Chinese	   companies	   shoulder	   Beijing’s	  ‘going	  out’	  strategy,	  using	  aid	  and	  infrastructure	  to	  expand	  overseas	  markets	  and	  acquire	   assets,	   especially	   energy	   assets,	   in	   Africa.	   Theoretically,	   this	   approach	  does	   not	   necessarily	   undermine	   development	   in	   Africa.	   However,	   in	   order	   to	  reach	  the	  central	  government’s	  goals,	  and	  constrained	  by	  the	  competition	  in	  the	  overseas	   market,	   Chinese	   companies	   have	   to	   invest	   in	   highly	   risky	   areas	   or	  provide	  generous	  loans	  and	  credit	  to	  outbid	  competitors,	  including	  overpayment	  for	  equity	  positions	  or	  underbidding	  contracts.	  Due	  to	  the	  profit-­‐driven	  nature	  of	  enterprises,	   Chinese	   companies	   sometimes	   try	   to	   reduce	   costs	   during	   the	  implementation	   of	   projects	   by	   reducing	   quality,	   cutting	   labour	   costs,	   or	  sacrificing	   worker	   safety	   and	   lowering	   environmental	   protection.	   Their	  irresponsible	  behaviour	  deviates	  from	  the	  central	  government’s	  policy,	  but	  also	  badly	  damages	  the	  reputation	  of	  both	  Chinese	  companies	  and	  China	  as	  a	  whole.	  	   	  Although	   the	   host	   African	   countries	   and	   their	   markets	   were	   considered	   to	   be	  untapped	   and	   less	   competitive,	   compared	   to	   developed	   countries	   and	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   Arab	  Maghreb	  Union	   	  AU	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   African	  Union	  CADFund	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   China-­‐Africa	  Development	  Fund	  CDB	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   China	  Development	  Bank	  CNCRC	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   China	  National	  Cotton	  Reserves	  Corporation	   	  CNOOC	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   China	  National	  Offshore	  Oil	  Corporate	   	   	  CNPC	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   China	  National	  Petroleum	  Corporate	  CREC	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   China	  Railway	  Engineering	  Corporation	  CUD	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Ethiopian	  Coalition	  for	  Unity	  and	  Democracy	   	  DDA	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Doha	  Development	  Round	  DPA	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   The	  Darfur	  Peace	  Agreement	  ECCAS	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Economic	  Community	  of	  Central	  African	  States	  ECOWAS	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Economic	  Community	  of	  West	  African	  States	  EEPCo	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Ethiopian	  Electric	  Power	  Corporation	   	  EPRDF	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   The	  Ethiopian	  People's	  Revolutionary	  Democratic	  Front	  FAOUN	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Food	  and	  Agriculture	  Organization	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  FAO	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Provincial	  Foreign	  Affairs	  Office	  FDI	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Foreign	  Direct	  Investment	  FOCAC	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Forum	  of	  China-­‐Africa	  Cooperation	  FTECC	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Foreign	  Trade	  and	  Economic	  Cooperation	  Commission	  GNI	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Gross	  National	  Income	  IAEA	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   International	  Atomic	  Energy	  Association	  IGAD	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Intergovernmental	  Authority	  on	  Development	  IMF	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   International	  Monetary	  Fund	  IR	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   International	  Relations	  JEM	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Justice	  and	  Equality	  Movement	  LDCs	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   least	  developed	  countries	  MOF	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Ministry	  of	  Finance	  of	  the	  PRC	  MOFA	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  of	  the	  PRC	  MOFCOM	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Ministry	  of	  Commerce	  of	  the	  PRC	  MNCs	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Multinationals	  NCP	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   National	  Congress	  Party	  NIPC	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Nigerian	  Investment	  Promotion	  Commission	  NNPC	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Nigeria	  National	  Petroleum	  Corporation	  ODA	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Official	  Development	  Assistance	  OECD	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Organization	  for	  Economic	  Cooperation	  and	  Development	  OFDI	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Outward	  Foreign	  Direct	  Investment	  OOF	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Official	  Flows	  PASDEP	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   plan	  for	  accelerated	  and	  sustained	  development	  to	  end	  poverty	   	  PDOC	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   PetroDar	  Operating	  Company	  Ltd.	   	  PLA	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   the	  People’s	  Liberation	  Army	  of	  the	  PRC	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PPP	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Purchasing	  Power	  Parity	  R2P	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Responsibility	  to	  protect	  ROI	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Return	  on	  Investment	  SADC	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Southern	  African	  Development	  Community	  SAPETRO	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   South	  Atlantic	  Petroleum	  Limited	   	  SASAC	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   State-­‐Owned	  Asset	  Supervision	  and	  Administration	  Commission	  SIINOPEC	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   China	  Petroleum	  and	  Chemical	  Corporate	  SPF	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Sudan	  Police	  Force	  SPLM/A	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Sudan	  Peoples’	  Liberation	  Movement/Army	  SOEs	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   State-­‐owned	  enterprises	  SRF	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Sudan	  Revolutionary	  Front	   	  UNDP	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   United	  Nations	  Development	  Program	  WTO	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   World	  Trade	  Organization	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Chapter	  1	  Introduction	   	  
1.1	  Research	  Topic	  
1.1.1	  Why	  China?	  The	   new	  millennium	  has	  witnessed	   a	   significant	   transformation	   in	   the	   field	   of	  international	  relations	  theory	  and	  world	  political	  patterns.	  China,	  as	  an	  emerging	  political	  and	  economic	  power,	  has	  experienced	  remarkable	  changes	  as	  a	  result	  of	  its	  high-­‐speed	  development	  and	  expansion	  in	  international	  affairs.	  However,	  as	  it	  maintains	   a	   different	   political	   system	   and	   pursues	   a	   different	   developmental	  path	   in	   the	   name	   of	   “crossing	   the	   river	   by	   feeling	   the	   stones”,	   its	   rise	   and	  unpredictable	  future	  has	  evoked	  wide	  debate.	  Consequently,	  the	  rise	  of	  China	  has	  become	  a	  subject	  of	  global	  interest.	  The	  consensus	  could	  be	  reached	  on	  China	  as	  a	   major	   global	   economy,	   but	   its	   political,	   developmental	   and	   humanitarian	  influences,	  along	  with	   its	  growing	  strength,	  remain	  controversial.	  On	  one	  hand,	  China	   has	   been	   unable	   to	   fully	   “project	   itself	   onto	   [the]	   international	   scene”	  (Taylor,	   2006b,	   p.	   1),	   which	   is	   dominated	   by	   Western	   political	   discourse.	   It	  portrays	  itself	  as	  different	  from	  the	  West	  and	  a	  leader	  of	  the	  developing	  world	  by	  emphasising	  “sovereignty	  and	  non-­‐interference”	  and	  “international	  democracy”	  (multi-­‐polarity	   国际关系民主化 ).	   These	   claims	   place	   it	   in	   opposition	   to	  traditional	  powers	  and	  as	  a	  challenger	  to	  the	  international	  system	  they	  created.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  Chinese	  government	  has	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  its	  economic	  growth	  through	  “going	  out”	  policy,	  which	  requires	  it	  to	  actively	  involve	  itself	   in	  the	  international	  community,	  and	  abide	  by	  global	  norms	  and	  institutions.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  its	  ambition	  to	  be	  a	  great	  power	  on	  the	  world	  stage	  also	  called	  for	  it	  to	   play	   a	   constructive	   role	   within	   the	   current	   system.	   These	   paradoxical	  motivations	   gave	   China	   a	   complex	   and	   uncertain	   reaction	   to	   the	   existing	  international	  system.	  Even	  now,	  when	  China	  has	  undergone	  a	  transformation	  on	  the	   international	  stage,	   “moving	   from	  a	  hostile,	  aggressive	   ‘rogue’	  state	  outside	  the	   international	   system”	   to	   “an	   active	   participant	   in	   global	   institutions	   and	   a	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sometimes	  constructive	  player”	  (Nina	  Hachigian	  &	  Beddor,	  November	  2009,	  p.	  3),	  it	   remains	   reluctant	   to	   fully	   accept	   the	   shared	   rules	   and	   norms	   advocated	   by	  international	  institutions.	  The	  answers	  to	  China’s	  new	  role	  and	  its	  impact	  on	  the	  global	   order	   are	   far	   less	   straightforward.	   China’s	   record	   on	   solving	   world	   hot	  crises	  differs	   from	  time	   to	   time,	  and	   from	  case	   to	  case.	  For	   instance,	  China	  has	  inconsistent	  responses	  to	  the	  “Responsibility	  to	  Protect”	  norm,	  employed	  during	  the	  “Arab	  Spring”:	  it	  abstained	  from	  voting	  on	  Security	  Council	  resolution	  1973,	  on	  17	  March	  2011,	  which	  helped	  to	  “establish	  a	  no-­‐fly	  zone”	  (Garwood-­‐Gowers,	  2012,	   p.	   11)	   and	   authorized	   “member	   states	   to	   take	   all	   necessary	  measures	   to	  protect	  civilians	  and	  civilian	  populated	  areas	  under	  threat	  of	  attack”	  (UNSC,	  17	  March	   2011).	   However,	   shortly	   after	   Libya’s	   vote,	   when	   all	   the	   Western	  countries	  expected	  China	  to	  agree	  to	  condemn	  or	  sanction	  Syria,	  China,	  followed	  Russia,	   opposed	   collective	   measures	   directed	   against	   the	   Assad	   regime	   (Qu,	  March/April	   2012).	   Secondly,	   it	   has	   a	   double-­‐faced	   attitude	   towards	  international	  institutions,	  organizations	  and	  initiatives.	  China	  has	  actively	  joined	  international	  institutions	  launched	  and	  established	  by	  traditional	  player,	  such	  as	  the	   International	   Monetary	   Fund	   (IMF),	   World	   Bank,	   International	   Atomic	  Energy	  Association	  (IAEA),	  and	  World	  Trade	  Organization	  (WTO)	  since	  1980s.	  It	  became	  a	  member	  of	  52	  intergovernmental	  institutions	  in	  2009	  (UIA,	  2009)	  and	  signed	  more	   than	  270	   international	   treaties	   (Kent,	  2007),	  many	  of	  which	  were	  the	  ones	  it	  once	  rejected.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  it	  enthusiastically	  supported	  regional	  organisations	  and	  initiatives,	  despite	  its	  weakness,	  in	  order	  to	  dilute	  US	  influence	  in	  Asia,	  Africa	   and	  other	  developing	  areas.	  After	   the	  East	  Asian	   financial	   crisis,	  China	  helped	  with	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  ASEAN+3	  forum	  and	  the	  East	  Asia	  Summit	  in	  2005	  that	  is	  considered	  with	  “a	  possible	  alternative	  to	  the	  US-­‐led	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  Economic	   Cooperation”	   (Hawke	   &	   NZIER,	   Nov.	   19	   2011).	   Similarly,	   China	  launched	   the	   Forum	   of	   China-­‐Africa	   Cooperation	   (FOCAC)	   that	   provided	   the	  continent	  with	  an	  alternative	   funding	  resource	   to	   the	   traditional	  OECD	  donors.	  These	  kinds	  of	  examples	  can	  also	  be	  found	  in	  China’s	  support	  for	  the	  Chiang	  Mai	  Initiative,	  Shanghai	  Cooperation	  Organization,	  and	  so	  forth.	  Thirdly,	   in	  terms	  of	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international	   cooperation	   on	   hot	   topics,	   it	   has	   also	   shown	   inconstancy.	  Regarding	  the	  non-­‐proliferation	  of	  nuclear	  weapons,	  it	  has	  played	  a	  constructive	  role	  in	  dealing	  with	  the	  North	  Korea	  nuclear	  crisis	  by	  facilitating	  Six	  Party	  Talks	  and	   passed	   the	   Security	   Council’s	   Resolution	   1718	   and	   1874	   which	   placed	  financial	  and	  commercial	  sanctions	  on	  DPRK	  (MOFA,	  July	  7	  2009).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	   it	  hesitated	   to	   impose	  sanctions	  on	   Iran,	  and	   instead,	  Chinese	  companies	  continue	   to	  be	   involved	  with	   the	   regime	   in	  Tehran.	  The	  BBC	   reported	   in	  2012	  that,	   as	   “Tehran’s	   largest	   trading	   partner	   and	   customer	   for	   its	   crude	   export	  (about	  20%	  of	  Iranian	  oil	  goes	  to	  China),	  it	  roughly	  imported	  500,000	  barrels	  a	  day”,	  (Pei,	  January	  20	  2012)	  which	  is	  criticized	  as	  “undermin[ing]	  US-­‐led	  efforts	  to	  shut	  off	  the	  supply	  of	  fuel	  on	  which	  Iran’s	  economy	  depends”	  (Blas	  &	  Hoyos,	  September	  23,	  2009).	  	  In	  short,	  China’s	  response	  to	  international	   issues	  and	  institutions	  have	  evolved,	  as	  China	  expert	  Kenneth	  Lieberthal	  described,	  “taking	  steps	  but	  without	  a	  clear	  agenda	  of	  where	  to	  go”	  (Nina	  Hachigian	  &	  Beddor,	  November	  2009,	  p.	  9).	  China’s	  unclear,	   sometimes	   contradictory	   agenda	   has	   received	   lots	   of	   criticism	   and	  experienced	   difficulties	   in	   cooperation	   in	   solving	   global	   issues.	   However,	  considering	   its	   size	   and	   growing	   power	   and	   influence,	   nearly	   all	   solutions	   for	  global	   topics	   could	   hardly	   be	   achieved	   without	   China’s	   active	   involvement.	  Indeed,	   it	   is	   unrealistic	   to	   expect	  China	   to	   change	  overnight;	   understanding	   its	  logic	  and	  motivating	  the	  country	   to	  be	  more	  cooperative	   is	  a	  compromised	  but	  better	  way.	  As	  a	  result,	  this	  thesis’s	  research	  on	  China	  aims	  to	  provide	  a	  realistic	  suggestion	  for	  understanding	  China’s	  diplomatic	  agenda,	  further	  to	  exploring	  the	  possibility	   of	   promoting	   its	   contribution	   to	   international	   issues	   from	   the	  perspective	  of	  China-­‐Africa	  engagement.	   	  
1.1.2	  Why	  International	  Responsibility?	   	  In	   order	   to	   ascertain	   China’s	   diplomatic	   agenda,	   one	   should	   first	   attempt	   to	  clarify	  its	  motivations.	  Like	  all	  other	  countries	  in	  the	  international	  arena,	  China’s	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foreign	   policy	   and	   diplomatic	   strategy	   is	   shaped	   through	   the	   balance	   of	   the	  domestic	   and	   international	   environments.	   Evaluating	   the	   term	   “international	  responsibility”	  provides	  a	  perspective	  to	  view	  both	  China’s	  national	  interests	  at	  home	   and	   international	   requirements,	   and	   the	   interaction	   between	   them.	   This	  norm	  could	  reflect	  the	  contradiction	  and	  compromise	  between	  China’s	  domestic	  agenda	   and	   international	   expectations	   and	   demands.	   Furthermore,	   it	   is	   a	   new	  concept	  to	  look	  beyond	  narrow	  traditional	  state	  sovereignty,	  and	  emphasize	  the	  interdependency	   of	   modern	   countries.	   By	   exploring	   China’s	   attitude	   towards	  “international	   responsibility”,	   it	   could	   help	   to	   understand	   to	   the	   state’s	  motivation	  to	  become	  more	  cooperative.	  Thirdly,	  “international	  responsibility”	  is	  a	   dual	   term	   which	   could	   be	   interpreted	   as	   both	   negative	   consequences	   and	  positive	  commitment,	  it	  offers	  a	  neutral	  stand	  from	  which	  to	  comment	  on	  China’s	  activities.	  Fourthly,	  it	  is	  a	  comprehensive	  term	  which	  combines	  foreign	  strategy	  with	   economic	   consideration	   and	   international	   ethics,	   with	   a	   combination	   of	  central	   policy	   and	   real	   implementation.	   In	   short,	   to	   analyse	   this	   concept	   is	   a	  useful	   tool	   for	   understanding	   the	   interrelated	   domestic	   interests	   and	  international	   environment	   that	   features	   in	   and	   informs	   Chinese	   foreign	   policy	  discourse.	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
1.1.3	  Why	  Africa?	   	  China,	  as	  a	  rising	  but	  lonely	  power	  in	  the	  international	  scene,	  inevitably	  requires	  political,	   diplomatic	   and	   economic	   support.	   Sharing	   similar	   backgrounds	   and	  grievances,	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  developing	  world	  forms	  the	  foundation	  of	  China’s	  diplomatic	   clout.	   Africa,	   a	   continent	   with	   the	   largest	   number	   of	   developing	  countries,	   is	   a	   traditional	   arena	   in	  which	   China	   can	   address	   [and	   exercise]	   its	  influence	   and	   attention.	   Recently,	   the	   long-­‐marginalized	   continent	   is	   hotly	  discussed	   and	   has	   drawn	   the	   world’s	   attention	   due	   to	   China’s	   high-­‐profile	  involvement.	   Nevertheless,	   China	   has	   attached	   a	   particular	   attention	   to	   its	  African	  brothers,	  from	  the	  time	  when	  “Chairman	  Mao	  said	  that	  we	  were	  carried	  into	   the	   UN	   by	   African	   friends”	   (Y.	   Liu,	   March	   11	   2011),	   to	   new	   President	   Xi	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Jinping’s	   statement	   that	   “China	  will	  be	  a	   reliable	   friend	  and	  genuine	  partner	  of	  African	  countries	  forever”	  (J.	  Yang,	  March	  29	  2013).	   	  	  The	   China-­‐African	   relationship	   can	   be	   traced	   from	   the	   1950s,	   but	   the	   growing	  close	   relations	   have	   drawn	   the	   world’s	   attention	   since	   the	   FOCAC-­‐Ministerial	  Conference	   in	   Beijing,	   in	   2000.	   Despite	   the	   fact	   that	   China’s	   outward	   foreign	  direct	   investment	   (OFDI)	   in	   Africa	   only	   accounted	   for	   2.2%	   of	   its	   total	   OFDI,	  (US$	  1.7	  billion	  out	  of	  US$	  74.65	  billion)	  in	  2011	  (MOFCOM,	  2011),	  and	  China’s	  direct	   investment	  (FDI)	   in	  Africa	  accounted	  for	  only	  4%	  of	   the	  world’s	   into	  the	  continent,	   (US$	  1.7	  billion	  out	  of	  US$	  42.65	  billion)	  (UNCTAD,	  2012,	  p.	  38),	   the	  world	   is	   still	   concerned	   with	   the	   impact	   and	   influence	   of	   China’s	   sharply	  increasing	  engagement,	  which	  is	  reflected	  in	  China’s	  FDI	  figures	  for	  Africa,	  which	  have	  dramatically	   increased	   from	  US$	  56	  million	   in	  1996,	   to	  US$	  1.5	  billion	   in	  2005,	  and	  US$	  15	  billion	  in	  2011	  (MOFCOM,	  2011).	  China’s	  growing	  engagement	  in	   the	   continent	   has	   received	  plenty	   of	   criticism	  and	   given	   rise	   to	  much	  doubt	  and	   concern,	   notably	   for	   “New	   Colonialism”	   and	   “come	   in,	   take	   out	   natural	  resources,	   pay	   off	   leaders	   and	   leave”,	   as	   express	   by	   then-­‐Secretary	   of	   State	  Hillary	   Clinton	   (Krause-­‐Jackson,	   June	   12	   2011),	   and	   violations	   of	  humanitarianism,	   environment	   and	   human	   rights,	   and	   notably	   Beijing’s	   close	  relation	  with	   certain	   pariah	   regimes,	   including	   Sudan	   and	   Zimbabwe.	   There	   is	  also	   criticism	   that	   the	   influx	   of	   cheap	   Chinese	   manufactures	   and	   labour	   has	  destroyed	  the	  development	  of	  Africa’s	  local	  industry.	   	  	   	  Apart	   from	   Africa’s	   significance	   to	   China	   and	   the	   world’s	   concern	   for	   China’s	  involvement	   in	   the	   continent,	   China’s	   asymmetrical	   strength	   in	   Africa	   also	  provides	  an	  opportunity	  to	  evaluate	  China’s	  dilemma	  agenda	  -­‐	  that	  is,	  hesitating	  between	   national	   interests	   and	   international	   expectations,	   between	   economic	  benefits	   and	   international	   ethics.	   As	   an	   independent	   actor,	   Africa’s	   attitude	  towards	   China-­‐Africa	   relations	   could	   serve	   as	   a	  mediator	   to	   avoid	   neither	   too	  “West”	  nor	  too	  “Chinese”.	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1.1.4	  Why	  China’s	  International	  Responsibility	  in	  Africa?	  China’s	   political	   discourse	   has	   developed	   from	   “why	   China	   should	   take	   the	  responsibility	   of	   Africa’s	   development”	   (T.	   Cheng,	   August	   27	   2012;	   Yuchuan	  Zheng,	  June	  8	  2013)	  into,	  “What	  kinds	  of	  responsibility	  should	  China	  take	  for	  the	  development	   of	   Africa”	   (D.	   Li,	   2011).	   The	   international	   community,	   Chinese	  government	   and	   African	   countries	   all	   have	   expectations	   for	   China	   to	   be	  more	  responsible	  for	  African’s	  current	  situation,	  so	  it	  is	  worth	  exploring	  how	  to	  make	  full	  use	  of	  China’s	  engagement	  and	  avoid	  negative	  consequences.	   	  	  First	   of	   all,	   there	   is	   no	   consensus	   definition	   of	   the	   term	   “international	  responsibility”.	   The	   most	   commonly	   accepted	   definition	   cannot	   fully	   explain	  China’s	   role	   in	   Africa,	   because	   it	   does	   not	   take	   into	   consideration	   the	   various	  factors	  behind	   it.	   The	   research	  on	  China’s	   international	   responsibility	   can	  help	  with	   an	   empirical	   assessment	   of	   the	   norm	   within	   China-­‐Africa	   context.	   The	  assessment	  of	  China’s	  impact	  on	  Africa	  can	  complement	  the	  current	  definition	  of	  “international	   responsibility”	   by	   viewing	   the	   term	   from	   developing	   countries’	  perspectives	   and	   attempt	   to	   create	   a	   more	   balanced	   standard	   with	   which	   to	  judge	  a	  state’s	  behaviour.	   	  	  Secondly,	  it	  attempts	  to	  formulate	  a	  compromised	  way	  that	  can	  take	  into	  account	  the	   full	   scope	   of	   China’s	   assistance	   to	   Africa.	   Since	   Chinese	   presence	   in	   the	  continent	  is	  inevitable,	  it	  is	  practical	  to	  push	  China	  to	  become	  more	  cooperative	  rather	  than	  undermine	  existing	  efforts/policies.	  Currently,	  the	  literature	  focuses	  on	  the	  either	  negative	  or	  positive	  impact	  China	  has	  brought	  to	  the	  continent,	  but	  the	   research	   on	   China’s	   international	   responsibility	   does	   address	   China’s	  different	  way	  of	  approaching	  Africa	  with	  both	  its	  positive	  and	  negative	  influence.	  In	   addition,	   it	   goes	   further	   by	   exploring	   the	   possible	  ways	   to	  motivate	   Beijing	  and	   how	   to	   take	   advantage	   of	   Beijing’s	   funds	   and	   policy	   by	   understanding	  China’s	  presence	  and	  policies	  in	  Africa.	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1.2	  Literature	  Review	  Few	  researchers	  have	  analysed	  China’s	  international	  responsibility	  in	  Africa.	  The	  most	   relevant	  paper	   is	   by	  political	   scientist	  Dr.	   Sven	  Grimm,	   “China	   as	  Africa’s	  Ambiguous	   Ally	   –	   Why	   China	   has	   a	   Responsibility	   for	   Africa’s	   development”	  (Grimm,	  June	  2011).	  In	  this	  paper,	  Grimm	  emphasises	  China’s	  importance	  to	  the	  world	   and	   provides	   a	   broad	   overview	   of	   the	   impact	   of	   China’s	   engagement	   in	  Africa.	   It	   inspired	   me	   to	   look	   at	   the	   differentiation	   between	   actors	   that	   take	  responsibility	   for	   Africa’s	   development.	   However,	   the	   paper	   does	   not	   clarify	  what	   responsibility	  means	   in	  China-­‐Africa	  discourse,	  nor	  does	   it	   clarify	  China’s	  motivation	   behind	   responsibility.	   A	   body	   of	   research	   focuses	   on	   the	  enterprise-­‐level,	   that	   is,	  China’s	  Corporate	  Social	  Responsibility	  (CSR)	   in	  Africa,	  (S.	  Cheng	  &	  Liang,	  May	  10	  2012;	  C.	  Yang,	  August	  2008;	  Zadek	  et	  al.,	  November	  2009),	   but	   little	   addresses	   state	   level	   engagement,	   and	   much	   neglects	   the	  interaction	  between	  the	  state	  and	  enterprise	  levels.	  Therefore,	  in	  order	  to	  figure	  out	  the	  background	  of	  this	  research,	  two	  fields	  of	  literature	  need	  to	  be	  discussed.	  One	   is	   China’s	   engagement	   in	   Africa,	   and	   the	   other	   is	   China’s	   international	  responsibility.	   	  
1.2.1	  The	  implication	  of	  China’s	  engagement	  in	  Africa	  As	  for	  the	  hotly	  debated	  topic	  in	  international	  relations,	  there	  is	  a	  large	  body	  of	  research	   focused	   on	   China’s	   engagement	   in	   Africa.	   Generally,	   three	   strands	   of	  thought	   and	   two	   scopes	   inform	   the	   on-­‐going	   discussion	   about	   the	   impact	   of	  China	  in	  Africa:	  these	  are	  “Sino-­‐optimism,	  Sino-­‐pragmatism	  and	  Sino-­‐pessimism”	  (Adem,	  2012),	  and	  the	  macro	  and	  microscope.	  
I.	  Three	  strands	  of	  China	  in	  Africa	   	  
From	   the	   perspective	   of	   Sino-­‐optimism,	   China’s	   involvement	   in	   Africa	   is	   a	  blessing.	   Africa	   gains	   much	   from	   its	   close	   relationship	   with	   Beijing,	   because	  China’s	   economic	   involvement	   in	   Africa	   has	   provided	   great	   opportunities	   for	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Africa’s	  growth	  and	  development.	  Wang,	  Foster	  and	  others	  point	  out	  that	  China	  provides	   substantial	   funds	   for	   infrastructure,	   for	   example	   in	   power	   (mainly	  hydropower),	   transport	   (mainly	   railroads),	   and	   information	   and	  communications	   technology	   (mainly	   equipment	   supply),	   where	   traditional	  donors	   allocate	   relatively	   little	   assistance	   (Corkin,	   December	   2007;	   Foster,	  Butterfield,	   Chen,	   &	   Pushak,	   2009).	   Some	   have	   suggested	   that	   Chinese	  investments	   in	   Africa	   have	   provided	   opportunities	   for	   African	   countries.	   For	  example,	   Alden	   has	   found	   examples	   of	   African	   entrepreneurs	   in	   small	   and	  medium	  businesses	  who	  have	  benefited	   from	  Chinese	   investments,	  particularly	  through	   “the	   growth	   of	   informal	   and	   formal	   linkage	   with	   Chinese...	   business	  networks	   outside	   of	   government	   sponsorship”.	   He	   has	   further	   argued	   that	  Chinese	   investments	   in	   Africa	   are	   much	   needed,	   especially	   in	   the	   face	   of	  declining	   investment	   from	   Western	   countries,	   and	   should	   therefore	   be	  welcomed	  (Alden,	  01	  August	  2005,	  01	  March	  2005).	  Some	  researchers	  have	  paid	  attention	  to	  China’s	   technical	   transfers	  -­‐	   for	  example,	  Muekalia	  has	  argued	  that	  Chinese	  agricultural	  technology	  will	  undoubtedly	  “increase	  productivity	  in	  Africa,	  reduce	  hunger	  and	  create	  jobs”	  (FAO,	  2012;	  Moyo,	  2010;	  Muekalia,	  2004,	  p.	  10;	  R.	  Rotberg,	  2008).	  	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  Sino-­‐pragmatism,	  China’s	   involvement	   in	  Africa	  has	   its	  strengths	   as	   well	   as	   weaknesses;	   whether	   it	   benefits	   the	   continent	   or	   China	  depends	   on	   how	   the	   host	   African	   governments	   take	   advantage	   of	   China’s	  activities.	   Brautigam	   compared	   the	   impact	   of	   Chinese	   investment	   in	  manufacturing	   industries	   among	   several	   African	   countries,	   and	   concluded	   that	  some	   countries	   with	   supportive	   investment	   environments	   have	   successfully	  formed	   a	   “flying	   geese”	  model	  with	   Chinese	   enterprises,	  while	   other	   countries	  that	   failed	   to	   “establish	   an	   environment	   that	   would	   allow	   either	   domestic	  industry	  or	  export-­‐oriented	   firms	   to	   thrive	  and	  grow”	  may	  perceive	  China	  as	  a	  threat	   to	   local	   industry	   (Brautigam,	   March	   2007,	   pp.	   13-­‐15).	   As	   for	   Chinese	  exports	   to	  Africa,	  Taylor	  argues	   that	   the	   cheap	  products	  made	   in	  China	   should	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not	  be	  condemned	  as	  a	  scapegoat	  for	  the	  decline	  of	  Africa’s	  own	  manufacturing	  sector.	   It	   is,	   rather,	  Africa’s	   internal	  problems	   that	  have	   caused	   this	  decline.	   In	  spite	   of	   these	   contentious	   issues,	   Chinese	   products	   have	   provided	   African	  consumers	  with	  more	  choices	  (Taylor,	  2009,	  pp.	  82-­‐86).	  Adem	  summarised	  that,	  “since	   the	   logic	   of	   capital	   is	   the	   same	   whether	   those	   in	   the	   driving	   seat	   are	  Europeans,	  Americans	  or	  Chinese”	  (Adem,	  2012,	  p.	  144).	  	  A	   Sino-­‐pessimist	   perspective	   prevails	   in	   media,	   journals	   and	   research.	   In	   this	  view,	  China’s	  engagement	   is	  a	   curse	   for	  Africa,	   and	   threats	   the	  development	  of	  the	   continent.	   Sino-­‐pessimists	   analyse	   trade	   between	   China	   and	   African	  countries	  as	  highly	   imbalanced	   (with	   the	  exceptions	  of	  oil	   and	  other	   resources	  exports	   to	   China)	   in	   favour	   of	   Chinese	   exporters,	   which	   has	   the	   effect	   of	  debilitating	  and	  even	   shutting	  down	   local	  manufacturers	  and	   traders	   (Alden,	  1	  March	  2005,	  p.	  7;	  Draper,	  March	  9	  2006;	  WILSONIII,	   JULY	  28,	  2005).	  Thus,	  not	  only	   do	   Chinese	   imports	   threaten	   local	   manufacturers,	   but	   also	   the	   labour	  market,	   since	   the	   closure	   of	   local	   retailers	   and	   manufacturers	   results	   in	  thousands	  of	  job	  losses	  as	  well	  (Alden,	  1	  March	  2005;	  Draper,	  March	  9	  2006,	  p.	  7;	  Zafar,	  2007,	  p.	  122).	  Mills	  &	  Shelton	  predict	  that,	  despite	  South	  African	  President	  Thabo	   Mbeki’s	   hopes,	   China	   is	   unlikely	   to	   promote	   development	   in	   Africa	  through	   more	   direct	   involvement	   in	   the	   New	   Partnership	   for	   Africa’s	  Development	   (NEPAD),	   because	   of	   China’s	   own	   domestic	   need	   to	   alleviate	  poverty	   in	   rural	   areas.	   Furthermore,	   they	   forecast	   that,	   in	   South	   Africa’s	   case,	  future	   investments	  would	   be	   discouraging;	   increasing	   trade	  will	   become	  more	  challenging	   due	   to	   the	   competitive	   nature	   of	   the	   Chinese	   economy	   (Mills	   &	  Shelton,	  2004,	  p.	  37).	  	  Furthermore,	  this	  strand	  holds	  that	  China’s	  involvement	  in	  Africa	  is	  self-­‐serving	  for	   oil	   and	   other	   raw	   materials,	   and	   that	   the	   political	   rhetoric	   of	   a	   “win-­‐win”	  situation	  only	   favours	  China.	  Hellström	  argued	   that	   the	   “centrepiece	   of	   China’s	  African	   policy	   became	   ‘mutual	   benefit’	   and	   ‘win-­‐win	   cooperation’,	   roughly	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translating	   into	   a	   relationship	   where	   Chinese	   investments,	   mainly	   in	  infrastructure,	   were	   offered	   in	   exchange	   for	   African	   natural	   resources”	  (Hellström,	  May	  2009,	  p.	  8).	  The	  thirst	  for	  resources	  leads	  China	  to	  aggressively	  pursue	  shady	  methods	  in	  ways	  that	  can	  violate	  the	  democratic	  development	  and	  human	   rights	   of	   these	   African	   nations.	   A	   number	   of	   scholars	   have	   criticised	  China’s	   foreign	   policy	   towards	   Africa	   of	   “non-­‐interference”	   in	   the	   affairs	   of	  another	   state,	   and	   the	   emphasis	   on	   state	   sovereignty	   ahead	   of	   humanitarian	  protection.	   Due	   to	   this	   principle,	   China	   does	   not	   attach	   any	   political	  conditionality	   to	   its	   engagement	   with	   Africa	   (Taylor,	   2006a,	   pp.	   956-­‐950).	  According	  to	  Wilson	  III	  (WILSONIII,	  JULY	  28,	  2005,	  p.	  11)	  and	  others	  (e.g.,	  Giry,	  November	   5,	   2004),	   principles	   such	   as	   democracy,	   transparency	   and	   human	  rights	   do	   not	   feature	   in	   China’s	   Africa	   policy.	   As	   Taylor	   has	   pointed	   out,	   this	  policy	  stance	  allows	  China	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  more	  despotic	  and	  undemocratic	  regimes	  in	  Africa	  (Taylor,	  2004,	  p.	  94;	  2005).	  This	  lack	  of	  political	  requirements	  for	  China’s	  engagement	  with	  Africa	  appeals	   to	  African	  elites,	  who	  are	  often	   the	  primary	   beneficiaries,	  while	   there	   is	   little	   to	   gain	   for	   the	   ordinary	   populations	  and	   democratic	   societies	   in	   Africa	   (Alden,	   1	   March	   2005,	   p.	   7;	   Taylor,	   2004).	  Alden	   argues	   that	   these	   African	   governments	   are	   happy	   to	   do	   business	   with	  China,	  since	  it	  provides	  them	  with	  a	  new	  source	  of	  regime	  security	  (Alden,	  2005,	  p.	  145)	  when	  most	  Western	   companies	  are	  unwilling	  or	  unable	   to	  do	  business	  with	   them	   (Giry,	   November	   5,	   2004).	   Taylor	   summarised	   that	   Beijing	   has	  contributed	   towards	   creating	   a	   discourse	   in	   Africa	   that	   “effectively	   legitimises	  human	   rights	   abuses	   and	   undemocratic	   practices”	   in	   pursuit	   of	   profits	   and	  resources	  (Taylor,	  2004,	  p.	  99).	  
II.	  The	  Impact	  of	  China	  in	  Africa:	  Macro	  and	  Micro	   	   	  
Some	  analysts	  view	  China’s	   involvement	   in	  Africa	   from	  the	  governmental	   level.	  Van	   der	   Wath	   describes	   relations	   between	   China	   and	   Africa	   as	   “constructive,	  stable,	   friendly	  and	   co-­‐operative”	   (Van	  der	  Wath,	  2004,	  p.	  73).	   Several	   authors	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pay	  attention	  to	  the	  flow	  of	  developmental	  aid	  from	  Beijing	  to	  Africa	  and	  make	  a	  comparison	  between	  the	  Chinese	  methods	  and	  amount	  with	  those	  aid	  flows	  from	  OECD	   members	   (Brautigam,	   2008a;	   Kragelund,	   2008;	   X.	   Wang	   &	   Ozanne,	  September	   2010).	   Foster	   and	   others,	   using	   a	   database	   based	   on	   information	  released	  by	  the	  press,	  estimate	  that	  Chinese	  infrastructure	  finance	  commitments	  to	   sub-­‐Saharan	   Africa	   accounted	   for	   US$16	   billion	   between	   2001	   and	   2007.	  While	  some	  of	  this	  financing	  appears	  to	  be	  concessional,	  most	  of	  it	  does	  not	  meet	  the	   OECD	   definition	   for	   aid	   (Foster	   et	   al.,	   2009).	   It	   was	   given	   to	   Africa	   as	  subsidies	   provided	   by	   government	   support	   programmes	   with	   low	   cost	   loans	  (Asche	  &	  Schüller,	  2008).	  	  Broadman’s	   research	   is	   one	   of	   the	   few	   studies	   based	   on	  microeconomic	   data,	  using	   a	   survey	   of	   both	   Chinese	   and	   non-­‐Chinese	   firms	   in	   South	   Africa,	   Ghana,	  Senegal	  and	  Tanzania.	  He	  finds	  that	  China’s	  trade	  and	  investment	  in	  Africa	  tend	  to	   reinforce	   each	   other,	   and	   notes	   significant	   investments	   have	   been	  made	   in	  non-­‐primary	   industries	   such	   as	   clothing,	   food	   industry,	   transport,	   building,	  tourism,	   power	   plants,	   and	   telecommunications	   (Broadman,	   2007).	   Chen	   and	  others	   surveyed	  Chinese	   firms	   involved	   in	   the	  African	   construction	   sector,	   and	  found	  that	   the	  success	  of	  Chinese	   firms	  was	  due	  both	  to	  cost	  competitiveness	   -­‐	  deriving	   from	   access	   to	   cheap	   capital,	   low-­‐cost	   labour,	   and	   cheap	   building	  materials	  -­‐	  and	  to	  political	  support	  from	  the	  Chinese	  government.	  However,	  the	  political	   support	   enjoyed	  by	  Chinese	   construction	   firms	  does	  not	   exempt	   them	  from	  the	  challenges	  faced	  by	  other	  construction	  firms	  in	  terms	  of	  economic	  and	  political	  instability,	  poor	  quality	  of	  local	  inputs	  and	  weak	  infrastructure	  in	  Africa	  (C.	   Chen,	   Chiu,	   Orr,	   &	   Goldstein,	   2007).	   Kernen	   emphasises	   the	   importance	   of	  multiple	  private	  sector	  networks	  and	  the	  increasingly	  significant	  role	  of	  Chinese	  privatized	   companies	   (Berthelemy,	   2011,	   p.	   8).	   Gu	   looks	   at	   Chinese	   private	  companies	   in	   Africa	   through	   “evaluating	   characteristics	   and	   motivations	   of	  Chinese	   private	   firms	   in	   Africa	   and	   assesses	   their	   development	   impacts”	   and	  concludes,	   “China’s	   Africa	   Policy	   and	   its	   implementation	   in	   terms	   of	   private	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sector	  engagement	  is	  lacking”	  (Gu,	  2009).	  	  In	  summary,	  the	  assessment	  of	  China	  in	  Africa	  varies	  from	  case	  to	  case,	  country	  to	  country,	  and	  perspective	  to	  perspective.	  To	  be	  good,	  neutral	  or	  bad	  depends	  on	  various	  factors,	  notably,	  from	  what	  perspective	  (the	  traditional	  OECD	  donors;	  Chinese	  central	  government;	  Chinese	  enterprises;	  African	  government	  or	  African	  people)	  and	  what	   the	   criteria	  used	   to	  evaluate	  China’s	  presence	  and	  actions	   in	  Africa	   (comparing	   it	  with	   the	  West,	   China	   in	   the	   past,	   or	  with	   other	   emerging	  economies).	  The	  three	  strands	  of	  thought	  “Sino-­‐optimism,	  Sino-­‐pragmatism	  and	  Sino-­‐pessimism”	   provide	   a	   panorama	   through	   which	   to	   look	   at	   both	   China’s	  contributions	  to	  and	  negative	  impacts	  on	  Africa.	  However,	  no	  matter	  if	  the	  praise	  or	   criticism	   is	   drawn	   from	   the	   perspectives	   of	   either	   the	  West	   or	   Africa,	   little	  concern	  is	  given	  to	  China’s	  strengths	  and	  limitations	  within	  this	  continent.	  Since	  China’s	  policies	  in	  Africa	  are	  driven	  by	  multiple	  factors,	  one	  could	  hardly	  get	  the	  whole	  story	  and	  a	  relatively	  balanced	  judgment	  without	  broader	  considerations.	  Secondly,	  the	  research	  on	  Macro	  and	  Minor	  engagement	  are	  separated	  from	  one	  another,	   with	   either	   central	   policy	   or	   enterprise	   activities	   discussed.	   It	   lacks,	  therefore,	  a	  dynamic	  connection	  between	  the	  two	  layers.	  Many	  Chinese	  scholars	  have	  pointed	  out	  the	  fact	  that	  China	  is	  not	  as	  a	  monolithic	  entity	  as	  outsiders	  may	  expect	   (Taylor,	   2009).	   (See	   also	   Brown,	   2007;	   Zhang,	   2005;	   Breslin,	   2007:61)	  This	   argument	   fits	   into	   the	  China-­‐Africa	  discourse	  as	  well.	  A	   fragmented	  China	  has	   become	   involved	   in	   Africa,	   and	   vice	   versa:	   different	   layers	   (central	  government,	  enterprises	  and	  individuals)	  shape	  the	  image	  of	  “China”	  in	  Africa.	  In	  this	   case,	   it	   is	   worth	   discussing	   the	   dynamic	   interaction	   between	   different	  Chinese	   actors	   in	   Africa.	   Thirdly,	   Taylor	   emphasised,	   “When	   talking	   of	   ‘Africa’,	  we	  are	   required	   to	  generalise	  even	  as	  we	   recognise	   that	  each	   state	   in	  Africa	   is	  different	  and,	  as	  a	  consequence,	  that	  the	  way	  in	  which	  Chinese	  engagement	  with	  any	  particular	  African	  country	  will	  always	  be	  contingent	  on	  the	  latter’s	  political	  economy”	  (Taylor,	  2009,	  p.	  9),	  however,	  most	  of	  the	  research	  on	  China	  in	  Africa	  is	   either	   assessing	   ‘Africa’	   as	   a	  whole	   or	   discussing	   specific	   bilateral	   relations,	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such	  as	  China-­‐Angola,	  China-­‐Nigeria	  or	  China-­‐Zimbabwe,	  and	  so	  forth.	  Few	  have	  paid	  attention	  to	  comparisons	  between	  African	  countries.	   	  
1.2.2	  The	  Concept	  of	  International	  Responsibility	   	  As	  mentioned	  in	  the	  previous	  paragraph,	  the	  assessment	  of	  China’s	  engagement	  in	  Africa	  requires	  balanced	  criteria,	  the	  recognition	  of	  a	  fragmented	  “China”,	  and	  a	  diversified	  “Africa”.	  Locating	  China-­‐Africa	  into	  “international	  responsibility”,	  a	  new	   norm	   in	   international	   relations,	   could	   help	   to	   complement	   the	   existing	  research	  and	  provide	  a	  multi-­‐layer	  and	  multi-­‐perspective	  evaluation.	   	  	  “International	  responsibility”	  is	  a	  new	  concept	  in	  the	  international	  relations	  field.	  Most	  of	  the	  research,	  which	  uses	  the	  term,	  is	  from	  the	  field	  of	  international	  law.	  Obviously,	   China’s	   “international	   responsibility”	   in	   this	   thesis	  will	   not	   focus	  on	  the	  juridical	  aspect.	  Instead,	  it	  is	  more	  like	  “international	  ethics”,	  which	  concerns	  the	   obligations	   between	   states	   in	   an	   era	   of	   globalization.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   it	  acknowledges	  the	  national	  interests	  within	  the	  boundaries	  and	  avoids	  the	  empty	  rhetoric	  of	  morality	  among	  countries.	  Since	  there	  is	  no	  existing	  systematic	  theory	  on	  “international	  responsibility”,	  Chapter	  Three	  will	  explore	  the	  term.	  	  Based	  on	  the	  existing	   literature,	   this	  thesis	  aims	  to	  fill	   these	  gaps	  and	  to	  create	  relatively	   objective	   criteria	   that	   could	   better	   evaluate	   China’s	   involvement	   in	  Africa.	   Considering	   the	   limitation	   of	   the	   literature,	   the	   assessment	   of	   China’s	  impact	   on	  Africa	   in	   the	   context	   of	   “international	   responsibility”	   is	   divided	   into	  two	   parts:	   the	   first	   is	   “international	   responsibility”,	   and	   the	   second	   is	  “China-­‐Africa”	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  “international	  responsibility”.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  it	  attempts	   to	   understand	   China-­‐Africa	   relations	   in	   a	   more	   complex	   context,	  including	   both	   policy	   and	   economic	   activities,	   both	   a	   fragmental	   China	   and	   a	  diverse	  Africa.	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1.3	  Research	  Questions	  and	  Hypotheses	   	  This	   thesis	   considers	   China’s	   international	   responsibility	   in	   Africa.	   The	  assessment	   of	   China’s	   impact	   on	   Africa	   in	   the	   context	   of	   “international	  responsibility”	   should	  be	  divided	   into	   three	  parts:	  The	   first	   requires	   criteria	  of	  China’s	   “international	   responsibility”.	   The	   second	   is,	   “What	   are	   the	   influential	  factors	  in	  China-­‐Africa”	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  international	  responsibility?	  (Policy)	  The	  third	   is,	   “How	   does	   the	   context	   of	   China-­‐Africa	   relations	   shape	   the	   conduct	   of	  international	   responsibility?”	   (Implementation)	  This	   requires	   three	  hypotheses	  and	  their	  related	  research	  questions.	   	   	  
I.	  International	  Responsibility	  
Hypothesis	  I:	  The	  term	  ‘international	  responsibility’	  is	  flawed	  because	  it	  does	  not	  take	   into	   account	   the	   developing	   countries’	   perspectives,	   such	   as	   a	   state’s	  capability	   in	   shouldering	   responsibility	   and	   the	   varied	   character	   of	   states’	  interaction	   on	   economic	   development.	   (Chapter	   3	   will	   answer	   the	   research	  questions	  of	  hypothesis	  I)	  	  Question	  1.	  What	  is	  international	  responsibility?	  Question	  2.	  What	  are	  the	  criteria	  of	  international	  responsibility?	  
II.	  China-­‐Africa	  
Hypothesis	  II:	  According	  to	  some	  of	  the	  literature,	  China’s	  behaviour	  in	  Africa	  is	  not	  responsible	  since	  China	  places	  its	  own	  economic	  and	  political	  interests	  ahead	  of	   the	   African	   societies’	   interest	   in	   development.	   Based	   on	   the	   discussion	   of	  influential	   factors,	   China’s	   motivations	   and	   African	   requirements	   (and	  international	  expectation)	  are	  not	  always	  compatible.	  (Chapter	  4	  and	  the	  second	  part	  of	  each	  case	  chapter	  will	  answer	  the	  research	  questions	  of	  hypothesis	  II)	  	  Question	  1.	  What	  are	   the	   influential	   factors	   that	  shape	  China’s	  motivations	  and	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responsibilities	  in	  Africa?	  Question	  2.	  Are	  China’s	  motivations	  and	  African	  requirements	  (and	  international	  expectation)	  incompatible?	  
III	  The	  context	  of	  China-­‐Africa	  relations	  
Hypothesis	  III:	  Most	  ideas	  of	  international	  responsibility	  place	  emphasis	  on	  state	  agencies	  and	  major	   institutions.	  Part	  of	   the	  character	  of	  China’s	   involvement	   is	  the	  many	   kinds	   of	   actor	   in	   varied	   circumstances.	   China	   has	   a	   complex	   role	   in	  international	   responsibility	   because	   of	   these	   varied	   contexts.	   (Chapter	   5	   will	  answer	   the	   question	   1	   of	   hypothesis	   III	   and	   the	   case	   studies	   part	   	   -­‐	   chapters	  6,7,8,	  &	  9	  -­‐	  will	  answer	  the	  question	  2	  of	  hypothesis	  III)	  	  Question	  1.	  Which	  actors	  from	  China	  are	  involved	  in	  its	  responsibility	  in	  Africa?	  Question	   2:	   How	   does	   the	   situation	   of	   many	   actors	   in	   many	   different	  environments	   effect	   China’s	   ability	   to	   be	   a	   responsible	   actor	   in	   African	  development?	   	  	  THESIS	  CONCLUSION:	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  hypotheses	  and	  research	  questions,	  is	  China	   a	   responsible	   actor	   in	   Africa?	   (To	   what	   extent	   is	   China	   responsible	   in	  Africa?)	  (Chapter	  10	  will	  answer	  this	  final	  question.)	  
1.4	  Research	  Structure	  and	  Research	  Outline	  
1.4.1	  Research	  Structure	  In	  order	  to	  answer	  the	  research	  questions	  and	  test	  the	  hypotheses,	  the	  thesis	  will	  be	   divided	   into	   two	   parts:	   the	   first	   part	   is	   complementary	   to	   the	   literature	  review,	   while	   the	   second	   part	   is	   a	   case	   study	   analysis	   to	   test	   the	   above	  hypotheses.	  The	  first	  part	  will	  be	  used	  to	  construct	  a	  framework	  for	  analysis	  and	  to	  answer	  research	  questions	  of	  hypothesis	  I	  (“international	  responsibility”)	  and	  hypothesis	   II	   ("China-­‐Africa”),	   and	   then	   to	  confirm	   the	  hypotheses	   I	  and	   II;	   the	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case	  studies	  will	  be	  used	  to	  evaluate	  and	   further	   test	  hypothesis	   II	  and	  answer	  the	  research	  questions	  of	  hypothesis	  III	  (“the	  context	  of	  China-­‐Africa	  relations”).	   	  
I.	  Framework	  Part	   	  
The	   framework	   part	   will	   be	   divided	   into	   three	   chapters:	   international	  responsibility,	  China’s	  Africa	  policy,	  and	  a	  fragmental	  China.	  	  The	   international	   responsibility	   chapter	   will	   lay	   a	   foundation	   for	   the	   whole	  analysis.	   It	   will	   discuss	   hypothesis	   I	   of	   the	   flawed	   term	   “international	  responsibility”.	   This	   chapter	   will	   also	   attempt	   to	   complement	   the	   current	  research	  on	   this	  norm	  in	   international	  relations,	  and	   it	  will	   set	  original	  criteria	  for	   the	   assessment	   of	   China	   in	   Africa	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   three	   perspectives:	  international	  society	  (dominated	  by	  the	  OECD	  countries),	  China	  and	  Africa,	  with	  the	  consideration	  of	  both	  political	  strategy	  and	  economic	  interests.	  The	  analysis	  and	  evaluation	  of	  the	  whole	  thesis	  will	  be	  conducted	  according	  to	  the	  findings	  of	  this	  chapter.	   	  	  The	  chapter	  on	  China’s	  Africa	  policy	  is	  designed	  to	  make	  a	  comparison	  between	  Chinese	   political	   discourse	   and	   the	   current	   literature	   on	   China	   in	   Africa.	   The	  current	  literature	  on	  China-­‐Africa	  focuses	  on	  “What	  China	  did”	  rather	  than	  “What	  China	   said”.	   In	   order	   to	   test	   hypothesis	   II	   of	   whether	   China’s	   political	   and	  economic	  interests’	  could	  be	  compatible	  with	  African’s	  demands,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  first	  identify	  China’s	  Africa	  policy	  and	  the	  interests	  and	  strategy	  between	  the	  lines.	  Policy	  analysis	  will	  help	  to	  identify	  the	  Chinese	  government’s	  priorities	  and	  latest	  development	  trends,	  to	  further	  explore	  Hypothesis	  II,	  to	  what	  extent	  China	  could	  cooperate	  with	   the	   traditional	  OECD	  donors	   in	  Africa’s	  development	  at	  a	  policy	  level.	   	  	  The	  chapter	  addressing	  China’s	  domestic	  environment	  will	  present	  a	  fragmented	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China	  in	  Africa.	  It	  will	  combine	  with	  the	  China’s	  Africa	  policy	  chapter	  to	  explore	  which	  branches	   or	   institutions	  may	  be	   involved	   in	  China-­‐Africa	   interactions.	   It	  will	   argue	   not	   only	   is	   China	   fragmented,	   but	   also	   that	   it	   is	   a	   fragmented	  implementer	   with	   respect	   to	   its	   strategy	   in	   Africa.	   Instead	   of	   working	   as	   a	  national	   ‘team’,	  every	  Chinese	  actor	   involved	   in	  Africa	  has	   its	  own	  motivations,	  priorities,	   aims	   and	   agendas;	   they	   often	   operate	   in	   a	   compromised	   way	   that	  combines	   both	   central	   policy	   and	   their	   own	   interests.	   Sometimes,	   they	   may	  undermine	  each	  other	  in	  order	  to	  pursue	  their	  own	  agendas.	  After	  the	  analysis,	  this	   chapter	   will	   show	   how	   China’s	   responsible	   and	   irresponsible	   behaviour	  comes	  out	  and	  which	  actors	  encourage	  China	  to	  be	  fully	  responsible	  in	  Africa.	   	   	   	  
II.	  Case	  Studies	  Part	  
The	  case	  studies	  will	  analyse	  hypotheses	  II	  and	  III	  of	  this	  thesis,	  and	  answer	  their	  respective	  research	  questions.	  In	  response	  to	  the	  literature	  of	  a	  diversified	  Africa,	  the	   case	   studies	   address	   four	   specific	   African	   countries:	   Sudan	   (South	   Sudan),	  Nigeria,	  South	  Africa	  and	  Ethiopia.	  Sudan	  is	  considered	  to	  have	  a	  pariah	  regime	  with	   large	   oil	   reserves,	   the	   two	   features	   that	   China	   has	   long	   been	   accused	   of	  courting.	  Nigeria	  has	  a	  partly	  democratic	  government	  with	  large	  oil	  reserves,	  and	  is	  also	  the	  largest	  African	  country.	  South	  Africa	  is	  a	  democratic	  country	  without	  much	   in	   the	   way	   of	   oil	   reserves,	   but	   it	   has	   the	   largest	   and	   most	   developed	  economy	  on	  the	  continent.	  Ethiopia	  is	  a	  one-­‐party	  state	  with	  regular	  elections,	  it	  is	   one	   of	   the	   least	   developing	   countries	   in	   Africa,	   is	   landlocked	   and	   does	   not	  much	  in	  the	  way	  of	  natural	  resources.	  The	  four	  cases	  are	  representative,	  because	  they	   have	   different	   types	   of	   government,	   different	   levels	   of	   development,	  different	   attitudes	   towards	   Beijing,	   and	   different	   amounts	   of	   energy	   reserves.	  (See	  table	  1.1)	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Table	  1.1	  The	  Comparison	  of	  Four	  Cases	  	   Sudan	   Nigeria	   South	  Africa	   Ethiopia	  Government	  type	  (According	  to	   	  Freedom	  House)	  
Pariah	  regime	   Semi-­‐democratic	   Democratic	   One	  party	  rules	  
Economy	   	   Least	  developed	   Lower	  middle	  income	  country	   Largest	  and	  most	  developed	  in	  Africa	   	  
Least	  developed	  
Energy	  reserve	   Oil	   	   Oil	   	   Mining	   	   None	   	  Regional	  Strength	   	   Used	  to	  be	  largest,	  now	  third	  largest	  African	  country	   	  
Largest	  African	  country;	   	  Regional	  leader	  
Regional	  leader	   Landlocked	  
Security	   Conflicts	   Armed	  Groups	   Stability	  with	  violent	  protests	  
Stability	  with	  some	  anti-­‐government	  protest	  
Source:	  author	  	  The	   case	   studies	  will	   be	  divided	   into	   four	   chapters,	   the	   first	   four	   chapters	  will	  focus	  on	  each	  individual	  African	  country	  and	  to	  answer	  the	  following	  questions:	  (the	  questions	  of	  hypothesis	  II	  and	  III)	  	  1.	   What	   are	   the	   influential	   factors	   that	   shape	   China’s	   responsibility	   in	   Sudan,	  Nigeria,	   South	   Africa	   and	   Ethiopia,	   respectively?	   This	   question	   is	   designed	   to	  respond	   to	   the	   three	   influential	   factors	   of	   state	   responsibility,	   as	   discussed	   in	  chapter	  three	  -­‐	  that	   is,	  since	  each	  case	  has	  its	  own	  features,	  China	  has	  different	  motivations	   and	   pressures	   to	   shoulder	   the	   responsibility	   there;	   which	   factors	  play	   a	   bigger	   role	   against	   the	   background	   of	   the	   host	   country’s	   situation,	   and	  how	  can	  they	  be	  compatible	  with	  each	  other?	  	  2.	   Since	  China’s	  involvement	  in	  Africa	  involves	  multiple	  kinds	  of	  actor	  in	  varied	  circumstances,	   what	   elements	   have	   affected	   China	   to	   be	   fully	   responsible	   to	  African	  countries,	  based	  on	  different	  situations	   in	   the	   four	  host	  countries?	  And	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how	  do	  they	  affect	  the	  implementation	  of	  China’s	  Africa	  policy?	  	  3.	  Since	  the	  four	  case	  countries	  have	  represented	  different	  features	  as	  showed	  in	  Table	   1.1,	   the	   discussion	   section	   of	   case	   studies	   part	  will	   conduct	   a	   horizontal	  comparison	  among	  four	  states,	  to	  explore	  China’s	  attitude	  and	  approach	  towards	  the	   different	   kinds	   of	   African	   countries	   and	   further	   to	   respond	   to	   the	   final	  questions	  of	  “is	  China	  a	  responsible	  player	  in	  Africa?”	   	  	  4.	   The	   two	   hypotheses	   tested	   in	   the	   case	   studies	   complement	   the	   concept	   of	  “international	   responsibility”	   by	   adding	   developing	   countries’	   ideas	   -­‐	   that	   is,	  Chinese	   researcher’s	   arguments	   of	   considering	   capability	   into	   state’s	  responsibility	   and	   African	   countries	   and	   their	   real	   demands	   and	   environment.	  The	   conclusion	  will,	   therefore,	   employ	   the	   five	   standards	   to	   evaluate	  whether	  China	  is	  a	  responsible	  country	  (with	  its	  unique	  features)	  in	  Africa.	   	   	  
III.	  Conclusion	   	  
Using	  the	  findings	  in	  the	  framework	  and	  case	  studies	  sections,	  the	  final	  chapter	  will	   answer	   the	   question,	   “Is	   China	   a	   responsible	   player	   in	   Africa?	   (Or	   what	  extent	  is	  China	  responsible	  in	  Africa?)”	  	  Through	  the	  comparison	  of	  the	  four	  case	  countries,	  the	  conclusion	  will	  evaluate	  China’s	   responsibility	   according	   to	   the	   established	   criteria	   in	   chapter	   3.	   The	  evaluation	  will	  be	  arranged	  into	  five	  parts,	  each	  addressing	  one	  criterion.	  In	  the	  analysis	   the	   criterion,	   the	   conclusion	  will	   respond	   to	   the	   common	   criticism	   of	  China-­‐Africa	   engagement,	   “non-­‐intervention”	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Sudan;	   “oil	   for	  infrastructure”	   in	   the	  case	  of	  Nigeria;	   “influx	  Chinese	  manufacture	  products”	   in	  the	  case	  of	  South	  Africa;	  “China	  as	  a	  model”	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Ethiopia.	  In	  addition,	  it	  will	  address	  the	  gap	  between	  China’s	  African	  policy	  and	  its	  implementation	  as	  a	  general	  trend	  or	  a	  specific	  case	  in	  different	  types	  of	  African	  countries.	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1.4.2	  Research	  Outline	  The	  thesis	  will	  be	  presented	  in	  the	  following	  chapters:	  	  Chapter	   one	   is	   an	   introduction.	   This	   chapter	   introduces	   the	   topic	   of	   the	   thesis	  and	  the	  significance	  and	  relevance	  of	  the	  research.	  Then	  it	  describes	  the	  research	  questions	   and	   hypotheses.	   In	   order	   to	   answer	   the	   research	   questions	   and	   test	  the	  hypotheses,	   it	  also	   introduces	   the	  research	  design,	  which	  will	  be	  organized	  into	   two	  parts:	   the	   framework	  and	  the	  case	  studies.	  Meanwhile,	   it	  presents	   the	  whole	  structure	  of	  this	  thesis.	  	  Chapter	   two	   is	   a	  methodology	   chapter	   that	  will	   talk	   about	  how	   to	   conduct	   the	  research.	   Considering	   feasibility	   and	   accessibility,	   documentation,	   elite	  interviewing,	   focus	  group	  observation,	  and	  comparative	  qualitative	  approaches	  will	   be	  most	   appropriate	   to	   achieve	   the	   research	   goals.	   The	  main	   instruments	  adopted	  for	  the	  thesis	  framework	  will	  be	  documentation	  and	  discourse	  analysis,	  while	   the	   data	   collected	   from	   interviews	   and	   observations	  will	   be	   used	   in	   the	  case	   study	   chapters.	   Fieldwork	   will	   be	   conducted	   through	   elite	   interviews	   of	  officials	   from	   China’s	   Ministry	   of	   Foreign	   Affairs	   (MOFA),	   employees	   from	  Chinese	   State-­‐owned	   enterprises	   (SOEs)	   who	   have	   been	   assigned	   to	   Africa,	  Chinese	   self-­‐employers	   in	   Africa,	   and	   China’s	   African	   scholars.	   Additionally,	   in	  order	  to	  get	  first	  hand	  information	  for	  each	  case	  country,	  rather	  than	  Africa	  as	  a	  whole,	   data	   from	   observation	   of	   the	   chatting	   groups	   and	   BBS	   among	   Chinese	  people	  in	  the	  host	  country	  will	  be	  analysed.	   	  	  In	  Chapter	  three,	  by	  reviewing	  the	  definition	  of	  “international	  responsibility”,	  the	  thesis	  will	  establish	  criteria	  of	  the	  norm;	  that	  is,	  what	  is	  a	  responsible	  country?	  How	  does	  one	  make	  a	  judgment	  of	  whether	  a	  country	  is	  responsible	  or	  not?	  The	  chapter	   will	   then	   employ	   China’s	   current	   strengths,	   identity	   and	   capabilities	  together	  with	  external	  expectations	  into	  these	  criteria	  in	  order	  to	  analyse	  China’s	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international	   responsibility.	   That	   is,	   for	   a	   country	   like	   China,	   what	   are	   the	  requirements	  to	  become	  responsible?	   	  	  Chapter	   Four	   is	   the	   policy	   analysis	   chapter.	   This	   chapter	   is	   designed	   to	   assess	  China’s	  responsibility	  in	  Africa	  at	  the	  policy	  level,	  and	  to	  test	  hypothesis	  II	  of	  the	  relations	  between	  China’s	  national	  interests	  and	  its	  responsibilities	  in	  Africa.	  At	  the	  beginning,	   it	  will	   review	  China’s	  African	  Policy	  and	   its	   trends	  by	  explaining	  China’s	   understanding	   of	   and	   logic	   for	   engagement	   in	   the	   continent,	   notably	  Beijing’s	  increasingly	  flexible	  interpretation	  of	  its	  “non-­‐intervention”	  principle	  in	  dealing	  with	   the	   crisis	   in	   Africa.	   After	   that,	   it	   will	   analyse	   Beijing’s	   policy	   and	  approach	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  responsibility.	  Indeed,	  China	  has	  held	  different	  positions	   and	   conducted	   different	   approaches	   to	   Africa	   from	   the	   traditional	  OECD	   donors,	   but	   its	   “oil	   for	   infrastructure”	   measures	   and	   the	   controversial	  China	   Model	   share	   similar	   expectations	   for	   the	   continent’s	   stability	   and	  development	  with	  that	  of	  the	  Western	  countries.	  Hence,	  at	  the	  policy	  level,	  even	  if	   China’s	   interpretation	   of	   being	   responsible	   is	   different	   to	   that	   of	   traditional	  players,	   it	   does	   not	   necessary	   mean	   those	   differences	   are	   necessarily	  irresponsible.	   	   	  	  Chapter	   five	   will	   present	   a	   fragmental	   China,	   with	   diverse	   interests	   and	  considerations	   that	   might	   influence	   its	   African	   policy	   implementation.	   It	   will	  introduce	   the	   first	   layer	   that	   shows	   China’s	   Africa	   policy	   has	   deviated	   in	  implementation.	   Since	   China’s	   involvement	   in	   Africa	   is	   mainly	   conducted	   in	  terms	   of	   foreign	   assistance,	   trade	   and	   investment,	   this	   chapter	   will	   ascertain	  which	   Chinese	   governmental	   departments	   or	   branches	   have	   been	   involved	   in	  China-­‐Africa	   projects,	   what	   are	   their	   motivations	   and	   interests,	   and	   to	   what	  extent	   and	   how	   they	   can	   impact	   the	   achievement	   of	   the	   central	   government’s	  pledge.	   Generally,	   after	   the	   policy	   has	   been	   announced	   by	   the	   central	  government,	   the	   state	   council,	   and	   three	  major	   players	   -­‐	  MOFCOM,	  MOFA	   and	  Exim	   Bank,	   are	   responsible	   for	   the	   policy’s	   management,	   supervision	   and	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implementation.	   Chinese	   companies	   will	   undertake	   the	   projects	   in	   the	   host	  country.	  Not	  only	  the	  official	  branches	  may	  have	  different	  strategies	  for	  Africa’s	  development,	   but	  Chinese	   companies’	   in	   the	  host	   country	  may	  also	  undermine	  Beijing’s	  policy	  as	  a	  result	  of	  their	  profit-­‐driven	  agendas.	  	  After	  the	  discussion	  in	  the	  framework	  part,	  this	  thesis	  will	  use	  four	  case	  studies	  to	  answer	  and	  test	  the	  research	  questions	  of	  hypotheses	  II	  and	  III.	  Since	  Africa	  is	  heterogeneous,	  to	  evaluate	  the	  influence	  of	  China’s	  engagement	  in	  the	  respective	  host	  country	  should	  be	  tailored	  to	  the	  particular	  situation	  of	  each	  subject.	  Four	  featured	   African	   countries	   are	   selected,	   Sudan	   (South	   Sudan),	   Nigeria,	   South	  Africa	  and	  Ethiopia	  (a	  pariah	  regime	  friendly	  to	  the	  Chinese	  government	  with	  oil	  reserves,	  an	  oil-­‐rich	  country	  under	  partly	  democratic	  government,	  and	  a	  regional	  leader,	   and	   the	   least	   developed	   state	   with	   no	   resources)	   will	   be	   discussed	   in	  Chapter	  Six,	  Seven,	  Eight	  and	  Nine.	   	  	  China’s	  responsibilities	   in	  Sudan	  mainly	   focus	  on	   its	  effectiveness	   in	   facilitating	  the	  resolution	  to	  the	  humanitarian	  crisis	  there.	  Chapter	  six	  will	  start	  with	  a	  brief	  introduction	  to	  the	  conflicts	  in	  Sudan	  and	  China’s	  evolving	  policy	  towards	  Darfur	  and	  South	  Sudan	   in	   terms	  of	   its	   “non-­‐intervention”	  principle.	  This	   chapter	  will	  also	   highlight	   international	   criticism	   and	   the	   serious	   situation	   in	   Sudan,	  which	  put	   important	   pressure	   on	   China’s	   evolving	   policy	   towards	   more	   cooperative	  and	   international	   joint	   efforts.	   However,	   the	   international	   society	   and	   the	  opposing	   sides	   in	   Darfur	   and	   South	   Sudan	   failed	   or	   were	   slow	   to	   recognise	  China’s	   changing	   policy,	   and	   still	   consider	   Beijing	   a	   close	   ally	   of	   the	   Bashir	  regime.	   It	   faced	   China	   with	   a	   dilemma,	   and	   limited	   its	   capability	   to	   be	  responsible	  for	  solving	  the	  crisis.	   	  	  Chapter	   seven	   will	   mainly	   discuss	   the	   typical	   Chinese	   involvement	   in	  resource-­‐rich	  African	  countries;	   that	   is,	   the	   “oil	   for	   infrastructure”	  approach	  as	  evidenced	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Nigeria.	   It	   will	   firstly	   introduce	   the	   China-­‐Nigeria	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relationship	   against	   a	   background	   of	   Chinese	   companies’	   sharply	   increasing	  presence	   in	   Nigeria’s	   oil	   industry,	   along	   with	   the	   infrastructure	   projects	  supported	  by	  the	  central	  government.	  Then,	  the	  chapter	  argues	  that	  on	  a	  policy	  level,	   there	   is	  no	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  China	   is	   irresponsible	   in	  Nigeria,	  since	   its	  “oil	   for	   infrastructure”	   strategy	   was	   put	   forward	   to	   diversify	   China’s	   overseas	  energy	  supply	  on	  one	  hand,	  and	  to	  fuel	  Nigeria’s	  economic	  growth	  on	  the	  other.	  But,	  in	  reality,	  multiple	  factors	  affect	  China’s	  level	  of	  responsibility	  in	  the	  country.	  The	  electoral	  politics	  between	  north	  and	  south	  Nigeria,	  and	  mismanagement	  and	  corruption	   in	   local	   government	   has	  made	   the	   “oil	   for	   infrastructure”	   approach	  highly	  unstable.	  Oil-­‐related	  violence	  and	  incompetent	  governance	  has	  prevented	  the	  Nigerian	   people	   from	   enjoying	   the	   benefits	   of	   national	   oil	   income.	   Chinese	  companies	  also	  lose	  profits	  due	  to	  these	  same	  problems.	  In	  addition,	  the	  Nigerian	  government	   and	   its	   people	   have	   great	   ambitions	   for	   its	   national	   strength	   and	  economic	  performance,	  but	  because	  of	   the	   insufficient	   local	   infrastructure,	   it	   is	  difficult	  for	  local	  Nigerian	  businesses	  to	  compete	  with	  Chinese	  counterparts.	  The	  impact	   of	   Chinese	   products	   on	   local	   business	   has	   raised	   the	   satisfaction	   for	  Chinese	   involvement	   as	  well,	  which	   is	   a	   common	  phenomenon	   in	   China-­‐Africa	  relations.	  	  Chapter	   eight	   will	   talk	   about	   South	   Africa.	   Currently,	   China	   has	   a	   close	  relationship	   with	   South	   Africa	   and	   a	   similar	   stance	   on	   international	   affairs.	  Economically,	  China’s	  involvement	  in	  this	  country	  is	  different	  from	  other	  African	  countries	  due	  to	  South	  Africa’s	  national	  strength	  and	  leading	  role	  in	  the	  region.	  The	   bilateral	   relationship	   between	   these	   two	   countries	   is	  more	   akin	   to	   that	   of	  competitors,	  rather	  than	  donor	  and	  recipient.	  As	  the	  most	  developed	  country	  on	  the	   continent,	   South	   Africa	   is	   expected	   to	   become	   a	   political	   and	   economic	  gateway	   between	   international	   society	   and	   the	   region.	   Beijing	   considers	   its	  responsibility	   clear	   in	   this	   aspect.	   However,	   in	   reality,	   its	   representation	   and	  influence	   on	   other	   African	   countries	   is	   limited,	   hence	   China’s	   engagement	   in	  South	  Africa	  is	  much	  more	  out	  of	  bilateral	  consideration.	  The	  domestic	  situation	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in	  South	  Africa	   shows	   two	   features	   to	  Chinese	   investors.	  On	  one	  hand,	   it	  has	  a	  democratic	   government	  with	  a	   sound	   legal	   system	  and	  advanced	  awareness	  of	  international	  standards.	  However,	  on	   the	  other	  hand,	   it	  has	  serious	  corruption,	  instability	   and	   a	   huge	   wealth	   gap	   between	   white	   and	   black	   South	   Africans.	  Chinese	   businesses	   that	   lack	   experience	   in	   overseas	   operations	   have	  met	  with	  difficulties	  and	  negative	  feedback	  in	  the	  South	  African	  market.	  	  Chapter	   nine	   looks	   at	   Ethiopia,	   a	   landlocked	   country	   with	   neither	   valuable	  reserves	   of	   natural	   resources,	   nor	   sufficient,	   quality	   infrastructure.	   China’s	  responsibility	   in	   this	   country	   is	   mainly	   economic	   development	   and	   finance	  assistance,	   because	   the	   China-­‐Ethiopia	   relationship	   is	   asymmetric.	   Beijing’s	  active	  involvement	  in	  the	  least-­‐developed	  country	  is	  much	  more	  out	  of	  political	  and	   diplomatic	   consideration	   than	   economic	   profits.	   Generally,	   the	   Ethiopian	  government	  and	  its	  people	  hold	  a	  positive	  attitude	  towards	  Beijing	  and	  Chinese	  enterprises.	  The	  only	  problem	  arises	  at	  the	  implementation	  level,	  because	  some	  Chinese	   companies	   lack	   the	   awareness	   of	   international	   standards	   on	  environmental,	  labour	  force	  and	  community	  protections.	  	  Chapter	  ten	  is	  the	  conclusion.	  This	  chapter	  will	  review	  China’s	  engagement	  in	  the	  four	  case	  studies	  and	  apply	  the	  five	  criteria	  established	  in	  Chapter	  3.	  It	  will	  give	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  China	  is	  responsible	  in	  Africa.	  And,	  finally,	  it	  will	  answer	  the	  research	  question	  of	  whether	  China	  is	  responsible	  or	  irresponsible	  in	  Africa.	  It	  will	  make	  a	  comparison	  between	  each	  type	  of	  African	  country	  in	  order	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  common	  criticism	  of	  China’s	  involvement	  in	  Africa,	  and	  further	  answer	  the	  question	  of	  “Whether	  China	  is	  responsible	  in	  Africa.”	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Chapter	  2	  Methodology	  	   	  Having	   formulated	   the	   research	   questions	   and	   hypotheses,	   and	   specified	   the	  research	  scope,	  this	  chapter	  on	  methodology	  is	  designed	  to	  explore	  how	  best	  to	  conduct	   the	   research	   and	   to	   obtain	   the	   required	   information	   and	   data.	   The	  chapter	  begins	  with	   a	  discussion	  of	   research	  methods	   and	  a	  practical	   research	  design.	   It	   will	   then	   specify	   the	   main	   methods	   of	   interviewing;	   observation,	  documentation	   and	   discourse	   analysis,	   while	   also	   detailing	   the	   research	  procedures	  and	  explain	  any	  issues	  arising	  from	  the	  data	  collection	  and	  analysis.	   	  
2.1	  Research	  Methods	  In	  order	  to	  evaluate	  the	  facets	  of	  China’s	  presence	  in	  Africa,	  the	  thesis	  begins	  by	  setting	  up	   a	   standard	   for	   the	   term	   “international	   responsibility”.	  Although	   it	   is	  unlikely	   to	   provide	   access	   to	   pure	   facts	   that	   might	   enable	   us	   to	   declare	   that	  particular	   interpretations	   and	   narratives	   are	   either	   true	   or	   false,	   it	   still	   could	  maintain	   an	   element	   of	   objectivity	   through	   criteria	   of	   comparison	   (Bevir	   &	  Rhodes,	   2010).	   In	   this	   case,	   chapter	   three	  will	   attempt	   to	   establish	   reasonable	  criteria	  for	  “international	  responsibility”	  for	  China	  that	  will	  not	  be	  considered	  as	  a	   given	   truth,	   but	   rather	   a	  pragmatic	  demand.	  This	  will	   be	   achieved	   through	   a	  process	  of	  gradual	  comparison	  of	  internal	  capabilities	  and	  external	  expectations.	  Then	   it	   will	   go	   further	   through	   the	   ideas,	   doctrines	   and	   Chinese	   policy	   and	  explore	  the	  real	  interests	  and	  impacts	  between	  them,	  in	  order	  to	  reveal	  whether	  there	  is	  the	  potential	  for	  cooperation	  between	  China	  and	  the	  West	  in	  Africa.	  The	  fourth	   chapter’s	   policy	   analysis	   will	   favour	   a	   form	   of	   interpretation	   that	   lies	  between	  hermeneutics	  and	  post-­‐structuralism,	  and	  will	  attempt	  to	  interpret	  the	  reality	  of	  China’s	  African	  policy	  as	  neither	  nihilistic	  nor	   irrational.	   It	  will	   try	   to	  investigate	   from	  neither	   the	  pure	   interpretation	  of	  Chinese	  documents,	  nor	   the	  pure	   characteristics	   of	   CPC’s	   subjective	   interests,	   but	   rather	   to	   offer	   a	  combination	   of	   China’s	   national	   interest	   with	   the	   policies	   and	   measures	   to	  Africa’s	   development	   announced	   by	   the	   central	   government.	   The	   following	  chapter	  will	  focus	  on	  China-­‐Africa	  connections	  in	  practice,	  and	  attempt	  to	  explain	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the	   relationship	   between	   the	   central	   government	   and	   the	   key	   actors	   in	   Africa,	  such	   as	   Chinese	   enterprises,	   African’s	   regulations	   and	   environments,	   through	  interpretation	   of	   evidence	   acquired	   during	   interviews	   and	   the	   materials	  available	   on	   discourse,	   from	   news	   media	   and	   various	   other	   documents.	   In	  comparison	  to	  Chapter	  4,	  Chapter	  5	  will	  discuss	  Chinese	  governmental	  branches	  and	   enterprises	   in	   Africa,	   and	   analyse	   the	   gap	   between	   policy	   and	  implementation	   based	   on	   the	   data	   from	   interviews	   with	   Chinese	   officials	   and	  also	  documentary	  evidence.	   	   	  	  After	   that,	   in	   order	   to	   further	   explore	   China’s	   activities	   in	   different	   kinds	   of	  African	  countries,	  it	  will	  use	  four	  national	  cases	  of	  China’s	  involvement	  in	  Africa	  –	   Sudan	   (South	   Sudan),	   Nigeria,	   South	   Africa	   and	   Ethiopia	   –	   to	   confirm	  hypothesis	   II	   and	   test	   hypothesis	   III.	   Chapter	   6-­‐9	   will	   discuss	   the	   influential	  factors	   that	   shape	   China’s	   Africa	   policy	   and	   the	   reason	   for	   China	   being	   or	   not	  being	   responsible	   to	   the	   respective	   host	   country	   in	   its	   policy	   implementation,	  according	  to	  the	  findings	  from	  interview	  materials	  and	  documentary	  analysis.	  It	  will	  point	  out	  the	  gap	  between	  Beijing’s	  African	  policy	  and	  its	  implementation	  in	  different	  countries	  and	  how	  it	  comes	  about.	  In	  discussing	  the	  gap,	  tone	  must	  also	  discuss	  the	  fragmented	  nature	  of	  China	  and	  a	  diversified	  Africa.	  One	  emphasises	  the	  Chinese	  situation	  -­‐	  that	  is,	  Chinese	  enterprises’	  activities	  -­‐	  due	  to	  the	  contrast	  and	   contradiction	   between	   their	   patriarchal	   relationship	   with	   the	   Chinese	  government	   and	  also	   their	   self-­‐interested	  nature.	  The	  other	   focuses	  on	  China’s	  limitations	  and	  capabilities	  in	  the	  host	  country.	   	  	  The	   conclusion	   to	   the	   case	   studies	   part	   will	   adopt	   a	   comparative	   method	  between	  each	  country	  that	  refers	  to	  the	  need	  to	  employ	  an	  analysis	  from	  a	  sense	  of	  perspective	  to	  a	  familiar	  environment	  and	  discourages	  parochial	  responses	  to	  political	   issues	   (Hopkin,	   2002).	   The	   case	   studies	   will	   enable	   the	   research	   to	  explore	  China’s	  motivations	   for	   shouldering	   responsibility	   in	  different	   kinds	  of	  African	   countries.	   Furthermore,	   it	   can	   reveal	   China’s	   featured	   approaches	   to	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different	  types	  of	  African	  countries,	  as	  different	  countries	  have	  different	  strategic	  meanings	   to	   China,	   politically,	   economically	   or	   diplomatically.	   Each	   case	  represents	  a	  unique	  Chinese	  feature	  in	  Africa.	  (“Non-­‐intervention”	  in	  Sudan;	  “Oil	  for	   infrastructure”	   in	   Nigeria;	   overwhelming	   Chinese	   products	   in	   South	   Africa	  and	  China	  as	  a	  model	  in	  Ethiopia.)	  In	  part	  2	  conclusion,	  it	  will	  use	  a	  comparative	  approach	   to	   explore	   since	   the	   four	   case	   countries	   are	  different,	  whether	  China	  has	   particular	   favoured	   some	   countries,	   such	   as	   oil-­‐rich	   countries	   or	   pariah	  regimes,	  as	  the	  common	  criticism	  said.	   	  	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  it	  is	  unrealistic	  to	  create	  an	  ideal	  model	  that	  excludes	  the	  variance	   for	   comparison	   in	   political	   science.	   Peters	   described	   the	   problem	   as	  “extraneous	   variance”,	   caused	   by	   factors	   outside	   the	   theoretical	   proposition	  being	   examined,	   which	   is	   a	   serious	   obstacle	   to	   comparative	   research	   (Peters,	  1998,	  pp.	  30-­‐36).	  In	  order	  to	  narrow	  the	  scope	  and	  find	  the	  most	  similar	  system	  research	   design,	   as	   suggested	   by	   Przeworski	   and	   Tenure,	   it	   should	   aim	   to	  minimise	   the	  variance	  problems	  (Burnham,	  Lutz,	  Grant,	  &	  Layton-­‐Henry,	  2004,	  pp.	   63-­‐68;	   Hopkin,	   2002,	   pp.	   255-­‐256).	   For	   this	   reason,	   the	   case	   studies	   will	  horizontally	   make	   a	   comparison	   across	   different	   types	   of	   African	   regime	   and	  vertically	  focus	  on	  China’s	  different	  levels	  of	  engagement.	   	  	  Having	   decided	   on	   the	   interpretative	   research	   approach	   and	   comparative	  method,	  the	  next	  step	  is	  to	  define	  the	  appropriate	  way	  to	  collect	  original	  data	  for	  the	  case	  studies.	  Burnham	  has	  pointed	  out	  the	  “purpose	  of	  the	  research	  design	  is	  to	  propose	  an	  operational	  plan,	  and	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  strategies	  and	  procedures	  adopted	  within	  the	  plan	  are	  adequate	  to	  provide	  valid	  and	  accurate	  solutions	  to	  the	   research	   questions”	   (Burnham	   et	   al.,	   2004,	   pp.	   29-­‐33).	   It	   is	   necessary	   to	  clarify	  the	  general	  aims	  for	  carrying	  out	  the	  research,	  which	  are	  stated	  as	  follows:	  first,	  to	  analyse	  the	  proper	  scope	  of	  China’s	  African	  responsibility.	  Second,	  using	  the	   “international	   responsibility”	   criteria	   discussed	   in	   the	   framing	   part	   to	  evaluate	   China’s	   African	   engagement	   during	   the	   last	   decade.	   Third,	   to	   find	   out	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the	   factors	   obstructing	   China	   from	   fulfilling	   its	   responsibility.	   Generally,	   there	  are	   three	   perspectives	   that	   count	   in	   the	   debate	   about	   China-­‐African	  responsibility:	   the	   Chinese	   central	   government,	   Western	   governments	   and	  international	  agencies;	  and	  the	  perspectives	  of	  different	  African	  states.	  However,	  in	   practice,	   the	   key	   actors	   on	   the	   front	   lines	   are	   the	   assistance	   groups,	   the	  Chinese	   enterprises	   (including	   managerial	   personnel,	   Chinese	   workers,	   and	  self-­‐employed),	  Chinese	  migrants,	  Western	  companies,	  and	  local	  African	  people.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  data	  collection	  process	  will	  be	  divided	  into	  two	  groups:	  official	  documents,	  discourse,	  news	  and	  opinions	  from	  the	  enterprise	  and	  people	  levels.	  	  The	  key	  issue	  is	  which	  research	  method	  (or	  methods)	  will	  be	  most	  appropriate	  to	  achieve	  these	  stated	  research	  goals?	  Considering	  the	  capability	  and	  energy	  of	  a	  PhD	  student,	  I	  decided	  to	  collect	  the	  first-­‐hand	  information	  through	  Small	  Ns	  (a	  small	   number	   of	   cases),	   as	   suggested	   by	   qualitative	   comparative	   methods.	  Qualitative	  comparative	  research	  tends	  to	  explain	  political	  phenomena	  in	  terms	  of	   the	   combined	   effect	   of	   several	   factors	   (Hopkin,	   2002).	   Comparing	   to	   the	  greater	   reliability	  of	   findings	   from	   large	  Ns	   (a	   large	  number	  of	   cases),	   in	  other	  words,	  quantitative	  comparative	  methods,	  Ragin	  argued	  that	  there	  is	  no	  a	  priori	  reason	   to	   regard	   case-­‐oriented,	   qualitative	   comparative	   research	   as	  methodologically	   “soft”	   and	   indeed	   this	   approach	   can	   provide	   a	   far	   more	  rigorous	  and	  sophisticated	  response	  to	  some	  types	  of	  research	  questions	  (Ragin,	  1987).	   Considering	   the	   China-­‐Africa	   connections,	   sophisticated	   response	  qualitative	   studies	   enable	   the	   researcher	   to	   look	   at	   the	   enterprise-­‐level	  within	  Chinese	   political	   contexts,	   at	   the	   cases	   individually	   and	   as	   a	   whole,	   while	  revealing	  the	  influence	  of	  domestic	  interests	  on	  outside	  behaviours.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	   it	  would	   “explore	   people’s	   subjective	   experiences	   and	   the	  meanings	   they	  attach	   to	   those	  experiences	  which	  are	  good	  at	   capturing	  meaning,	  process	   and	  context”	   (Bryman,	   1988,	   p.	   62).	   As	   a	   result,	   the	  main	   instruments	   adopted	   for	  data	   collection	   are	   interviews,	   observations,	   documentation	   and	   discourse	  analysis,	   which	  will	   be	   detailed	   respectively	   in	   the	   sections	   below.	   The	   use	   of	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such	   a	   combination	   of	   methods	   will	   check	   the	   accuracy	   of	   data	   and	   provide	  complementary	  information	  to	  strengthen	  the	  findings.	  
2.2	  Research	  Design	  
2.2.1	  In-­‐depth	  Interview	  A	  qualitative	  method	  is	  intended	  to	  “explore	  people’s	  subjective	  experiences	  and	  the	  meanings	  they	  attach	  to	  those	  experiences”	  (Cassidy,	  Reynolds,	  Naylor,	  &	  De	  Souza,	  2011).	  Intensive	  interviewing	  allows	  people	  to	  talk	  freely	  and	  offer	  their	  interpretation	   of	   events.	   Qualitative	   methods	   are	   good	   at	   capturing	   meaning,	  process,	   and	   context	   and	   eliciting	   people’s	   subjective	   experiences,	   opinions,	  beliefs,	  values,	  and	  so	  forth	  (Bryman,	  1988).	  The	  intensive	  interview	  is	  a	  popular	  approach	  used	  by	  political	  science	  to	  collect	  first-­‐hand	  information	  and	  increase	  the	   interaction	   between	   the	   interviewer	   and	   the	   respondent.	   The	   research	  design	   of	   the	   in-­‐depth	   interview	   is	   flexible	   and	   open	   to	   new	   ideas	   and	  interpretations	   (Burnham	   et	   al.,	   2004,	   p.	   219).	   Open-­‐ended	   questions	   are	   also	  valuable	   for	   discovering	   what	   the	   respondent	   really	   feels.	   Moreover,	   the	  perspectives	  provided	  by	  experienced	  people	  will	  be	  useful	  for	  further	  discourse	  analysis.	  At	  the	  start	  of	   interview	  design,	   it	   is	   important	  to	  identify	  who	  will	  be	  interviewed,	   since	  what	  questions	  will	  be	  asked	   is	   inevitably	  shaped	  by	  who	   is	  going	   to	   answer	   them.	   The	   size	   and	   categories	   of	   interviewees	   –	   from	  International	  Relations	  scholars,	  officials,	  SOEs	  employees	  and	  self-­‐employers	  –	  are	  deliberately	  defined,	  and	  interview	  questions	  are	  accordingly	  designed.	  Then	  one	  should	  draw	  up	  an	  interviewing	  schedule.	  This	  section	  will	   involve	  the	  real	  procedures	   and	   problems	   encountered	   during	   the	   interviews,	   followed	   by	   the	  process	  of	  transcription	  and	  analysis.	  	  By	  categorising	  the	  key	  actors	  involved	  in	  China’s	  operations	  in	  Africa,	  research	  was	   conducted	   on	   the	   following	   four	   sample	   groups:	   1)	   officials	   from	   central	  government	   (former	   Chinese	   ambassadors	   to	   African	   countries,	   staff	   from	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Chinese	  embassies	   in	  Africa);	  2)	  Chinese	  African	  scholars	  from	  universities	  and	  research	  institutions	  affiliated	  to	  ministries;	  3)	  employees	  assigned	  to	  Africa	  by	  central	   state-­‐owned	   enterprises;	   and	   4)	   staff	   from	   private	   firms	   and	  self-­‐employers.	  With	  the	   limitations	  of	   time	  and	  funding,	   fieldwork	  was	  carried	  out	  in	  Beijing,	  China,	  which	  is	  not	  only	  the	  political,	  economic	  and	  cultural	  centre	  of	  China	  with	  global	  significance,	  but	  also	  the	   location	  of	  all	  Chinese	  ministries,	  top	  universities	  and	  leading	  institutions.	  For	  those	  subjects	  currently	  working	  in	  Africa,	  I	  used	  emails,	  telephones	  or	  voice-­‐over-­‐internet	  software	  applications	  to	  gain	  the	  information	  and	  conduct	  interviews.	  	  The	   sample	   size	  was	   about	   20	   people	   in	   total,	   depending	   on	   their	   availability.	  Though	  the	  number	  is	  small,	   it	   is	  enough	  for	  intensive	  and	  in-­‐depth	  interviews.	  In	   addition,	   according	   to	   the	   casual	   conversations	   with	   relevant	   respondents,	  people	  from	  similar	  backgrounds	  seemed	  to	  provide	  similar	  perspectives.	  More	  information	   could	   be	   supplemented	   from	   other	   sources,	   such	   as	   observation,	  discourse,	  documents,	  news,	  and	  so	  forth,	  but	  not	  from	  more	  interviewing.	  Since	  the	  research	  not	  only	  seeks	  to	  evaluate	  China’s	  activities	  in	  Africa,	  but	  also	  to	  see	  which	  level	  (central-­‐enterprises’	  or	  African	  countries’	  capability)	  impact	  China’s	  African	   policy,	   what	   the	   people	   who	   have	   experience	   in	   Africa	   have	   to	   say	   is	  more	   important	   than	   simply	   discussing	   theory.	   Because	   of	   the	   number	   and	  specified	   groups	   of	   samples,	   I	   employed	   snowball	   sampling,	   by	   which	   I	   mean	  asking	  them	  to	  nominate	  potential	  informants	  during	  the	  interview.	  The	  request	  is	   usually	   made	   at	   each	   subsequent	   interview	   until	   the	   required	   number	   is	  reached.	  This	  is	  a	  valuable	  strategy	  to	  generate	  a	  sample	  of	  people	  or	  groups,	  and	  it	  is	  more	  suited	  to	  in-­‐depth	  interview	  research	  (Burnham	  et	  al.,	  2004,	  pp.	  92-­‐93).	  In	   each	   of	   the	   four	   groups	   of	   people,	   according	   to	   the	   availability	   and	  accessibility	  of	   a	   certain	   level	  or	   category,	   the	   interview	  survey	  may	   choose	   to	  interview	   some	   people	   from	   the	   entry	   and	   medium	   levels,	   instead	   of	   high	  position.	   This	   is	   because	   middle-­‐level	   staffers	   are	   more	   likely	   to	   provide	   true	  stories	  rather	  than	  stalling	  with	  official	  jargon.	   	  
	   31	  
	  Since	  all	   the	   interviewees,	   regardless	  of	   the	   level	  or	  groups	   they	  belong	   to,	  are	  experienced	   in	   China-­‐Africa	   issues,	   the	   intensive	   interviews	   would	   be	   more	  appropriate	   for	   this	   research.	   In	  contrast	   to	   the	  structured	   interview,	   intensive	  interviews	  are	  open	  and	   flexible,	   allowing	   the	   informants	   to	  elaborate	  on	   their	  values	   and	   attitudes	   and	   account	   for	   their	   actions	   (Brenner,	   1985).	   When	   it	  comes	  to	  the	  perspective	  of	  China,	  all	  the	  stories	  from	  Chinese	  officials,	  scholars,	  employees,	   and	   private	   owners	   in	   Africa	   are	   paramount	   for	   this	   research.	   The	  intensive	  interviews	  are	  conducted	  in	  Chinese,	  which	  allows	  the	  key	  informants	  to	   tell	   their	   stories	   in	   the	   language	   they	   are	   familiar	   with,	   and	   helps	   them	   to	  better	   express	   their	   logic	   and	  positions.	   The	   intensive	   interviewing	   techniques	  are	  based	  on	  a	  general	  interview	  guide.	  Therefore,	  questions	  in	  the	  case	  studies	  are	  prepared	  as	  topic	  headings	  and	  general	  questions	  targeted	  at	  each	  group	  to	  facilitate	   a	   discussion	   of	   issues	   in	   a	   semi-­‐structured	   or	   unstructured	   manner	  (Devine,	   2002).	   It	   is	   worth	   noting	   that,	   although	   the	   interview	   guide	   is	   just	  served	   as	   a	   checklist	   of	   topics	   to	   be	   covered,	   the	   order	   in	   which	   they	   are	  discussed	  is	  not	  preordained	  (Bryman,	  1988,	  p.	  66).	  The	  design	  of	  the	  interview	  questions	  of	  each	  group	   is	  detailed	  below	  for	  each	  targeted	  group	  –	   its	  general	  aims,	  specific	  research	  areas,	  and	  interview	  topics.	   	  
I.	  Interview	  Questions	  
According	  to	  the	  general	  aims	  of	  the	  research,	  the	  data	  collection	  process	  focused	  on	   a	   comparison	   between	   different	   groups,	   officials	   and	   civil	   citizens.	  Furthermore,	   in	   order	   to	   ascertain	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   Chinese	  government	  and	  state	  or	  province-­‐owned	  enterprises,	  the	  information	  should	  be	  collected	   from	   both	   sides.	   For	   the	   civil	   citizens	   group	   itself,	   opinions	   included	  both	   SOEs	   and	   private	   companies.	   Opinions	  were	   collected	   from	   the	   following	  angles:	   1)	   the	   awareness	   of	   China’s	   international	   responsibility;	   2)	   the	  impression	   of	   Chinese	   ways	   in	   Africa;	   3)	   their	   own	   experiences	   of	   what	   has	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happened	   as	   part	   of	   China-­‐Africa	   links.	   To	   be	   more	   specific,	   the	   respondents	  were	   divided	   into	   four	   groups	   based	   on	   their	   occupations,	   and	   interviewing	  questions	  were	  prepared	  to	  meet	  the	  requirements	  of	  each	  of	  the	  four	  groups.	  	  Question	  schedule	  1	  was	  designed	  for	  officials	  from	  the	  central	  government,	  such	  as	   former	  Chinese	   ambassadors	   to	   certain	  African	   countries,	   and	  officials	   from	  China’s	  African	  embassies.	  The	  people	  confirmed	   for	   interviews	  are	   the	   former	  ambassador	  to	  Morocco,	   the	   former	  second	  secretary	  to	  Ghana,	  and	  the	   former	  Chinese	   Ambassador	   to	   Nigeria	   and	   Namibia.	   Because	   of	   the	   accessibility	   of	  diplomats,	  “snowball”	  or	  referral	  sampling	  were	  used	  during	  the	  interview.	  This	  meant	  I	  started	  with	  a	  few	  key	  informants	  who	  were	  identified	  as	  relevant,	  and	  then	  asked	  them	  in	  turn	  to	  name	  other	  key	  individuals	  who	  would	  be	  relevant	  to	  this	   research.	   In	   this	   way,	   more	   accurate	   and	   specific	   first-­‐hand	   information	  could	   be	   acquired.	   For	   those	   officials	   who	   held	   a	   higher	   position	   and	   better	  understanding	  of	  China’s	  African	  policy,	  elite	  interviewing	  was	  most	  appropriate,	  as	   this	   treated	  each	  respondent	  as	  an	  expert	   in	  the	  topic	  (Leech,	  2002,	  p.	  663).	  During	   the	   interviews	   with	   these	   diplomats,	   the	   balance	   was	   usually	   in	   the	  favour	  of	   the	   respondents’	   high	   level	   of	   position,	   and	  bureaucratic	   tones	   could	  hinder	   the	   successful	   completion	   of	   the	   research.	   Therefore,	   I	   chose	   the	  respondents	   who	   were	   not	   currently	   holding	   office,	   in	   the	   hope	   of	   fewer	  constraints	  and	  apprehensions	  of	  what	  they	  say.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  I	  sent	  a	  topic	  guideline	   in	   advance	   and	   choose	   to	   interview	   those	   who	   showed	   the	   most	  interest	  in	  the	  topic.	  	  The	  aims	  of	  interviewing	  this	  group	  were:	  1)	  to	  compare	  their	  understanding	  of	  international	   responsibilities	   with	   the	   Western	   expectations	   and	   Africa’s	  demands,	  and	  to	  test	  hypothesis	  II	  to	  see	  the	  possibility	  of	  cooperation	  between	  China	   and	  Western	   countries	   on	  African	   issues;	   2)	   to	   become	   acquainted	  with	  the	  central	  government’s	  motivations	  towards	  and	  strategies	  for	  Africa;	  3)	  to	  get	  first	  hand	  information	  on	  China’s	  governmental	  assistant	  projects	  in	  Africa;	  4)	  to	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assess	   the	   connections	   between	   Chinese	   enterprises	   in	   Africa	   and	   central	  government.	  Based	  on	  these	  goals,	  the	  following	  eight	  questions	  were	  discussed	  during	  the	  interviews:	  	  1)	  What’s	  your	  opinion	  towards	  the	  idea	  of	  China’s	  international	  responsibility,	  for	   example,	   as	   proposed	   by	   the	   then-­‐U.S.	   Deputy	   Secretary	   of	   State	   Robert	  Zoellick?	  2)	  What	  kinds	  of	  responsibilities	  should	  China	  take	  in	  Africa’s	  development?	  3)	  Do	  you	  think	  China	  is	  a	  responsible	  stakeholder	  in	  Africa?	  Why?	  4)	   What	   do	   you	   think	   are	   the	   biggest	   problems	   that	   blocked	   African	  development?	  Please	  take	  the	  country	  you	  worked	  in	  as	  an	  example.	  5)	   To	   what	   extent	   and	   in	   what	   ways	   do	   the	   Chinese	   enterprises	   operating	   in	  Africa	   liaise	   with,	   and	   get	   help	   from	   the	   local	   embassy?	   What	   are	   the	   issues	  between	   the	   Chinese	   diplomats	   and	   the	   representatives	   of	   the	   Chinese	  enterprises?	  6)	  How	  do	  China	  and	  African	   states	   achieve	  a	  win-­‐win	   situation	  when	   the	   two	  countries	  have	  an	  unbalanced	  development	  status?	   	  7)	  Please	  name	  the	  most	  successful	  assistance	  project	  conducted	  by	  China,	  and	  why	  it	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  successful.	  8)	   What	   do	   you	   think	   are	   the	   biggest	   problems	   that	   affect	   China’s	   image	   in	  Africa?	  	  Questions	  Schedule	  2	  was	  targeted	  at	  the	  employees	  of	  SOEs.	  People	  from	  these	  groups	   have	   worked	   or	   are	   currently	   working	   in	   Africa	   for	   certain	   Chinese	  projects.	   This	   enabled	   them	   to	   have	   a	   greater	   chance	   of	   communicating	   with	  local	   communities,	   and	   is	   more	   prone	   to	   discover	   the	   problems	   that	   exist	  between	   central	   policies	   and	   practical	   feasibility.	   Two	   sectors,	   the	   energy	   and	  construction	   industries,	   have	   the	   most	   Chinese	   SOEs	   operating	   in	   Africa.	   The	  respondents	   who	   confirmed	   were	   all	   from	   these	   two	   industries:	   an	   African	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projects	  manger	  from	  China	  Gezhouba	  Group	  Company	  Ltd.,	  a	  project	  manager	  in	  Ghana	   from	   Sino	  Hydro	   Corporation	   Limited,	   and	   an	   engineer	   in	   Nigeria	   from	  CNPC.	  Meanwhile,	   employee	   from	  provincial	  or	  municipal	   level	   companies	  was	  included	   as	   well:	   a	   project	   manager	   of	   Guinea-­‐Mali,	   China	   Geo	   Engineering	  Corporate.	   This	   research	   focuses	   on	   the	   people	   who	   have	   work	   experience	   in	  Africa,	  even	   if	   they	  are	   from	   lower	  positions,	  because	   they	  were	  more	   likely	   to	  provide	  the	  truth	  about	  the	  front	  line.	  In	  order	  to	  unearth	  true	  stories,	  I	  avoided	  interviewing	  employees	  from	  public	  or	  communication	  departments,	  who	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  regurgitate	  their	  press	  releases.	  However,	  people	  from	  this	  group	  are	   often	   not	   familiar	   with	   research	   interviews,	   sometimes	   they	   may	   ask	   the	  interviewer	   to	   offer	   their	   own	   opinions	   on	   the	   topics	   under	   discussion	   (Finch,	  1984),	  so	  the	  guidelines	  needed	  to	  be	  more	  specific.	  	  By	  interviewing	  this	  group,	  one	  would	  expect	  to	  get	  the	  following	  information:	  1)	  their	  awareness	  and	  understanding	  of	  China’s	  African	  policy;	  2)	  the	  gap	  between	  foreign	   policy	   rhetoric	   and	   actual	   economic	   activities;	   3)	   Chinese	   enterprises’	  problems	  in	  Africa.	  Finally,	  the	  interview	  questions	  were	  prepared	  as	  follows:	  	  1)	  How	  does	  your	  company	  decide	  who	  will	  be	  assigned	  to	  Africa?	  2)	  Please	  describe	   the	   aims	  of	   the	  projects	   you’ve	  worked	  on,	   or	   are	   currently	  involved,	  in	  Africa.	  3)	   What	   percentage	   of	   funding	   in	   this	   project	   is	   from	   government,	   central	   or	  provincial,	   respectively?	   Compared	   to	   projects	   elsewhere,	   is	   there	   obvious	  governmental	  support?	  4)	   Comparing	   to	   other	   projects	   domestically,	   or	   in	   other	   developing	   countries,	  how	  profitable	  are	  the	  projects	  in	  Africa?	  5)	  How	  many	  African	  colleagues	  do	  you	  have,	  and	  what	  positions	  do	  they	  hold?	  How	  do	  they	  get	  along	  with	  Chinese	  counterparts?	  6)	   How	   does	   your	   company	   accomplish	   the	   industry	   chain?	   In	   the	   example	   of	  transportation,	  how	  do	  they	  get	  the	  necessary	  components	  for	  the	  projects?	  Do	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you	  favor	  Chinese	  or	  African	  partners	  when	  accessing	  supply	  chains?	  7)	  Please	  describe	   the	   advantages	   and	  disadvantages	  of	  Chinese	   enterprises	   in	  Africa	  compared	  to	  Western	  competitors.	  8)	   What	   difficulties	   do	   Chinese	   companies	   have	   during	   their	   cooperation	   in	  Africa?	  	  Question	  Schedule	  3	  was	   conducted	  with	   the	  hope	  of	   getting	   information	   from	  private	  companies	  in	  Africa.	  Chapter	  5	  specifically	  discusses	  the	  ambiguous	  lines	  between	   China’s	   SOEs	   and	   private	   firms.	   Considering	   the	   fact	   that	  most	   of	   the	  large	  Chinese	  private	  companies	  have	  close	  connections	  to	  the	  government,	  the	  samples	   for	   these	   groups	  were	   from	   small	   or	  medium-­‐sized	  private	   firms.	  The	  private	   firms	   randomly	   involved	   in	   Africa,	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	   find	   them	   for	   an	  interview.	  Only	  one	  translator	  for	  a	  small	  trading	  company	  in	  Nigeria	  confirmed	  interest	   in	   being	   interviewed,	   via	   Internet	   communication	   software.	   Other	  first-­‐hand	   information	   of	   private	   companies	   was	   acquired	   from	   observation,	  which	  will	  be	  addressed	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  	  The	   aims	   of	   interviewing	   employees	   of	   private	   firms	   were:	   1)	   the	   impact	   of	  Chinese	   engagement	   in	   Africa	   at	   a	   grassroots	   level;	   2)	   to	   evaluate	   the	   gap	  between	   China’s	   Africa	   policy	   and	   its	   implementation	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   private	  sector.	  The	  prepared	  topics	  are	  as	  follows:	  	  1)	  When	  did	  you	  come	  to	  Africa	  for	  the	  first	  time?	  2)	  Why	  do	  you	  invest	  in	  Africa?	  3)	   What’s	   your	   opinion	   towards	   the	   going	   global	   strategy	   and	   China’s	   Africa	  responsibilities;	  do	  they	  have	  any	  influence	  in	  your	  daily	  operations	  in	  Africa?	  4)	  What	  constraints	  have	  you	  experienced	  during	  your	  operations	  in	  the	  African	  market?	  5)	  Will	  you	  introduce	  your	  friends	  or	  relatives	  to	  Africa?	  Why?	  6)	  How	  many	  employees	  do	  you	  have?	  Will	  you	  employ	  African	  staff?	  Why?	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7)	  Did	  you	  receive	  any	  help	  from	  local	  embassy?	  8)	  Who	  is	  your	  biggest	  competitor?	  	  Question	  Schedule	  4	  was	   for	  China’s	  African	  scholars.	  Although	   the	  opinions	  of	  Chinese	  academia	  can	  be	  accessed	  through	  their	  books	  and	  articles,	  considering	  the	  prudence	  of	  Chinese	   scholars,	   the	   interviews	   for	   this	   group	  aim	   to	   achieve	  the	   following	   goals:	   1)	   to	   address	   the	   notion	   of	   “international	   responsibility”	  from	  China’s	  African	  scholars’	  point	  of	  view;	  2)	  to	  access	  the	  latest	  information	  of	  China	   in	   Africa;	   3)	   to	   serve	   as	   a	   supplementary	   source	   for	   the	   previous	   data	  collection.	   Due	   to	   the	   high	   level	   of	   knowledge	   and	   expressive	   abilities,	   the	  interview	   favoured	   the	   respondent	   in	   this	   group.	   Therefore,	   the	   questions	  prepared	   for	   each	   scholar	   were	   based	   on	   their	   existing	   publications.	   The	  confirmed	  respondents	  were	  a	  professor	  from	  Beijing	  University	  who	  specialises	  in	   African	   studies	   and	   energy	   studies;	   a	   research	   professor	   on	   African	   studies	  from	   the	   China	   Institutes	   of	   Contemporary	   International	   Relations;	   and	  researchers	   from	   the	  Chinese	  Academy	  of	   Social	   Sciences.	  Their	  opinions	  were	  collected	  in	  order	  to	  deepen	  the	  other	  research	  findings,	  and	  to	  modify	  the	  data	  from	  the	  three	  non-­‐academic	  groups.	  The	  questions	  and	  topics	  for	  these	  people	  were	   (modified	   questions	   and	  more	   specific	   queries	  were	   added	   following	   the	  completion	  of	  the	  other	  three	  groups’	  interviews):	  	  
International	  responsibility	  	  1)	  What’s	   your	   opinion	   of	   China’s	   international	   responsibility,	   as	   proposed	   by	  the	  then-­‐U.S	  Deputy	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Robert	  Zoellick?	  2)	  What	  kinds	  of	  responsibilities	  should	  China	  take	  in	  Africa’s	  development?	  3)	  Do	  you	  think	  China	  is	  a	  responsible	  stakeholder	  in	  Africa?	  Why?	  4)	  What	  kinds	  of	  positions	  does	  Africa	  have	  in	  China’s	  foreign	  strategy?	  5)	  In	  your	  book,	  Great	  Powers’	  Responsibility,	  you’ve	  emphasised	  the	  possibility	  of	  cooperation	  between	  China	  and	  the	  West;	  do	  you	  think	  this	  perspective	  suits	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the	  situation	  in	  Africa?	  6)	  Both	  your	  articles	  and	  books	  on	  China’s	  responsibility	  are	  from	  national	  policy	  level	   perspective.	   What	   do	   you	   think	   is	   the	   role	   of	   lower	   levels	   in	   the	  responsibility	  process?	  	  
African	  studies	  	  1)	  Why	  does	  the	  Chinese	  government	  enthusiastically	  promote	  the	  FOCAC,	  while	  also	   being	   the	   focus	   of	   much	   criticism,	   such	   as	   Chinese	   neo-­‐colonialism,	   and	  kidnapping	  targeted	  at	  Chinese	  labours	  by	  local	  African	  people?	  2)	  What	  do	  you	  think	  are	  the	  problems	  affecting	  China’s	  image	  in	  Africa?	  3)	  Has	  China’s	  African	  policy	  experienced	  big	  changes	  during	  last	  10	  years?	  4)	  What	  do	  you	   think	  of	   the	  Chinese	  model	   (Beijing	  Consensus)?	  Do	  you	   think	  China	  has	  provided	  an	  alternative	  development	  road	  for	  Africa,	  and	  why?	  5)	   According	   to	   statistics,	   African	   elites	   favour	   China’s	   presence,	   while	   non-­‐	  governmental	   people	   express	   resentment.	   How	   do	   you	   think	   the	   different	  attitudes	  came	  about,	  and	  how	  could	  the	  problem/disparity	  be	  solved?	  
II.	  Interview	  Procedures	  
A	  pilot	  study	  was	  conducted,	  based	  on	  the	  literature	  review,	  in	  order	  to	  test	  the	  interview	   structure,	   respondents	   and	   questions,	   to	   assess	   the	   quality	   of	   elite	  interviewing,	   to	   reveal	   the	   meaningless	   or	   embarrassing	   questions,	   and	   to	  discover	  the	  new	  issues	  raised	  during	  the	  pilot	  study.	  The	  rehearsal	  of	  the	  actual	  survey	  provided	  an	  opportunity	  to	  discover	  how	  the	  respondents	  might	  react	  to	  the	  survey,	  and	  thus	  to	  estimate	  the	  level	  of	  non-­‐responses	  (Burnham	  et	  al,	  2004:	  39)	  and	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  data.	  The	  pilot	  research	  was	  conducted	  as	  follows:	  1)	  to	  choose	  one	  or	  two	  representatives	  from	  each	  group	  and	  initiate	  a	  flexible	  and	  open	   conversation	   to	   test	   their	   openness	   to	   this	   kind	   of	   interview,	   and	   their	  attitudes	  towards	  the	  questions;	  2)	  the	  interviews	  were	  conducted	  via	  email	  and	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telephone	   because	   all	   the	   potential	   interviewees	   were	   not	   in	   UK;	   3)	   the	   pilot	  study	  was	  conducted	  between	  10-­‐30	  May,	  2012.	  	  During	  the	  pilot	  study,	  the	  interview	  questions	  and	  process	  were	  modified,	  new	  questions	   and	   potential	   informants	   were	   added.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	  unforeseen	   difficulties	   were	   revealed.	   The	   lack	   of	   interaction	   has	   blocked	   the	  successful	   completion	   of	   an	   elite	   interview,	   especially	   using	   emails	   where	   the	  respondents	   may	   provide	   lots	   of	   anecdotes,	   such	   as	   complaints	   of	   the	   harsh	  conditions	   in	   Africa,	   which	   are	   not	   relevant	   to	   this	   research.	   Limited	   by	   the	  length	   of	   the	   interview,	   more	   attention	   should	   be	   paid	   to	   interaction.	  Furthermore,	   more	   detailed	   stories,	   not	   only	   personal	   experiences	   but	   also	  accurate	  investment	  figures	  were	  expected	  to	  be	  obtained	  through	  interviews.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  nearly	  all	   the	  respondents	  expressed	  willingness	  to	  recommend	  other	   informants	   -­‐	  as	  noted	   in	   the	  previous	  section,	  snowball	  sampling	  designs	  will	   be	   used	   to	   select	   interviewees	   from	   the	   existing	   four	   groups	   for	   further	  subcategory.	   It	   was	   expected	   to	   achieve	   a	   total	   number	   of	   20	   people;	   that	   is,	  approximately	   six	   officials,	   six	   SOEs	   employees,	   three	   employees	   from	   private	  firms,	  and	  five	  scholars.	  	  The	   formal	   interview	   research	   will	   be	   titled	   “Assessment	   of	   China’s	   African	  Policy	  and	  its	  Implementation”,	  with	  an	  introductory	  letter	  issued	  by	  the	  School	  of	   Government	   and	   International	   Affairs	   at	   Durham	   University.	   The	   fieldwork	  was	  carried	  out	  between	  15	  July	  2012	  and	  15	  September	  2012,	  in	  Beijing,	  China.	  The	   interview	   order	   for	   the	   four	   groups	   was	   fixed.	   Officials	   from	   the	   central	  government	  were	  the	  first	  group	  interviewed,	  their	   interviews	  and	  information	  focused	   on	   the	   policy	   level.	   The	   second	   group	   to	   be	   interviewed	   was	   the	  employees	  from	  SOEs,	  focusing	  on	  their	  awareness	  of	  central	  African	  policy,	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  they	  might	  receive	  support	  from	  the	  central	  government,	  and	  the	  implementation	   in	   practice	   could	   offer	   a	   useful	   comparison	   with	   the	   policy	  advocated	   by	   the	   officials.	   Then	   it	   came	   the	   private	   firms,	   investigating	   their	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motivations	   for	   investing	   in	   Africa,	   and	   their	   ways	   of	   operation	   could	   offer	   a	  comparison	  with	   both	   official	   policies	   and	   those	   of	   SOEs.	   Finally,	   the	   evidence	  generated	  by	  these	  three	  groups	  was	  assessed	  in	  order	  to	  inspire	  new	  questions,	  which	  would	  be	  asked	  during	  the	  interviews	  of	  the	  fourth	  group.	  This	  discussion	  focused	   on	   the	   interpretation	   of	   their	   reactions	   to	   the	   former	   interview	  transcripts.	   	  	  Case	   studies	   are	   an	   extremely	  popular	  part	   of	   research	  design,	   and	   are	  widely	  used	  throughout	  the	  social	  sciences.	  The	  qualitative	  research	  method	  embraces	  it,	  as	  it	  generates	  a	  wealth	  of	  data	  relating	  to	  one	  specific	  case	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  generate	  hypotheses	  and	  theories	  (Burnham	  et	  al,	  2004).	  It	  enables	  a	  researcher	  to	  focus	  on	  one	  area	  and	  study	  it	  in	  depth.	  After	  the	  first	  round	  of	  elite	  interviews,	  I’ll	  conducted	  a	  second	  round	  of	  interviews	  focusing	  on	  the	  case	  study	  countries	  and	  interview	  Chinese	  African	  studies	  scholars	  who	  are	  specialized	  in,	  and	  have	  work	  experience	  or	  have	  done	  fieldwork	  in	  the	  four	  case	  countries.	  The	  second	  round	  of	  interviews	  will	  be	  carried	  out	  while	  writing	  the	  case	  studies,	  conducted	  through	  emails	  or	   interviews	   in	  Beijing.	   (The	   information	   from	   interviewees	   is	  included	  in	  an	  appendix.)	   	  	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  the	  interviews	  were	  conducted	  in	  difficult	  situations.	  First,	  due	   to	   accessibility,	   some	   of	   the	   key	   informants	  were	   not	   from	   the	   case	   study	  countries.	  As	  a	  result,	  there	  was	  a	  lack	  of	  a	  subcategory	  based	  on	  host	  countries.	  Second,	   the	   number	   of	   interviewees	   from	   Group	   3	   (self-­‐employers)	   was	   too	  small.	  Not	  only	  were	  they	  difficult	  to	  reach,	  but	  they	  also	  showed	  limited	  interest	  in	  academic	   interviews.	  Third,	  as	  Witness	  7,	  an	  African	  researcher	  who	  has	  six	  years’	  work	  experience	  in	  Africa,	  suggested,	  it	  was	  hard	  to	  get	  information	  from	  Chinese	   enterprises…	   because	   they	   tend	   to	   talk	   about	   their	   contributions	   to	  African	   countries	   but	   to	   neglect	   their	  weaknesses,	   as	   they	  believe	   “Don't	  wash	  your	   dirty	   linen	   in	   public”.	   In	   this	   case,	   I	   employed	   the	   following	   methods	   to	  adjust	  for	  these	  deficiencies.	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2.2.2.	  Participant	  Observation	  Participant	   Observation	   is	   a	   research	   strategy	   used	   by	   researchers	   who	  participate	   in	   a	   social	   environment	   to	   understand	   people’s	   behaviour.	   The	  researcher	   needs	   to	   establish	   a	   tight	   connection	   or	   themselves	   become	   group	  members	   for	   this	  method	  (Wax,	  1968).	  The	  participation	  can	  be	  deep	  or	  slight,	  public	   or	   secret,	   but	   this	   participation	   would	   need	   a	   specific	   period	   of	   time,	  during	  which	   the	   researcher	  would	   observe	   and	   record	   people’s	   behaviour,	   in	  formal	  or	  informal	  interviews,	  or	  collect	  documents	  that	  describe	  these	  people’s	  activities	   in	   this	   environment	   (Lofland	   &	   Lofland,	   1984,	   p.	   12).	   The	   key	   to	  implementing	   a	   successful	   Participant	   Observation	   is	   a	   long-­‐term	   observation	  (Burnham	  et	  al.,	  2004,	  p.	  256).	   	  	  Gold	   is	   one	   of	   the	   pioneers	   who	   offer	   a	   clear	   category	   for	   this	   method,	   and	  identified	   four	   kinds	   of	   participant	   for	   this	   method:	   complete	   participant,	  participant-­‐as-­‐observer,	   observer-­‐as-­‐participant,	   and	   complete	   observer	   (Gold,	  1958,	   pp.	   30-­‐39).	   The	   first	   one	   is	   a	   full	   participant	   of	   the	   group,	   and	   other	  members	  of	  the	  group	  do	  not	  know	  the	  researcher’s	  real	  identity.	  The	  difference	  between	  the	  first	  type	  and	  the	  second	  is	  that	  the	  researcher	  in	  the	  second	  variant	  needs	   to	   clarify	   the	   researcher’s	   purpose	   to	   the	   other	   group	  members.	   In	   the	  third	  category,	   the	  group	  members	  understand	  the	  research’s	  purpose,	  and	  the	  researcher	  can	  freely	  interact	  with	  group	  members	  without	  excuses.	  In	  the	  final	  category,	   the	   researcher	   just	   observes	   the	   group	   without	   any	   interaction	  (Burnham	   et	   al.,	   2004,	   pp.	   227-­‐235;	   Frankfort-­‐Nachmias	   &	   Nachmias,	   1996)	  (Frankfort-­‐Nachmias	  &	  Nachmias	   chapter	   12,	   but	   in	   their	   book,	   there	   are	   only	  two	  types:	  complete	  participant	  and	  participant-­‐as-­‐observer).	   In	  order	  to	  reach	  the	   informants	   from	   the	   four	  host	   countries	   -­‐	   Sudan,	  Nigeria,	   South	  Africa	   and	  Ethiopia,	  as	  well	  as	  Chinese	  self-­‐employers	  in	  Africa	  and	  some	  African	  veterans,	  the	   thesis	   took	   the	   third	   and	   the	   fourth	   of	   Gold’s	   categories	   and	   conducted	   an	  observation	  in	  QQ	  and	  BBS	  to	  obtain	  essential	  data	  from	  the	  informants.	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  Tencent	  QQ	   is	   the	  one	  of	   the	  common	   instant	  message	  software	   for	  Chinese	   to	  communicate	   with	   each	   other	   via	   mobile	   phone,	   laptop,	   or	   computers.	   One	  function	   of	   it	   is	   group	   chat,	  which	   enables	   its	  members	   to	   create	   a	   discussion	  group	  (Qun)	  under	  certain	  subjects.	  Thus,	  I	  applied	  to	  some	  Chinese	  in	  Africa	  QQ	  chatting	  groups	  based	  on	  the	  four	  African	  countries.	  After	  being	  rejected	  by	  some	  exclusive	  chat	  groups,	  and	  considering	   the	  relevance	  of	   those	  who	  accepted,	  as	  well	   as	   their	   numbers	   and	   levels	   of	   activity,	   the	   following	   chat	   groups	   were	  selected	  for	  observation:	   	  	  1)	  Sudan	  i)	   Walking	   Across	   Sudan	   (Xingzou	   zai	   sudan	   行走在苏丹)	   with	   999	   group	  members	  (the	  maximum	  number	  of	  members	  for	  a	  QQ	  group)	   	  	  2)	  Nigeria	  i)	  Home	  of	  Chinese	  Enterprises	  in	  Nigeria	  (Niriliya	  zhongzi	  qiye	  zhijia	   尼日利亚
中资企业之家)	   with	   332	   members;	   ii)	   Nigerian	   Association	   of	   Trade	   and	  Commercial	  Enterprises	  (Niriliya	  shangmao	  qiye	  xiehui	   尼日利亚商贸企业协会)	  with	  213	  members	  	  3)	  South	  Africa	   	  i)	  South	  Africa-­‐China	  Chamber	  of	  Commerce	  (Nanfei	  zhongguo	  shanghui	   南非中
国商会)	  with	  306	  members;	  ii)	  South	  Africa	  chrome	  ore	  (Nanfei	  gekuang	   南非铬
矿)	  with	  338	  members	  	  4)	  Ethiopia	  i)	  Ethiopia	  Autonym	  Business	  Group	   (Aisaiebiya	   shiming	   shangwu	  qun	   埃塞俄
比亚实名商务群)	  with	  465	  members;	  ii)	  Ethiopia	  Boss	  Group	  (Aisaiebiya	  laoban	  qun	   埃塞俄比亚老板群)	  with	  433	  members	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This	   software	   enabled	   me	   to	   observe	   the	   discussions	   on	   Chinese	   enterprises’	  daily	  running,	  opportunities	  and	  challenges	  in	  the	  host	  countries	  and	  sometimes	  participate	   in	   their	   conversations,	   and	   hence	   to	   obtain	   first	   hand	   information.	  Since	  they	  are	  free	  to	  talk	  about	  any	  issues	  raised	  in	  their	   life	  and	  work,	   it	  was	  more	   likely	   to	   reveal	   the	   real	   occurrences	   of	   Chinese	   activity	   in	   Africa,	   which	  could	  then	  be	  used	  to	  compare	  with	  Beijing’s	  official	  African	  policy.	   	   	  	  Bulletin	  Board	  System	  (BBS)	  is	  another	  common	  tool,	  which	  gathers	  people	  who	  have	   similar	   interests	   or	   needs	   to	   discuss	   their	   daily	   or	   specific	   issues.	   BBS,	  which	   is	   different	   from	   an	   instant	   message	   tool,	   is	   a	   public	   or	   private	   space	  (board)	   for	   members	   to	   post	   their	   articles.	   Every	   board	   will	   have	   a	   specific	  subject,	   and	   the	   manager	   of	   this	   board	   manages	   the	   range	   of	   discussion;	  members	  can	  use	  these	  boards	  to	  discuss	  or	  share	  their	  thoughts	  or	  experiences	  on	   any	   given	   subject.	   The	   articles	   on	   BBS	   are	  more	   systematic	   than	  QQ	   group	  chats.	  I	  observed	  the	  following	  ones:	   	  	  Chinese	  in	  Nigeria	  BBS:	   	   	   http://www.nigeriabbs.com/bbs/	  South-­‐Africa	  Chinese	  BBS:	   	   	   http://www.nanfei8.com/	  Ethiopia	  Chinese	  BBS:	   	   	   http://www.ethiopianbbs.com/bbs/portal.php	  	  The	   data	   collected	   from	   participant	   observation	   of	   QQ	   chat	   group	   and	   BBS	   is	  anonymous.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   people	   are	   more	   likely	   to	   express	   their	   real	  feelings	   without	   few	   constraints,	   even	   if	   on	   sensitive	   topics.	   However,	   as	   the	  informants	  are	  not	  required	  to	  be	  responsible	  for	  their	  opinions,	  the	  authenticity	  of	   their	   articles	  needs	   to	  be	   evaluated	  by	   the	   researcher	  on	   the	  basis	   of	   other,	  more	  reliable	  sources	  -­‐	  such	  as	  documentary	  evidence,	  papers	  and	  books.	   	  	  
2.2.3	  Documentary	  and	  Archival	  Analysis	  It	   is	  very	  important	  for	  a	  political	  researcher	  to	  use	  essential	  documentary	  and	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archives	   when	   conducting	   a	   research	   project.	   There	   are	   three	   categories	   of	  documents	  and	  archives:	  primary,	  secondary	  and	  tertiary	  (Burnham	  et	  al.,	  2004,	  p.	   166;	   Lichtman	   &	   French,	   1978,	   p.	   18).	   Primary	   documents	   or	   archives	   are	  directly	  related	  to	   the	  research	  topic,	  and	  can	  be	  materials	   that	  still	  need	  to	  be	  studied.	   Secondary	   documents	   refer	   to	   materials	   which	   are	   related	   to	   the	  research	   topic,	   or	   were	   written	   or	   recorded	   just	   after	   the	   research	   events.	  Tertiary	   materials	   are	   written	   or	   recorded	   after	   the	   event	   and	   attempt	   to	  reconstruct	   the	   facts	   of	   the	   event	   (Burnham	   et	   al.,	   2004,	   p.	   166;	   Lichtman	   &	  French,	  1978,	  p.	  18).	   	  	  Normally,	  as	  a	  researcher,	  primary	  documentation	  is	  the	  most	  valuable	  material	  because	   these	  materials	  detail	   facts	  of	  events.	  However,	   these	  materials	  can	  be	  hard	   to	   obtain	   (Burnham	   et	   al.,	   2004,	   pp.	   166-­‐169;	   Frankfort-­‐Nachmias	   &	  Nachmias,	  1996).	  When	  using	  secondary	  materials,	  there	  are	  certain	  limitations	  related	   to	   the	   reliability	   of	   the	   materials.	   Therefore,	   government	   documents,	  international	   organisations’	   official	   archives,	   United	   Nation’s	   publications,	  respected	  newspapers	  and	  magazines	  would	  be	  considered	  reliable	  documents	  and	   archives	   (Burnham	   et	   al.,	   2004,	   pp.	   171-­‐172).	   Official	   documents	   on	  China-­‐Africa	   are	   not	   transparent	   and	   the	   bilateral	   data	   is	   hard	   to	   access.	  Therefore,	  most	  of	  the	  evidence	  contained	  in	  the	  case	  studies	  was	  acquired	  from	  local,	  respected	  newspapers.	  Notably,	  the	  Sudan	  Tribune	  of	  Sudan;	  Vanguard	  and	  AllAfrica	   of	   Nigeria;	   the	  Mail	   and	   Guardian	   of	   South	   Africa;	   and	   the	   Ethiopian	  Herald	  of	  Ethiopia.	   	  	  In	   summary,	   the	   best	   research	   utilises	   a	   combination	   of	   methodological	  approaches	  in	  order	  to	  deepen	  the	  research	  findings	  (Hertz	  &	  Imber,	  1995).	  The	  qualitative	  methods	   have	   been	   aligned	  with	   an	   interpretive	   epistemology	   that	  stresses	   the	   dynamic,	   constructed	   and	   evolving	   nature	   of	   social	   reality,	   while	  other	  sources	  and	  techniques	  –	  such	  as	  archives,	  materials	  on	  the	  internet,	  and	  discourse	   –	   all	   could	   be	   utilised	   to	   check	   the	   rough	   data.	   Elite	   interviews	   and	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Part	  1	  Framework	  Part	  
Chapter	  3	  International	  responsibility:	  The	  concept	  and	  its	  implications	  
3.1	  Introduction	   	  The	  notion	  of	  international	  responsibility	  derives	  from	  the	  dilemma	  that,	  on	  the	  one	   hand,	   “state	   sovereignty	   has	   long	   been	   regarded	   as	   the	   pivotal	   structural	  paradigm	   of	   international	   law”	   (Payandeh,	   2010,	   p.	   469),	   while	   on	   the	   other	  hand,	   the	  emergence	  of	  different	  kinds	  of	   global	   issues	   require	   states,	   living	   in	  the	  international	  society,	  to	  not	  only	  meet	  the	  demands	  of	  their	  people	  but	  also	  to	  be	  bound	  by	  rules	  imposed	  on	  them	  by	  external	  forces,	  and	  to	  bear	  obligations	  beyond	  their	  borders	  and	  people’s	  needs.	  As	  an	  emerging	  political	  concept,	   the	  word	   “responsibility”	   can	   be	   easily	   found	   in	   political	   discourse,	   diplomatic	  documents	   and	   speeches,	   such	   as:	   “to	   be	   a	   responsible	   great	   power”,	  “responsible	  stakeholder”,	  “responsible	  sovereignty”,	  “responsibility	  to	  protect”,	  “irresponsible	   behaviour”,	   “power	   and	   responsibility”,	   “special	   responsibility”,	  “global	   responsibility”,	   “regional	   responsibility”,	   and	   so	   forth	   (Breslin,	   2010,	   p.	  53;	   Etzioni,	   2011,	   p.	   539;	   Küng,	   2004;	   Slim,	   2010,	   p.	   156;	   Stedman,	   Jone,	   &	  Pascual,	  2009;	  Teitt,	  2008,	  p.	  4;	  Yongnian	  Zheng	  &	  Chen,	  2006,	  p.	  11).	  However,	  the	  conception	  of	  this	  term	  is	  incomplete,	  and	  the	  international	  community	  is	  far	  from	   reaching	   a	   consensus	   on	   a	   complete	   definition.	   Additionally,	   it	   is	   still	   a	  flawed	   concept,	   since	   the	   evaluation	   of	   “responsibility”	   is	   ambiguous.	   This	  Chapter	   intends	   to	   demonstrate	   the	   existing	   interpretation	   on	   “international	  responsibility”	   and	   to	   develop	   the	   criteria	   to	   evaluate	   this	   term,	   and	   then	   to	  locate	  it	  within	  China’s	  political	  context,	  in	  order	  to	  further	  assess	  its	  implication	  for	  China’s	  African	  engagement.	  	  This	   chapter	   starts	   with	   a	   discussion	   of	   “responsibility”	   and	   summarises	   five	  criteria	  to	   judge	  “being	  responsible	  or	  not”.	   In	  the	  second	  section,	   it	   introduces	  “state”	  as	  the	  subject,	  and	  explains	  “international	  responsibility”	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  two	   theories	   from	   the	   English	   school	   (pluralism	   and	   solidarism).	   Then	   it	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analyses	   the	   defects	   of	   the	   term	   (incomplete	   and	   flawed).	   This	   chapter	  complements	  the	  term	  through	  China’s	  and	  Africa’s	  interpretation	  and	  develops	  the	  criteria	  of	  “responsibility”.	  Finally,	  it	  sets	  five	  criteria	  with	  which	  to	  assess	  a	  state	   level	   of	   responsibility.	   In	   the	   third	   section,	   it	   looks	   at	   the	   term	   from	   the	  context	   of	   China’s	   politics,	   and	   answers	   the	   question,	   “What	   is	   the	   proper	  international	  responsibility	  for	  a	  state	  like	  China?”	  This	  chapter	  aims	  to	  establish	  a	   reasonable	   standard	   for	   state’s	   responsibility	   which	   would	   lay	   a	   conceptual	  foundation	  and	  scope	  for	  further	  argument.	   	   	   	  
3.2	  Conceiving	  International	  Responsibility	  
3.2.1	  Responsibility	  In	   order	   to	   determine	  what	   “international	   responsibility”	  means,	   and	  what	   its	  implications	  are,	  we	  must	  start	  with	  the	  word	  “responsibility”.	  According	  to	  the	  Longman	  Dictionary,	  “responsibility”	  refers	  to	  “a	  duty	  to	  be	  in	  charge	  of	  someone	  or	   something,	   so	   that	  you	  make	  decisions	  and	  can	  be	  blamed	   if	   something	  bad	  happens”.1	   For	   Adam	   Watson,	   “responsibility	   implies	   accountability	   for	   one’s	  actions,	   for	   their	   consequences”	   (Watson,	   1997,	   p.	   95).	   Others	   look	   at	  responsibility	   in	   two	  dimensions:	   the	   first	   is	   “accountability,	   answerability	  and	  liability	   look	  backwards	   to	   conduct	   and	   events	   in	   the	   past”,	   and	   the	   second	   is,	  “roles	   and	   tasks	   look	   to	   the	   future”	   (Cane,	   2002,	   p.	   31).	   Following	   these	  definitions,	   “responsibility”	   could	   be	   interpreted	   two	   different	   ways:	   an	  obligation,	   duty	   and	   task	   one	   should	   fulfil,	   and	   the	   accountability	   for	   the	  consequences	   of	   one’s	   actions	   or	   inactions.	   Similarly,	   Lucas	   has	   categorised	  responsibility	   as	   having	   both	   a	   positive	   and	   negative	   angle.	   He	   argued	   that	  responsibility	   could	   be	   seen	   from	   a	   negative	   perspective,	   in	   contrary	   to	   the	  positive	   responsibility.	   The	   former	   refers	   to	   “bear[ing]	   the	   consequences	   for	  their	   misconduct”,	   whilst	   the	   latter	   one	   means	   “fulfill[ing]	   the	   requirement”	  (Lucas,	  1993,	  p.	  53).	  These	  explanations	  bring	  about	  two	  questions	  -­‐	  specifically,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	   The	  Chinese	  authorised	  dictionary	  defines	  the	  word	  in	  the	  same	  way.	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“What	  is	  means	  to	  be	  responsible?”	  and	  “What	  are	  our	  responsibilities?”	  (Kramer,	  2004,	   p.	   133)	   There	   arises	   a	   dichotomy	   from	   these	   distinctions.	   One	   is	   the	  bottom	   line	   to	   shoulder	   a	   consequence,	   while	   the	   other	   is	   the	   high	   line	   of	  fulfilling	   a	   requirement.	   Cane	   has	   interpreted	   it	   from	   a	   legal	   and	   moral	  perspective.	   	   According	   to	   his	   view,	   law	   is	   the	   bottom	   line	   to	   be	   responsible,	  while	   moral	   standards	   shape	   the	   range	   of	   “what	   our	   responsibilities	   are”.	  However,	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  “moral”	  is	  an	  equally	  ambiguous	  and	  conditional	  term	  which	  depends	  on	  one’s	  perspective	  and	  situation.	  Cane	  suggests	  that	  there	  are	   three	   issues	   that	   should	   be	   considered	   with	   regards	   to	   assessing	  responsibility:	  1)	  the	  conduct	  and	  mental	  life	  of	  agents2;	  2)	  the	  consequences	  of	  conduct	  and	  their	  impact	  on	  others;	  3)	  what	  our	  prospective	  responsibilities	  are	  (Cane,	   2002).	   This	   implies	   that	   the	   judgment	   of	   responsibility	   could	   be	   made	  from	  three	  perspectives:	  the	  subject’s	  motivation	  and	  strengthen,	  the	  impacts	  on	  the	  object,	  and	  external	  expectations.	  	  The	  debate	  on	  the	  high	  line	  of	  moral	  responsibility	  has	  drawn	  the	  attention	  of	  a	  large	  number	  of	  philosophers.	  Wolf	  and	  Wallace	  assume	  responsibility	  that	  goes	  beyond	   “moral	   character”	   is	   not	   casual	   (Wallace,	   1994,	   p.	   52);	   historically	   it	  relied	   upon	   two	   aspects:	   “the	   merit-­‐based	   view”3	   and	   “the	   consequentialist	  view”4.	   The	   former	   presumes	   that	   being	   responsible	   should	   be	   a	   condition	   of	  “metaphysical	   freedom”,	   the	   latter	   assumes	   the	   agent	   could	   be	   “influenced	  through	   outward	   expression	   of	   praise	   and	   blame	   in	   order	   to	   curb	   or	   promote	  certain	   behaviours”	   (Bivins).	   The	   merit-­‐based	   view	   echoes	   Cane’s	   evaluation	  criteria	   of	   a	   subject’s	   strength	   and	   capability,	   while	   the	   consequentialist	   view	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	   Unlike	   conduct,	   mental	   states	   cannot	   be	   observed	   directly,	   but	   Cane	   believed	   that	   it	   rested	   on	   an	  interpretation	  of	  what	  the	  agent	  said	  or	  did	  –	  viewed	  against	  a	  background	  of	  relevant	  circumstances	  –	  as	  manifesting	  or	  not	  manifesting	  the	  mental	  state	  in	  question.	  	  3	   According	  to	  which	  praise	  and	  blame	  would	  be	  an	  appropriate	  reaction	  toward	  the	  candidate	  if,	  and	  only	  if,	  she	  merits	  –	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  “deserves”	  –	  such	  a	  reaction.	  	  4	   According	  to	  which	  praise	  and	  blame	  would	  be	  an	  appropriate	  if,	  and	  only	  if,	  a	  reaction	  of	  this	  sort	  would	  likely	  lead	  to	  a	  desired	  change	  in	  the	  agent	  and/or	  her	  behaviour.	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introduces	  the	  consideration	  of	  outward	  expression.	  Later,	  Strawson	  pointed	  out	  that	   both	   of	   these	   interpretations	   have	   defects,	   according	   to	   his	   “participant	  reactive	  attitudes”	  theory,	  “the	  justification	  refers	  back	  to	  the	  reactive	  attitudes”.	  That	   is,	   the	   internal	   role	   in	   the	   relationship,	   not	   theoretical	   conditions.	   This	  judgment	   highlights	   the	   importance	   of	   a	   participant’s	   attitude.	   Generally,	  responsibility	  could	  be	  understood	  by	  attributability	  or	  accountability.	  When	   it	  came	  to	  responsibility	  as	  attributability,	  the	  assessment	  of	  the	  agent	  itself	  should	  be	  measured.	  This	  brings	  the	  agent’s	  ability	  into	  consideration.	  Meanwhile,	  when	  it	   comes	   to	   “being	   responsible”	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   accountability,	   Strawson	  developed	   his	   theory	   by	   proposing	   the	   influence	   of	   external	   expectations	   (a	  branch	  of	  reactive	  attitudes)	  to	  holding	  responsibility	  (Stanford	  Encyclopaedia	  of	  Philosophy,	  2011).	  	  Recognising	   of	   diversity	   of	   discussion	   in	   interpretations	   of	   the	   word	  “responsibility”,	  the	  criteria	  for	  judging	  “responsibility”	  can	  be	  summarised	  thus:	  1)	  liability	  and	  accountability	  to	  the	  subject’s	  behaviours,	  this	  could	  be	  judged	  by	  legal	   and	   widely	   accepted	   normative	   norms,	   which	   is	   the	   basic	   standard	   and	  foundation	  of	  being	  responsible.	  The	  following	  four	  criteria	  are	  viewed	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  “tasks	  in	  the	  future”,	  which,	  in	  contrast,	  lack	  regulations	  or	  rules:	  2)	  the	  agent’s	  physical	  and	  mental	  condition,	  which	  refers	  to	  the	  subject’s	  strength	  and	   capability	   as	  well	   as	   attitudes	   towards	   the	  object.	  This	   standard	   is	   viewed	  from	   the	   subject’s	   perspective	   and	   explores	   the	   inner	   motivation	   of	   being	  responsible.	  3)	   the	  subjects’	  behaviour,	  which	   includes	  action	  and	   inaction,	   the	  main	  components	  of	  responsibilities.	  4)	  consequences	  and	  impacts,	  the	  influence	  could	  be	  positive	  or	  negative,	  which	  is	  judged	  from	  the	  objective’s	  perspective;	  5)	  judgment	  and	  feedback	  of	  the	  behaviour,	  censure	  or	  praise,	  sanctions	  or	  rewards.	  This	  feedback	  is	  viewed	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  public	  opinion,	  which	  provides	  a	  third-­‐party	  perspective	  alongside	  subject	  and	  object.	   	   	  	  As	   discussed	   earlier,	   for	   the	   first	   dimension,	   different	   kinds	   of	   laws	   and	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regulations	   clearly	   describe	   the	   primary	   range	   of	   retrospective	   responsibility.	  Blame	  or	  praise,	  sanctions	  or	  rewards	  mostly	  come	  out	  of	  the	  consequences	  and	  impact	   of	   the	   agents’	   actions	   or	   inactions.	   By	   contrast,	   the	   perspective	   of	  responsibility	  does	  not	  always	  have	  clear	  instructions	  -­‐	  that	  is,	  what	  means	  to	  be	  responsible	   seems	   ambiguous.	   Some	   moral	   standards,	   common	   and	  acknowledged	  items	  have	  partly	  shaped	  “responsibilities”,	  but	  the	  evaluation	  of	  them	  is	  difficult.	  The	  four	  criteria	  introduced	  in	  the	  previous	  paragraph	  help	  to	  judge	   behaviour	   as	   responsible	   or	   not.	   The	   second	   criterion	   of	   a	   subject’s	  physical	  and	  mental	  condition	  could	  be	  added	  to	  the	  subject’s	  general	  capability	  and	   identity,	  as	  well	  as	   its	  willingness	  and	   its	  own	   interests.	  The	   fifth	  criterion	  talks	  about	  the	  pressures	  from	  public	  opinion,	  which	  form	  an	  expectation	  for	  the	  subject	  to	  act	  in	  a	  specific	  way.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  public	  opinion	  is	  a	  general	  term,	   shaped	   by	   various	   voices.	   Not	   all	   voices	   enjoy	   the	   same	   position	   or	  influence	   in	   an	   evaluation.	   As	   shown	   in	   figure	   3.1,	   below,	   “expectation	   and	  demands	   B”	   is	   considered	   to	   have	   a	   bigger	   influence	   than	   others.	   Following	  Strawson’s	  logic,	  expectation	  and	  demands	  B	  comes	  from	  the	  participants	  and	  is	  more	  like	  the	  receiver.	   	  	  As	   shown	   in	   figure	   3.1,	   employing	   the	   five	   criteria	   to	   make	   a	   judgment	   of	  responsibility	  or	  not,	  the	  subject,	  object	  and	  third	  party	  (external)	  expectations	  of	  a	  behaviour	  works	  in	  a	  dynamic	  way.	  Laws	  and	  rules	  serve	  as	  the	  foundations	  for	   being	   responsible;	   while	   the	   subject’s	   capability	   and	   external	   expectations	  influence	  the	  subject’s	  identity.	  The	  subject’s	  identity,	  its	  own	  interests	  towards	  the	   object,	   and	   its	   willingness	   to	   be	   responsible	   finally	   determine	   the	  “responsibility”.	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Figure	  3.1	  the	  Dynamic	  influential	  factors	  of	  “responsibility”	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
Source:	  author	  	   	  The	   explanation	   above	   draws	   a	   general	   boundary	   for	   responsibility	   from	  individual	   and	   social	   perspectives.	   When	   it	   comes	   to	   state	   level,	   the	   only	  authoritative	  definition	  of	   “international	   responsibility”	   rested	  on	   international	  law.	   Generally,	   “every	   internationally	   wrongful	   act	   of	   a	   state	   entails	   the	  international	  responsibility	  of	  that	  state	  in	  the	  international	  law”	  (International	  Law	   Commission,	   2001).	   It	   provides	   a	   base	   line	   and	   lowest	   standard	   of	  international	  responsibility.	  However,	  this	  definition	  only	  provides	  a	  rough	  idea	  of	   retrospective	   responsibility,	   and	  does	   not	   explain	   perspective	   “international	  responsibility”	  in	  political	  discourse.	  Since	  this	  thesis	  focuses	  on	  bilateral	  and/or	  multilateral	   responsibility	   between	   China	   and	   African	   states,	   the	   following	  section	   will	   investigate	   what	   “international	   responsibility”	   means	   in	   political	  discourse,	  through	  a	  discussion	  of	  “responsibility”.	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3.2.2	  International	  Responsibility	   	  Historically,	   states	   have	   developed	   a	   sovereign	   border	   within	   which	   the	  government	   takes	   charge	   of	   the	   behaviour	   of	   the	   state	   in	   bilateral	   and	  multilateral	   dealings.	   These	   states,	   as	   units	   with	   various	   political,	   cultural,	  economic,	   religious,	   and	   ideological	  backgrounds	  exist	   in	  an	  anarchical	   system.	  As	   Bull	   described,	   “there	   is	   no	   higher	   level	   of	   authority	   over	   states”	   in	  international	  society,	  “each	  state	  has	  ultimate	  sovereignty	  over	  its	  citizens	  within	  its	  borders”	  (Bull,	  2002,	  p.	  25).	   In	  practice,	  states	   form	  an	   international	  society	  with	   some	   basic	   values	   established	   through	   international	   laws,	   the	   balance	   of	  power,	  diplomacy,	  war,	  and	   the	   impact	  of	  great	  power.	  Therefore,	  shared	  rules	  and	  international	  norms	  provide	  order	  to	  the	  international	  arena.	  The	  emerging	  political	  norm	  of	  “international	  responsibility”	  stems	  from	  such	  an	  international	  society,	  where	  states	  are	  the	  main	  subjects	  of	  “being	  responsible”.	  Different	  from	  the	   “responsibility”	  of	   individuals,	   a	   state’s	   international	   responsibility	   inherits	  the	   legal,	   political	   and	   moral	   traditions	   of	   each	   state.	   To	   evaluate	   a	   state’s	  responsibility,	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  consider	  these	  three	  aspects.	   	  	   	  International	  regulations	  and	  rules	  define	  the	  legal	  obligations	  of	  states	  in	  terms	  of	  retrospective	  responsibility;	  clarifying	  what	  laws	  constrain	  their	  actions,	  and	  what	  consequences	  they	  would	  be	  subject	  to	  if	  they	  broke	  these	  laws.	  However,	  the	   International	   Law	   Commission	   reveals	   that	   the	   notion	   of	   international	  responsibility	   is	   one	   of	   the	   most	   difficult	   issues	   under	   international	   law,	   and	  concluded	   that	   two	   elements	   are	   required	   to	   ascertain	   a	   state’s	   responsibility:	  “an	  illicit	  act	  under	  international	  law	  and	  that	  the	  act	  is	  attributable	  to	  the	  State”.	  However,	   “International	   law	   has	   followed	  with	   excessive	   slowness	   and	   lack	   of	  reaction	  to	  the	  changing	  environment	  of	  international	  relations”	  (Solla,	  2004,	  p.	  1).	   For	   instance,	   in	   the	   past,	   only	   states	   were	   subject	   to	   international	  responsibility.	  But,	   in	   the	   current	   international	   system,	  even	   though	  states	   still	  play	  a	  dominant	  role,	   the	   impact	  of	  non-­‐state	  actors	  cannot	  be	  neglected.	  They	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include	   international	   organisations,	   multinational	   corporations,	   some	   NGOs	  (such	   as	   in	   the	   field	   of	   human	   rights,	   environment	   and	   development),	   even	  certain	   individuals	   who	   have	   a	   great	   influence	   in	   international	   affairs.	   It	   is	  unrealistic	   to	   bestow	   all	   relevant	   actors	   with	   the	   same	   status	   as	   states	   in	   the	  framework	   of	   legality	   in	   the	   short	   term,	   but	   it	   cannot	   be	   denied	   that	   disputes	  arising	  from	  the	  actions	  of	  non-­‐state	  factors	  sometimes	  need	  to	  be	  solved	  at	  the	  state-­‐level.	   This	   has	   created	   a	   dilemma	   that,	   on	   one	   hand,	   states	   are	   trying	   to	  avoid	   being	   constrained	   by	   international	   law,	   while	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	  interaction	  and	  communication	  between	  states	  is	  more	  complex	  than	  interstate	  disputes,	   and	   cannot	   fully	   be	   solved	   without	   the	   intervention/involvement	   of	  international	   institutions.	   That	   is	   to	   say,	   some	   impacts	   and	   consequences	   of	   a	  state’s	   behaviour	   are	   surely	   felt	   beyond	   the	   state	   itself.	   Indirect	   responsibility	  can	   arise	   beyond	   the	   immediate	   cause-­‐and-­‐effect	   actors.	   It	   is	   inevitable	   that	  non-­‐state	   actors	   must	   be	   taken	   into	   consideration	   in	   terms	   of	   international	  responsibility.	  As	  a	  result,	  when	  evaluating	  a	  state’s	  responsibility,	  the	  subject	  of	  “responsibility”	  is	  the	  state	  in	  most	  of	  the	  situation,	  but	  in	  reality,	  various	  other	  actors	   have/can	   become	   involved	   in	   the	   process	   of	   being	   responsible	   (or	  irresponsible).	   	  	  Furthermore,	   as	   international	   laws	   are	   generally	   regarded	   as	   soft	   laws,	   the	  political	  choices	  of	  states	  to	  abide	  by	  the	  laws	  and	  to	  use	  their	  discretional	  power	  under	   the	  common	   legal	  norms,	  or	   in	  cases	  where	  such	   legal	  norms	  are	   totally	  absent,	  is	  of	  great	  importance	  to	  the	  interests	  of	  other	  states	  and	  actors	  (Z.	  Chen,	  2009,	  p.	  9).	  Jackson	  considers	  this	  discretion-­‐based	  responsibility	  as	  political	  or	  prudential	   responsibility,	   as	   opposed	   to	   the	   legally-­‐based	   procedural	  responsibility	   (Jackson,	   November	   1998,	   p.	   5).	   International	   political	  responsibility	   requires	   states	   to	   avoid	   the	   possibly	   adverse	   consequences	   of	  prudential	   decisions,	   policy	   or	   action	   (Z.	   Chen,	   2009).	   When	   contemplating	  foreign	   policy,	   national	   leaders	   are	   usually	   responsible	   to	   not	   only	   domestic	  requirements,	   but	   also	   the	   influence	   and	   impact	   of	   other	   authorities	   -­‐	   for	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example,	   to	   allies,	   to	   partners,	   to	   neighbouring	   countries,	   and	   to	   international	  society	  as	  a	  whole.	  The	  political	  responsibility	  is	  determined	  by	  a	  state’s	  rightful	  membership	  and	  status	   in	   the	   international	  society.	   It	   should	  be	  noted	   that	   for	  those	  leaders	  of	  great	  powers	  and	  major	  powers,	  not	  only	  their	  inner	  policy	  will	  have	  a	  global	  impact	  due	  to	  their	  strong	  economies	  and	  militaries,	  but	  also	  their	  values	   and	   ideology	   are	  mainstream	  and	  distinguished	   from	   those	  who	   are	   on	  the	   periphery.	   They	   are	   the	   rule-­‐makers	   of	   current	   international	   society.	   This	  means,	  the	  great	  power	  the	  state	  enjoys,	  the	  greater	  the	  responsibility	  it	  should	  exercised.	   Since	   most	   states	   have	   their	   own	   cultural	   traditions,	   ideology	   and	  ethnicities	   the	  evaluation	  of	  political	   responsibility	  has	  various	   interpretations.	  Therefore,	   the	   impact	   to	   the	  host	   country	   and	   the	   feedback	   from	   international	  society	  will	  be	  used	  to	  adjust	  the	  assessment.	   	   	  	  Finally,	   legal	   and	   political	   responsibilities	   have	   shaped	   states’	   moral	  responsibility,	   an	   obligation	  without	   a	   formal	  mechanism	   for	   enforcement,	   but	  determined	  by	   its	  own	  capability	  and	  awareness.	  Moral	  responsibility	  does	  not	  require	  states	  and	  other	  international	  actors	  necessarily	  to	  abide	  by	  laws,	  rules	  or	  regulations,	  nor	  to	  obey	  a	  certain	  government	  in	  the	  international	  society,	  but	  for	   the	  application	  of	  certain	  common	  values.	   It	   is	   like	   international	  ethics	   that	  focus	  on	  moral	  issues.	  Here	  the	  moral	  responsibility	  assumes	  that	  international	  security,	  stability,	  peace	  and	  common	  prosperity	  are	  a	  basic	  value	  shared	  by	  all	  members	   in	   the	   world.	   Judgments	   will	   be	   made	   from	   external	   expectations,	  internal	   identities,	   capabilities	   and	   motivations	   rooted	   in	   these	   values.	   As	   a	  higher	  responsibility,	  moral	  responsibility	  should	  be	  accomplished	  based	  on	  and	  cohered	  with	   former	   two.	   Following	   the	   discussion	   of	   “responsibility”,	   there	   is	  also	  a	  dynamic	  relationship	  between	  a	  state’s	  identity	  and	  external	  expectations.	  Each	  state	  will	  conceive	  its	  own	  definition	  of	  “being	  responsible”	  according	  to	  its	  national	  interests,	  capabilities,	  values	  and	  developmental	  stage.	  It	  interacts	  with	  international	   expectations	   and,	   when	   operating	   abroad,	   a	   host	   country’s	  demands.	   The	   following	   section	  will	   discuss	   different	   types	   of	   states	   and	   their	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respective	  political	  agendas,	  and	  different	  understandings	  of	  what	  responsibility	  entails,	   and	   answers	   the	  question	  of	  what	   criteria	   each	   state	  may	  use	   to	   judge	  another	  nation	  as	  acting	  responsibly	  or	  not.	   	  
I.	  Western	  Interpretation	  of	  international	  responsibility	  
The	   international	   consensus	   regarding	   the	   criteria	   of	   what	   constitutes	   “being	  responsible”	   has	   always	   been	   in	   flux.	   The	   emphasis	   on	   the	   principle	   of	  sovereignty,	  national	  diversity	  and	  non-­‐intervention	  has	  shifted	  towards	  mutual	  dependence,	   cooperation,	   and	   increasingly	   towards	   attention	   on	   human	   rights	  and	  humanitarian	  intervention.	  	  Two	   international	   relations	   theories	   are	   concerned	  with	   the	  dilemma	  between	  national	   interests	   (such	   as	   sovereignty,	   diversity	   values)	   and	   international	  responsibility	   (widely	   considered	   as	   global	   interests,	   such	   as	   humanitarian	  intervention	  and	  development	  finance):	  realism	  and	  liberalism.	   	  	  Liberalism,	  based	  on	  a	  belief	   in	   the	   inherently	  good	  nature	  of	  all	  humans,	  rests	  on	  the	   law	  and	  stable	   institutions.	  Liberals	  believe	   that	  political	  activity	  should	  be	  framed	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  universal	  human	  condition,	  rather	  than	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  particularities	  of	  any	  given	  nation.	  They	  place	  norms	  and	  laws	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  their	   national	   interests	   and	   power.	   Inferred	   from	   their	   assumption,	   an	   open	  international	  and	  a	  competitive	  market	  will	  help	  to	  solve	  economic	  problems	  and	  to	   allocate	   recourses	   effectively.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   Realism	   emphasises	   the	  importance	   of	   states,	   claiming	   that	   International	   relations	   are	   motivated	   by	  national	  interests	  and	  driven	  by	  power.	  Although	  realists	  accept	  the	  importance	  of	   morality,	   they	   insist	   that	   morality	   is	   shaped	   and	   judged	   in	   terms	   of	   power	  (Stering-­‐Folker,	  2004,	  pp.	  341-­‐343).	  Guided	  by	  this	  principle,	  narrowly	  focusing	  on	   the	   national	   interest	   leads	   to	  weaker	   attention	   to	   the	   greater	   panorama	   of	  international	  relations.	  The	  pursuit	  of	  maximised	  national	  interest	  has	  relegated	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international	   responsibility	   to	   a	   place	   where	   it	   may	   or	   may	   not	   be	   needed.	  Self-­‐interest	   serves	   as	   the	   yardstick	   for	  whether	   or	   not	   to	   bear	   responsibility,	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  should	  it	  fulfil	  the	  commitment.	   	  	  As	   for	   the	   question	   of	   “How	   can	   we	   judge	   a	   leader’s	   action?”,	   utilitarianism	  suggests	   a	   consequences-­‐oriented	   answer,	   while	   cosmopolitanism	   makes	   a	  judgment	   from	   a	   deontological	   perspective.	   Utilitarianism	   emphasises	   the	  greatest	  good	  for	  the	  greatest	  number.	  However,	  “the	  greatest	  good”	  is	  vague	  and	  has	  a	  risk	  of	  sacrificing	  some	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  others.	  Cosmopolitanism	  argues	  that	   relevant	   community	   is	   global	   -­‐	   since	   we	   interact	   with	   people	   in	   other	  countries,	  we	  have	  a	  duty	  to	  treat	  them	  morally	  -­‐	  but	  there	  is	  a	  lack	  of	  a	  law	  or	  regulation	  for	  enforcement,	  and	  there	  is	  also	  an	  imbalance	  between	  stronger	  and	  weak	  states.	  	  These	  four	  approaches	  provide	  two	  dimensions	  from	  which	  one	  can	  understand	  a	  state’s	  responsibility:	   the	  gap	  between	  national	   interests	  and	  global	   interests,	  the	  political	  decisions	  from	  consequence	  and	  deontology.	  Recently,	  IR	  scholars	  of	  the	   English	   school	   have	   delivered	   more	   moderate	   explanations	   and	   provided	  more	   reasonable	   and	   practical	   suggestions	   for	   addressing	   the	   dilemma	   of	  national-­‐vs.-­‐global	   interests.	   They	   emphasise	   the	  normative	  norms	   and	   system	  establishment	   in	   international	   society,	  which	  provides	  a	   theoretical	   foundation	  for	   further	   exploration	   of	   the	   boundary	   of	   a	   state’s	   responsibility.	   Although	  pluralists	   and	   solidarists	   still	   argue	   about	   the	   priority	   of	   sovereignty	   and	  non-­‐intervention	   or	   intervention,	   the	   debate	   between	   them	   has	   shaped	   the	  theory	  and	  practice	  of	  humanitarian	  intervention	  (Bellamy,	  2003).	   	   	  	  Pluralists	   argue	   that	   states	   do	  not	   share	   substantive	   goals	   and	   values.	   Instead,	  they	   recognise	   that	   they	   are	   legally	   and	  morally	   bound	   by	   a	   common	   code	   of	  co-­‐existence	  (Wheeler	  &	  Dunne,	  2002,	  p.	  95).	  Hence,	  the	  most	  crucial	  recognition	  is	  a	  respect	   for	  sovereignty	  and	  the	  norm	  of	  non-­‐intervention	  for	  the	  basis	  of	  a	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responsible	  government.	  The	  great	  strength	  of	  pluralism	  is	  that	  it	  enables	  states	  with	   different	   conceptions	   of	   justice	   to	   provide	   for	  minimum	   interstate	   order,	  but	  crucially	   the	  moral	  value	  of	  a	  pluralist	  society	  of	  states	  has	   to	  be	   judged	   in	  terms	   of	   its	   contribution	   to	   individual	   well-­‐being,	   and	   Bull	   makes	   this	   the	  ultimate	  test	  of	  any	  ethical	  position	  (Jackson,	  1990,	  p.	  267).	  First	  of	  all,	  pluralism	  emphasises	   the	   rights	   and	   duties	   of	   states,	   which	   are	   considered	   to	   be	   the	  foundation	  of	  a	  state’s	  responsibility.	  Second,	  it	  recognises	  an	  interstate	  order	  of	  cultural	   heterogeneity.	   It	   suggests	   protecting	   individuals’	   rights	   through	   the	  cooperation	  and	  protection	  of	   sovereignty	  of	   countries	   in	   an	  orderly	  world.	  As	  for	   the	   establishment	   of	   an	   international	   justice	   order,	   Bull	   held	   that	   great	  powers	   have	   responsibilities	   in	   providing	   for	   international	   and	   world	   order.	  However,	  against	  the	  background	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  Bull	  was	  pessimistic	  about	  the	  role	  in	  international	  order	  of	  the	  then-­‐Great	  Powers,	  the	  USA	  and	  Soviet	  Union.	  Later,	  Jackson	  argued	  that	  international	  pluralism	  weakens	  the	  responsibility	  of	  great	   powers,	   and	   deliberately	   seeks	   to	   do	   that	   through	   diverse	   standards	   of	  morality	  and	  ethics,	  as	  well	  as	  relative	  values.	  They	  consider	  ethics	  of	  statecraft	  as	   a	   situational	   one,	   thus,	   “responsibility	   is	   the	   alter-­‐ego	   of	   power	   in	   world	  politics	   [and]	   the	   responsibilities	   of	   states	   people	   cannot	   everywhere	   be	   the	  same	   because	   the	  military	   and	   economic	   power	   available	   to	   them	  definitely	   is	  not	  the	  same.”	  (Jackson,	  2000,	  p.	  141)	  	  Pluralism	   recognises	   the	   diversity	   among	   states,	   and	   that	   it	   contributes	   to	  problems	   of	   international	   order	   and	   justice.	   Vincent	   compared	   international	  society	  to	  an	  egg-­‐box	  (Vincent,	  1986,	  pp.	  123-­‐124),	  where	  an	  egg	  was	  like	  a	  state	  and	  the	  box	  was	  international	  society.	  A	  smooth	  international	  order	  will	  separate	  and	   relieve	   the	   conflicts	   between	   eggs,	   that	   is	   to	   say,	   nations,	   groups	   or	  individuals	   could	   appeal	   through	   states	   rather	   than	   through	   direct,	   joint	  intervention.	  The	  emphasis	  on	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  a	  state	  on	  one	  hand	  demands	  a	  legal	   and	   political	   responsibility	   of	   policy	   makers.	   Only	   in	   an	   international	  society	  with	   responsible	   states	   can	   establish	   the	   expected	   international	   order.	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While	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  lacks	  realistic	  suggestions	  on	  how	  to	  regulate	  states	  and	   motivate	   them	   to	   become	   responsible.	   It	   recognises	   the	   importance	   of	  international	   organisations’	   concerns	   for	   human	   rights	   and	   humanitarian	  intervention	   along	   with	   the	   increasing	   interdependence	   of	   states,	   and	   argues	  that	   this	   process	   is	   not	   meant	   to	   undermine	   state’s	   sovereignty	   (Neumann	   &	  Waever,	   1997,	   pp.	   47-­‐49).	   However,	   when	   faced	   with	   a	   serious	   humanitarian	  crisis	  or	  disaster,	  it	  is	  unrealistic	  to	  protect	  the	  human	  rights	  as	  well	  as	  maintain	  an	   irresponsible	   government’s	   sovereignty.	   A	   great	   power’s	   motivation	   and	  capability	   of	   intervening	   is	   also	   doubted.	   As	   a	   result,	   pluralism	   has	   a	   high	  requirement	  of	   a	   state’s	   responsibility,	  but	   it	  does	  not	  provide	  a	   solution	   to	  or	  suggestion	  for	  dealing	  with	  the	  dilemma	  between	  the	  realisation	  of	  international	  justice	  and	  the	  protection	  of	  international	  order.	   	   	  	  Based	   on	   pluralism,	   solidarists	   go	   deeper	   to	   solve	   the	   problem	   of	   sovereignty	  and	  international	  responsibility.	  Solidarism	  posits	  that	  international	  society	  is	  a	  society	   formed	  of	  states	  and	  sovereigns,	  whose	  position	   is	  secondary	  to	   that	  of	  the	   universal	   community	   of	   mankind	   (Bell	   &	   Thatcher,	   2008,	   p.	   21).	   Vincent	  holds	  that,	  despite	  sovereignty	  and	  non-­‐intervention	  playing	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  maintaining	   international	  order,	   it	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  a	  sovereign	  country	  will	  always	  be	   the	  basic	   political	   unit	   in	   international	   society,	   nor	   that	   laws	  do	  not	  apply	   to	   international	  society	   (Vincent,	  1974,	  p.	  349).	   It	   requires	  a	  middle	  way	  between	   a	   state’s	   practice	   and	   the	   protection	   of	   individuals.	   Furthermore,	  Vincent	  suggests	  that	  there	  should	  be	  a	  minimum	  standard	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  human	   rights	   (Vincent,	   1986,	   p.	   125).	   The	   central	   assumption	   of	   solidarism	   is	  “that	   of	   the	   solidarity,	   or	   potential	   solidarity,	   of	   most	   states	   in	   the	   world	   in	  upholding	   the	   collective	   will	   of	   the	   society	   of	   states	   against	   challenges	   to	   it.”	  (Bellamy	   &	   Wheeler,	   2006)	   It	   implies	   that	   a	   state	   does	   not	   only	   have	   the	  responsibility	   to	   protect	   human	   rights	   domestically,	   but	   also	  when	   it	   fails,	   the	  international	   society	   has	   responsibility	   to	   protect	   it	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   moral	  boundary.	  Later,	  Deng	  introduced	  the	  concept	  of	  sovereignty	  as	  responsibility,	  in	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1993,	   which	   helped	   to	   “redefine	   sovereignty	   away	   from	   the	   then	   (current)	  interpretations	  based	  on	  strict	  non-­‐interference	  in	  the	  domestic	  affairs	  of	  states”	  (Stedman	   et	   al.,	   2009).	   Deng’s	   work	   has	   emphasised	   the	   link	   between	  sovereignty	  and	  responsibility.	  For	  him,	  the	  crux	  of	  the	  protection’s	  conundrum	  was	   to	   determine	   how	   to	  move	   beyond	   the	   obstruction	   of	   national	   authorities	  rebuffing	  international	  assistance	  and	  offers	  of	  aid	  in	  situations	  where	  the	  state	  is	  unable	  (or	  unwilling)	  to	  fulfil	  its	  own	  responsibility	  (R.	  Cohen	  &	  Deng,	  1996).	  In	   summary,	   solidarism	  does	  not	  only	   reconfirm	   the	  assumption	  of	  pluralism’s	  perspective	   on	   a	   state’s	   responsibility,	   but	   also	   makes	   a	   breakthrough	   for	  pluralism	   and	   emphasises	   the	   responsibility	   and	   obligation	   of	   states	   in	  international	   society,	   which	   therefore	   provides	   a	   normative	   standard	   for	  shouldering	  responsibility	  beyond	  boundaries/borders.	   	  	  The	   English	   School	   has	   made	   contributions	   to	   the	   exploration	   of	   state	  responsibility.	   It	   not	   only	   analyses	   the	   possibility	   and	   limitations	   of	   a	   state	  responsibilities	   to	   its	   domestic	   population	   and	   international	   society,	   but	   also	  discusses	   the	   developmental	   trends	   towards	   concern	   for	   human	   rights	   in	  international	   society.	   However,	   the	   genocide	   in	   Rwanda,	   where	   thousands	   of	  Rwandans	   were	   killed	   with	   no	   international	   intervention	   reveals	   the	   lack	   of	  methodology	  for	  protecting	  civilians	  in	  developing	  countries	  (UHRC,	  2012).	  This	  tragedy	   encouraged	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   international	   intervention	   when	  Responsibility	  to	  Protect	  (R2P)	  principles	  were	  introduced	  by	  the	  US	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  future	  mass	  atrocities,	  that	  were	  later	  adopted	  by	  the	  UN	  at	  the	  United	  Nations	   World	   Summit	   in	   2005.	   It	   clearly	   declared	   that	   the	   state	   has	   a	  responsibility	   to	  protect	   its	  people	   from	  genocide,	  war	  crimes,	  ethnic	  cleansing	  and	  crimes	  against	  humanity,	  and	  also	  from	  their	  incitement.	  When	  a	  state	  fails	  to	  provide	  such	  protection,	  UN	  member	  states	  have	  the	  responsibility	  to	  respond	  in	   a	   timely	   and	   decisive	   manner,	   and	   to	   assist	   failed	   state	   to	   meet	   these	  obligations	   (Teitt,	   2008).	   Recently,	   the	   crisis	   in	   Libya	   has	   shown	   progress	   in	  implementing	   the	   R2P	   through	   diplomatic,	   humanitarian,	   and	   coercive	  means.	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The	   endorsement	   and	   practice	   of	   this	   principle	   has	   impelled	   a	   new	  interpretation	  of	  traditional	  sovereignty	  and	  humanitarian	  intervention.	  The	  R2P	  principle	   avoids	   the	   limitations	   of	   traditional	   sovereignty	   and	   places	   human	  rights	   as	   a	   basic	   value	   to	   protect.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   it	   legitimised	   the	   right	   of	  international	  intervention.	   	   	  	  In	   general,	   most	   states	   in	   international	   society	   have	   shown	   a	   willingness	   to	  accept	   the	   concept	   of	   “human	   rights	   beyond	   sovereignty”.	   The	   traditional	  interpretation	  of	  sovereignty	  has	  given	  way	  to	  a	  new	  consensus	   in	  response	   to	  this	   conceptual	   change,	   and	   some	   researchers	   have	   argued	   that	   the	   “national	  sovereignty”	   of	   the	   twentieth	   century	   must	   develop	   into	   “responsible	  sovereignty”	  -­‐-­‐	  a	  principle	  requiring	  nations	  to	  not	  only	  protect	  their	  own	  people,	  but	  also	  to	  cooperate	  across	  borders	  to	  safeguard	  common	  resources	  and	  tackle	  common	   threats	   (Stedman	  et	   al.,	   2009).	  Both	   international	   trends	  and	  practice	  show	  that	  sovereignty	  can	  no	  longer	  be	  used	  as	  a	  shield	  to	  protect	  a	  government	  from	   bearing	   responsibility	   for	   their	   actions	   and	   shouldering	   internal	   and	  external	   accountability.	   It	   also	   implies	   that	   major	   powers	   have	   obligations	   to	  intervene	  and	  assist	  weaker	  states.	  	  In	   practice,	   stable	   improvements	   in	   human	   rights	   conditions	   usually	   require	  some	  measure	  of	  political	  transformation,	  and	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  one	  aspect	  of	  liberalisation	  processes.	   Enduring	  human	   rights	   changes,	   therefore,	   go	  hand	   in	  hand	   with	   domestic	   structural	   change	   (Donelly,	   1998).	   Further	   to	   this,	   the	  external	  legitimacy	  of	  a	  state	  depends	  increasingly	  on	  how	  domestic	  societies	  are	  ordered	  (Hurrell,	  2007,	  p.	  143).	  Human	  rights	  and	  democratic	  entitlements	  serve	  as	   a	   “test	   for	   fit	   membership	   of	   international	   society”	   (Clark,	   2005).	   Other	  elements	  extending	   from	  human	  rights	   include	  the	  actions	  relating	   to	  refugees,	  women’s	   employment	   and	   equal	   rights,	   a	   ban	   of	   landmines,	   the	   protection	   of	  property	  rights,	  and	  climate	  change	  (Zhang,	  2010).	  Additionally,	  democratisation	  is	  a	  broad	  system	  that	  involves	  free	  media,	  an	  independent	  judiciary,	  rule	  of	  law	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and	   full	   respect	   for	   civil	   rights	   (Clark,	  2005).	  All	   these	   requirements	   shape	   the	  western	  scholars’	  perspective	  on	  state’s	  responsibility	  and	  the	  “entrance	  ticket”	  of	  international	  society.	   	   	  	  However,	  even	  if	  human	  rights	  protections	  have	  already	  become	  a	  common	  goal	  on	  the	  world	  stage,	  Western	  scholars	  did	  not	  offer/suggest	  a	  tangible	  way	  for	  the	  majority	   of	   developing	   countries	   to	   implement	   these	   goals,	   nor	   to	   distinguish	  interests	   or	   values	   in	   shouldering	   responsibility.	   They	   do	   not	   clarify	   the	  possibility	   of	   conflicts	   of	   interest	   between	   individuals.	   The	   employment	   of	  Western	  standards	  in	  other	  countries	  is	  often	  limited.	   	  	  In	   conclusion,	   western	   standards	   for	   being	   responsible	   have	   become	   the	   new	  international	  norms	  that	  have	  linked	  responsibility	  with	  sovereignty.	  That	  is,	  the	  criteria	   for	   legitimate	   sovereignty,	   an	   entrance	   ticket	   for	   the	  world	   stage,	   and	  bedrock	   of	   international	   order.	   In	   practice,	  Western	   scholars	   have	   argued	   that	  there	  can	  be	  no	  neutral	  definition	  of	  human	  rights,	  and	  that	  human	  rights	  cannot	  be	  logically	  disengaged	  from	  comprehensive	  notions	  of	  what	  constitutes	  a	  good	  society	  (Hurrell,	  2007,	  p.	  143),	  and	  that	  accepting	  assistance	  in	  terms	  of	  human	  rights	   does	   not	   weaken	   sovereignty,	   but	   rather	   preserves	   it	   (Sofaer	   &	   Heller,	  2001).	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   they	   acknowledged	   that	   reality	   is	   that	   these	  requirements	  have	  become	  stark	   symbols	  of	  division	  and	  confrontation,	   rather	  than	   well-­‐institutionalised	   reflections	   of	   a	   shared	   humanity	   (Hurrell,	   2007,	   p.	  143).	   Since	   currently	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   outsiders	   can	   alter	   a	   sovereignty	  country	   is	   limited,	   it	   is	   unrealistic	   to	   implement	   these	   Western	   requirements	  without	   the	   cooperation	   of	   host	   countries,	   it	   is	   essential	   to	   have	   a	   better	  understanding	   of	   “other”	   countries’	   perspectives	   to	   complement	   the	   theory	   of	  “international	  responsibility”.	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II.	  China’s	  interpretation	  of	  international	  responsibility	  
In	   the	   early	   1990s,	   few	   researchers	   were	   concerned	   about	   the	   term	  “international	  responsibility”	  with	  regards	  to	  China.	  On	  one	  hand,	  this	  emerging	  concept	   was	   quite	   different	   from	   the	   Chinese	   government’s	   Five	   Principles	   of	  Peaceful	  Coexistence	  and	  Chinese	  leader	  Deng	  Xiaoping’s	  foreign	  policy	  guideline	  “keep	   a	   low	  profile”	   (tao	   guang	   yang	  hui	   韬光养晦).	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	   either	  “international	   distributions	   of	   power”	   (guoji	   geju	   国际格局 )	   or	   China’s	  international	   role	   and	   identity	   at	   that	   time	   required	   China	   to	   shoulder	  responsibility	  for	  other	  countries,	  since	  the	  country	  was	  still	  a	  large	  recipient	  of	  foreign	  aid.	   In	  short,	  whether	   to	  be	  a	  responsible	  stakeholder	  or	  not	  was	  not	  a	  salient	  issue	  for	  both	  the	  Chinese	  government	  and	  academia.	  Only	  a	  few	  scholars	  mentioned	  responsibilities	  generally.	  Pioneering	  awareness	  included:	  China,	  as	  a	  member	   of	   UN	   and	   other	   international	   organisations,	   should	   develop	   into	   a	  “responsible	   state	   of	   great	   importance”,	   have	   a	   global	   vision	   and	   a	   spirit	   of	  international	   cooperation	   (Y.	   Wang,	   1995);	   national	   interests	   include	   external	  responsibility,	   and	   specifically	   “playing	   a	   greater	   role	   in	   international	   affairs	  serves	  as	  a	  significant	  element	  in	  China’s	  national	  interests”	  (Yan,	  1997);	  based	  on	   experiences	   of	   former	   great	   powers,	   some	   researchers	   suggested	   that	  “obligations	  came	  along	  with	  power	   is	  an	   inevitable	  strategy	   for	  China’s	  rising”	  (G.	   Zhou,	   2009).	   Some	   have	   gone	   further	   and	   categorised	   international	  responsibility	  as	  internal,	  regional,	  and	  global	  duty,	  and	  divided	  states	  into	  three	  sets	  too:	  general	  states,	  regional	  powers	  and	  great	  powers.	  He	  argued	  that	  each	  set	  has	  to	  fulfil	  its	  own	  responsibility.	  (See	  table	  3.1)	  His	  argument	  revealed	  that	  most	  Chinese	  researchers	  believed	  responsibility	  should	  be	  conducted	  based	  on	  national	  strength.	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Table	  3.1.	  The	  comparison	  of	  responsibility	  among	  three	  sets	  of	  states	   	  
	  	   Internal	  Responsibility	   Regional	  Responsibility	   Global	  Responsibility	  General	  State	   Pursue	   internal	  security	   and	   	  general	  prosperity	  
Strategic	  border	   	   In	  general	  
Regional	  Power	   Internal	   security	  and	   general	  prosperity	   	  
A	  safety	  zone	   Pursuing	  
Global	  Power	   Security	  and	  wealth	   Influential	  orbit	   Be	   responsible	  for	  global	  order	  	  
Source:	  :	  (Kong,	  2011)	  	  Although	  calling	  on	  China	   to	  be	  a	   “responsible	  world	  power”	  began	  during	   the	  Clinton	   administration5,	   it	  was	   during	   the	   George	  W.	   Bush	   administration	   that	  then-­‐Deputy	   Secretary	   of	   State	   Robert	   Zoellick	   called	   for	   China	   to	   act	   as	   a	  “responsible	  stakeholder”	   in	  2005.	  This	  drew	  the	  Chinese	  IR	  field’s	  attention	  to	  the	  term	  “international	  responsibility”.	  Initially,	  most	  of	  the	  debates	  were	  about	  whether	  China’s	  international	  responsibility	  was	  another	  Western	  Trojan	  or	  not;	  and	  what	   China’s	   responsibility	   should	   be,	   rather	   than	   an	   analysis	   of	   the	   term	  itself	   in	   the	   international	   arena.	   Against	   this	   backdrop,	   they	   viewed	  responsibility	   in	   a	   more	   practical	   way.	   A	   definition	   was	   arrived	   at,	   which	  translated	   international	   responsibility	   as	   “obligations	   that	   a	   member	   of	  international	   society	   should	   undertake	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   external	  world	   in	   the	  fields	   of	   the	   economy,	   politics,	   security,	   morality	   and	   so	   on,	   reflecting	   the	  contributions	   a	   country	   should	   make	   to	   the	   external	   world”.	   International	  responsibility	  is	  a	  derivative	  attribute	  of	  a	  member	  state	  of	  international	  society.	  Countries,	  big	  or	  small,	  should	  bear	  certain	  international	  responsibility	  (G.	  Wang,	  2008,	  p.	  26).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	   During	  the	  Clinton	  administration,	  Secretary	  of	  Defense	  William	  Perry	  argued	  that	  engagement	  was	  a	  strategy	  for	  getting	  China	  to	  act	  like	  a	  “responsible	  world	  power”,	  and	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Madeleine	  Albright	  called	  on	  China	  to	  become	  a	  “constructive	  participant	  in	  the	  international	  arena”.	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  Compared	   to	   Western	   scholars,	   the	   Chinese	   interpretation	   of	   “international	  responsibility”	  has	  experienced	  a	  change,	  from	  a	  passive	  and	  cautious	  response	  with	  doubts,	  to	  an	  active	  acceptance	  of	  the	  norm.	  The	  Chinese	  definition	  is	  given	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  its	  national	  strategy.	  First,	  it	  emphasizes	  the	  connection	  between	  national	   strengthen	   and	   capability	   in	   shouldering	   responsibility.	   They	   argued	  that	   bigger	   countries	   have	   greater	   responsibilities.	   But	   they	  did	  not	   clarify	   the	  bottom	   line	   of	   small	   countries’	   responsibilities,	   nor	  what	   international	   society	  could	   do	   if	   a	   country	   fails	   to	   be	   responsible.	   Their	   understanding	   of	   being	  responsible	   is	   different	   from	   the	   Western	   counterparts.	   Shi	   holds	   that	   the	  primary	   task	   of	   promoting	   international	   obligations	   and	   responsibilities	   is	  China's	  domestic	   long-­‐term	  healthy	  development	  and	  China’s	   strategic	   security	  (Shi,	   2008).	   This	   implies	   that	   China	   considers	   domestic	   stability,	   security	   and	  development	  as	  the	  fundamental	  elements	  for	  becoming	  responsible.	  Following	  this	  logic,	  China’s	  perspective	  on	  “international	  responsibility”	  focuses	  on	  a	  more	  practical	   approach.	  China	  believes	   that	   states	   at	  different	  developmental	   levels	  have	  different	  criterion	  for	  being	  responsible.	  Witnesses	  1,	  4,	  22,	  and	  23	  all	  held	  that	   survival	   and	   development	   rights	   are	   primary	   human	   rights.	   Hence,	   their	  concerns	   for	   developing	   countries	   mostly	   come	   out	   of	   economic	   performance	  rather	  than	  their	  political	  systems	  or	  good	  governance.	   	   	  
III.	  Africa’s	  attitude	  towards	  international	  responsibility	  
From	  the	  genocide	  in	  Rwanda	  in	  1994,	  to	  the	  crisis	  in	  Darfur	  since	  2003,	  and	  the	  civil	  war	  in	  Libya,	  many	  African	  governments	  are	  not	  capable	  of	  maintaining	  the	  stability	   and	   economic	   growth	   in	   their	   own	   countries,	   nor	   to	   shoulder	  responsibilities	   to	   international	   society.	   “In	   a	   good	   many	   African	   countries,	  power	  is	  a	  patrimonial	  power	  not	  a	  representation	  of	  the	  sovereignty	  will	  of	  the	  people.”	  (Taylor,	  2009,	  p.	  9)	  Hence,	   in	  a	  continent	  plagued	  by	  war,	  poverty	  and	  disease,	  Africa	  has	  become	  the	  largest	  recipient	  of	  humanitarian	  intervention,	  aid	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and	  assistance	  from	  international	  society.	   	  	  Africa’s	  attitude	  towards	  international	  responsibility	  results	  from	  its	  position	  as	  recipient	   countries.	   In	   terms	   of	   intervention,	   the	   African	   Union	   and	   the	  continent’s	   key	   regional	   organisations	   —	   the	   Southern	   African	   Development	  Community	  (SADC),	  the	  Economic	  Community	  of	  West	  African	  States	  (ECOWAS),	  the	   Intergovernmental	   Authority	   on	   Development	   (IGAD),	   the	   Economic	  Community	   of	   Central	   African	   States	   (ECCAS),	   and	   the	   Arab	   Maghreb	   Union	  (AMU)	  —	  have	   increasingly	   taken	   leading	  roles	   in	   implementing	  Responsibility	  to	   Protect	   (Sarkin	   &	   Paterson,	   2010).	   Theoretically,	   most	   African	   countries	  support	  the	  concept	  of	  Responsibility	  to	  Protect.	  When	  R2P	  was	  endorsed	  by	  the	  UN	  in	  2005,	  53	  African	  governments	  also	  adopted	  it.	  The	  African	  Union	  has	  even	  included	   the	   policy	   into	   its	   constitution.	   Some	   African	   countries	   went	   even	  further,	  and	  reached	  an	  agreement	  on	  the	  regional	  organisations’	  intervention	  in	  conflict.	  However,	   if	  we	   look	  at	  each	   individual	  state,	  many	  African	   leaders	  still	  remain	   cautious	  and	   suspicious	  of	   interference	   in	   their	  domestic	   affairs	  due	   to	  their	   colonialism	   histories	   and	   the	   Cold	   War.	   They	   prefer	   intervention	   from	  regional	   organisations,	   rather	   than	   from	   the	  UN	  or	  US-­‐led	  organisations.	  Many	  African	   scholars	   do	   not	   favour	   humanitarian	   intervention	   on	   this	   continent	  where	  the	  majority	  of	  conflicts	  and	  human	  rights	  violations	  occur.	  They	  are	  more	  concerned	   about	   the	   following	   phase	   -­‐	   that	   is,	   the	   post-­‐conflict	   peace	   and	  rebuilding,	   reconstruction	   and	   economic	   assistance.	   Some	   have	   suggested	   that	  local	   communities	   should	   play	   a	   bigger	   role	   by	   cooperating	  with	   international	  organisations,	   which	   will	   ensure	   that	   adequate	   resources	   are	   channelled	   into	  peace	   efforts	   in	   Africa	   (Sarkin	   &	   Paterson,	   2010).	   Some	   researchers	   from	  more-­‐developed	  countries	  have	  emphasised	  their	  own	  countries’	  significance	  in	  the	  continent.	  For	  example,	  South	  Africa	  and	  Nigeria	   in	  Western	  Africa,	  believe	  they	   should	  have	   a	   greater	   role	   in	   the	   implementation	   of	   responsibility	   in	   this	  region.	   One	   could	   say	   African	   scholars’	   perspectives	   are	   far	   from	   forming	   a	  unified	   voice	   on	   the	   world	   stage.	   However,	   they	   do	   represent	   a	   Third	   World	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opinion	   of	   the	   term,	   that	   is,	   “security	   depends	   more	   on	   state	   building	   and	  economic	   development	   than	   protection	   against	   military	   threats	   internal	   and	  external.”	  (Keller	  &	  Rothchild,	  July/August	  1997)	  
IV.	  Defining	  International	  Responsibility	  
Inspired	   by	  Western	   scholars,	   China’s	   and	   Africa’s	   interpretations	   of	   the	   term	  suggests	  we	  can	  infer	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  countries	  have	  reached	  an	  agreement	  on	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  state	  should	  be	  responsible	  domestically	  and	  internationally.	  A	  state’s	  primary	  responsibility	  lies	  at	  home,	  and	  the	  international	  society	  has	  a	  responsibility	   to	   intervene	   when	   a	   state	   fails	   to	   fulfil	   its	   obligations.	   To	   be	  specific,	   states	   need	   to	   shoulder	   the	   consequences	   of	   their	   misbehaviour	   or	  inaction,	   to	   comply	   with	   relevant	   international	   laws,	   regulations	   and	  international	   norms,	   and	   to	   address	   the	   obligations	   and	   responsibilities	   of	  international	  society	  with	  its	  own	  capability.	  But,	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  the	  criterion	  are	   for	   “being	   responsible”,	   different	   perspectives	   have	   arrived	   at	   different	  answers.	  Western	   researchers	   are	   dedicated	   to	   viewing	   responsibility	   through	  the	  lens	  of	  a	  democratic	  system	  and	  human	  rights	  protection.	  These	  trends	  form	  an	   international	   mainstream	   consensus	   and	   an	   entry	   ticket	   for	   states	   to	   be	  accepted	  by	  the	   international	  society.	  While	  Chinese	  scholars	  consider	  a	  state’s	  capability	  in	  undertaking	  responsibilities,	  and	  African	  scholars’	  interpretation	  is	  based	  on	  the	  demands	  of	  recipient	  countries.	   	  	  The	   evaluation	   on	   the	   term	   “responsibility”	   lays	   a	   foundation	   from	   which	   to	  further	  explore	  the	  idea	  of	  “international	  responsibility”.	  Combing	  the	  discussion	  of	  International	  relations	  theory	  and	  the	  thoughts	  from	  developing	  countries,	  the	  five	  criteria	  established	  for	  how	  judging	  “responsibility”	  could	  be	  developed	  for	  the	  state	  level	  are	  as	  follows:	   	  	  1)	   Good	   governance:	   this	   criteria	   looks	   at	   retrospective	   responsibility.	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Regarding	  the	  state-­‐	  level,	  it	  refers	  to	  the	  basic	  requirement	  that	  any	  state	  has	  to	  fulfil	  its	  legal	  responsibilities	  and	  abide	  by	  multilateral	  and	  bilateral	  treaties	  and	  agreements,	   to	   bear	   the	   punishment	   and	   consequences	   if	   they	   fail	   to	   do	   so.	   In	  theory,	   this	  contractual	  responsibility	  should	  be	  abided	  by	  any	  state,	  no	  matter	  its	   size.	   According	   to	   the	   English	   School’s	   advocation	   of	   “responsible	  sovereignty”,	  this	  criterion	  serves	  to	  assess	  the	  legitimisation	  of	  a	  sovereign	  state.	  If	  any	  state	  violates	  its	  legal	  responsibility,	  the	  international	  society	  has	  the	  right	  to	  intervene	  or	  punish	  in	  order	  to	  stop	  any	  illegal	  behaviour.	   	  	  The	  second	  to	  fifth	  criteria	  look	  at	  prospective	  responsibilities:	   	   	  	  2)	   Expression:	   this	   criterion	   refers	   to	   policy	   and	   foreign	   strategy.	   Even	   if	   a	  state’s	   foreign	   policy	   and	   motivation	   are	   designed	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   its	   own	  interests,	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   compare	   the	   subject’s	   expression	   with	   external	  demands,	   and	   to	   see	   the	   extent	   to	  which	   they	   are	   compatible	  with	   each	  other.	  Inspired	   by	   the	   evaluation	   of	   “responsibility”,	   three	   influential	   factors	   have	  shaped	  the	  state’s	  responsible	  (irresponsible)	  policy	  -­‐	  that	  is,	  a	  state’s	  motivation,	  the	   recipient	   countries’	   demands	   and	   international	   expectations.	   In	   terms	   of	   a	  state’s	   capability,	   it	   refers	   to	   a	   combined	   consideration	   of	   the	   state’s	   identity,	  national	   strengthen,	   national	   interests,	   and	   its	   relations	   with	   the	   recipient	  country.	  The	  African	  perspective	  has	  made	  a	  contribution	  by	  clarifying	  recipient	  countries’	  demands,	  while	  the	  Western	  perspective	  has	  shaped	  the	  international	  mainstream	  expectation.	  	  3)	   The	  subject’s	  capability:	  this	  criterion	  echoes	  the	  Chinese	  scholar’s	  argument	  for	  combining	  national	  strength	  with	  international	  responsibility.	  It	  implies	  that	  bigger	   states	   have	   greater	   responsibilities,	   and	   some	   particularly	   influential	  states	  bear	  additional	  responsibilities	  due	  to	  their	  significant	  position.	  For	  Bull,	  “A	  great	  power	  cannot	  ignore	  these	  demands,	  or	  adopt	  a	  contrary	  position	  in	  the	  way	   that	   lesser	   powers	   can	   do;	   its	   freedom	  of	  manoeuvre	   is	   circumscribed	   by	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‘responsibility’.”	   (Bull,	   2002,	   pp.	   199-­‐222)	   It	   is	   unavoidable	   that	   states	   will	  shoulder	   responsibility	   according	   to	   its	   current	   development	   status	   and	  capability.	   This	   criterion	   provides	   higher	   standards	   for	   those	   more	   powerful	  states,	  and	  tolerance	  for	  those	  less-­‐developed	  states.	  But	  it	   is	  worth	  noting	  that	  the	   consideration	   of	   capability	   is	   not	   an	   excuse	   for	   not	   being	   responsible,	   or	  ignoring	   	   responsibilities.	   The	   following	   criteria	   from	   recipient	   countries	   and	  international	  society’s	  perspective	  could	  be	  used	  as	  an	  adjustment	  to	  avoid	  this	  problem.	  	  The	   subject’s	   behaviour:	   Basically,	   the	   state’s	   behaviour	   has	   three	  responsibilities,	   as	   discussed	   in	   earlier	   sections:	   legal,	   political	   and	  moral.	   The	  subject’s	  behaviour	  is	  closely	  connected	  to	  the	  subject’s	  capability.	  This	  criterion	  is	  employed	  to	  compare	  with	  the	  expression.	   	  	  4)	   The	   consequences	   and	   impacts:	   this	   criterion	   is	   viewed	   from	   the	   recipient	  country’s	   perspective.	   African	   researchers	   have	   offered	   a	   series	   of	   analyses	   on	  the	   efficiency	  of	  helping	   recipient	   countries.	  But	   “recipient	   countries”	   is	   a	   very	  general	   term.	   Take	   Africa	   as	   an	   example:	   the	   continent	   is	  made	   up	   of	   diverse	  countries	  with	   their	  own	   interests,	  priorities	  and	  agendas.	   In	  each	  country,	   the	  interests	   among	  different	   groups,	   levels	   and	   even	   individuals	  may	   be	   different	  and	  sometimes	  conflict.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  evaluation	  of	  a	  state’s	  impact	  on	  recipient	  countries	  should	  be	  analysed	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis.	   	  	  5)	   External	   Expectations:	   This	   criterion	   is	   viewed	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	  international	  society.	  Currently,	  the	  international	  society	  has	  reached	  agreement	  on	  protecting	  its	  people	  from	  genocide,	  war	  crimes,	  ethnic	  cleansing,	  and	  crimes	  against	  humanity,	  to	  develop	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  welfare	  of	  their	  people,	  to	  maintain	  an	   open,	   transparent	   and	   incorruptible	   government,	   to	   create	   economic	  prosperity,	  and	  to	  diminish	  the	  risk	  of	  mass	  emigration.	  Differences	  lie	  in	  when	  a	  state	   fails	   to	   accomplish	   these	   tasks,	   to	   what	   extent	   should	   the	   international	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Figure	  3.2	  Subcategory	  of	  state’s	  responsibility	  
Source:	  author	  
	  There	  are	  certain	  misunderstandings	  that	  need	  to	  be	  addressed,	  and	  are	  detailed	  in	  the	  following	  section. 	  	  International	   responsibility	   is	   not	   “great	   power	   responsibility”.	   Although	   great	  powers	   have	   a	   significant	   impact	   on	  maintaining	   order,	   peace	   and	   stability,	   as	  well	   as	   ensuring	   the	   international	   system	   and	   some	   basic	   values,	   each	  international	  actor	  should	  share	  its	  responsibility	  based	  on	  its	  own	  identity	  and	  capability.	   On	   one	   hand,	   as	   the	   integration	   of	   the	   global	   economy	   and	   the	  dynamic	  distribution	  of	  power,	  superpowers	  or	  power	  allies	  can	  hardly	  deal	  with	  the	   ever	   more	   complex	   and	   diverse	   issues.	   Negative	   issues	   that	   would	   need	  addressing	   include	   terrorism,	   disease,	   poverty	   and	   regional	   conflicts;	   and	  positive	   issues	   include	   international-­‐cooperation,	   communication,	   foreign	  investment	  and	  foreign	  aid.	  Bull	  has	  advocated	  that	  great	  powers	  should	  provide	  for	   international	   and	   global	   order	   (Bull,	   2002,	   p.	   200).	   But	   order	   relies	   on	   the	  joint	  efforts	  of	  all	  states	  in	  international	  society.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  according	  to	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the	  English	   School’s	   interpretation	  of	   “responsible	   sovereignty”,	   all	   states	  have	  basic	  responsibilities	  to	  their	  people	  and	  international	  community,	  otherwise	  its	  sovereignty	  will	  not	  be	  recognised	  by	  the	  international	  community.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  developing	  countries	  are	  wary	  of	  great	  power	  responsibilities,	  as	  they	  are	  concerned	   that	   international	   society	   relying	  excessively	  on	  select	  great	  powers	  may	  increase	  the	  distance	  between	  states,	  and	  can	  even	  sometimes	  be	  used	  as	  an	  excuse	  for	  violating	  sovereignty	  (Kang,	  2012).	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  following	  chapter	  will	  argue	  that	  each	  state	  as	  a	  member	  of	  the	  global	  community	  has	  respectively	  responsibility	  according	  to	  its	  capability.	  Differences	  would	  be	  reflected	  by	  their	  scales	  and	  capabilities	  decide	  the	  level	  of	  responsibility.	  	  International	   responsibility	   is	   not	   the	   same	   as	   state	   responsibility.	   Alongside	  economic	   globalization	   and	   integration,	  more	   and	  more	   factors	   have	   begun	   to	  have	   an	   impact,	   sometimes	   powerful/considerable,	   on	   the	   development	   of	   the	  host	  countries	  -­‐	  both	  positively	  and	  negatively	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  politics,	  society	  and	   economy.	  However,	   the	   rules	   and	   regulations	   for	  multinational	   corporates	  (MNCs)	   and	   other	   non-­‐governmental	   international	   actors’	   responsibilities	   to	  host	   countries	   are	   lacking	   and	   slow	   to	   respond	   to	   the	   changing	   situation.	  Currently,	   most	   overseas	   companies	   and	   organisations	   are	   regulated	   by	  Corporate	   Social	  Responsibility	   for	   the	  protection	  of	   local	   labour	   rights,	   safety,	  welfare	  and	  the	  environment.	  Some	   leading	  companies	  go	   further,	  and	  concern	  themselves	   with	   the	   welfare	   of	   the	   local	   population	   and	   communities.	   But,	   in	  practice,	  due	  to	  their	  interest-­‐driven	  nature,	  companies’	  awareness	  and	  activities	  in	   shouldering	   responsibility	   are	   constrained	  by	   their	  pursuit	   of	   profits.	  As	   for	  medium	   and	   small	   companies,	   their	   pursuit	   of	   profits	   often	   sacrifices	   the	  interests	   of	   their	   host	   country.	   Their	   misbehaviour	   and	   mistakes	   in	   the	   host	  countries	  do	  not	  only	  affect	  their	  own	  reputations,	  but	  also	  the	  image	  of	  the	  state	  from	  which	  they	  originate.	   	   	   	  	  International	  Responsibility	  is	  not	  merely	  “responsibility	  to	  protect”	  (R2P).	  The	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principle	  of	  R2P	  adopted	  by	  UN	  in	  2005	  has	  been	  endorsed	  by	  the	  majority	  of	  UN	  members,	  and	  it	  officially	  solves	  the	  dilemma	  between	  crimes	  against	  humanity	  and	   sovereignty	   and	   domestic	   jurisdiction.	   However,	   as	   an	   emerging	   norm,	  doubts	  still	  persist	  among	  supporters	  and	  sceptics;	  for	  example,	  the	  alternatives	  to	  military	  intervention	  (Teitt,	  2008,	  p.	  17).	  On	  one	  hand,	  the	  norm	  is	  incomplete	  in	  reflecting	  the	   fact	   that	  states	  have	  responsibilities	  beyond	  combating	  human	  rights	  violations;	  and	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  where,	  when	  and	  who	  is	  to	  intervene.	   Therefore,	   this	   thesis	   categorises	   the	   R2P	   as	   a	   kind	   of	   obligation	  applied	   in	   extreme	   cases,	   and	   a	   commitment	   to	   promote	   the	   legitimacy	   of	  international	  responsibility.	  	  International	  Responsibility	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  international	  ethics.	  International	  ethics	   are	   concerned	  with	   the	   extent	   and	   scope	   of	   ethical	   obligations	   between	  states	  in	  an	  era	  of	  globalization.	  It	  is	  more	  like	  moral	  responsibility	  discussed	  in	  an	   earlier	   section.	   International	   responsibility	   addresses	   legal,	   political	   and	  moral	   aspects.	   It	   also	   considers	   domestic	   situations	   as	   one	   of	   the	   criteria	  with	  which	   to	   evaluate	   whether	   responsibility,	   and	   argues	   that	   domestic	  responsibility	  is	  the	  foundation	  for	  being	  responsible	  on	  the	  international	  stage.	  
3.3	  Framing	  China’s	  international	  responsibility	   	   	  
3.3.1	  External	  expectations	  and	  demands	  on	  China’s	  international	  
responsibility	   	  Since	   1997,	   the	   concept	   of	   great	   power	   responsibility	   has	   come	   to	   the	   fore,	  against	  a	  backdrop	  of	  warnings	  of	  the	  rising	  “China	  Threat”	  (Buzan	  &	  Foot,	  2002,	  p.	   52).	   Zoellick,	   former	   deputy	   secretary	   of	   state,	   a	   well-­‐known	   advocator	   of	  China’s	   international	   responsibility,	   has	   urged	   China	   to	   become	   “a	   responsible	  stakeholder”.	   In	   his	   speech,	   China’s	   “responsible	   stakeholder”	   covered	   “a	  wide	  spectrum	  of	  faster	  political	  reform,	  stronger	  IPR	  protection,	   looser	  control	  over	  RMB	  exchange	  rates,	  higher	  military	  budget	   transparency,	  bigger	  contributions	  towards	   post-­‐war	   reconstruction	   in	   Afghanistan	   and	   Iraq,	   etc.”	   (H.	   Niu,	   2007)	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Zoellick’s	  demands	  of	  China’s	   responsibilities	  are	  well	   tailored	   to	   the	  US’s	  own	  interests,	   and	   the	   European	   Commission’s	   expressions	   reflect	   the	   EU’s	  expectations.	  The	  European	  Commission	   issued	   its	  China	  policy	  paper,	   entitled	  “EU-­‐China:	   Closer	   Partners	   and	   Growing	   Responsibilities,”	   which	   called	   for	   a	  greater	   emphasis	   on	   Beijing’s	   part	   on	   democracy,	   energy	   efficiency	   and	  environmental	   protection,	   trade	   and	   customs	   and	   international	   cooperation	   in	  East	  Asia	   (EU	  Commission,	  2006).	  Especially	   in	   the	  political	   realm,	  Europe	  has	  advocated	   for	   China	   to	   engage	   with	   the	   international	   community	   through	  constant	   encouragement	   to	   step	  up	   its	   reforms,	   adopt	   internationally	   accepted	  norms	   and	   values,	   and	   improve	   its	   domestic	   human	   rights	   situation	   (G.	  Wang,	  2008).	  Japan,	  for	  its	  part,	  demanded	  that	  China	  pay	  higher	  UN	  membership	  fees.	  In	   short,	   all	   these	   developed	   countries	   expected	   China	   to	   become	   deeper	  involved	   in	   the	   international	   system,	   and	   join	   their	   global	   efforts	   for	   greater	  common	   prosperity	   (H.	   Niu,	   2007).	   They	   particularly	   wished	   China	   to	   avoid	  being	   a	   free-­‐rider	   on	   the	   world	   stage	   while	   enjoying	   the	   economic	   benefits	  within	  it,	  to	  open	  its	  domestic	  market	  and	  offer	  them	  new	  market	  opportunities,	  and	   also	   to	   promote	   human	   rights	   and	   democracy.	   In	   contrast,	   developing	  nations	   mostly	   want	   Beijing	   to	   promote	   their	   interests	   in	   the	   international	  community	   and	   to	   raise	   development	   aid	   and	   foreign	   investment	   as	   an	  alternative	  source	  to	  the	  US	  or	  EU.	  In	  other	  words,	  to	  “represent	  the	  developing	  countries	  to	  play	  a	  bigger	  role	  in	  world	  stage”	  and	  provide	  development	  finance	  (Yongnian	   Zheng,	   August	   8	   2007).	   Generally,	   the	   external	   demands	   on	   and	  expectations	   for	   China’s	   responsibilities	   range	   from	   security,	   political	   and	  governmental	  reform,	  ,	  to	  economic	  development	  and	  international	  order.	  All	  of	  the	   requirements	  are	  designed	   to	   satisfying	  other	  nation’s	  needs	  and	   interests,	  some	  of	  which	  are	  consistent	  with	  China’s	  interests	  and	  principles	  but	  some	  may	  not	   be;	   some	   are	   reasonable	   and	   some	   may	   be	   beyond	   China’s	   capability.	   In	  response	   to	   these	   various	   demands,	   the	   Chinese	   political	   elites	   have	   given	  different	  answers.	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3.3.2	  China’s	  interpretations	  of	  international	  responsibility	  
I.	  Responsibility	  and	  expectation	  
After	  Zoellick	  appealed	  for	  greater	  Chinese	  responsibility,	  Chinese	  academia	  and	  political	   elites	   given	   various	   responses,	   which	   can	   be	   divided	   into	   two	   main	  camps.	   The	   sceptics	   mostly	   came	   from	   party	   newspapers	   or	   government	  documents,	   and	   they	   argued	   that	   “China’s	   Collapse”,	   “China’s	   threat”	   and	   the	  current	  responsibility	  theory	  are	  interlinked;	  one	  is	  the	  cudgel	  to	  death	  (bangsha	  
棒杀)	  and	  the	  other	  one	  is	  praise	  to	  death	  (pengsha	   捧杀)	  (Chinanews.com,	  July	  30	   2010).	   Similar	   explanations	   include:	   China	   responsibility,	   exaggerated	   and	  embroidered	   by	   the	   West,	   is	   defined	   by	   the	   Western	   world	   solely	   on	   the	  conditions	  of	  satisfying	  their	  own	  needs	  and	  interests.	  This	  is	  literally	  evaluated	  by	  how	  much	  responsibility	  China	  has	  assumed	  for	  the	  West	  (Hongmei	  Li,	  2009).	  Urging	   China	   to	   become	   a	   responsible	   stakeholder	   implies	   China	   is	   not	   yet	   a	  responsible	   state	   (Guo,	   July	   27	   2010),	   and	   this	   statement	   masks	   a	   strategic	  conspiracy	  to	  set	  a	  trap	  for	  China	  (Lin,	  June	  2007)	  and	  suggests	  they	  are	  eager	  to	  capitalise	  on	  China’s	  strengths	  in	  order	  to	  shake	  off	  their	  own	  troubles,	  and	  also	  constrain	   China’s	   development	   by	   making	   it	   bear	   responsibilities	   beyond	   its	  capability	  (Wen,	  July	  31	  2010).	   	  	  The	   supporters	   mostly	   come	   from	   research	   institutes	   or	   universities.	   They	  believed	   that	   this	   concept	   conveys	   a	   message	   that	   China	   is	   accepted	   by	   the	  Western-­‐dominated	   international	   system,	   and	   that	   its	   international	   status	   and	  influence	  has	  been	   recognised	  by	   the	   traditional	  powers.	  To	  undertake	  greater	  international	   responsibilities	   is	   a	   useful	   way	   to	   eliminate	   the	   “China	   threat”	  fallacy,	   and	   to	   improve	  China’s	   image	   internationally	   (Y.	  Wang,	  2007).	   If	   China	  turns	   a	   deaf	   ear	   to	   the	   responsibility	   expectations,	   it	   would	   be	   easier	   for	   the	  traditional	   powers	   to	   doubt	   China’s	   peaceful	   rise,	   peaceful	   development,	  harmonious	  global	   foreign	  policy.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  developing	  countries	  could	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feel	  disappointed	  by	  China’s	  behaviour,	  which	  would	  lead	  China	  to	  be	  isolated	  on	  the	  world	  stage	  (J.	  Liu,	  March	  6	  2008).	  Since	  the	  government	  has	  put	  forward	  a	  harmonious	   world	   theory,	   it	   is	   time	   that	   China	   takes	   its	   responsibilities	   to	  safeguard	   this	   international	  system	   in	  which	  much	   is	  also	  at	  stake	   for	  China	  (J.	  Niu	  &	  Wu,	  2011).	  	  China’s	   rise	   has	   been	   more	   rapid	   than	   many	   expected.	   As	   a	   result,	   the	   state	  appears	  slow	  in	  responding	  to	  external	  expectations	  (Zhu,	  September	  2010).	  As	  the	  concept	  of	  “international	  responsibility”	  gradually	  becomes	  more	  accepted	  in	  China,	   the	   extent	   to	  which	   China	   should	   shoulder	   responsibility	   has	   become	   a	  concern	   in	   Chinese	   society.	   An	   article	   entitled	   “What	   international	  responsibilities	   should	   China	   take”,	   published	   in	   the	   People’s	   Daily,	   gave	   a	  threefold	  answer:	  1)	  to	  address	  China's	  problems	  well;	  2)	  to	  fulfil	  the	  duties	  and	  responsibilities	   imposed	   by	   the	   U.N.	   Charter	   and	  more	   than	   300	   international	  conventions	  China	  has	  joined;	  3)	  to	  the	  two	  major	  issues	  of	  the	  world:	  peace	  and	  development	   (People's	   Daily,	   February	   16	   2011).	   Comparing	   China’s	  interpretation	   of	   its	   responsibilities	   to	   those	   requirements	   from	   the	   US,	   EU,	  Japan	   and	   developing	   countries,	   even	   the	   researchers	   who	   favour	   the	  responsibility	   theory	   have	   agreed	   that	   external	   interests	   might	   contradict	  China’s	   own	   interests	   (Z.	   Chen,	   2009).	   This	   creates	   a	   gap	   between	   China’s	  conceived	  responsibility	  and	  international	  expectations.	  Further	  to	  this,	  it	  raised	  the	  question	  of	  how	  should	  China	  balance	  its	  domestic	  development	  agenda	  with	  foreign	  demands?	  Apparently,	  it	  is	  unrealistic	  for	  China	  to	  try	  everything	  simply	  to	  meet	   the	  high	  demands	  of	  others,	  and	  also	   to	   ignore	   the	   feedback	   from	  host	  countries	   and	   international	   society.	   On	   one	   side	   of	   the	   coin,	   high	   external	  expectations	  will	  help	  enhance	  the	  awareness	  of	  responsibility	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  Chinese	   leadership	   and	   people	   (J.	   Niu	   &	  Wu,	   2011);	   on	   the	   flip	   side,	   a	   proper	  balance	  should	  be	  made	  between	  the	  consideration	  of	  China’s	   identity,	  national	  interests,	  foreign	  policy	  principles,	  and	  capabilities.	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II．Responsibility	  and	  foreign	  policy	  principles	  
Contrasting	   attitudes	   to	   international	   responsibility	   reflect	   China’s	   debate	   on	  traditional	   foreign	  policy	  principles	  and	  the	   introspection	  of	   them.	  Launched	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1950s,	  the	  Five	  Principles	  of	  Peaceful	  Coexistence	  have	  had	  a	  profound	  influence	   in	   China’s	   foreign	   policy,	   and	   guided	   China’s	   diplomatic	   agenda	   ever	  since.	   These	   principles	   cover	   the	   claim	   of	   national	   sovereignty	   and	   territorial	  integrity,	   non-­‐aggression,	   peaceful	   coexistence,	   non-­‐interference	   in	   other	  countries’	  internal	  affairs,	  and	  equality	  and	  mutual	  benefit.	  Of	  these,	  advocating	  for	  “non-­‐interference”	  conflicts	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  being	  a	  responsible	  state	  because	  it	  requires	  the	  “right	  (and	  indeed	  the	  obligation)	  of	  the	  international	  community	  to	   infringe	   on	   the	   autonomy	   of	   the	   nation-­‐state	   to	   protect	   or	   advance	  considerations”	  (Harding,	  2009).	  However,	  adherence	  to	  “non-­‐interference”	  does	  not	   necessarily	   mean	   China	   could	   escape	   from	   shouldering	   its	   international	  responsibilities.	   Along	   with	   its	   expansion	   into	   world	   stage,	   the	   Chinese	  interpretation	  of	  “non-­‐interference”	  has	  experienced	  an	  evolution	  according	  to	  a	  changing	  political	  strategy.	   	   	   	  	  The	  five	  principles	  were	  introduced	  at	  a	  time	  that	  China’s	  foreign	  policy	  had	  “the	  tendency	  to	  regard	  social	  system,	  ideology,	  or	  the	  concept	  of	  values	  as	  inevitably	  determining	   the	   relationship	   between	   nations”	   (Harding,	   2009).	   China	   has	   a	  strong	  motivation	   to	   safeguard	   national	   sovereignty,	  which	   reflects	   a	   different	  ethical	   judgment	   tradition	   and	  produced	   very	   different	   approaches	   for	   dealing	  with	  today’s	  international	  problems.	   	  	  In	  the	  1990s,	  then-­‐Chinese	  leader	  Deng	  Xiaoping	  laid	  out	  a	  guideline	  for	  Chinese	  foreign	  policy:	   “keep	   a	   low	  profile,	   and	   achieving	   something”.	   For	  more	   than	   a	  decade,	   Chinese	   foreign	   policy	   was	   generally	   grounded	   in	   the	   principle	   of	  “keep[ing]	   a	   low	   profile”,	   concentrating	   on	   creating	   a	   favourable	   external	  environment	   for	   economic	   development	   at	   home.	   Also	   Deng	   Xiaoping’s	   theory	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for	  China’s	  domestic	  development	  implies	  that	  China	  should	  “be	  navigating	  along	  the	   middle	   course	   and	   concentrate	   on	   more	   practical	   things	   rather	   than	   seek	  leadership	  or	  hegemony”	  (Hengjie	  Li,	  2008,	  p.	  2).	  Deng’s	  reforms	  brought	  China	  dramatic	   economic	   growth.	   At	   a	   time	   when	   China	   has	   accumulated	   certain	  economic	  achievements,	  the	  debate	  on	  whether	  China	  should	  continue	  to	  “keep	  a	  low	   file”	   has	   grown	   louder.	   Some	   researchers	   have	   argued	   that	   “the	   present	  international	   distribution	   of	   power	   has	   not	   undergone	   substantive	   changes,	  compared	   with	   what	   prevailed	   when	   Deng	   first	   put	   forward	   this	   idea”	   (Feng,	  2005).	   It	   is	   a	   long-­‐term	   strategy	   in	   order	   to	   “strive	   for	   the	   realisation	   of	   a	  harmonious	  world,	  and	  the	  image	  that	  a	  confident	  and	  modest	  nation	  shows	  to	  the	  outside	  world”	  (S.	  Zhou,	  2008).	  	  Evidence	   from	   both	   diplomatic	   practice	   and	   governmental	   doctrine	   has	  suggested	  that	  policy-­‐makers	  have	  made	  some	  subtle	  adjustments	  in	  exercising	  these	  traditional	  principles.	  China	  has	  endorsed	  Responsibility	  to	  Protect	  at	  the	  UN	  at	  the	  World	  Summit	  in	  2005.	  In	  2007,	  Hu	  Jintao	  said	  in	  his	  report	  to	  the	  17th	  CCP	  Congress:	  “We	  advocate	  that	  the	  people	  of	  all	  countries	  should	  cooperate	  in	  efforts	  to	  promote	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  harmonious	  world	  of	  lasting	  peace	  and	  common	  prosperity.	  To	  this	  end	  they	  should	  adhere	  to	  the	  aims	  and	  principles	  of	  the	   United	   Nations	   Charter,	   consult	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   equality,	   abide	   by	  international	   law	  and	   the	  commonly	  accepted	  norms	  of	   international	   relations,	  and	  advance	  the	  spirit	  of	  democracy,	  harmony,	  cooperation,	  and	  common	  gains	  in	   international	   relations”	   (Xinhua	   News,	   October	   24	   2007).	   In	   August	   2008,	  China	   was	   contributing	   more	   engineers	   and	   civilian	   police	   personnel	   to	   UN	  peacekeeping	   missions	   than	   any	   other	   permanent	   member	   of	   the	   Security	  Council	  (Gill	  &	  Huang,	  February	  2009).	  These	  actions	  demonstrated	  that	  Beijing	  exhibited	  some	  flexibility	  on	  their	  traditional	  principles.	  Also,	  there	  are	  examples	  of	   China	  using	   its	   influence	   on	  other	   regimes,	   like	  North	  Korea,	  Myanmar,	   and	  Sudan	   by	   sending	   special	   envoys	   for	   negotiations.	   In	   2009,	   an	   official	   Outlook	  magazine	  article,	  “Hu	  Jintao’s	  Viewpoints	  about	  the	  Times,”	  proposed	  a	  concept	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of	   “shared	   responsibility,”	   which	   set	   forth	   two	   important	   parameters	   for	  Beijing’s	   international	   responsibility.	   First,	   China’s	   contributions	   to	   the	   global	  commonwealth	   cannot	   adversely	   affect	   China’s	   core	   interests.	   Second,	   China’s	  international	   commitments	   are	   conditional	   upon	   the	   inputs	   of	   other	   states,	  especially	   developed	   countries	   and	   regions	   such	   as	   the	   United	   States	   and	   the	  European	  Union	   (Xinhua	  News,	  November	   24	   2009).	   In	   2011,	   China	   abstained	  rather	   than	   vetoed	   the	  UN	  Security	   Council	   resolution	   to	   impose	   a	   no-­‐fly	   zone	  over	   Libya,	   and	   measures	   to	   protect	   civilians	   from	   attacks	   by	   forces	   led	   by	  Gaddafi	   (IBtimes,	   March	   17	   2011).	   This	   suggests	   that	   Beijing	   has	   gradually	  abandoned	  its	  commitment	  to	  standing	  out	  of	  other	  countries’	  domestic	  affairs,	  slowly	   evolved	   from	   its	   traditional	   interpretation	   of	   “non-­‐interference”	   and	   	  became	  more	  active	  and	  cooperative	  in	  solving	  international	  crises.	  	  It	   is	   worth	   noting	   that	   China’s	   engagement	   in	   international	   affairs	   does	   not	  signify	  a	  top-­‐down,	  radical	  shift.	  Concerning	  the	  debate	  on	  whether	  or	  not	  China	  needs	  to	  still	  “keep	  a	  low	  profile”,	  Chinese	  scholars	  have	  other	  suggestions.	  Some	  researchers	   argue	   that	   China	   “needs	   to	   be	   more	   bold	   and	   assertive	   in	  international	  affairs	   in	  a	  way	   that	  matches	  China’s	  newfound	  status	  as	  a	  major	  world	  power”	  (Yan,	  March	  31	  2011).	  Others	  have	  tried	  to	  find	  a	  balance	  between	  “keep	   a	   low	   profile”	   (taoguang	   yanghui	   韬光养晦)	   and	   “achieving	   something”	  (yousuo	  zuowei	   有所作为),	  and	  suggested	  that	  “doing	  something	  in	  the	  lights	  of	  general	  trend”	  (shunshi	  erwei	   顺势而为).	  This	  is	  not	  a	  passive	  or	  reactive	  policy,	  but	   one	   aimed	   at	   defusing	   the	   pressures	   of	   responsibility.	   Instead,	   it	   is	   a	  proactive	   approach,	   which	   combines	   China’s	   development	   strategy	   with	   a	  peaceful	   cooperation	   in	   the	   current	   international	   system	   (X.	   Zhao,	   2010).	   In	  short,	  Chinese	  policy	  makers	  have	  recognized	   that	   the	  principle	  of	   “keep	  a	   low	  profile”	  and	  “non-­‐interference”	  were	  not	  always	  compatible	  with	  China’s	  current	  expansion	  and	  influence.	  And	  the	  country	  has	  undergone	  a	  stop-­‐and-­‐go	  process	  in	  order	   to	  demonstrate	  a	  responsible	  role	   to	   the	  world.	  Chapter	  4	  will	   further	  discuss	   the	   relationship	   between	   China’s	   international	   responsibility	   and	   its	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foreign	  policy.	  
III.	  Responsibility	  and	  national	  interests	  
Zhou	  argues	  that	  China	  must	  act	  as	  a	  great	  power	  and	  shoulder	  its	  responsibility	  in	   keeping	   with	   its	   peaceful	   development	   strategy.	   Furthermore,	   as	   its	   global	  influence	  expands,	  this	  would	  also	  benefit	  its	  external	  interests	  and	  improve	  its	  image	   (G.	   Zhou,	   2009).	   Zhou’s	   argument	   connected	   “being	   responsible”	   with	  national	   interests	   (image).	  The	  majority	  of	   researchers	  agree	   that	   interests	  are	  composed	  of	   two	  aspects,	   both	  hard	  and	   soft	   interests	   -­‐	   the	   former	   refers	   to	   a	  peaceful	   and	   stable	   international	   system,	   the	   latter	   indicates	   a	   peaceful	   power	  image	   (Wu,	   2010).	   According	   to	   this	   category,	   international	   responsibility	   is	  compatible	  with	  soft	  interests	  and	  is	  not	  always	  compatible	  with	  hard	  interests.	   	  	  Chinese	   scholars	   have	   emphasised	   that	   China’s	   international	   responsibility	  should	   be	   defined	   by	   its	   own	   national	   interest.	   This	   could	   also	   be	   reflected	   in	  China’s	   interpretation	  of	   “international	   responsibility”.	  As	   for	   the	   foundation	  of	  international	  responsibility,	  Chinese	  researchers	  hold	  that	  “as	  the	  world’s	  most	  populous	   country,	   China’s	   primary	   responsibility	   should	   be	   to	   provide	   for	   its	  citizens,	  who	  account	   for	  one	   fifth	  of	   the	  world	  population,	   and	  ensure	   them	  a	  better	   life.	   This	   is	   not	   merely	   a	   domestic	   affair,	   but	   also	   one	   of	   international	  significance.”	   (Hu,	  2007)	  Based	  on	   this	   reorganization,	   a	  peaceful	   international	  environment,	  international	  cooperation	  and	  communication	  are	  for	  China’s	  own	  interests..	   	  	  Therefore,	   some	   Chinese	   researchers	   advocate	   viewing	   international	  responsibility	  as	  a	  win-­‐win	  situation	  between	  China	  and	  a	  host	  country,	   rather	  than	   a	   burden.	   They	   suggest	   states	   undertake	   international	   responsibilities	  based	  on	  their	  own	  interests,	  which	  is	  why	  the	  great	  powers	  with	  the	  broadest	  interests	   have	   always	   been	   the	   most	   active	   in	   acting	   on	   international	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responsibilities	   in	  the	  past	  (Yan,	  2011).	  As	  China’s	  economy	  continues	  to	  grow,	  its	   trading	  partners	   expanded	  across	   the	  world,	  which	  brought	   its	   attention	   to	  previously	   ignored	   countries,	   such	   as	   Africa,	   Latin	   America,	   and	   in	   the	  Middle	  East.	   The	   political	   and	   economic	   situation	   in	   those	   countries	   is	   connected	   to	  China’s	   interest.	   This	   understanding	   has	   brought	   a	   broader	   interpretation	   of	  China’s	  national	   interests,	  and	  advocates	  a	   “mutual	  benefits”	   situation	  between	  China	  and	  a	  host	  country.	  Even	  considering	  “win-­‐win”	  situation	  are	  mostly	  come	  out	   of	   political	   rhetoric,	   it	   cannot	   deny	   the	   fact	   that	   national	   interests	   are	   not	  necessarily	  identified	  in	  accordance	  with	  international	  expectations,	  nor	  do	  they	  necessarily	  contradict	  them.	  Like	  many	  other	  countries,	  China’s	  responsibility	  is	  a	   combination	   and	   comprise	   between	   national	   interests	   and	   external	  expectations.	  The	  second	  section	  of	  each	  case	  study	  chapter	  will	  further	  discuss	  the	  dynamic	  interaction	  between	  national	  interests	  and	  external	  expectations.	   	  
IV.	  Responsibility	  and	  capability	  
If	   legal	   and	   political	   responsibility	   is	   seen	   as	   the	   base	   line	   of	   international	  responsibility,	   then	   moral	   responsibility	   could	   be	   interpreted	   as	   the	   highest	  standard	  of	  the	  three	  layers.	  Many	  Chinese	  researchers	  insist	  that	  China	  should	  do	  what	  it	  is	  able	  to	  do,	  no	  less	  and	  no	  more(Zhu,	  September	  2010).To	  figure	  out	  what	   China’s	   proper	   obligations	   are,	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   keep	   an	   eye	   on	   its	  capabilities.	   	  	  China’s	  capability	  is	  an	  ambiguous	  term,	  that	  depends	  on	  from	  what	  perspective	  you	   are	   looking	   at	   this	   country.	  One	  may	   conclude	  China	   as	   a	   strong	   economy	  power	   if	   we	   consider	   the	   figure	   that	   since	   2006,	   China	   has	   held	   the	   world’s	  largest	  foreign	  exchange	  reserves	  for	  four	  years,	  from	  1.066	  trillion	  US	  dollars,	  to	  2.399	  trillion	  US	  dollars	  by	  the	  end	  of	  2009.	  Up	  to	  2009,	  China	  followed	  the	  US,	  France,	  Japan	  and	  Germany,	  ranked	  fifth	  with	  565.3	  billion	  US	  dollars	  in	  foreign	  direct	  investment.	  In	  2010,	  China’s	  GDP	  surpassed	  that	  of	  Japan	  and	  become	  the	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world’s	   second	   largest	   economy;	   however,	   one	  may	   also	   categorise	   China	   as	   a	  weak	  state	  when	  considering	  China’s	  domestic	  problem	  on	  governance,	  wealth	  gap,	   pollution	   and	   corruption.	   The	   United	   Nations	   Development	   Program	  (UNDP),	  which	  calculates	  a	  “human	  development	  index”	  for	  each	  country	  based	  on	   three	   indices	   –	   average	   life	   expectancy,	   education	   and	   living	   standards	   –	  ranked	  China	  89th	   in	  2010,	   and	  categorised	   it	   as	   a	  developing	   country	  with	   “a	  medium	   level	   of	   development”.	   Of	   the	   12	   indices	   examined	   in	   the	   Global	  Competitiveness	   Report	   of	   2009-­‐2010	   issued	   by	   the	   World	   Economic	   Forum,	  China	  ranked	  79th	  in	  the	  world	  in	  the	  maturity	  of	  its	  science	  and	  technology	  (Qu,	  February	  18	  2011).	  It	  could	  be	  say	  that	  China	  has	  made	  a	  great	  achievement	  in	  boosting	   its	   economy,	   but	   over-­‐rapid	   growth	   has	   brought	   about	   an	   imbalance,	  which	   can	   be	   seen	   in	   its	   social	   development,	   education,	   health,	   science	   and	  technology,	   legislation,	   modernisation,	   and	   so	   forth.	   According	   to	   the	   World	  Bank	   and	   IMF,	   China	   remains	   a	   lower	   middle-­‐income	   country.	   The	   dual	  interpretation	  of	  China’s	  capability	  has	  created	  a	  gap,	  between	  China’s	  expected	  national	  power	  versus	  that	  of	   its	  practical	  power;	  the	  potential	  strength	  and	  its	  influence,	   versus	   its	   current	   international	   capability;	   limited	   resources	   for	  domestic	  development	  versus	   international	  demands.	  Much	  of	  Chinese	  political	  discourse	   recognises	   this	   gap,	   and	   concludes	   that	   China	   is	   the	   world’s	   largest	  developing	   country,	   with	   a	   large	   population,	   a	   poor	   foundation	   and	   uneven	  economic	   development.	   Hence,	   it	   should	   not	   assume	   responsibilities	   out	   of	  proportion	  to	  its	  strengths	  and	  development	  phase	  (Zhu,	  September	  2010).	  	  Meanwhile,	  when	  discussing	  China’s	  responsibility	  in	  Africa,	  China’s	  place	  is	  as	  a	  donor	  and	  Africa	  as	  a	  recipient.	  Ostensibly,	  the	  relationship	  is	  asymmetrically	  in	  favour	   of	   the	   donor.	   And	   it	   seems	   that	   the	   donor	   has	  maintained	   the	   decision	  power	  while	  the	  recipient	   is	   in	  a	  passive	  position.	   In	  practice,	  however,	   foreign	  assistance	  from	  China	  is	  neither	  military	  nor	  economic	  intervention.	  Instead,	  it	  is	  the	  transfer	  and	  exchange	  of	  resources,	  which	  could	  not	  be	  achieved	  without	  the	  cooperation	  from	  the	  host	  country.	  Therefore,	  the	  recipient	  has	  a	  capability	  that	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is	  not	  consistent	  with	  its	  national	  strength.	  China’s	  capability	  in	  the	  host	  African	  countries	  is	  constrained	  by	  the	  political	  and	  economic	  situation	  therein.	  The	  host	  country	  has	   the	   ability	   to	   affect	   China’s	   implementation	  of	   its	  African	   strategy.	  The	  third	  section	  of	  each	  case	  study	  chapter	  will	  analyse	  China’s	  limitations	  for	  implementing	  responsibility	  in	  the	  host	  countries.	   	  	  In	  response	  to	  the	  three	  levels	  of	  China’s	  international	  responsibility,	  the	  proper	  responsibilities	  can	  be	  summarised	  thus:	  	  1)	  Domestically	  	  Premier	  Li	  Keqiang,	   said	   in	  Davos	   in	   the	   summer	  of	  2013,	   that	   “China	   is	   still	   a	  developing	   country.	   According	   to	   international	   standards,	   we	   have	  more	   than	  100	  million	  people	  who	  live	  below	  the	  poverty	  line.	  China’s	  modernisation	  has	  a	  long	   and	   arduous	   way	   to	   go,	   its	   international	   responsibility	   and	   obligation	  should	   be	   in	   accordance	   with	   its	   development	   status.”	   (News,	   September	   13	  2013)	   Excessively	   undertaking	   responsibility	   is	   unsustainable	   and	   a	   long-­‐term	  internationally	  responsible	  role	  depends	  on	  domestic	  sustainable	  development.	  Witness	  3	  said:	  	  China	  should	  not	  shoulder	  international	  responsibility	  beyond	  its	  capability.	  In	  a	  transitional	   period,	   it	   has	   the	   problems	   of	   social	   justice,	   environmental	  protection,	  three	  rural	   issue	  and	  population	  aging.	  As	  Premier	  Wen	  Jiabao	  said,	  solving	  our	   own	  problems	   is	   the	   largest	   responsibility	   to	   international	   society.	  Because	  in	  a	  time	  of	  globalization	  and	  regionalisation,	  China’s	  domestic	  problem	  has	  a	  great	   impact	  worldwide,	  a	  peaceful	  and	  sustainable	  developing	  China	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  Beijing’s	  responsibility	  to	  the	  international	  society.	  Only	  with	  a	  growing	  China,	   can	   it	   have	   more	   capability	   and	   strengthen	   to	   fulfil	   its	   international	  responsibilities.	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Chinese	  officials’	  comments	  reflect	  the	  importance	  of	  China’s	  domestic	  affairs	  as	  the	  foundation	  of	  ‘being	  responsible’	  internationally.	  This	  indicates	  the	  fact	  that	  the	   stability	  and	  development	  of	   the	   state,	   especially	  a	   large	   state,	  benefits	   the	  world.	  However,	  the	  Chinese	  officials	  tend	  to	  consider	  economic	  performance	  as	  the	  only	  way	  to	  evaluate	  ‘being	  responsible’	  and	  to	  neglect	  many	  other	  important	  aspects,	   such	  as	  good	  governance	  and	   the	  protection	  of	  human	   rights.	  Without	  these	   normative	   measures,	   the	   state	   could	   never	   be	   considered	   as	   fully	  responsible	  and	  accepted	  by	  international	  society.	  	  2)	  Regional	  power	  Retrospective	   responsibility	   (which	   concerns	   China’s	   increasing	   influence	   and	  presence	   in	   this	   region,	   and	   the	   threats	   to	   its	   neighbours	   that	   come	   with	   it)	  requires	  China	  to	  be	  very	  prudent	  about	  its	  policymaking,	  and	  avoid	  the	  negative	  consequences	  and	  the	  potential	  conflicts	  within	  this	  region.	  Additionally,	  like	  any	  sovereign	  state	  in	  the	  world,	  China	  has	  to	  fulfil	  certain	  duties	  and	  responsibilities	  imposed	  on	  it	  by	  the	  U.N.	  Charter	  and	  more	  than	  300	  international	  conventions	  it	  has	   joined	  (People's	  Daily,	  February	  16	  2011),	  especially	  at	  a	   time	  when	  China	  gains	  membership	  of	  more	  and	  more	  treaties	  and	  organisations.	  Chinese	  political	  elites	   and	   researchers	   all	   agree	   that	   international	   responsibility	   should	   be	  undertaken	  based	  on	   the	  United	  Nations	  Charter	  and	   the	  existing	   international	  system	  and	  order.	   	  	  In	   terms	   of	   prospective	   responsibility,	   as	   an	   influential	   power	   in	   Asia,	   where	  about	  80%	  of	  its	  FDI	  goes,	  China	  considers	  its	  responsibility	  set/clear	  in	  this	  area,	  as	   currently	   China’s	   national	   interests	   are	   concentrated	   around	   Asia	   where	  hot-­‐button	  issues	  and	  great	  powers’	  involvement	  jointly	  impact	  its	  stability	  and	  development.	   Safeguarding	   peace	   and	   security	   in	   this	   region,	   advocating	   for	  regional	  or	  sub-­‐regional	  dialogue	  on	  security,	  and	  taking	  steps	  that	  would	  help	  to	  increase	   national	   confidence	   and	   assuage	   doubts	   while	   promoting	   the	  establishment	  of	  a	  security	  mechanism	  that	  conforms	  to	  the	  interests	  and	  wishes	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of	   all	   countries	   in	   this	   region,	   all	   of	   these	   are	   key	   elements	   of	   China’s	  responsibility	   (Y.	   Wang,	   2007).	   Meanwhile,	   China	   should	   shoulder	   greater	  responsibility	   in	   promoting	   Asian	   economic	   development,	   enlarging	   common	  economic	   interests	   among	   Asian	   countries,	   and	   enhancing	   the	   common	  prosperity	  of	  the	  region.	   	  	  3)	  Globally	   	  	  Whether	  or	  not	  China	  is	  a	  global	  power	  remains	  a	  controversial	  topic.	  However,	  as	  one	  of	  the	  five	  permanent	  members	  of	  the	  UN	  Security	  Council	  and	  a	  leading	  economy,	   certain	   corresponding	   responsibilities	   are	   unavoidable.	   For	   example,	  UN	   peacekeeping	   operations,	   and	   financial	   assistance.	   Some	   researchers	   from	  developing	   countries’	   have	   suggested	   that	   China	   should	   make	   the	   effort	   to	  address	   the	   imbalance	   between	   Northern	   and	   Southern	   states,	   to	   promote	  South-­‐South	   dialogue	   and	   cooperation,	   (He,	   2008)	   and	   to	   provide	   them	   with	  more	   aid	   and	   multilateral	   cooperation	   opportunities.	   Some	   writing	   from	   the	  development	  viewpoint	  advocated	  that,	  along	  with	  expanding	  overseas	  interests,	  it	   is	   China’s	   responsibility	   to	   safeguard	   the	   stability	   in	   those	   areas	   in	   order	   to	  secure	   its	   economic	   interests,	   including	   the	   safety	   of	   energy	   supplies,	   major	  strategic	   areas	   and	   transportation	   hubs	   (G.	   Zhou,	   2009).	   By	   doing	   this,	   it	   is	  China’s	   shared	   responsibility	   to	   cope	   with	   international	   terrorism,	   relational	  extremism,	  crisis	  and	  military	  conflicts.	  	  In	  conclusion,	  Chinese	  scholars	  believe	  that	  China’s	  responsibility	  is	  not	  what	  is	  imposed	  by	  western	  powers(Sun,	  2008),	  but	  rather	  the	  inevitably	  responsibility	  China	   should	   take	   in	   line	   with	   its	   own	   capability	   and	   practical	   national	  conditions.	   The	   following	   chapters	   will	   answer	   questions	   relating	   to	   the	  compatibility	  of	  China	  national	  interests	  with	  external	  (African	  and	  international)	  demands.	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3.4	  Conclusion	   	  This	   chapter	   has	   reviewed	   different	   interpretations	   of	   “international	  responsibility”,	  and	  has	  established	  five	  criteria	  to	  assess	  state	  responsibility.	  In	  addition	   to	   a	   country’s	   foreign	   strategy,	   it	   acknowledges	   the	   importance	   of	  comments	   from	   international	   society	   and	   feedback	   from	   host	   countries	   in	  shaping	  a	  state’s	  responsibility	  policy.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	   it	  emphasises	  a	  state’s	  capability	  in	  implementing	  responsibility	  in	  practice.	  Based	  on	  the	  five	  standards,	  it	   further	   explores	   what	   kinds	   of	   responsibility	   should	   a	   state	   like	   China	   take	  domestically,	  regionally,	  and	  globally.	   	  	  After	   reviewing	   the	   relationship	   between	   China’s	   international	   responsibility	  and	   national	   foreign	   policy,	   interests	   and	   capability.	   It	   recognises	   that	   China’s	  foreign	   policy	   agenda	   and	   national	   interests	   are	   not	   always	   contradicted	   by	  China’s	   international	   responsibility,	   because	   a	   responsible	   international	  reputation	  is	  of	  significance	  to	  Beijing’s	  soft	  interests,	  and	  a	  stable	  Africa	  is	  also	  in	  China’s	   interest.	  However,	  China’s	  capability	  of	  being	  fully	  responsible	   in	  the	  international	  society	  is	  constrained	  by	  China’s	  domestic	  developmental	  status	  on	  the	   one	   hand,	   and	   the	   diversified	   demands	   and	   limitations	   in	   the	   host	   African	  countries	   on	   the	   other.	   The	   following	   two	   chapters	   will	   discuss	   China’s	  international	  responsibility	  in	  Africa	  from	  the	  policy	  and	  implementation	  levels,	  respectively,	   and	   explore	   to	   what	   extent	   international	   responsibility	   is	  compatible	  with	  China’s	  national	  agenda.	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Chapter	  4	  China’s	  Policy	  Analysis	   	  
4.1	  Introduction	   	  Chapter	   three	   has	   set	   the	   criteria	   for	   “being	   a	   responsible	   stakeholder”	   in	  international	   society.	   Among	   the	   five	   standards,	   it	   included	   “expression”	   as	   an	  index	  to	  evaluate	  responsibility.	  On	  the	  state	  level,	  “expression”	  refers	  to	  policy	  and	   the	   foreign	   strategy	   behind	   it.	   Thus,	   it	   is	   useful	   to	   find	   out	   what	   China’s	  African	  policy	  is,	  in	  order	  to	  assess	  its	  responsibility	  in	  Africa	  and	  further	  to	  test	  hypothesis	  II,	  “are	  China’s	  motivations	  and	  African	  requirements	  incompatible?”	  This	   chapter	  will	   concentrate	  on	   the	  policy	   level	   and	  explore	  whether	  China	   is	  responsible	  in	  Africa	  based	  on	  this	  criteria	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  3.	   	  
4.2	  China’s	  African	  Policy	  and	  its	  Trends	   	  China’s	  Africa	  policy	  serves	  Beijing’s	  diplomatic	  strategy	  and	  trends	  as	  a	  whole.	  Its	   development	   reflects	   China’s	   evolving	   foreign	   policy.	   From	   the	   founding	   of	  the	   PRC	   in	   1949,	   to	   the	   introduction	   of	   Reform	   and	   Opening-­‐Up	   in	   1978,	   and	  further	   to	   the	   establishment	   of	   FOCAC	   in	   2000,	   China’s	   African	   policy	   is	   a	  miniature	  version	  of	  Chinese	  national	  political	  agenda	  as	  a	  whole.	  For	  more	  than	  half	   a	   century,	   China-­‐Africa	   relations	   have	   been	   conducted	   under	   the	   “Five	  Principles	  of	  Peaceful	  Coexistence”,	  which	  are	  the	  foundation	  and	  guidelines	  for	  China’s	  foreign	  strategy,	  as	  well	  as	  an	  important	  element	  of	  China’s	  “independent	  foreign	   policy	   of	   peace”.	   Even	   when	   China	   shows	   flexibility	   in	   international	  affairs,	   this	   principle	   has	   still	   been	   advocated	   by	   Chinese	   politics	   as	   the	  foundation	  for	  China’s	  relationship	  with	  all	  other	  countries,	  according	  to	  China’s	  Foreign	  Policy	  released	  by	  MOFA,	  and	  updated	  on	  November	  26	  2013.	  	  Since	   the	   establishment	   of	   the	   PRC,	   China	   has	   always	   referred	   to	   African	  countries	   as	   brothers	   to	   emphasize	   its	   identity	   as	   a	   developing	   country	   and	  belonging	   to	   the	   developing	   world.	   Initially,	   China	   and	   Africa	   shared	   similar	  experiences	  of	  grievous	  colonial	  history,	  civil	  war,	  poverty	  and	  domestic	  chaos.	  However,	   whether	   China	   considered	   these	   “brothers”	   equal	   or	   not	   is	   open	   to	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question.	   Even	   at	   a	   time	  when	  China	   itself	   suffered	   from	   famine	   and	   domestic	  chaos,	  it	  still	  sought	  to	  become	  a	  leader	  of	  these	  “brothers”.	  Following	  this	  logic,	  aid	  from	  China	  to	  Africa	  has	  been	  generous	  and	  forthcoming	  since	  the	  founding	  of	   the	   PRC.	   In	   order	   to	   develop	   diplomatic	   support	   from	   Africa,	   China	   has	   to	  continuously	   provide	   official	   aid	   to	   African	   countries.	   It	   actively	  maintains	   the	  relationship	   with	   African	   countries	   who	   share	   a	   similar	   interpretation	   of	  socialism.	   In	   return,	   the	   African	   governments	   recognize	   the	   PRC	   as	   “China”,	  rather	   than	   the	   ROC	   in	   the	   international	   arena.	   A	   notable	   fact	   is	   that	   African	  countries	   voted	   for	   the	   restoration	   of	   China’s	   lawful	   seat	   on	   the	   UN	   in	   1971,	  leading	  Mao	  Zedong	  to	  say	  that	  “it	  was	  our	  African	  brothers	  who	  carried	  China	  into	  the	  UN”.	   	  	  The	   “Five	   Principles	   of	   Peaceful	   Coexistence” 6 ,	   the	   foundation	   of	   China’s	  relationship	  with	  other	  countries,	  was	  introduced	  by	  Premier	  Zhou	  Enlai	  during	  his	  negotiations	  with	   Indian	  delegations,	   in	  discussions	  on	   the	  Tibet	   issue.	  The	  principles	   have	   been	   adhered	   to	   by	   Chinese	   governments	   for	   more	   than	   six	  decades.	  China-­‐Africa	   relations	  are	  no	  exception.	  Thirty-­‐eight	  African	  countries	  have	   incorporated	   the	   Five	   Principles	   of	   Peaceful	   Coexistence	   into	   their	   joint	  communiqués	   with	   China	   and	   was	   included	   in	   the	   declaration	   of	   many	  Afro-­‐Asian	   conferences	   as	   well	   -­‐	   for	   example,	   the	   Final	   communiqué	   of	   the	  Asian-­‐African	  conference	  in	  1955;	  the	  Afro-­‐Asian	  People’s	  Solidarity	  Conference	  in	   1957;	   Organization	   of	   African	   Unity	   Charter	   in	   1963;	   and	   the	   non-­‐aligned	  movement.	   Premier	   Zhou	   Enlai	   explained	   the	   five	   principles	   in	   a	   press	  conference	  in	  1954,	  	   “All	  world	  countries	  big	  or	  small,	  strong	  or	  weak,	  no	  matter	  its	  social	  system	  should	  coexist	  peacefully,	  all	  nations	  should	  have	  rights	  to	  choose	  their	  own	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The	  Five	  Principles	  of	  Peaceful	  Coexistence	  are:	  1)	  mutual	  respect	  for	  sovereignty	  and	  territorial	  integrity;	  2)	   mutual	   non-­‐aggression;	   3)	   non-­‐interference	   in	   each	   other’s	   internal	   affairs;	   4)	   equality	   and	   mutual	  benefit	  and	  5)	  peaceful	  coexistence.	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system	  and	  way	  of	  living	  without	  external	  interference.	  ”	  	  His	  explanation	  implies	  that	  the	  core	  concept	  of	  the	  “Five	  Principles	  of	  Peaceful	  Coexistence”	  is	  that	  a	  state's	  independence	  should	  not	  be	  infringed	  upon.	  At	  that	  time,	  the	  “Five	  Principles	  of	  Peaceful	  Coexistence”	  was	  an	  ideological	  claim,	  but	  it	  provided	   a	   foundation	   for	   China’s	   future	   foreign	   policy.	   It	   shields	   China	   from	  international	   pressure	   on	   the	   improvement	   of	   human	   rights	   protection	   and	  humanitarian	   principles	   implementation	   on	   one	   hand,	   and	   international	  expectation	  of	  China	  shouldering	  responsibility	  beyond	  its	  border	  on	  the	  other.	  Due	  to	  its	  ambiguity,	  China	  has	  sometimes	  provided	  different	  interpretations	  of	  this	   principle	   in	   relation	   to	   its	   foreign	   strategy	   and	   priorities.	   Taking	  “non-­‐inference”	  as	  an	  example,	  China	  didn’t	  present	  a	  boundary	  or	  range	  fore	  the	  meaning	  of	  “without	  external	  interference”.	  For	  example,	  whether	  larger	  foreign	  economic	   involvement	  could	  be	  a	  kind	  of	   interference,	  or	  whether	   interference	  can	  be	  justified	  if	  there	  is	  a	  serious	  human	  right	  crisis.	  	  In	   the	   early	   1960s,	   when	   Beijing	   broke	   with	   Moscow,	   the	   Third	   World	   and	  non-­‐aligned	  movement	  became	  more	   important	   for	  China	   to	  gain	   international	  support	   to	   survive	   in	   a	   bipolar	   world	   dominated	   by	   the	   US	   and	   Soviet	   Union.	  Premier	   Zhou	  Enlai	   visited	   ten	  African	   countries	   between	  December	  1963	   and	  February	   1964.	   During	   this	   tour,	   he	   announced	   five	   strands7	   of	   China-­‐African	  Relations	   and	   eight	   principles8	   of	   Chinese	   African	   aid.	   These	   radical	   strands	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The	  Five	  Strands	  of	  China-­‐African	  Relations	  refers	  to	  the	  following	  1)	  It	  should	  support	  the	  African	  people	  in	  the	  struggle	  against	  imperialism,	  colonialism	  and	  neocolonialism,	  and	  strive	  for	  national	  independence;	  2)	  It	  should	  back	  African	  countries’	  peaceful,	  neutral	  policy	  of	  non-­‐alignment;	  3)	  It	  should	  support	  the	  African	  people’s	   wishes	   to	   choose	   their	   own	   way	   to	   solidarity	   and	   unification;	   4)	   It	   should	   encourage	   African	  countries	   to	   solve	   conflicts	   through	   peaceful	   negotiation;	   5)	   It	   should	   advocate	   the	   respect	   for	   African	  countries’	  sovereignty	  from	  all	  nations,	  and	  be	  against	  all	  aggression	  and	  interference.	  	  
8 The	  eight	  principles	  of	  Chinese	  African	  aid	  refers	  to	  the	  following:	  it	  would	  be	  based	  on	  equality,	  mutual	  benefit	   and	   respect	   for	   the	   sovereignty	   of	   the	   host.	   (Principles	   of	   Peaceful	   Coexistence)	   Loans	  would	   be	  non-­‐conditional,	   interest-­‐free,	   or	   low-­‐interest,	   and	   easily	   rescheduled.	   Projects	   would	   use	   high-­‐quality	  materials,	  have	  quick	  results,	  and	  boost	  self-­‐reliance.	  Chinese	  experts	  would	  transfer	  their	  expertise	  “fully”	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were	   accompanied	   by	   generous	   debt	   relief	   and	   large-­‐scale	   economic	   aid,	   and	  improved	  China’s	  reputation	  on	  the	  continent,	  but	  also	  exceeded	  its	  capability	  to	  shoulder	  burdens	  at	  home.	  In	  1960s,	  China’s	  foreign	  aid	  to	  Africa	  has	  been	  US$46	  million,	  which	  is	  ten	  times	  that	  of	  the	  1950s,	  However	  the	  average	  GDP	  increased	  less	  than	  double,	  let	  alone	  per	  capita	  GDP.	  Despite	  domestic	  poverty	  and	  famine,	  this	  figure	  has	  dramatically	  increased	  to	  US$319	  million	  from	  1970-­‐1975,	  which	  accounted	   for	   over	   5%	  of	  GDP	   in	   the	   corresponding	  period.	  Meanwhile,	   in	   the	  early	  1950s,	  the	  main	  recipient	  countries	  of	  China’s	  aid	  were	  in	  Asia.	  After	  1955,	  the	  recipients	  of	  China’s	  foreign	  aid	  expanded	  to	  include	  some	  African	  countries.	  By	   1970,	   China	   had	   donated	   more	   aid	   to	   Africa	   than	   its	   foreign	   aid	   to	   its	  neighbouring	  countries.	  Africa	  became	  a	  major	  destination	  for	  Chinese	  aid	  flows	  thereafter	   (H.	   Liu	   &	   Huang,	   2013).	   The	   continuous	   donations	   are	   far	   beyond	  China’s	   ability,	   which	   has	   faced	   the	   state’s	   foreign	   assistance	   with	   a	   dilemma.	  Without	   considering	   the	   economic	   benefits,	   China	   agreed	   to	   take	   on	   the	  Tanzania-­‐Zambia	   railway	   project,	   which	   has	   been	   rejected	   by	   the	  World	   Bank	  and	   great	   powers	   due	   to	   its	   impracticality	   and	   cost	   –	   almost	   10%	   of	   China’s	  foreign	  reserves	  at	  the	  time.	  The	  completed	  flagship	  project	  was	  handed	  over	  to	  local	  operators	  in	  1976,	  but	  it	  was	  not	  the	  end,	  and	  the	  Chinese	  have	  had	  to	  stay	  in	   order	   to	   ensure	   its	   continued,	   efficient	   running	   while	   also	   continuing	   to	  provide	  loans	  for	  spare	  parts	  and	  maintenance	  (Brautigam,	  2011).	  	  Enduring	   a	   famine	   for	   more	   than	   a	   year,	   China	   nevertheless	   still	   donated	   ten	  thousand	   tons	   of	   rice	   to	   Guinea	   in	   1960.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   China	   has	  implemented	  its	  economic	  and	  technological	  cooperation	  agreement	  with	  Guinea	  by	  constructing	  a	  Cigarettes	  &	  Matches	  factory	  near	  Conakry	  -­‐	  a	  first	  completed	  project	   in	   Sub-­‐Saharan	   Africa.	   The	   Chinese	   staff	   overcame	   the	   temperature,	  malaria,	  language	  and	  clean	  water	  problem,	  and	  finished	  the	  factory	  -­‐	  “a	  pearl	  of	  Conakry”	   as	  one	   local	  newspaper	   called	   it	   -­‐	  within	  one	  year	   and	  eight	  months.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  and	  live	  to	  the	  same	  standards	  as	  their	  local	  counterparts.	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Then-­‐president	   Ahmed	   Sékou	   Touré	   cut	   the	   ribbon	   himself	   at	   the	   completion	  ceremony	   (People’s	   Daily,	   October	   29	   2006).	   However,	   China	   subsequently	  broke	   its	   relationship	  with	   this	   country	  because	  of	   its	   pro-­‐Soviet	   position.	  The	  same	   situation	   happened	   with	   the	   South	   African	   Communist	   Party,	  Independence	  of	  Cape	  Verde	  Party,	  Mozambique	  National	  Liberation	  Front,	  and	  others,	   and	  China	   also	   refused	   to	   cooperate	  with	  Congo’s	   Party	   of	   Labour	   as	   a	  result	   of	   its	   non-­‐communist	   identity.	  Despite	   the	   fact	   that,	   from	  1956	   to	  1977,	  China	  provided	  more	  that	  US$2.4	  billion	  in	  economic	  assistance	  to	  Africa,	  which	  accounts	  for	  58%	  of	  its	  foreign	  aid	  and	  twice	  that	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union’s	  during	  the	  same	  period,	  the	  late	  of	  1970s,	  only	  the	  Ethiopian	  People’s	  Revolutionary	  Party	  and	  several	   communist	  parties	  have	   interactions	  with	  CPC	   in	   the	   continent	   (H.	  Liu	  &	  Huang,	  2013).	  This	  over-­‐capacity	  and	  inconsistent	  foreign	  aid	  experiences	  set	   off	   alarms	   for	   both	   Chinese	   academics	   and	   people	   nowadays.	   Along	   with	  China’s	   expansion	   in	   Africa,	   Beijing	   is	   very	   careful	   to	   persuade	   the	   domestic	  audience	   that	   China	   is	   capable	   of	   providing	   the	   current	   scale	   of	   foreign	  assistance	   to	   Africa.	   According	   to	   a	   Chinese	   official	   report,	   China’s	   foreign	   aid	  accompanies	  its	  increasing	  GNI	  and	  economic	  growth.	  The	  report	  indicates	  that	  China’s	   annual	   foreign	   aid	   volume	   of	   30	   billion	   RMB	   from	   2010	   to	   2012	  accounted	   for	   0.064%	   of	   GNI	   (Luo,	   August	   11	   2014),	   which	   is	   lower	   than	   the	  international	  standard	  of	  0.7%	  and	  the	  OECD	  donors’	  percentage	  (OECD).	  	  In	  1977,	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  CPC	  authorised	  its	  International	  Department,	  Central	  Committee	   and	   Ministry	   of	   Foreign	   Affairs	   to	   jointly	   research	   China’s	  relationship	  with	  the	  parties	  in	  Africa.	  Five	  months	  later,	  the	  Political	  Bureau	  of	  the	  Central	  Committee	  ratified	  the	  joint	  proposal.	  As	  a	  result,	  since	  1978,	  Beijing	  has	   started	   to	   re-­‐establish	   communications	  with	   some	  parties	   in	  Africa,	   and	   to	  receive	  visitors	  from	  Africa	  (A.	  Li,	  2006a).	  This	  revealed	  that	   ideological	  export	  was	  no	  longer	  a	  priority	  in	  China’s	  foreign	  policy.	  Soon	  after,	  the	  third	  session	  of	  China’s	   Eleventh	   Communist	   Party	   Congress	   represented	   another	   important	  turning	   point	   for	   the	   CPC.	   Radical	   Maoism	   was	   gradually	   replaced	   by	   a	   more	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practical,	  open	  and	  economic-­‐oriented	  policy.	  Consequently,	  foreign	  strategy	  has	  developed	  from	  one	  ideologically	  driven	  to	  that	  of	  more	  economic	  consideration.	  Meanwhile,	  the	  opening-­‐up	  policy	  has	  considerably	  grown	  China’s	  international	  trade	  and	  foreign	  exchanges.	  It	  requires	  China	  to	  re-­‐think	  its	  identity	  and	  role	  on	  the	  world	  stage	  -­‐	  hence	  its	  changing	  relations	  with	  Africa.	   	  	  At	   the	   end	   of	   December	   1982,	   then-­‐Premier	   Zhao	   Ziyang	   visited	   11	   African	  countries, 9 	   seeking	   south-­‐south	   cooperation	   and	   to	   promote	   a	   fairer	  international	  order.	  During	   this	   trip,	  he	  announced	   four	  principles	  of	  economic	  and	   technical	   cooperation	   with	   African	   countries:	   equality	   and	  mutual	   benefit	  (ping	  deng	  hu	  li	   平等互利),	  stress	  on	  practical	  results	  (jiang	  qiu	  shi	  xiao	  讲求实
效),	  diversity	  in	  form	  (xing	  shi	  duo	  yang形式多样)	  and	  common	  progress	  (gong	  tong	   fa	  zhan	  共同发展).	  Zhao’s	   redefinition	  of	  China-­‐Africa	   relations	  was	  more	  reasonable,	  realistic	  and	  practical	  when	  compared	  to	  China’s	  domestic	  situation	  at	   that	   time.	   It	  abandoned	  the	  constraints	  of	   ideology	  and	  brought	   forward	   the	  idea	   of	   “cooperation”,	   rather	   than	  one-­‐way	   aid	   flow	   to	  Africa.	  What’s	  more,	   by	  emphasising	  “practical	  results”,	  it	  introduced	  the	  consideration	  of	  economics	  and	  efficiency.	   Meanwhile,	   “diversity	   in	   form”	   enabled	   non-­‐governmental	  communications	  (You,	  2007).	  	  The	  1980s	  witnessed	  a	   transition	  of	  China-­‐Africa	   relations.	  During	   this	  decade,	  both	   China	   and	   Africa	   underwent	   profound	   changes.	   After	   the	   Cultural	  Revolution,	   domestic	   difficulties	   made	   it	   hard	   for	   the	   Chinese	   government	   to	  solve	  the	  inner	  political	  chaos	  and	  economic	  crisis	  while	  also	  remaining	  involved	  in	   international	   aid	   in	   an	   enthusiastic	   manner.	   Also,	   past	   experiences	   led	   the	  state	  to	  think	  about	  re-­‐establishing	  a	  systematic	  strategy	  with	  a	  clear	  agenda	  and	  a	  sober	  framework	  in	  its	  communications	  with	  Africa.	  When	  it	  came	  to	  Africa,	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 The	   eleven	   countries	   Premier	   Zhao	   visited	   were	   Egypt,	   Algeria,	   Morocco,	   Guinea,	   Gabon,	   Congo	  (Democratic	  republic	  of	  Congo	  and	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  Congo,	  Zambia,	  Zimbabwe,	  Tanzania	  and	  Kenya. 
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wave	  of	  national	  independence	  movements	  passed,	  leaving	  many	  with	  damaged	  economies	   and	   tremendous	   debt.	   New	   governments	   faced	   the	   challenges	   of	  “transforming	  national	  territories	  inherited	  from	  colonialism	  into	  viable	  political	  communities”	  and	  also	  economic	  development.	  In	  1980,	  African	  leaders	  gathered	  in	  Lagos	  and	  passed	  the	  Lagos	  Plan	  of	  Action	   for	   the	  economic	  development	  of	  Africa,	   1980-­‐2000,	   through	   the	   Organization	   of	   African	   Unity.	   It	   called	   for	   a	  decreased	   reliance	   on	   raw	   materials	   extraction	   and	   global	   equality	   in	   trade	  relations	   (Eyoh,	   1998).	   Later,	   many	   countries	   have	   implemented	   structural	  adjustments	   launched	   by	   the	   World	   Bank	   and	   IMF.	   This	   period	   marked	   a	  watershed	  between	  China	  and	  Africa.	  China	  has	  concentrated	  exclusively	  on	   its	  economic	   development	   and	   modernisation,	   while	   the	   structural	   adjustment	  required	  African	  governments	  to	  pursue	  an	  austerity	  policy.	   	  	  Despite	  each	  side	  developing	  its	  economy	  along	  a	  different	  path,	  the	  interactions	  have	   increased.	   By	   the	   end	   of	   the	   1980s,	   not	   only	   had	   China	   strengthened	  relations	  with	  old	   friends,	   such	  as	  Tanzania,	   Zambia,	  Egypt,	  Mali	  Guinea,	  Zaire,	  Ghana	   and	   Gabon,	   but	   also	   was	   able	   to	   establish	   diplomatic	   relations	   with	  pro-­‐Soviet	  or	  pro-­‐US	  states	  including	  Angola,	  the	  Ivory	  Coast,	  Lesotho	  -­‐	  thereby	  increasing	   the	   number	   of	   recognized	   countries	   from	   44	   to	   47.	   Economically,	  although	   China	   has	   concentrated	   on	   domestic	   economic	   reform	   and	   sought	   to	  keep	   a	   low	  profile	   in	   international	   affairs,	   its	   foreign	   aid	   to	  Africa	   has	   steadily	  grown	  by	  US$274	  million	  over	  the	  figure	  in	  the	  1970s,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  its	  aid	  to	  Asia	  and	  Latin	  America	  has	  sharply	  decreased	  (Brautigam,	  2008b).	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  China	  also	  signed	  127	  agreements	  on	  financial	  support	  in	  more	  than	  49	   African	   states,	   which	   demonstrated	   China’s	   preference	   for	   Africa	   (A.	   Li,	  2006b).	  	   	  A	  political	  breakthrough	  was	  made	  by	  Zhao	  Ziyang’s	  authorisation	  that	  staying	  in	  African	  countries	  for	  management	  and	  technical	  support	  was	  not	  “interfering	  in	  internal	   affairs”,	  which	  was	  a	   re-­‐interpretation	  of	   the	   “non-­‐interference”	   (A.	  Li,	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November	  12	  2008).	  It	  enabled	  Chinese	  experts	  to	  stay	  on	  the	  continent	  after	  the	  completion	  of	  assistance	  projects,	  and	  those	  who	  chose	  to	  stay	  in	  Africa	  became	  the	   first	   wave	   of	   mainlander	   migrants	   to	   Africa.	   The	   flexible	   foreign	   policies	  enabled	  Chinese	  enterprises	  to	  seek	  business	  opportunities	  in	  Africa.	  The	  trade	  value	  during	  this	  decade	  fluctuated	  between	  US$0.8	  million	  and	  US$1.2	  million.	  More	   than	   150	   business	   centres	   and	   offices	  were	   established,	  which	   attracted	  over	   200	   Chinese	   companies	   to	   the	   continent	   (A.	   Li,	   November	   12	   2008).	  Additionally,	  the	  exchanges	  in	  the	  fields	  of	  science,	  education,	  culture	  and	  health	  between	  China	  and	  Africa	  became	  more	  frequent.	  More	  than	  80	  African	  cultural	  and	  arts	  delegations	  visited	  China,	  and	  over	  ten	  ensembles	  performed.	  More	  than	  2,300	   African	   students	   entered	   Chinese	   universities	   and	   over	   100	   Chinese	  experts	  and	  teachers	  were	  sent	  to	  teach	  in	  African	  schools	  (You,	  2007).	  	  Generally,	   this	   period	   witnessed	   a	   transformation	   from	   radical	   direct	   aid	   to	   a	  pragmatic	   and	   reciprocal	   strategy	   with	   diversification	   of	   communication	  between	   China	   and	   Africa.	   It	   could	   be	   said	   that	   even	   if	   China	   had	   established	  closer	  ties	  with	  the	  West	  due	  to	  economic	  needs,	  “its	  aid	  policy	  clearly	  continued	  to	  favour	  Africa	  over	  other	  regions”	  (Brautigam,	  2008b,	  p.	  52).	  	  The	  1990s	  witnessed	  new	  global	  waves	  of	  democracy	  and	  urged	  governments	  to	  rethink	   their	   bilateral	   relations.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   the	   protest	   in	   Tiananmen	  Square	   triggered	   political	   turmoil	   in	   China	   in	   1989,	   after	   which	   Western	  countries	  responded	  by	  issuing	  sanctions	  and	  isolating	  China.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  African	   states	   experienced	   the	   shock	  waves	   of	   the	  multiparty	   democratisation	  movement;	   just	   between	   1990-­‐1994,	   42	   African	   countries	   accomplished	  multiparty	   elections.	   Also,	   Taiwan	  with	   its	   democratic	   identity	   and	   a	   boosting	  economy	   tried	   to	   buy	   back	   the	   recognition	   of	   ROC	   in	   the	   1990s.	   Starting	  with	  Liberia,	   ten	   African	   nations	   broke	   diplomatic	   ties	   with	   Beijing	   and	   turned	   to	  Taipei	  in	  eight	  years.	  Beijing	  immediately	  responded	  to	  the	  challenge,	  beginning	  a	   competition	   of	   courting	   African	   countries	   for	   recognition	   in	   1990s	   (H.	   Liu	  &	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Huang,	  2013).	  	  In	  July	  1989,	  soon	  after	  the	  Tiananmen	  Square	  Event,	  then-­‐Foreign	  Minister	  Qian	  Qichen	  visited	  six	  African	  countries10	   to	  clarify	  its	  stance	  on	  the	  Five	  Principles	  of	  Peaceful	  Coexistence	  and	   its	  support	   for	  South	  Africa’s	  anti-­‐apartheid	  policy.	  His	  trip	  initiated	  a	  tradition	  that	  the	  Foreign	  Minister	  would	  visit	  several	  African	  countries	  in	  the	  January	  of	  each	  new	  year	  (Q.	  Wang,	  1999).	  This	  action	  has	  been	  viewed	  as	  China’s	  reassessment	  of	  Africa’s	  significance	  and	  a	  quick	  response	  to	  the	  international	  and	  domestic	  changes.	  After	  the	  breakdown	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  then-­‐president	   Yang	   Shangkun	  made	   a	   trip	   to	  Morocco,	   Tunisia	   and	   the	   Ivory	  Coast,	   and	   put	   forward	   six	   principles11	   in	   response	   to	   the	   new	   international	  environment	  towards	  China.	  His	  speech	  emphasised	  the	  core	  values	  of	  the	  Five	  Principles	   of	   Peaceful	   Coexistence	   again,	   but	   the	   idea	   of	   Third	   World	   theory	  proposed	   in	  Mao’s	   era	  was	   rarely	   present.	   This	   could	   reflect	   that	   Third	  World	  theory	  was	   ebbing	  while	  words	   such	  as	   “solidarity”,	   “unity”	   and	   “jointly”	   came	  into	  view	  in	  China’s	  African	  policy.	  	  In	   the	   1990s,	   Taiwan	   emerged	   as	   a	   significant	   economic	   power	   with	   weak	  diplomatic	  status.	  Therefore,	  dollar	  diplomacy	  became	  a	  major	  way	  for	  Taipei	  to	  find	  political	  recognition.	  The	  impoverished	  African	  countries	  keen	  for	  financial	  support	  rather	  than	  political	  ambitions	  were	  considered	  the	  targets	  for	  Taiwan’s	  dollar	   diplomacy.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	   “One	   China	   Policy”12	   was	   a	   great	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The	  six	  countries	  were	  Botswana,	  Angola,	  Zimbabwe,	  Zambia,	  Mozambique	  and	  Lesotho.	    
11 The	   six	   Principles	   of	   Sino-­‐African	   Policy	   were:	   1)	   It	   should	   support	   African	   countries’	   efforts	   in	  struggling	  against	  external	  interference	  and	  economic	  development.	  2)It	  should	  respect	  African	  countries	  to	  choose	   their	   political	   system	   and	   way	   of	   development	   based	   on	   their	   national	   conditions.	   3)	   It	   should	  encourage	   African	   countries’	   solidarity,	   unity	   for	   strength	   and	   solve	   the	   disputes	   through	   peaceful	  negotiation.	  4)	  It	  should	  support	  African	  countries’	  efforts	  to	  jointly	  seek	  peace,	  stability	  and	  development,	  as	   well	   as	   the	   economic	   integration	   of	   the	   continent.	   5)	   It	   should	   support	   African	   countries’	   active	  involvement	  in	  international	  affairs	  as	  an	  equal	  member.	  6)	  It	  would	  like	  to	  develop	  friendly	  exchanges	  and	  various	  economic	  cooperation	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  Five	  Principles	  of	  Peaceful	  coexistence. 
12 The	  PRC	  automatically	  severs	  relations	  with	  any	  state	  that	  establishes	  diplomatic	  relations	  with	  the	  ROC. 
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challenge	  to	  China-­‐African	  relations	  because	  ten	  African	  counties	  broke	  relations	  with	  Beijing	  and	  established	  ties	  with	  Taipei	  -­‐	  some	  of	  them,	  for	  example	  Liberia	  and	  Central	  African	  Republic,	  have	  broken	  relations	   twice.	  The	  shift	   in	  political	  ties	  can	  hardly	  be	  interpreted	  as	  “the	  Africans	  care	  much	  who	  is	  the	  ‘real’	  China	  or	  with	  whom	  official	  diplomatic	  ties	  should	  be	  established”	  (Taylor,	  2002).	  But	  the	   competition	   for	  African	   recognition	  between	  Beijing	   and	  Taipei	  did	  benefit	  the	   African	   leaders	   in	   terms	   of	   financial	   resources.	   In	   1991,	   Beijing	   offered	   a	  ten-­‐year	  interest-­‐free	  loan	  to	  Gambia.	  Just	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  this	  loan,	  the	  country	  turned	  to	  Taipei,	  and	  in	  return	  it	  received	  a	  US$35	  million	  aid	  package.	  A	  similar	  situation	  happened	  with	  Sao	  Tome	  as	  well:	   four	  years	  after	  Beijing	  pledged	  an	  interest-­‐free	   loan	  of	  RMB	  20	  million	  and	  a	  delay	   to	  debt	   repayments,	   the	   state	  chose	  to	  recognize	  Taipei	   for	  US$	  30	  million	   in	   financial	  aid,	   in	  1997.	   It	  sounds	  practical	   that	   African	   countries	   recognized	   the	   highest	   bidder,	   but	   for	   the	  impoverished	  and	  marginalized	  countries,	  aid	  has	  a	  priority	  (Brautigam,	  2010).	  This	   reorganisation	   wave	   reflected	   that	   looking	   beyond	   political	   rhetoric	  between	  China	  and	  its	  African	  counterparts,	  the	  link	  between	  Beijing	  and	  African	  countries	  are	  fragile	  and	  largely	  relied	  on	  continuous	  foreign	  assistance.	   	   	   	   	  	  In	   1996,	   then-­‐President	   Jiang	   Zemin	   made	   a	   significant	   trip	   to	   six	   African	  countries,13	   and	   systematically	   expounded	   China’s	   African	   policy14	   in	   the	   new	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 The	  six	  African	  countries	  are	  Kenya,	  Egypt,	  Ethiopia,	  Mali,	  Namibia	  and	  Zimbabwe.	  
14 Its	  main	   thrust	   is	   to	   strengthen	   solidarity	   and	   cooperation	  with	   African	   countries	   and	  work	   together	  with	  them	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  lofty	  cause	  of	  world	  peace	  and	  development.	  The	  guiding	  principle	  that	  China	  follows	  in	  developing	  relations	  with	  African	  countries	  in	  the	  new	  situation	  is:	  "to	  treat	  each	  other	  as	  equals,	  develop	  sincere	  friendship,	  strengthen	  solidarity	  and	  cooperation,	  and	  seek	  common	  development."	  China's	  African	  policy	  in	  the	  new	  period	  mainly	  contains	  the	  following	  elements:	  to	  respect	  the	  choices	  of	  road	  to	  development	  made	  by	  African	  people	  themselves;	   to	  abide	  by	  the	  Five	  Principles	  of	  Peaceful	  Co-­‐existence	  and	  non-­‐interference	  in	  the	  internal	  affairs	  of	  African	  countries;	  to	  respect	  all	  countries	  and	  treat	  them	  as	  equals,	  irrespective	  of	  their	  size,	  strength	  and	  wealth;	  to	  support	  African	  countries	  in	  their	  just	  struggle	  to	  maintain	  national	  independence,	  state	  sovereignty	  and	  territorial	  integrity	  and	  oppose	  foreign	  interference;	  to	  promote	  unity	  among	  African	  countries	  and	  advocate	  settlement	  of	  disputes	  among	  them,	  if	  any,	  through	  peaceful	  negotiation;	   to	  uphold	   justice	  and	  help	  safeguard	   the	   rights	  and	   interests	  of	  African	  countries	   in	  international	   affairs;	   to	   continue	   to	   provide	   economic	   aid	   to	   African	   countries	   without	   attaching	   any	  political	  strings;	  and	  to	  stick	  to	  the	  principle	  of	  equality	  and	  mutual	  benefit	  in	  its	  economic	  cooperation	  and	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era.	   Also,	   in	   his	   keynote	   speech	   in	   Ethiopia,	   he	   put	   forward	   a	   five-­‐point	  proposal15	   for	   the	   development	   of	   China-­‐Africa	   relations.	   In	   Jiang’s	   speech,	   he	  attached	   great	   importance	   to	   African	   countries	   by	   calling	   them	   China’s	  all-­‐weather	  friends.	  He	  emphasized	  the	  equality	  of	  China-­‐Africa	  relations	  (MOFA,	  2010),	   even	   if	   the	   bilateral	   economic	   strength	   has	   become	   more	   and	   more	  asymmetric.	   Jiang’s	   visit	   revealed	   the	   significance	  of	  Africa	   to	  China’s	   changing	  diplomatic	   strategy.	   After	   that,	   high-­‐level	   visits	   to	   Africa	   became	   routine	   for	  China’s	   top	   leaders.	   Then-­‐President	   Jiang	   Zemin,	   Premier	   Li	   Peng	   and	   Vice	  Premier	  Zhu	  Rongji,	  Vice	  President	  Hu	  Jintao	  all	  set	  foot	  on	  Africa	  in	  1997,	  1998	  and	  1999	  respectively.	   	   	  	  In	  the	  1990s,	  China	  experienced	  a	  transformation	  of	  its	  Africa	  engagement.	  The	  third	  generation	  of	  CPC	  leaders	  held	  a	  foreign	  assistance	  conference	  to	  reform	  its	  foreign	   aid	   in	   1995	   (Information	   Office	   of	   the	   State	   Council,	   April	   2011).	  Thereafter,	  the	  government	  started	  to	  diversify	  the	  sources	  of	  foreign	  assistance	  with	   three	   new	   features:	   first,	   it	   combined	   national	   grants	   and	   loans	   with	  overseas	  aid	  projects.	  The	  Export-­‐Import	  Bank	  of	  China	  provided	  medium-­‐	  and	  long-­‐term	  low-­‐interest	  loans	  to	  other	  developing	  countries,	  largely	  enlarging	  the	  number	   of	   recipients	   and	   increasing	   the	   efficiency	   of	   the	   funds.	   In	   this	  way	   it	  promoted	   China’s	   exportation	   on	   equipment,	   materials	   and	   human	   resources.	  Second,	   it	   integrated	   recipients’	   funds	   and	   enterprises’	   investment.	   The	  government	   set	   up	   the	   Foreign	   Aid	   Fund	   for	   Joint	   Ventures	   and	   Cooperative	  Projects	   with	   parts	   of	   the	   interest-­‐free	   loans	   repaid	   to	   China	   by	   developing	  countries.	   The	   fund	   was	   mainly	   used	   to	   support	   Chinese	   small-­‐	   and	  medium-­‐sized	  enterprises	  to	  build	  joint	  ventures	  or	  cooperate	  with	  the	  recipient	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  trade	  with	  African	  countries.	   	  
15 The	  proposal	  includes	  the	  following	  points:	  1)	  to	  foster	  a	  sincere	  friendship	  between	  the	  two	  sides	  and	  become	  each	  other's	  reliable	  "all-­‐weather	  friends";	  2)	  to	  treat	  each	  other	  as	  equals	  and	  respect	  each	  other's	  sovereignty	  and	  refrain	  from	  interfering	  in	  each	  other's	  internal	  affairs;	  3)	  to	  seek	  common	  development	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  mutual	  benefit;	  4)	   to	  enhance	  consultation	  and	  cooperation	   in	   international	  affairs;	  5)	  And	  to	  look	  into	  the	  future	  and	  create	  a	  more	  splendid	  world.	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countries	   in	   the	   production	   and	   operation	   spheres.	   It	   extended	   the	   fund’s	  resources	  and	  the	  scale	  of	  the	  projects,	  as	  well	  as	  ensured	  future	  operation	  and	  management.	   Third,	   the	   governments	   signed	   contracts	   for	   financial	   or	   policy	  support	  while	   the	  companies	   from	  both	  countries	   jointly	  operated.	  The	  project	  helped	   recipients	   cast	   off	   the	   export	   of	   the	   raw	   materials	   and	   establish	  processing	  industries	  of	  small-­‐	  and	  medium-­‐sized	  companies.	  These	  instruments	  greatly	   encouraged	   Chinese	   enterprises	   entering	   the	   African	   market,	   which	  echoed	  with	   the	   “going	   global”	   policy	   and	   the	   idea	   of	   taking	   advantage	   of	   the	  domestic	   and	   international	   market	   and	   resources	   (liangzhong	   shichang	  liangzhong	   ziyuan	  两种市场	  两种资源).	   It	   resulted	   in	   a	   sustained	   growth	   of	  trade	   between	   China	   and	   Africa,	   which	   rose	   from	   US$0.1	   billion	   in	   1990,	   to	  US$6.4	  billion	  in	  1999	  (A.	  Li,	  2006a).	  In	  comparison	  with	  former	  African	  policies,	  the	  new	  approach	  is	  much	  more	  oriented	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  economy.	  However,	  on	  one	   hand,	   this	   has	   created	   diversified	   financial	   sources	   and	   new	   investment	  motivation	  for	  the	  continent,	  but	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  involvement	  of	  Chinese	  companies	   has	   also	   brought	   a	   negative	   impact.	   The	   case	   studies	   section	   will	  further	  explore	  the	  negative	  aspects.	   	  	  In	   the	   new	   century,	   with	   the	   rapid	   development	   of	   China’s	   economy,	   bilateral	  relations	   have	   been	   raised	   to	   a	   new	   level	   marked	   by	   the	   successful	   hosting	   a	  FOCAC	   (Forum	   of	   China	   and	   Africa	   Cooperation)	   conference,	   including	   one	  summit	  attended	  by	  more	  than	  forty	  African	  leaders.	  The	  forum	  was	  initiated	  by	  China’s	   third	   generation	   leaders	   to	   further	   “promote	   mutual	   cooperation	   and	  jointly	  meet	  the	  challenge	  of	  globalization	  and	  to	  seek	  for	  common	  development	  every	  three	  years”	  (FOCAC,	  April	  9	  2013).	  This	   first	   forum	  was	  held	   in	  2000	   in	  Beijing,	  and	  attended	  by	  80	  ministers	  from	  44	  African	  countries,	  representatives	  of	   17	   regional	   and	   international	   organisations,	   and	   people	   from	   the	   business	  communities	   of	   China	   and	   Africa.	   They	   broadly	   discussed	   joint	   efforts	   for	   the	  establishment	   of	   a	   new	   international	   political	   and	   economic	   order	   in	   the	   21st	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century,	   and	   also	   China-­‐African	   economic	   cooperation	   and	   trade	   in	   the	   new	  international	   environment.	   The	   conference	   also	   charted	   the	   direction	   for	   the	  development	  of	  a	  new,	  stable	  and	  long-­‐term	  partnership	  featuring	  equality	  and	  mutual	  benefit	  (FOCAC,	  April	  9	  2013).	   	  	  The	  second	  ministerial	   conference	  was	  convened	   in	  Addis	  Ababa,	   in	  2003.	  The	  theme	   of	   the	   forum	   was	   pragmatic	   and	   action-­‐oriented	   cooperation.	   At	   the	  opening	   ceremony	   of	   this	   conference,	   Premier	   Wen	   Jiabao	   put	   forward	   a	  four-­‐point	  proposal16	   on	  how	  to	  further	  China-­‐Africa	  friendship	  and	  cooperation,	  after	  the	  Addis	  Ababa	  Action	  Plan	  (2004-­‐2006)	  was	  passed.	   	  	  The	  Chinese	  government	  named	  2006	  the	  “year	  of	  Africa”.	  The	  Summit	  and	  the	  third	  ministerial	   conference	  were	  held	   in	  Beijing,	  where	   the	  Declaration	  of	   the	  Beijing	   Summit	   of	   the	   Forum	   on	   China-­‐Africa	   Cooperation	   and	   the	   Forum	   on	  China-­‐Africa	   Cooperation	   Beijing	   Action	   Plan	   (2007-­‐2009)	   were	   passed.	   The	  theme	  for	  this	  summit	  was	  friendship,	  peace,	  cooperation	  and	  development.	  The	  leaders	  jointly	  discussed	  “reducing	  debts,	  economic	  assistance,	  personal	  training	  and	  investment”	  (Taylor,	  2012).	  President	  Hu	  Jintao	  announced	  eight	  measures17	  to	  help	  African	  countries	  accelerate	  their	  development	  while	  further	  promoting	  China-­‐Africa	  cooperation	  in	  the	  following	  three	  years	  (Xinhua	  News,	  November	  4	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 The	  four	  point	  proposal	   included:	  1)	  Continue	  to	  move	  forward	  the	  traditional	  China-­‐Africa	   friendship	  through	   mutual	   support;	   2)	   Promote	   democratization	   of	   international	   relations	   through	   intensified	  consultation;	   3)	   Jointly	  meet	   the	   challenges	   of	   globalization	   through	   coordination	   of	   positions;	   4)	   Turn	   a	  new	  chapter	  in	  China-­‐Africa	  friendly	  relations	  through	  enhanced	  cooperation.	  
17 These	  measures	   included:	   1)	   doubling	   China’s	   2006	   assistance	   to	   Africa	   by	   2009;	   2)	   providing	  Africa	  with	   US$3	   billion	   of	   preferential	   loans	   and	   US$2	   billion	   of	   preferential	   buyer’s	   credits;	   3)	   setting	   up	   a	  China-­‐Africa	  development	  fund	  worth	  US$5	  billion;	  4)	  building	  a	  conference	  center	  for	  the	  African	  Union	  in	  Addis	  Ababa,	  Ethiopia;	  5)	  cancelling	  debt	  owed	  by	  heavily	  indebted	  poor	  countries	  and	  the	  least	  developed	  countries	   in	   Africa;	   6)	   further	   opening	   up	   China’s	   market	   to	   Africa	   by	   increasing	   from	   190	   to	   over	   440	  number	  of	  export	   items	  from	  the	  29	  least-­‐developed	  countries	   in	  Africa	  that	  have	  no	  tariffs	   levied	  against	  them;	  7)	  establishing	  several	  trade	  and	  economic	  cooperation	  zones	  in	  Africa	  and	  creating	  other	  measures	  to	  promote	  Sino-­‐African	  cooperation	  in	  the	  socio-­‐economic	  field;	  8)	  China	  has	  also	  pledged	  to	  support	  in	  the	  field	  of	  socio-­‐cultural	  cooperation.	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2006).	   Furthermore,	   the	   white	   paper	   on	   China’s	   African	   Policy,	   which	   was	  released	   in	   the	   same	   year,	   called	   for	   the	   establishment	   of	   a	   new	   type	   of	  China-­‐Africa	  strategic	  partnership.	  	  In	  2009,	   foreign	  ministers	   from	  China	  and	  49	  African	  countries	  got	   together	   to	  review	   the	   implementation	   of	   follow-­‐up	   actions	   after	   the	   Beijing	   Summit	   and	  proposed	   new	   measures	   and	   new	   ideas	   for	   agricultural	   and	   food	   safety,	  infrastructure	  construction,	  trade	  and	  investment,	  medical	  support,	  and	  more	  for	  the	  next	  three	  years.	  The	  conference	  passed	  the	  Declaration	  of	  Sharm	  El	  Sheikh	  of	   FOCAC	   and	   the	   FOCAC	   Sharm	   El	   Sheikh	   Action	   Plan	   (2010-­‐2012).	   Premier	  Wen	  Jiabao	  addressed	  eight	  new	  measures	   intended	  to	  strengthen	  China-­‐Africa	  cooperation.	  	  
Along	   with	   the	   regular	   ministerial-­‐level	   meetings	   between	   China	   and	   Africa	  through	   the	   platform	   of	   the	   FOCAC,	   Beijing	   has	   developed	   a	   practical	   and	  systematic	   approach	   for	   its	   engagement	   with	   the	   African	   continent.	   The	   state	  council	  has	  released	  a	  white	  paper	  on	  China’s	  African	  Policy,	  China’s	  Foreign	  Aid,	  and	   China-­‐Africa	   Economic	   and	   Trade	   Cooperation	   in	   2006,	   2011	   and	   2013	  respectively.	   These	  were	   the	   first	   of	   its	   kind	   in	  Beijing’s	   diplomatic	   history	   for	  the	   continent,	   and	   were	   presented	   as	   being	   the	   key	   documents	   for	   framing	  China’s	  relations	  with	  Africa	  (Taylor,	  2012,	  p.	  65).	  Generally,	  African	  participants	  and	  international	  commenters	  have	  provided	  positive	  feedback	  towards	  FOCAC.	  Many	  African	  governments	  are	   satisfied	  with	  Beijing’s	  proposals	  on	   the	   forum.	  The	   International	   Monetary	   Fund	   (IMF)	   has	   reported	   that	   Africa’s	   generally	  positive	  growth	  rate	   is	  partly	  due	   to	   increased	  commodity	  demand	   from	  China	  (Servant,	  2005).	  Kaplinsky’s	  research	  on	  China-­‐Africa	  trade	  suggests	  that	  China’s	  demands	   for	   oil,	   gas	   and	   other	   primary	   products	   have	   ‘positive	   direct	   and	  indirect	   benefits	   on	   resource-­‐exporting	   African	   economies’	   (Kaplinsky,	   2007).	  However,	   there	   are	   also	   concerns	   in	   Africa	   on	   the	   form,	   content	   and	   future	   of	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FOCAC:	   for	   instance,	   limited	   interaction	   between	   African	   countries	   and	   China	  may	  lead	  to	  Africa’s	  long-­‐term	  dependency	  on	  China	  and	  the	  neglect	  of	  an	  African	  agenda.	   They	   have	   suggested	   a	   comprehensive	   interaction	   between	  AU-­‐FOCAC	  and	   NEPAD-­‐FOCAC,	   which	   could	   give	   more	   weight	   to	   the	   African	   side	   of	   the	  dialogue	  (CCS	  Team,	  2010).	  
Based	  on	  the	  understanding	  of	  China’s	  African	  policy	  trends	  and	  the	  motivation	  behind	   it,	   the	   following	   section	   will	   further	   analyse	   the	   information	   and	   data	  from	   these	   policy	   documents	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   international	  responsibility.	  
4.3	  The	  Analysis	  of	  China’s	  African	  Policy	  China’s	  African	  policy	   is	   evolving	  on	   the	  basis	   of	  China’s	  national	   strategy	   as	   a	  whole.	  In	  order	  to	  assess	  the	  compatibility	  of	  China’s	  Africa	  policy	  and	  external	  expectations,	  this	  section	  will	  analyse	  the	  following	  two	  aspects:	  China’s	  national	  interests	  and	  policy	  with	  Chinese	  characteristic,	  and	  then	  attempt	   to	   figure	  out	  the	   relationship	   between	   its	   policy	   and	   African	   demands	   and	   international	  requirements.	  
4.3.1	  Responsibility	  and	  China’s	  national	  interests	  No	  matter	  how	  rhetorical	  the	  political	  documents	  are,	  one	  cannot	  deny	  the	  fact	  that	   international	   responsibility	   cannot	   contradict	   national	   core	   interests.	  Seeking	   to	   become	   a	   responsible	   player	   in	   Africa,	   China	   doesn’t	   and	   shouldn’t	  avoid	  its	  national	  interests	  and	  appeals	  to	  Africa,	  because	  that	  is	  the	  fundamental	  motivation	   behind	   China’s	   engagement	   with	   this	   continent.	   Also,	   to	   assess	  China’s	   responsibility	   at	   the	   policy	   level	   is	   not	   the	   same	   as	   exploring	  whether	  China’s	  policy	  is	  beneficial	  or	  not,	  but	  rather	  what	  China’s	  core	  interests	  mean	  to	  Africa	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world.	   	   	  	  The	  latest	  national	  defence	  white	  paper	  issued	  by	  the	  State	  Council	  Information	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Office,	   the	   fundamental	   policies	   and	   principles	   followed	   by	   the	   diversified	  employment	  of	  China's	  armed	  forces,	  delivered	  a	  clear	  message	  to	  the	  world	  of	  China’s	   priority,	   which	   was	   to	   “safeguard	   national	   unity,	   safeguarding	   the	  territorial	   integrity	   of	   heavy	   and	   arduous	   task	   of	   safeguarding	   the	   interests	   of	  development”	  (Information	  Office	  of	  the	  State	  Council,	  2013b),	  which	  cannot	  be	  challenged.	  Meanwhile,	  it	  is	  the	  first	  time	  that	  China	  has	  included	  the	  protection	  of	   its	   overseas	   interests	   in	   a	   national	   defence	   white	   paper.	   It	   reveals	   China’s	  growing	   expansion	   in	   international	   affairs,	   and	   its	   traditional	   interpretation	   of	  the	  ‘non-­‐interference’	  principle	  is	  a	  barrier	  for	  its	  expanding	  interests.	  Especially	  with	   its	   increased	   investment	   in	   pariah	   countries,	   China	   is	   no	   longer	   able	   to	  escape	  from	  protecting	   its	  assets	  and	  the	  criticism	  in	  these	  countries.	  Africa,	  as	  one	  of	   the	   largest	  Chinese	   investment	  and	   foreign	  aid	  destinations	  with	  a	   large	  number	  of	  pariah	  governments,	  has	  pushed	  Beijing	  to	  reconsider	   its	  traditional	  policy.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	   international	   criticism	   of	   China	   in	   Darfur	   alerts	  Beijing	   to	   care	   about	   its	   international	   image,	   and	   sends	   a	   clear	   message	   that	  China	   cannot	   be	   a	   free	   rider	   in	   Africa.	   China’s	   fear	   about	   ‘a	   backlash	   and	   the	  potential	   damage	   to	   its	   strategic	   and	   economic	   relationships	   with	   the	   US	   and	  Europe’	  prompts	   the	  country	   ‘to	  put	  great	  effort	   into	  demonstrating	   that	   it	   is	  a	  responsible	  power’	  (Kleine-­‐Ahlbrandt	  and	  Small,	  2008).	  	  In	   response	   to	   the	   changing	   international	   environment,	   China	   has	   showed	  flexibility	   in	   the	   interpretation	  of	   “non-­‐interference”,	   evidence	  of	  which	   can	  be	  seen	  from	  China’s	  pressuring	  of	   the	  Bashir	  regime	   in	  Sudan	  and	  the	  abstention	  from	   voting	   on	   the	   UN’s	   resolution	   to	   impose	   a	   no-­‐fly	   zone	   over	   Libya.	   In	   the	  National	   Defence	   White	   Paper	   of	   2013,	   it	   clearly	   included	   “international	  obligations”	   and	   pledged	   to	   “play	   an	   active	   role	   in	   maintaining	   world	   peace,	  security	  and	  stability”	  (Information	  Office	  of	  the	  State	  Council,	  2013b).	  Thus,	  as	  a	  result	   of	   China’s	   increasing	   influence	   in	   international	   affairs,	   the	  “non-­‐interference”	   for	   Beijing	   has	   already	   evolved	   from	   inaction	   or	   avoidance	  into	  non-­‐“military	  intervention”	  or	  non-­‐“economic	  sanction”.	  It	  is	  true	  that	  China	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is	  very	  cautious	  and	  prudent	  towards	  international	  intervention,	  largely	  because	  of	  its	  own	  domestic	  territorial	  problems.	  However,	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  West’s	  efforts	  is	   questionable	   as	   well.	   As	   a	   Chinese	   commenter	   argued,	   changing	   a	   small	  country’s	   regime	   through	   intervention	   is	   not	   hard	   for	   great	   powers,	   but	   the	  problem	  is	  what	  international	  military	  intervention	  will	  leave	  in	  its	  wake.	  Even	  if	  they	  stay	  for	  a	  while	  afterwards,	  it	  is	  hard	  for	  intervening	  powers	  to	  protect	  the	  local	  civilians	   -­‐	  as	  happened	   in	   Iraq,	  Afghanistan	  and	  Libya	  (Zhong,	  February	  6	  2012).	   	  	  As	  a	  result,	  China’s	  adherence	  to	  the	   ‘non-­‐interference’	  policy	  arises	  more	  from	  domestic	   needs	   and	   does	   not	   necessarily	   shield	   the	   country	   from	   being	  responsible	   for	  Africa’s	  security	  crisis.	  Stability	  and	  peace	   in	  Africa,	  even	  in	  the	  pariah	  countries	  who	  are	  China’s	  economic	  partners,	  are	  consistent	  with	  China’s	  own	  national	  interests.	  The	  difference	  between	  China	  and	  the	  traditional	  donors	  lies	   in	   the	  way	   this	   aim	   can	   be	   achieved.	   The	   case	   of	   Sudan	   in	   Chapter	   6	  will	  feature	  further	  discussion	  of	  China’s	  interpretation	  of	  ‘non-­‐interference’.	   	  	  According	   to	   China’s	   African	   policy,	   Africa,	   as	   an	   important	   partner	   of	   China’s	  “South-­‐South	   Cooperation”	   and	   a	   supporter	   of	   “North-­‐South	   dialogue”,	   is	  significant	   for	   China’s	   national	   interests	   in	   terms	   of	   trade,	   energy	   supply,	   and	  diplomatic	  and	  political	  support.	   Internationally,	  as	  President	  Xi	   Jinping	  said	   to	  South	  African	  President	  Zuma,	  China-­‐Africa	  development	  has	  great	  significance	  to	   increase	   the	   strength	  of	  developing	   countries	   and	   to	  promote	   “international	  relations	   democratisation”	   (Guoji	   Guanxi	  Minzhuhua	  国际关系民主化)	   (MOFA,	  February	   17	   2013).	   Here,	   international	   relations	   democratization	   calls	   for	   a	  fairer	   international	   political	   and	   economic	   order.	   As	   former	   Foreign	   Minister	  Yang	   Jiechi	   specified,	   “China-­‐Africa	   have	   maintained	   communication	   and	  coordination	   on	   peace	   and	   security,	   climate	   change,	   Doha	   development	   round	  (DDA)	   and	   the	   reform	   of	   the	   international	   financial	   system,	   protected	   the	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legitimate	   rights	   of	   developing	   countries	   and	   promoted	   the	   development	   of	   a	  fairer	   and	   more	   reasonable	   international	   political	   and	   economic	   order”.	  (Chinanews.com,	  January	  6	  2012)	  China’s	  stance	  corresponded	  with	  President	  of	  Burkina	  Faso	  Compaore’s	   advocation	  of	   “close	   connection	  of	  African	  and	  other	  developing	  countries	  in	  the	  international	  financial	  system	  reform”	  (Xinhua	  News,	  November	  17	  2008).	  It	  is	  obvious	  that	  both	  China	  and	  Africa	  are	  motivated	  to	  call	  for	  multi-­‐polar	   international	   relations,	   from	  which	   they	  can	  gain	  more	  benefits	  than	   from	   the	   current	   one.	   However,	   it	   is	   questionable	   whether	   China’s	  conceived	  new	  order	  is	  similar	  to	  Africa’s,	  let	  alone	  that	  a	  diversified	  Africa	  has	  different	   requirements	   which	   are	   far	   from	   unified.	   It	   is	   hard	   to	   conclude	   that	  China	  is	  responsible	  in	  terms	  of	  “international	  relations	  democratization”,	  simply	  because	  both	  sides	  consider	   themselves	   to	  be	  as	  vulnerable	  as	   the	  other	   in	   the	  current	  world	  order.	  Nor	  could	  the	  reverse	  be	  argued,	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  each	  of	  them	  has	   its	  own	  national	   interests.	   Currently,	   both	   sides	  need	   support	  on	   the	  world	   stage,	  but	   the	  assessment	  of	   responsibility	  needs	   to	  be	  analysed	  case	  by	  case	  in	  the	  following	  chapters.	   	  
4.3.2	  Responsibility	  and	  Chinese	  Characteristics	   	  
I.	  Oil	  for	  infrastructure	   	  
Africa	   is	   an	   important	   energy	   supplier	   for	   China.	   For	   those	   oil-­‐rich	   countries,	  China	   has	   conducted	   an	   “oil	   for	   infrastructure”	   approach	   to	   access	   the	   energy	  industry	  there,	  in	  return	  for	  infrastructure	  construction.	  Angola	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  China’s	  most	  successful	  oil	  supplier	  on	  the	  continent;	  some	  researchers	  have	  called	  the	  Chinese	  way	  of	  “oil	   for	   infrastructure”	  the	  “Angola	  model”18	   (Corkin,	  2011;	   M.	   Davies,	   Edinger,	   Tay,	   &	   Naidu,	   2008).	   The	   expansion	   of	   Chinese	   oil	  companies	   into	   Africa’s	   market	   has	   drawn	   attention	   from	   the	   international	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 China	  EXIM	  Bank’s	  financing	  arrangement	  that	  ties	  a	  commodity	  (Oil)	  off-­‐take	  agreement	  with	  the	  provision	  of	  infrastructure	  in	  the	  contracting	  African	  country	  are	  commonly	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  “Angola	  Model’. 
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community,	   which	   is	   concerned	   not	   only	   because	   China	   is	   a	   competitor	   for	  Western	  oil	   companies,	  but	  also	  because	  of	   its	   impact	  on	   the	  African	  countries	  and	   their	   people.	   China	   has	   not	   been	   actively	   involved	   in	   African	   countries’	  public	  financial	  management,	  and	  has	  not	  linked	  its	  loans	  to	  these	  countries’	  oil	  revenue	  disbursement.	  The	  doubts	  held	  by	  many	  Western	  policymakers	  are	  that	  China	   will	   undermine	   efforts	   by	   traditional	   donors	   and	   international	   financial	  institutions	   to	   regulate	  oil	   revenue	  management	   and	   reduce	   corruption.	  At	   the	  same	  time,	  partly	  due	  to	  large	  inflows	  of	  Chinese	  labour,	  the	  local	  job	  creation	  of	  Chinese	  projects	  on	  oil	  and	   infrastructure	   investment	   is	   limited.	  There	   is	  a	  risk	  that	   this	   “oil	   for	   infrastructure”	   relationship	   will	   result	   in	   resource	   extraction	  and	   that	   human	   capital	   development	   may	   be	   neglected	   (Collier,	   2007;	   Zafar,	  2007,	  p.	  39).	   	  	  First,	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   persuading	   African	   governments	   to	   accept	   Western	  good	  governance	  and	  transparency	  as	  requirements	  for	  loans	  is	  questionable,	  (R.	  I.	  Rotberg,	  2008,	  pp.	  121-­‐124)	  because	  for	  oil	  rich	  countries,	  their	  governments	  have	   diversified	   sources	   for	   their	   survival	   rather	   than	   solely	   relying	   on	   either	  multilateral	   banks	   or	   China.	   And	   lacking	   the	   inner	   motivation	   to	   adopt	   the	  requirements,	  the	  contribution	  of	  these	  measures	  is	  always	  not	  as	  successful	  as	  expected.	  Second,	  resources	  do	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  China-­‐Africa	  economic	  relations,	  but	  there	  is	  much	  more	  business	  beyond	  natural	  resources.	  According	  to	   the	   China-­‐Africa	   Economic	   and	   Trade	   Cooperation,	   currently	   “over	   2,000	  Chinese	   enterprises	   are	   investing	   and	   developing	   in	   more	   than	   50	   African	  countries	   and	   regions”	   -­‐	   some	   of	   these	   countries	   have	   oil	   or	   other	   resources,	  while	   many	   don't.	   The	   case	   studies	   chapters	   will	   make	   further	   comparisons	  between	  China’s	  engagement	  with	  oil-­‐rich	  and	  non-­‐energy	  reserve	  countries	   to	  test	   this	   policy.	   Meanwhile,	   its	   cooperative	   fields	   “have	   expanded	   from	  agriculture,	   mining	   and	   building	   industry	   to	   intensive	   processing	   of	   resource	  products,	  industrial	  manufacturing,	  finance,	  commercial	  logistics	  and	  real	  estate”.	  This	   reveals	   that	   China’s	   business	   exploration	   on	   the	   continent	   is	   not	   only	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focused	  on	  resources,	  but	  on	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  industries.	  In	  recent	  years,	  China	  has	  improved	  its	  mechanisms	  for	  investment	  in	  Africa.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  2012,	  China	  had	   signed	   bilateral	   investment	   treaties	   with	   32	   African	   countries,	   and	  established	   joint	   economic	   commission	  mechanisms	  with	  45	  African	   countries.	  By	   the	   end	  of	   2012,	   the	  China-­‐Africa	  Development	   Fund,	   established	   as	   one	  of	  the	  eight	  pledges	  China	  made	  at	  the	  FOCAC	  Beijing	  Summit,	  had	  agreed	  to	  invest	  US$2.385	  billion	  in	  61	  projects	  in	  30	  African	  countries,	  and	  had	  already	  invested	  US$1.806	   billion	   for	   53	   projects.	   According	   to	   preliminary	   statistics,	   the	  agreed-­‐upon	  investment	  projects	  will	  bring	  US$10	  billion	  worth	  of	  investment	  to	  Africa,	   increase	   local	   exports	  by	   about	  US$2	  billion	  annually,	   and	  benefit	  more	  than	  700,000	  people.	  Thirdly,	   in	   terms	  of	   the	  Chinese	   labour	   force’s	   impact	  on	  African	   employment	   opportunities,	   the	   witnesses	   from	   both	   MOFA	   and	   SOEs	  have	   disclosed	   that	   central	   government	   and	   policy	   banks	   don’t	   have	  requirements	   for	   hiring	   local	   people	   with	   the	   loans.	   It	   is	   up	   to	   the	   Chinese	  companies	  to	  make	  decisions	  on	  their	  human	  resources	  management	  according	  to	   the	   host	   country’s	   law	   and	   their	   profits	   consideration.	   The	   main	   reason	   to	  limited	   local	   employees,	   nearly	   all	   the	   witness	   agreed,	   is	   the	   competence	   of	  African	   workers	   and	   their	   skills.	   In	   response	   to	   this	   problem,	   the	   Chinese	  government	   has	   launched	   a	   series	   of	   training	   programs.	   From	   2010	   to	   2012,	  China	   held	   various	   training	   courses	   in	   54	   countries	   and	   regions	   in	   Africa;	   the	  courses	   involved	  a	   total	   of	  27,318	  officials	   and	   technicians,	   and	   covered	   topics	  relating	   to	   economics,	   foreign	   affairs,	   energy,	   industry,	   agriculture,	   forestry,	  animal	   husbandry	   and	   fishing,	   medicine	   and	   health	   care,	   inspection	   and	  quarantine,	  climate	  change,	  security,	  and	  some	  other	  fields.	  In	  addition,	  Chinese	  medical	   teams,	   agricultural	   experts	   and	   enterprises	   located	   in	  Africa	  have	   also	  trained	   local	   people	   in	   an	   effort	   to	   enhance	   local	   technological	   capabilities	  (Information	  Office	  of	   the	  State	  Council,	   2013a).	  The	  Nigeria	   case	   in	  Chapter	  7	  will	  further	  discuss	  the	  approach	  of	  “oil	  for	  infrastructure”.	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II.	  Aid	  with	  no-­‐strings	  
China’s	   official	   policy	   statement	   on	   its	   foreign	   aid,	   as	   the	   second	   feature,	  emphasizes	   “no	   political	   conditions”,	   and	   China	   “respects	   recipient	   countries’	  right	   to	   independently	   select	   their	   own	   path	   and	   model	   of	   development,	   and	  believes	   that	   every	   country	   should	   explore	   a	   development	   path	   suitable	   to	   its	  actual	   conditions.	   China	   never	   uses	   foreign	   aid	   as	   a	   means	   to	   interfere	   in	  recipient	   countries’	   internal	   affairs	   or	   seek	   political	   privileges	   for	   itself”	  (Information	   Office	   of	   the	   State	   Council,	   April	   2011).	   President	   Xi	   Jinping	  re-­‐confirmed	   this	   principle	   during	   his	   African	   tour	   in	   March	   2013,	   and	   said,	  “China	  will	   continue	   to	  offer,	   as	   always,	   necessary	   assistance	   to	  Africa	  with	  no	  political	  strings	  attached”	  (Reuters,	  March	  25	  2013).	  	   	  China’s	   non-­‐conditional	   aid	   has	   been	   seriously	   questioned	   by	  Western	   donors.	  First,	   its	   non-­‐conditionality	   (i.e.	   aid	  without	   requirement	   on	   good	   governance,	  transparency	   or	   political	   reform)	   is	   said	   to	   support	   irresponsible	   regimes,	  thereby	   fuelling	   corruption	   and	   delaying	   necessary	   economic	   and	   political	  reform	   in	   African	   countries.	   Second,	   China’s	   aid	   to	   Africa	   is	   considered	   to	   be	  driven	  by	  a/its	  domestic	  thirst	  for	  resources	  and	  the	  exploration	  of	  new	  African	  markets.	   Therefore,	   compared	   to	   traditional	   donors	   whose	   aid	   comes	   with	  political	   conditions,	   China	   is	   criticised	   for	   exporting	   its	   “growth	   at	   any	   cost”	  strategy	  at	  home	  to	  Africa	  (Condon,	  2012,	  pp.	  6-­‐7).	  However,	  given	  that	  Chinese	  aid	  is	  offered	  in	  kind	  rather	  than	  cash,	  it	  might	  also	  be	  less	  prone	  to	  corruption	  (Brautigam,	  2008b).	  According	  to	  a	  white	  paper	  about	  China’s	  Foreign	  Aid,	  China	  offers	   foreign	   aid	   in	   eight	   forms:	   complete	   projects,	   goods	   and	   materials,	  technical	  cooperation,	  human	  resource	  development	  cooperation,	  medical	  teams	  sent	   abroad,	   emergency	   humanitarian	   aid,	   volunteer	   programs	   in	   foreign	  countries,	   and	  debt	   relief	   (Information	  Office	   of	   the	   State	  Council,	   April	   2011).	  The	  assistance	  is	  tangible	  and	  often	  conducted	  by	  Chinese	  companies19.	  Different	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	   Here	   the	   argument	   of	   “Chinese	   side	   controls	   the	   cash	   flow”	   does	   not	   necessarily	   mean	   China	   is	   not	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from	   international	  banks	  and	   traditional	  donors,	   the	  cash	   flow	   is	  always	  under	  the	  control	  of	  the	  Chinese	  government	  and	  Chinese	  enterprises,	  which	  limit	  the	  possibility	   of	   corruption	   in	   recipient	   countries.	   Second,	   as	   discussed	   in	   former	  section,	   the	   support	   of	   pariah	   governments	   contradicts	   with	   China’s	   overseas	  interests	   protection	   and	   international	   image.	   The	   approach	   of	   “aid	   with	   no	  political	  conditions”	  is	  out	  of	  the	  weakness	  of	  Beijing	  rather	  than	  its	  intentional	  protection	  of	  dictators,	  because	   its	  domestic	  political	   situation	  gives	  China	   less	  voice	   to	   persuade	   African	   governments	   of	   good	   governance	   and	   human	   rights	  protection.	  Meanwhile,	   “political	   conditions”	  has	   an	   assumption	   that	  China	  has	  the	   capability	   to	  press	   its	  African	  counterparts,	  but	   in	   the	   case	  of	  Africa,	  China	  and	   its	   projects	   are	   largely	   constrained	   by	   local	   regulations	   and	   political	  manipulation.	   The	   country	   even	   cannot	   fully	   protect	   its	   overseas	   assets	   and	  citizens,	  how	  could	  it	  have	  the	  power	  to	  change	  local	  governance?	   	   	   	   III.	  China	  
as	  a	  model	  According	  to	  Witness	  1,	  who	  has	  involved	  in	  the	  briefing	  meeting	  of	  FOCAC	  V,	  the	  biggest	  difference	  between	  FOCAC	  V	  and	  former	  meetings	  within	  this	  platform,	  is	  that	   it	   included	   “China	   and	   Africa	   will	   enhance	   the	   sharing	   of	   experience	   in	  governance”	   in	   the	   fifth	   ministerial	   conference	   of	   FOCAC	   Beijing	   Action	   Plan	  2013-­‐2015.	  However,	   little	  political	  discourse	  has	  mentioned	  what	   “experience	  in	   governance”	   China	  would	   like	   to	   share.	  Witness	   3	   interpreted	   it	   as	   “China’s	  experience	   and	  model	   of	   rapid	   growth”.	   In	   the	   Joint	   Communiqué	  of	   the	  Third	  Round	  of	  Political	  Consultations	  between	  Chinese	  and	  African	  Foreign	  Ministers,	  in	  2013,	  it	  emphasised	  shared	  experience	  of	  “development”.	  While	  in	  the	  Beijing	  Action	  plan	  2013-­‐2015,	  it	  said	  “two	  sides	  will	  continue	  to	  expand	  the	  scope	  and	  diversify	   the	   forms	   of	   exchanges	   between	   political	   parties,	   deepen	   political	  dialogue,	   consolidate	   political	   mutual	   trust,	   enhance	   experience	   sharing	   on	  governance	   and	   national	   development	   and	   promote	   practical	   cooperation”	  (FOCAC,	  July	  23	  2012).	  In	  September	  2013,	  the	  Central	  Party	  School	  of	  CPC	  held	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  corrupt.	  But	  as	   the	   thesis	   focused	  on	   the	  evaluation	  of	  China’s	   impact	   to	  Africa,	   the	   tangible	  assistance	  at	  least	  is	  better	  than	  cash	  for	  African	  people.	   	  
	   107	  
a	   seminar	   on	   “China-­‐Africa	   experiences	   of	   governance	   and	   development”	   to	  further	   discuss	   the	   topic	   with	   110	   experts	   from	   more	   than	   50	   African	  universities	  and	  research	  institutes.	  Zhang	  Boli,	  the	  vice	  principle	  of	  the	  Central	  Party	   School	   has	   pointed	   out	   that,	   China-­‐Africa‘s	   new	   strategic	   partnership	  should	  be	  established	  not	  only	   through	  political,	  economics	  and	   trade,	  but	  also	  dialogue	   and	   communication	   among	   people	   (FOCAC,	   October	   9	   2013).	   China’s	  Special	  Representative	  to	  Africa	  Liu	  Guijin,	  emphasised	  that	  China	  just	  wants	  to	  share	  its	  own	  experiences	  with	  Africa,	  but	  not	  to	  force	  any	  African	  countries	  to	  accept	  it,	  because	  there	  is	  not	  a	  universal	  model	  that	  is	  suitable	  for	  every	  country	  (Xinhua	  News,	  September	  25	  2013).	  	  The	   Chinese	   government	   didn’t	   give	   a	   clear	   explanation	   of	   what	   “governance	  experience”	   it	   would	   like	   to	   share	   with	   African	   countries.	   From	   the	   limited	  political	  documents,	   it	  has	   indicated	   that	  China’s	  development	  path,	  which	  also	  echoed	   with	   African	   countries’	   expectation.	   As	   Senegal	   President	   Abdoulaye	  Wade	  said,	  “the	  Chinese	  model	  for	  stimulating	  rapid	  economic	  development	  has	  much	   to	   teach	   Africa”	   (Wade,	   January	   23	   2008).	   Most	   African	   countries	   are	  interested	   in	  China’s	  experience	  of	   lifting	  hundreds	  of	  millions	  of	  people	  out	  of	  poverty	   in	   a	   relatively	   short	   period	   of	   time.	   Thus,	   this	   thesis	  will	   assume	   that	  what	  China	  shares	   is	  an	  alternative	  economic	  development	  model,	  what	   Joshua	  Cooper	  Ramo	  named	  the	  “Beijing	  Consensus”	  (Cooper	  Ramo,	  May	  2004).	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  China’s	  rapid	  economic	  growth	  was	  achieved	   through	  a	  high	   level	  of	  investment	   and	   concentration	   on	   exports.	   In	   recent	   years,	   many	   African	  countries’	   economic	   growth	   has	   also	   been	   spurred	   by	   China’s	   investment	   in	  African	   commodities.	   The	   exportation	   of	   the	   Beijing	   Consensus	   could	   help	   to	  further	  promote	  and	   facilitate	  China’s	   investment	   in	  Africa.	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	  China’s	   economic	   strength	   is	   attractive	   to	   African	   political	   elites.	   Sharing	  experiences	  will	   enhance	   China’s	   soft	   power	   in	   Africa.	   From	   the	   launch	   of	   the	  China-­‐Africa	  Joint	  Research	  and	  Exchange	  Plan	  in	  March	  2010	  to	  the	  end	  of	  2012,	  it	   had	   supported	   64	   projects	   in	   the	   form	   of	   workshops,	   subject	   research,	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academic	   exchanges,	   and	   publishing	   works	   (Information	   Office	   of	   the	   State	  Council,	   2013a).	   The	  project	   had	   also	   subsidised	   visits	   and	   exchanges	   for	   over	  600	  Chinese	  and	  African	  scholars.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  China	  emphasised	  its	  respect	  for	  Africa’s	  choice	  of	  its	  own	  development	  path.	  China	  did	  provide	  an	  alternative	  source	   of	   funds	   and	   a	   development	   model,	   but	   whether	   China’s	   development	  model	  suits	  African	  countries	  largely	  depends	  on	  the	  situation	  and	  environment	  within	   the	  host	   countries.	  The	  Ethiopian	   case	   in	  Chapter	  9	  will	   further	  discuss	  China	  as	  a	  model	  for	  Africa.	  
4.4.	  Conclusion	   	  China’s	   Africa	   policy	   has	   experienced	   an	   evolution,	   from	   radical	   ideologically	  driven	   towards	   a	   more	   practical	   way	   and	   flexible	   interpretation.	   Notably,	   its	  non-­‐interference	   principle	   has	   a	   different	   interpretation	   according	   to	   its	  changing	   national	   agenda.	   Currently,	   China	   has	   political,	   economic	   and	  diplomatic	   interests	   in	   Africa.	   And	   based	   on	   its	   own	   national	   interests	   of	  protecting	  overseas	   assets	   and	   citizens	   and	  a	   stable	   and	  peaceful	   international	  environment,	   China	   has	   similar	   expectation	   with	   African	   countries	   with	   the	  continent	  and	  international	  society	  and	  it	  is	  of	  China’s	  own	  interests	  to	  become	  responsible	  to	  African’s	  stability	  and	  development.	  The	  second	  part	  of	  each	  case	  study	  chapter	  will	  further	  address	  how	  the	  mutual	  requirements	  between	  China	  and	  its	  host	  country	  come	  out	  and	  their	  compatibility.	   	  	  China	   has	   a	   different	   approach	   and	   philosophy	   towards	   its	   responsibility	   in	  Africa.	   On	   the	   international	   level,	   it	   advocates	   a	   fairer	   international	   order	   in	  favour	  of	  Southern	  countries’	  interests.	  In	  practice,	  this	  advocacy	  has	  manifested	  as	   mutual	   political	   support	   for	   each	   other	   in	   the	   international	   arena.	   On	   the	  policy	   level,	   China-­‐Africa	   engagement	   has	   the	   following	   features:	  non-­‐interference,	   oil	   for	   infrastructure	   and	  aid	  with	  no	   strings	   attached.	  These	  approaches	  were	  introduced	  for	  China’s	  win-­‐win	  situation	  with	  African	  countries,	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  African	  governments	  with	  a	  free	  environment	  to	  choose	  the	  
	   109	  
way	   that	   fit	   their	   own	   development	   agendas	   and	   financial	   assistance	   for	   their	  infrastructures.	  And	  it	  also	  reveals	  China’s	  limited	  capability	  in	  the	  continent.	  In	  practice,	   these	   approaches,	   even	   may	   have	   good	   willingness	   in	   mind,	   have	  brought	  Africa	  negative	  effects	  as	  well,	  such	  as	  overwhelming	  floods	  of	  Chinese	  labour	  and	  Chinese	  products.	  Hence	  Beijing	   launched	  various	  measures	   for	   the	  promotion	   of	   investment,	   debt	   reduction	   and	   relief,	   economic	   assistance	   and	  cooperation.	  In	  response	  to	  African	  countries’	  trade	  deficits,	  China	  has	  vigorously	  expanded	   its	   imports	   from	  Africa	   by	   enacting	   tariff	   exemptions	   and	   setting	   up	  exhibition	   centres	   for	   African	   products.	   Since	   January	   2012,	   the	   30	  least-­‐developed	   African	   countries	   that	   have	   established	   diplomatic	   relations	  with	   China	   have	   been	   granted	   zero-­‐tariff	   treatment	   for	   60%	   of	   their	   exported	  items.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  2012,	  22	  of	  them	  had	  seen	  910	  million	  yuan	  worth	  of	  tariff	  exemption,	   involving	  US$1.49	  billion-­‐worth	  of	   goods	   (Information	  Office	  of	   the	  State	  Council,	  2013a).	  In	  order	  to	  support	  African	  medium	  and	  small	  businesses,	  at	   the	   Fourth	   FOCAC	   Ministerial	   Conference	   in	   2009,	   China	   announced	   the	  establishment	  of	  “a	  special	  loan	  for	  small	  and	  medium-­‐sized	  African	  businesses.”	  By	  the	  end	  of	  2012,	  the	  special	  loan	  service	  had	  promised	  to	  offer	  loans	  totaling	  US$1.213	   billion,	   with	   a	   contract	   value	   of	   US$1.028	   billion,	   and	   loans	   granted	  worth	   US$666	   million,	   providing	   strong	   support	   for	   the	   development	   of	  agriculture,	   forestry,	   animal	   husbandry,	   fishing,	   processing	   and	  manufacturing,	  trade	   and	   logistics,	   and	   other	   industries	   closely	   associated	   with	   people’s	  livelihoods	  in	  Africa	  (Information	  Office	  of	  the	  State	  Council,	  April	  2011).	  As	  for	  the	  complaints	  regarding	  the	  quality	  of	  Chinese	  goods,	   from	  December	  2010	  to	  March	   2011,	   the	   Chinese	   took	   steps	   to	   crack	   down	   on	   the	   potential	   export	   to	  Africa	   of	   counterfeit	   and	   poor-­‐quality	   products,	   and	   commodities	   that	   violate	  intellectual	   property	   rights.	   This	   involved	   multiple	   measures,	   such	   as	  prior-­‐to-­‐shipment	  quality	   examinations	   for	   industrial	  products	   that	  were	   to	  be	  exported	   to	   Africa.	   These	   measures	   helped	   guarantee	   the	   quality	   of	   Chinese	  commodities	   exported	   to	   Africa	   (MOFCOM,	   February	   17	   2011).	   In	   terms	   of	  foreign	   aid,	   African	   countries	   accounted	   for	   45.7%	   of	   China’s	   total	   foreign	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Chapter	  5	  A	  Fragmented	  China	  in	  Africa	  with	  Chinese	  Characteristics	   	  
5.1	  Introduction	  As	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  international	  responsibility	  is	  not	  the	  same	  thing	  as	  a	  state’s	  responsibility,	  and	  instead	  many	  kinds	  of	  actors	  have	  become	  involved	  in	  the	   process	   of	   shouldering	   responsibility.	   The	   implementation	   of	   international	  responsibility	  is	  achieved	  in	  the	  political	  and	  economic	  contexts	  of	  the	  donor	  and	  host	   countries	   by	   the	   actions	   of	   various	   actors,	   as	   has	   been	   suggested	   in	  hypothesis	  III.	  In	  order	  to	  test	  this	  hypothesis,	  this	  chapter	  will	  investigate	  which	  branches	  or	  departments	  of	  government	  have	  been	  involved	  in	  the	  China-­‐Africa	  policy	   implementation	   process,	   and	   also	   further	   explore	   which	   actors	   have	   a	  potential	  impact	  on	  China	  “being	  responsible”.	   	  	  It	  is	  common	  to	  see	  the	  phrase	  “fragmented	  authoritarianism”	  in	  Chinese	  studies	  literature.	   This	   refers	   to	   the	   idea	   that	   “policy	   made	   at	   the	   centre	   becomes	  increasingly	   malleable	   to	   the	   parochial	   organisational	   and	   political	   goals	   of	  various	  vertical	  agencies	  and	  spatial	  regions	  charged	  with	  enforcing	  that	  policy”	  (Mertha,	  2009,	  p.	  996).	  Outcomes	  are	  shaped	  by	  the	  incorporation	  of	  interests	  of	  the	   implementing	   agencies	   into	   the	   policies	   themselves.	   Fragmented	  authoritarianism	   thus	   explains	   a	  policy	   arena	   governed	  by	   incremental	   change	  via	   bureaucratic	   bargaining	   (Mertha,	   2009,	   p.	   996).	   In	   a	   globalising	   world,	  China’s	  foreign-­‐economic	  policies	  are	  put	  into	  practice	  by	  an	  increasingly	  diverse	  set	   of	   actors	   under	   pressure	   from	   a	   wide	   variety	   of	   interest	   groups	   and	  constituency	  demands	  (Taylor,	  2009).	  For	  instance,	  China’s	  overseas	  SOEs	  have	  to	  be	  sensitive	  both	  to	  general	  government	  policies	  and	  proclamations,	  and	  also	  to	   their	   profit	   motives	   (Taylor,	   2009,	   p.	   5).	   This	   implies	   that	   China’s	   foreign	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policy	   implementation	   is	   a	   result	   of	   compromise	   between	   actors	   through	  calculations	   of	   central	   policy,	   economic	   profits	   and	   other	   interests.	   As	   for	   the	  assessment	   of	   China	   in	  Africa,	   the	   following	   sections	  will	   discuss	  which	   actors	  have	   influenced	   China’s	   activities	   in	   Africa	   from	   two	   major	   areas:	   foreign	  assistance	   and	   foreign	   investment.	   Additionally,	   it	  will	   provide	   an	   overview	   of	  China’s	   foreign	   aid	   and	   foreign	   investment	   system,	   which	   is	   different	   from	  traditional	  OECD	   countries’	   and	   is	   designed	   to	   test	   hypothesis	   III	   from	  China’s	  perspective.	   	  
5.2	  Explanation	  of	  China’s	  Aid	  system	  
5.2.1	  An	  Ambiguous	  Number	  Developed	   countries	   widely	   use	   official	   development	   assistance	   (ODA)20	   as	  defined	  by	  the	  Organisation	  for	  Economic	  Cooperation	  and	  Development	  (OECD)	  to	  measure	  international	  aid	  flows.	  The	  three	  largest	  OECD	  donors	  -­‐	  the	  US,	  EU	  and	   France	   -­‐	   have	   provided	   sub-­‐Saharan	   Africa	   with	   US$7.6	   billion,	   US$	   4.8	  billion	   and	  US$3.9	  billion,	   respectively,	   in	   the	   form	  of	   development	   grants	   and	  concessional	   loans	   in	   2009	   (Calculated	   from	   OECD	   website).	   By	   comparison,	  notwithstanding	  the	  lack	  of	  official	  statistics	  on	  its	  annual	  aid	  totals,	  Brautigam	  estimated	  that	  China	  probably	  disbursed	  US$1.4	  billion	  in	  ODA	  in	  Africa	  during	  the	   same	   period	   (Brautigam,	   2011,	   p.	   211).	   However,	  Weston	   et	   al,	   Lum	   et	   al,	  Brautigam	   and	   Lancaster	   all	   agreed	   that	   the	   actual	   amount	   of	   Chinese	   foreign	  assistance	  in	  Africa	  has	  been	  understated	  if	  we	  use	  ODA	  as	  an	  indicator,	  because	  much	  of	  China’s	  economic	  financing	  on	  the	  continent	  often	  doesn’t	  fit	  the	  OECD’s	  definition	   of	   development	   assistance	   (Lancaster,	   2007;	   Lum,	   Fischer,	  Gomez-­‐Granger,	  &	  Leland,	  2009;	  Weston,	  Campbell,	  &	  Koleski,	  September	  2011).	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 The	  full	  definition	  of	  ODA	  is,	  flows	  administered	  with	  the	  promotion	  of	  the	  economic	  development	  and	  welfare	  of	  developing	  countries	  as	  the	  main	  objective,	  and	  which	  are	  concessional	  in	  character	  with	  a	  grant	  element	   of	   at	   least	   25%	   (using	   a	   fixed	   10%	   rate	   of	   discount).	   By	   convention,	   ODA	   flows	   comprise	  contributions	  of	  donor	  government	  agencies	  at	  all	   levels	   to	  developing	  countries	   (“bilateral	  ODA”)	  and	   to	  multilateral	   institutions.	   ODA	   recipients	   comprise	   disbursement	   by	   bilateral	   donors	   and	   multilateral	  institutions.	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  The	  lack	  of	  transparency	  perplexes	  researchers	  of	  Chinese	  aid	  studies.	  Although	  the	   government	   released	   a	   white	   paper	   on	   foreign	   aid	   in	   2011,	   which	   was	   a	  substantial	  step	  towards	  making	  its	  foreign	  aid	  more	  transparent	  and	  systematic,	  people	  still	  could	  not	  find	  certain	  details	  of	  its	  foreign	  aid,	  such	  as	  annual	  aid	  data,	  nor	  the	  criteria	  used	  in	  calculating	  it.	  Why	  does	  such	  a	  goodwill	  issue	  have	  to	  be	  a	   “state	   secret”?	   (Weston	   et	   al.,	   September	   2011)	   The	   answer	   from	   Chinese	  officials	   is	   that	   they	  were	   trying	   to	   “avoid	   unwelcome	   pressure	   from	  many	   of	  those	   governments	   for	   more	   aid	   to	   keep	   up	   with	   the	   largest	   recipients”	  (Lancaster,	   2007,	   p.	   2)	   by	   not	   issuing	   the	   amount	   of	   bilateral	   aid.	   It	   sounds	  reasonable	  but	  does	  not	  satisfy	  all	  the	  concerns.	  There	  appear	  to	  be	  several	  other	  reasons,	   internal	   and	  external,	   for	  why	   the	  Chinese	   government	   is	   reluctant	   to	  release	  more	  details	  on	  its	  foreign	  aid.	   	  	  First,	   it	   is	   hard	   to	   calculate.	   As	   mentioned	   above,	   much	   of	   China’s	   assistance	  doesn’t	   fit	   into	   the	   ODA	   definition	   of	   the	   OECD.	   According	   to	   the	   Foreign	   Aid	  White	   Paper,	   China	   has	   provided	   assistance	   to	   Africa	   through	   three	   types	   of	  financial	   resources:	   grants,	   interest-­‐free	   loans,	   and	   confessional	   loans	   without	  clarifying	  whether	  the	  grants	  elements	  are	  less	  than	  at	  least	  25%	  of	  the	  loans.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  much	  of	  the	  official	  assistance	  doesn’t	  qualify	  under	  the	  standards	  of	   ODA.	   For	   instance,	   “export	   buyer’s	   credit”,	   “export	   commodity-­‐secured	   or	  ‘mutual-­‐benefit’	  credits”,	  “official	  loans	  at	  commercial	  rates”	  and	  “strategic	  lines	  of	  credit	  to	  Chinese	  companies”	   in	  Africa	  (Brautigam,	  2011).	  These	  kinds	  of	  aid	  are	  often	  provided	  as	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  package	  of	  investment	  or	  trade	  deals	  with	  local	  government	  and	  companies,	  which	  can	  hardly	  separate	  the	  amount	  of	   the	  ODA	   element	   from	   business	   expenses.	   Furthermore,	   based	   on	   the	   statistics	  estimated	  by	  the	  NYU	  Wagner	  School,	  about	  54%	  of	  China’s	  foreign	  aid	  in	  Africa	  went	  to	  infrastructure	  projects	  and	  public	  works,	  which	  included	  transportation,	  communication,	   power	   supply,	   municipal	   utilities,	   civilian	   buildings,	   wells	   for	  water	  supply,	  conference	  centers,	  sports	  venues,	  culture	  venues,	  and	  facilities	  for	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scientific,	  educational	  and	  medical	  care	  purposes.	  (Lum	  et	  al.,	  2009)	  Much	  of	  the	  manpower	   and	   technologies	   used	   in	   these	   projects	   were	   not	   included;	   as	  Witness	  22	  suggested,	  the	  technicians	  and	  specialists	  are	  the	  biggest	  advantage	  China	  can	  offer	  Africa	  because	  they	  have	  comprehensive	  procedures.	  In	  this	  way,	  how	   to	  quantify	   the	  Chinese	  human	  resource	   cost	   involved	   in	   these	  projects	   is	  another	  obstacle	   to	   ascertaining	  China’s	   aid	   in	   the	   continent.	   In	   addition,	   if	  we	  did	  research	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  figures	  provided	  by	  the	  media	  or	  in	  pledges,	  there	  is	  a	  risk	  that	  some	  of	  the	  projects	  may	  have	  not	  been	  fulfilled	  or	  even	  be	  cancelled.	  According	   to	   the	   data	   from	   the	   China-­‐Africa	   Database,	   among	   all	   the	   projects	  China	   has	   conducted	   in	   Africa,	   30	   have	   been	   cancelled.	   Meanwhile,	   some	  commitments	   that	   lasted	   for	   several	   years	   may	   be	   counted	   more	   than	   once	  (Brautigam,	   2010).	   What’s	   more,	   the	   bureaucracy	   in	   central	   and	   local	  governments	  has	  increased	  the	  difficulty	  in	  divining	  an	  exact	  number.	  Normally,	  five	  ministries	   (the	  Ministry	  of	  Commerce,	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  Finance,	  Health	  and	  Education),	   two	   policy	   banks	   (China’s	   Export-­‐Import	   Bank	   and	   Development	  Bank),	  as	  well	  as	  some	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises	  would	  be	  involved	  in	  foreign	  aid,	  and	  none	  of	  them	  seem	  to	  be	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  whole	  process,	  nor	  responsible	  for	  providing	  more	  details.	  	  Second,	  China,	  being	  categorized	  as	  a	  lower	  middle-­‐income	  country	  by	  the	  OECD,	  who	   receives	   net	   ODA	   to	   the	   amounts	   of	   US$1.1	   billion	   in	   2009	   and	   US$648	  million	  in	  2010,	  (Calculated	  from	  OECD	  website)	  may	  reduce	  the	  financial	  funds	  it	   could	   receive	   from	  OECD	   donors	   if	   it	   acted	   as	   a	   generous	   contributor	   itself.	  This	   concern	   could	   be	   reflected	   in	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   Chinese	   government	  frequently	  emphasises	  that	  it	  is	  still	  a	  lower-­‐middle-­‐income	  country,	  and	  that	  its	  largest	  donor	  Japan	  has	  announced	  the	  termination	  of	  its	  government’s	  Yen	  Loan	  to	  China,	  in	  2007.	   	  	  Third,	   “being	   a	   responsible	   power”	   has	   provoked	   a	   lot	   of	   domestic	   pressure.	  During	   the	   observation	   of	   BBS	   and	  QQ	   chat	   groups,	   lots	   of	   people	   complained	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and	   criticised	   the	   government	   by	   asking	   why	   China	   should	   prioritise	   other	  countries	  rather	  than	  their	  own	  people.	  They	  argued	  that	  mainland	  China’s	  per	  capita	  GDP	  was	  only	  US$4,382	  in	  2010,	  and	  ranked	  a	  lowly	  92,	  even	  behind	  many	  of	   its	   aid	   recipients	   in	   Africa,	   such	   as	   Equatorial	   Guinea,	   Gabon,	   Botswana,	  Mauritius,	   South	   Africa	   and	   Namibia.	   According	   to	   per	   capita	   gross	   national	  income	   (GNI),	   China	   has	   long	   struggled	   to	   reach	   the	   bottom	   end	   of	   the	   upper	  middle-­‐income	  countries	  as	  classified	  by	  the	  World	  Bank,	  which	  meant	  it	  was	  a	  lower-­‐middle	  income	  economy	  until	  2009.	  If	  using	  per	  capita	  purchasing	  power	  parity	  (PPP)	  as	  a	  criterion	  to	  avoid	  mistakenly	  categorising	  some	  countries	  with	  a	  lower	  living	  expense	  but	  a	  higher	  living	  standard,	  China	  still	  placed	  96th,	  behind	  several	  African	  states.	  It	  is	  hard	  for	  people	  who	  witness	  the	  wealth	  gap	  as	  well	  as	  urban	  and	  rural	  developmental	  division,	  to	  feel	  satisfied	  with	  the	  government’s	  scant	   investment	   in	   domestic	   education,	   health	   and	   social	   insurance,	   while	  generously	   financing	   people	  who	   turn	   out	   to	   be	  much	   richer	   than	   the	   Chinese	  themselves.	   Additionally,	   people	   with	   this	   kind	   of	   discontent	   would	   easily	   be	  suspicious	  of	  the	  West's	  promotion	  of	  China’s	  commitments	  to	  the	  international	  community.	   The	   dual	   identity	   of	   China	   as	   the	   second	   largest	   economy	   and	   a	  developing	   country	   with	   a	   large	   number	   of	   people	   in	   poverty	   is	   inevitable	   to	  meet	   with	   pressure	   from	   external	   expectations	   and	   internal	   criticism.	   Against	  this	  backdrop,	  the	  Chinese	  government	  has	  always	  tried	  to	  veil	  the	  details	  of	  its	  foreign	  aid.	  
5.2.2	  An	  Aid	  System	  with	  Chinese	  Characteristics	  Many	  scholars	  of	  China-­‐African	  studies	  argue	  that	  the	  amount	  of	  China’s	  foreign	  aid	   might	   be	   understated	   without	   applying	   more	   flexible	   definitions.	   The	  research	   on	   China’s	   foreign	   aid	   from	   the	  NYC	  Wager	   School	   not	   only	   included	  grants,	   loans,	   debt	   cancellation	   or	   relief,	   but	   also	   state-­‐sponsored	   investments,	  and	  in-­‐kind	  aid	  when	  calculating	  the	  exact	  amount	  (Lum	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  Brautigam	  also	  paid	  attention	  to	  the	  official	  funds,	  such	  as	  export	  buyer’s	  credit,	  and	  export	  commodity-­‐secured	   credit	   (Brautigam,	   2010).	   Apparently,	   the	  more	   types	   that	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are	  counted	  as	  assistance,	  the	  more	  actors	  that	  should	  also	  be	  considered.	  Take	  the	   FOCAC	   as	   an	   example:	   27	   ministries	   were	   involved	   in	   its	   implementation	  actions.	  And	  since	  there	  is	  not	  a	  special	  law	  similar	  to	  Foreign	  Assistance	  Act	  in	  US	  to	  regulate	  the	  aid	  system,	  each	  ministry	  might	  operate	  according	  to	  its	  own	  rules.	   Hence,	   some	   of	   China’s	   aid	   was	   strategic-­‐oriented,	   some	   was	  economic-­‐driven,	   and	   some	  was	   just	   out	   of	   a	   sense	   of	  morality.	   The	   following	  section	  will	  attempt	  to	  ascertain	  who	  decides	  what.	  
I.	  Management	  of	  Aid	  to	  Africa	   	  
According	  to	  China’s	  Foreign	  Aid,	  the	  decision-­‐making	  power	  in	  China	  regarding	  foreign	  aid	  lies	  with	  the	  central	  government.	  However,	  agencies	  at	  various	  levels	  of	  the	  Chinese	  government	  are	  responsible	  for	  the	  management	  of	  foreign	  aid.	   	  	  MOFCOM	  is	  the	  major	  institution	  of	  China’s	  foreign	  aid.	  The	  Department	  of	  Aid	  to	  Foreign	   Countries	   was	   broken	   off	   from	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Foreign	   Economic	  Relations	   in	  1982,	   and	   is	   now	  affiliated	  with	   the	  MOFCOM.	  This	  department	   is	  responsible	   for	   the	   formulation	   of	   foreign	   aid	   policies,	   regulations,	   overall	   and	  annual	   plans,	   examination	   and	   approval	   of	   foreign	   aid	   projects,	   and	   the	  management	  of	  project	  execution.	  With	   three	  out	  of	  13	  divisions	  specialised	   in	  Africa,	   it	   is	   also	   responsible	   for	   promoting	   reform,	   organising	   foreign	   aid	  negotiations,	   signing	   agreements,	   dealing	   with	   intergovernmental	   assistance,	  and	  supervising	  aid	  projects.	   In	  addition,	   the	  Executive	  Bureau	  of	   International	  Economic	   Cooperation,non-­‐profit	   entities	   (shiye	   danwei	  事业单位)21	   affiliated	  with	   MOFCOM	   takes	   charge	   of	   the	   management	   and	   implementation	   of	   its	  completed	  foreign	  aid	  projects.	  It	  is	  mainly	  responsible	  for	  the	  pre-­‐qualification	  documents	  of	  bidding	  for	  overseas	  completed	  projects,	  bidding	  for	  management,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 3.	  non-­‐profit	   entities	   (Shiye	   danwei	  事业单位),	   is	   not	   a	   governmental	   executive,	   but	   it	   has	   a	   similar	  function.	  The	  administrative	  ranking	  of	  the	  Bureau	  of	  International	  Economic	  Cooperation	  is	  bureau-­‐level,	  which	  is	  same	  to	  the	  Department	  of	  Aid	  to	  Foreign	  Countries.	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approval,	   monitoring	   and	   execution	   (expect	   exploration	   and	   design)	   of	   the	  projects.	  Meanwhile,	  it	  negotiates	  with	  the	  host	  countries	  for	  the	  implementation	  as	   well	   as	   inner	   supervision	   and	   estimation.	   It	   is	   also	   in	   charge	   of	   technical	  materials,	   personnel	   (experts),	   and	   project	   data.	   Other	   agencies	   include	   the	  China	  International	  Centre	  for	  Economic	  and	  Technical	  Exchanges,	  and	  Academy	  of	   International	   Business	   Officials,	   affiliated	  with	  MOFCOM	   are	   entrusted	  with	  tasks	   of	   managing	   the	   implementation	   of	   completed	   projects	   and	   technical	  cooperation,	  material	  aid	  and	  training	  programs	  (MOFCOM,	  March	  8	  2009).	  	  Foreign	  aid	  branches	  within	  MOFCOM	  have	  no	  overseas	  offices	  in	  Africa,	  nor	  do	  they	   have	   specialists	   on	   development	   and	   technology.	   Therefore,	   the	   related	  departments	   of	   the	   Chinese	   government	   keep	   in	   contact	   and	   cooperate	   with	  these	   agencies	   to	   provide	   foreign	   aid.	   In	   drafting	   foreign	   aid	   programs	   and	  foreign	  aid	  fund	  plans	  for	  each	  country,	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Commerce	  communicates	  regularly	   with	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Foreign	   Affairs,	   Ministry	   of	   Finance	   and	   the	  Export-­‐Import	  Bank	  of	  China	  to	  seek	  their	  suggestions	  (Information	  Office	  of	  the	  State	   Council,	   April	   2011).	   Some	   other	   ministries	   of	   the	   State	   Council	   are	  responsible	   for,	  or	  participate	   in,	   the	  management	  of	   foreign	  aid	  programs	  that	  require	  professional	  expertise,	  such	  as	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Education	  and	  Ministry	  of	  Agriculture.	   Additionally,	   the	   Exim	   Bank	   is	   responsible	   for	   the	   assessment	   of	  projects	   with	   concessional	   loans,	   and	   the	   evaluation	   of	   host	   countries’	  repayment	   capabilities,	   the	   allocation	   and	   repayment	   or	   relief	   of	   the	   loans.	  Chinese	  embassies	  or	  consulates	  abroad	  are	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  direct	  coordination	  and	   management	   of	   foreign	   aid	   projects	   in	   their	   host	   countries	   (Exim	   Bank,	  2010).	  The	  local	  branches	  are	  required	  to	  cooperate	  with	  MOFCOM	  to	  deal	  with	  affairs	   related	   to	   foreign	   aid	   within	   their	   jurisdictions.	   (Interview	   from	  Witnesses	  1,	  2	  and	  3,	  who	  revealed	  their	  experience	  of	  such	  kinds	  of	  works.)	  In	  order	   to	   strengthen	   the	   coordination	   of	   the	   departments	   concerned,	   the	  ministries	   of	   Commerce,	   Foreign	   Affairs	   and	   Finance	   officially	   established	   the	  country's	   Foreign	   Aid	   Inter-­‐Agency	   Liaison	   Mechanism	   in	   2008.	   In	   February	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2011,	   this	   liaison	  mechanism	  was	   upgraded	   into	   an	   inter-­‐agency	   coordination	  mechanism	  (China’s	  Foreign	  Aid,	  2011).	  	  Gathering	   information	   from	  Witnesses	   1,	   2	   and	   3,	   a	   typical	   foreign	   assistance	  project	   is	   achieved	   through	   the	   following	   procedures:	   usually	   the	   foreign	   aid	  budget	  started	  at	  the	  Economic	  Counsellor’s	  Office	  in	  Chinese	  embassy	  located	  at	  host	   state.	   The	   officers	   on	   the	   ground	   are	   responsible	   for	   collecting	   first-­‐hand	  information	  and	  reporting	  the	  proposal	  of	  the	  African	  state’s	  foreign	  aid	  budget	  to	  Beijing.	  When	  planning	   the	  project,	  MOFA	  would	   collaborate	  with	  MOFCOM	  and	  MOF	   for	   control	   of	   the	   budget.	   Here	   is	  where	   the	   problems	   can	   arise:	   the	  protocols	  are	  designed	  for	  diplomatic	  strategy	  has	  been	  vetted	  by	  the	  ministries	  with	   economic	   benefits	   in	   mind.	   Even	   if	   no	   witnesses	   have	   revealed	   more	  information	  as	  to	  what	  extend	  the	  three	  ministries	  would	  coordinate	  together	  or	  undermine	  each	  other,	  Witness	  2	  believes	  that	  MOFCOM	  and	  MOF	  have	  stronger	  voice	  than	  MOFA,	  because	  they	  control	  the	  money.	  As	  the	  criticism	  said,	  “most	  of	  China’s	   aid	   is	   doled	   out	   by	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Commerce	   and	   the	   China	  Export-­‐Import	   Bank	   (Exim	   Bank),	   whose	   central	   mandate	   is	   to	   strengthen	  China’s	   economy”	   (Condon,	   2012,	   p.	   6),	   their	   commitment	   to	   African	  development	  shrinks.	   	  	  As	   for	   the	   supervision	  of	   the	  projects,	   according	   to	   the	   responsibilities	   of	   each	  agency	   (listed	   on	   their	   official	   websites)	   involved	   in	   African	   assistance,	   the	  division	   and	   cooperation	   between	   them	   is	   not	   very	   clear.	   The	   monitor	   and	  supervisors	   for	   the	  projects	   are	   entrusted	  by	   the	   two	  branches	   from	  MOFCOM	  mentioned	  in	  the	  former	  paragraph.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  Witness	  3,	  who	  worked	  at	  China’s	  embassy	  in	  Nigeria,	  described	  his	  working	  experience	  of	  monitoring	  and	  facilitating	   China’s	   foreign	   assistance	   projects	   and	   coordinating	   with	   Chinese	  enterprises	   to	   make	   sure	   the	   project	   could	   finish	   on	   time.	   It	   reveals	   that	   the	  responsibilities	  overlapped	  between	  one	  ministry	  and	  another	  and	   reversely	   it	  may	   buck	   passing	   as	   well.	   Additionally,	   this	   mechanism	   lacks	   an	   independent	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agency	  with	  specialists	  to	  have	  a	  comprehensive	  evaluation	  of	  the	  projects,	  such	  as	   ecological	   impact,	   local	   capability	   and	   sustainability.	   It	   makes	   the	   Chinese	  sponsoring	  projects	  much	  more	  controversial	  and	  local	  unfriendly.	   	   	  China’s	   foreign	   aid	   of	   grants	   (donations),	   interest-­‐free	   loans	   pledged	   and	  disbursed	  by	   the	  Chinese	  government	  rarely	  have	  been	   implemented	  as	  a	  cash	  transfer,	  but	  usually	  as	  a	  completed	  project	  conducted	  by	  Chinese	  firms.	  On	  the	  policy	  level	  this	  created	  a	  “win-­‐win”	  situation	  in	  which	  African	  countries	  get	  the	  tangible	   projects	   in	   a	   short	   period	   of	   time	   while	   Chinese	   companies	   have	   the	  opportunities	   to	   access	   African	   markets.	   However,	   in	   reality,	   the	   Chinese	  enterprises,	  whether	  SOEs	  or	  private	  companies	  with	  their	  profit-­‐driven	  natures,	  tend	  to	  complete	  the	  projects	  in	  the	  most	  economical	  way,	  sometimes	  sacrificing	  quality	  and	  local	  employment	  opportunities	  or	  environmental	  protection,	  which	  can	   have	   the	   result	   that	   the	   pledged	   assistance	   projects	   shrink	   in	   value.	  Meanwhile,	   comparing	   the	   official	   information	   with	   that	   from	   interviews	   and	  observations,	   we	   can	   see	   some	   illegal	   behaviour	   taking	   place	   in	   the	   host	  countries.	  According	  to	  the	  regulations	  of	  MOFCOM,	  the	  Chinese	  companies	  with	  foreign	   aid	   qualification	   would	   have	   a	   cipher	   code	   to	   access	   the	   Foreign	   Aid	  Tenders	  system	  under	  the	  Bureau	  of	  Foreign	  Economic	  Cooperation,	  and	  bid	  for	  relevant	  projects	  in	  terms	  of	  investigation,	  exploration	  and	  design,	  construction	  and	   supervision.	   However,	   during	   my	   interviews,	   Witness	   16	   from	   an	   SOE	  disclosed	   that	   her	   company	   has	   subcontracted	   the	   projects	   to	   other	   private	  companies	   in	   the	   name	   of	   cooperation	   and	   due	   to	   the	   hardships	   in	   African	  countries,	  but	  she	  has	  no	  idea	  if	  these	  private	  companies	  were	  qualified	  to	  work	  on	  foreign	  aid	  projects.	  Witness	  15	  from	  an	  SOE	  said	  that	  on-­‐site	  managers	  and	  translators	   who	   belong	   to	   her	   company	   were	   always	   new	   employees	   or	  temporary	  contractors,	   rather	   than	  veterans	   in	  Africa,	  because	   the	  experienced	  technicians	  and	  managers	  prefer	  to	  work	  in	  Europe,	  America,	  and	  some	  Middle	  East	   countries.	   Lot	   of	   witness	   from	   SOEs	   admitted	   that	   the	   inexperienced	  Chinese	   employees	   don’t	   get	   along	   well	   with	   African	   workers,	   due	   to	   the	  language	  barrier,	  and	  differences	  in	  customs,	  culture,	  and	  living	  styles.	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  What	   makes	   the	   process	   more	   complicated	   is	   one	   of	   the	   three	   key	   actors	   in	  China’s	   aid	   system,	   alongside	   Ministry	   of	   Foreign	   Affairs	   and	   Ministry	   of	  Commerce:	   the	  China	  Exim	  Bank.	  Also	  known	  as	  one	  of	   the	   three	  policy	  banks	  that	   support	   the	   “going	   global”	   strategy,	   established	   in	   1994,	   the	   bank	   is	  responsible	  for	  providing	  export	  buyer’s	  credit,	  export	  sellers’	  credit,	  guarantees,	  loans	  for	  overseas	  projects	  and	  investment.	  It	  is	  also	  the	  only	  bank	  that	  provides	  concessional	   loans	   and	   preferential	   export	   buyer’s	   credit.	   Researchers	   have	  various	   opinions	   on	  whether	   or	   to	  what	   extend	   the	   products	   provided	   by	   the	  Exim	   Bank	   can	   be	   categorised	   as	   foreign	   aid.	   The	   following	   section	   will	   talk	  address	  it	  specifically.	  But,	  there	  is	  one	  product	  that	  is	  considered	  in	  agreement:	  concessional	  loans.	  Although	  this	  type	  of	  loan	  is	  by	  its	  nature	  a	  form	  of	  aid,	  it	  is	  different	  from	  those	  of	  MOFCOM,	  because	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  would	  use	  the	  central	  assistance	  budget	  to	  cover	  the	  gap	  between	  a	  low,	  fixed	  rate	  loan	  offered	  by	  Exim	  Bank	  and	   the	   actual	   costs.	   In	   addition,	   the	   loans	  have	  a	   strict	   interest	  rate	  and	  terms,	  and	  it	  is	  unlikely	  to	  have	  a	  grace	  period	  or	  cancellation.	  The	  cycle	  for	  concessional	  loans	  is	  illustrated	  in	  Figure	  5.1.	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Figure	  5.1	  the	  Cycle	  of	  Concessional	  Loans	  from	  Exim	  Bank	  
	  	  	  
Source:	  The	  Export-­‐Import	  Bank	  of	  China	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  West,	  China	  doesn’t	  have	  an	  independent	  aid	  agency,	   like	  the	  United	  States’	  Agency	  for	  International	  Development,	  that	  generally	  takes	  charge	  of	   economic	   support	   funds	   and	  development	   assistance	   programs.	  However,	   it	  has	   the	   same	   situation	   as	   that	   of	   the	  West,	   in	  which	   a	   variety	   of	   divisions	   and	  departments	  under	  the	  ministries	  and	  policy	  banks	  jointly	  have	  influence	  on	  its	  foreign	   aid	   decision-­‐making	   system.	   And	   each	   of	   them	   to	   some	   extent	   has	  impacted	   the	   Chinese	   overseas	   companies,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   accomplishments	   of	  assistance	  projects.	  The	  agencies	   involved	   into	  China’s	   foreign	  aid	   in	  Africa	  are	  illustrated	  in	  Figure	  5.2	  







Figure	  5.2	  Agencies	  involved	  into	  China’s	  Africa	  assistance	   	   	  	  
	  
Data	  Source:	  (Brautigam,	  2011)	  
II.	  Forms	  of	  China’s	  Aid	  to	  Africa	   	  
China’s	   foreign	   aid	   white	   paper	   included	   three	   types	   of	   financial	   resources	   -­‐	  grants,	   interest-­‐free	   loans,	   and	   concessional	   loans	   -­‐	   as	   “aid”.	   These	   categories	  reconciled	   with	   the	   definition	   of	   ODA,	   if	   the	   funds	   were	   disbursed	   with	   an	  appropriate	  grant	  element.	  However,	  if	  we	  keep	  an	  eye	  on	  the	  forms	  of	  Chinese	  aid,	  they	  probably	  are	  not	  interpreted	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  ODA’s	  definition.	  China	  has	  listed	  eight	  forms	  of	  its	  foreign	  aid:	  complete	  projects,	  goods	  and	  materials,	  technical	  cooperation,	  human	  resource	  development	  cooperation,	  medical	  teams	  sent	   abroad,	   emergency	   humanitarian	   aid,	   volunteer	   programs	   in	   foreign	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countries,	  and	  debt	  relief.	  It	  could	  be	  said	  that	  these	  forms	  of	  aid	  are	  equivalent	  to	  ODA	  but	  they	  do	  not	  fully	  correspond	  to	  the	  concept.	   	  	   	  “Turn-­‐key	   -­‐	   or	   complete	   -­‐	   project”	   is	   the	   category	   that	   raises	   the	   most	  misunderstanding	   and	   concern,	   because	   it	   can	   easily	   be	   considered	   as	  state-­‐sponsored	   economic	   cooperation	   activities,	   or	   be	   categorised	   as	  concessional	  loans	  if	  you	  neglect	  the	  fact	  that	  Chinese	  firms	  were	  fully	  involved.	  This	  approach	  reflected	  the	  Chinese	  aid	  philosophy	  as	  Witness	  1	  said,	  	   “the	  meaning	  of	  China-­‐Africa	  relations	  is	  not	  charity,	  it	  is	  aid	  for	  the	  poor,	  it	  is	  not	  humanitarianism,	   it	   is	   internationalism	  and	   international	   justice.	  We	  are	   a	   great	   power	   which	   has	   great	   power	   responsibilities,	   aiding	   Africa’s	  development	  is	  part	  of	  our	  construction	  of	  a	  harmonious	  world.”	  	   	  Complete	   projects	   were	   conducted	   along	   terms	   of	   “mutual	   benefit”,	   which	   is	  quite	   different	   from	   the	   Western	   donors,	   who	   “believe	   that	   a	   relatively	  well-­‐governed	  country	  should	  be	  able	  to	  make	  its	  own	  decision	  about	  how	  to	  use	  foreign	  assistance”	  (Brautigam,	  2010,	  p.	  124)	  and	  therefore	  are	  focused	  on	  good	  governance	   and	   human	   rights	   protections.	   Instead,	   the	   Chinese	   preferred	  tangible	   contributions	   such	   as	   stadiums,	   government	   buildings,	   and	   other	  infrastructure.	  According	  to	  the	  white	  paper,	  complete	  projects	  account	  for	  40%	  of	   China’s	   foreign	   aid	   expenditure,	   widely	   distributed	   in	   the	   sectors	   of	  agriculture,	  public	  facilities,	  economic	  infrastructure	  and	  industry.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  2010,	   China	   had	   accomplished	   more	   than	   900	   complete	   projects	   in	   about	   50	  African	  countries,	  which	  included	  2,233km	  of	  railway,	  3,391km	  of	  highway	  roads,	  42	   stadiums,	   54	   hospitals	   and	   118	   schools.	   It	   also	   promised	   to	   provide	  US$10	  billion	  of	  preferential	   loans	   to	  Africa	   from	  2010	  to	  2012.	  These	   loans	  are	   to	  be	  used	  to	  finance	  some	  of	  the	  big	  projects	  under	  construction,	  such	  as	  an	  airport	  in	  Mauritius,	   housing	   in	   Malabo,	   Equatorial	   Guinea,	   and	   the	   Bui	   Hydropower	  Station	  in	  Ghana	  (Information	  Office	  of	  the	  State	  Council,	  2013a).	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  Along	   with	   food	   and	   medicine,	   goods	   and	   materials	   are	   mostly	   provided	   to	  support	   the	   completed	   projects,	   such	   as	   machinery	   and	   other	   relevant	  equipment,	   devices	   and	   transportation	   vehicles.	   Meanwhile,	   technical	  cooperation	  serves	  as	  a	  follow-­‐up	  action	  to	  the	  completed	  projects.	  The	  Chinese	  experts	  would	  give	  technical	  guidance	  on	  production,	  operation	  or	  maintenance	  to	  ensure	  proper	  use	  and	  skill	  transfers.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  2009,	  China	  had	  sent	  104	  senior	   agricultural	   technical	   experts	   to	   33	  African	   countries.	  One	  hundred	   and	  seven	   schools	   had	   been	   built	   in	   Africa	   with	   Chinese	   assistance,	   and	   29,465	  African	   students	   had	   received	   Chinese	   government	   scholarships	   to	   study	   in	  China.	   By	   June	   2010,	   China	   had	   provided	   training	   programs	   for	   over	   30,000	  people	  from	  African	  countries,	  covering	  over	  20	  fields	  such	  as	  economics,	  public	  administration,	  agriculture,	  animal	  husbandry	  and	  fishing	  industry,	  medical	  care	  and	   public	   health,	   science	   and	   technology,	   and	   environmental	   protection	  (Information	  Office	  of	  the	  State	  Council,	  April	  2011).	  	  In	   Summary,	   the	  Chinese	  definition	  of	   aid	   explained	   in	   the	  white	  paper	   shares	  some	   characteristics	   with	   those	   of	   Western	   donors.	   Table	   5.1	   shows	   the	  similarities	   and	  differences	   between	  OECD	  defined	  ODA	  and	  Chinese	   aid.	   Even	  though	   they	   don’t	   always	   fit	   in	   the	   theory,	   they	   do	   provide	   benefits	   to	   the	  continent.	   Furthermore,	   many	   analysts	   preferred	   to	   apply	   more	   flexible	  measures	   to	   calculate	   Chinese	   assistance	   and	   therefore	   gave	   a	   higher	  number/value.	   Some	   estimated	   China	   had	   an	   aid	   scale	   comparable	   to	   that	   of	  middle-­‐developed	  countries,	  such	  as	  Australia,	  Belgium	  or	  Denmark	  (Lancaster,	  2007).	  The	  NYU	  Wagner	  School	  included	  government-­‐sponsored	  investment	  as	  a	  kind	   of	   aid	   fund,	   which	   resulted	   in	   a	   24%	   increase	   in	   the	   total	   value.	   Some	  European	   Scholars	   categorised	   China-­‐Africa	   development	   funds	   provided	   by	  China	  Development	  Bank	  as	  in-­‐kind	  aid	  as	  well	  (Welle-­‐Strand,	  2010).	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Table	  5.1	  The	  Comparison	  of	  Chinese	  Foreign	  Assistance	  with	  OECD	  standard	  	  	   Government	  to	  Government	   	  
Financing	  through	  Develop-­‐	  ment	  Agency	  
Strong	  Links	   to	  Donor	  Country	  Economy	  
Concessional	  or	   Favorable	  Lending	  Terms	  
Receives	  Payment	  of	  Debt	   in	  Kind	  
Grant	  Element	   of	  at	   Least	  25%	  
Private	   or	  Corporate	  Financing	  
OECD	  Aid	  Donor	  
Yes	  a	   yes	   no	   yes	   no	   yes	   no	  
China	   Yes	   No	  b	   Yes	  c	   yes	   Yes	  d	   no	   no	  
 
Sources:	  (P.	  Davies,	  2007;	  Foster	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Lum	  et	  al.,	  2009)	  a).	   Grants	   may	   be	   awarded	   to	   NGOs	   based	   in	   either	   the	   donor	   country	   or	   recipient	  country.	  b).	   PRC	   aid	   is	   provided	   largely	   in	   the	   form	   of	   concessional	   loans	   administered	   by	   the	  China	  Exim	  bank.	  c).	  Aid	  projects	  facilitate	  the	  export	  of	  natural	  resources	  and	  commodities	  to	  China	  and	  utilise	  PRC	  companies,	  materials,	  and	  labour.	  d).	   In	   some	   cases,	   aid	   recipients	   make	   payments	   on	   loans	   from	   China	   with	   oil	   or	  minerals.	  Brautigam	  drew	  a	  figure	  (Figure5.3)	  to	  illustrate	  the	  international	  finance	  flows.	  It	   has	   clearly	   separated	  ODA	   from	  other	   kinds	   of	   official	   flows	   (OOF)22.	   In	   this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22. Other	  official	  flows	  are	  official	  sector	  transactions	  which	  do	  not	  meet	  the	  ODA	  criteria,	  e.g.:	  i).	  Grants	  to	  developing	   countries	   for	   representational	   or	   essentially	   commercial	   purposes;	   ii).	   Official	   bilateral	  transactions	   intended	   to	   promote	   development	   but	   having	   a	   grant	   element	   of	   less	   than	   25	   per	   cent;	   iii).	  Official	  bilateral	  transactions,	  whatever	  their	  grant	  element,	  that	  are	  primarily	  export-­‐facilitating	  in	  purpose.	  This	  category	  includes	  by	  definition	  export	  credits	  extended	  directly	  to	  an	  aid	  recipient	  by	  an	  official	  agency	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way,	   the	   export	   credits	   and	   guarantees,	   or	   funds	   with	   export	   facilitating	  purposes	  could	  be	  included.	  It	  also	  separated	  the	  funding	  sources	  from	  MOFCOM	  and	   those	   from	   the	   China	   Exim	   bank	   and	   China	   Development	   Bank.	   Different	  from	  the	  traditional	  ODA	  donors,	  China’s	  ODA	  funds	  to	  developing	  countries	  are	  lower	   than	   its	   OOF.	   The	   concessional	   loans	   for	   complete	   projects	   noted	   above	  actually	  accounted	  for	  a	  small	  part	  of	  the	  Exim	  Bank’s	  products.	  By	  comparison,	  Chart	   5.1	   reveals	   that	   export	   credit	   is	   a	   major	   expenditure	   for	   the	   bank.	   The	  credit	   was	   paid	   out	   on	   terms	   of	   2%	   interest,	   10-­‐15	   year	   maturity,	   no	   grace	  period,	  and	  the	  RMB	  as	  the	  debt	  currency.	  An	  OECD	  counsellor	  has	  calculated	  the	  grant	  element	  of	  this	  credit	  by	  ODA	  definition,	  and	  has	  argued	  that	  it	  “carries	  a	  grant	   element	   of	   40.81%”,	   which	   is	   “high	   enough	   to	   count	   such	   concessional	  export	  as	  aid”	  (Reisen,	  2007).	  Fitch	  Rating	  even	  estimated	  the	  China	  Exim	  Bank	  extended	  US$12.5	  billion	  more	  in	  loans	  to	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  in	  the	  past	  decade	  than	   the	  World	   Bank	   (M.	   Cohen,	   December	   29	   2011).	  While	   Standard	   &	   Poor	  pointed	   out	   that	   the	   China	   Exim	   Bank	   extended	   90%	   of	   its	   export	   credits	   to	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises	  and	  to	  large	  projects	  (Bosshard,	  2007).	  
	  Another	   major	   OOF	   funding	   source	   came	   from	   the	   China	   Development	   Bank	  (CDB).	  The	  China-­‐Africa	  Development	  Fund	  was	  announced	  as	  one	  of	   the	  Eight	  Measures	  to	  Africa	  by	  President	  Hu	  Jintao	  at	  the	  FOCAC	  Beijing	  Summit	  in	  2006.	  Special	  loans	  for	  the	  development	  of	  African	  small-­‐	  and	  medium-­‐sized	  companies	  were	  also	  announced	  as	  part	  of	  the	  New	  Eight	  Measures	  by	  Wen	  Jiabao	  in	  2009.	  Together,	  these	  have	  brought	  the	  policy	  bank	  into	  the	  spotlight.	   	  	  Traditionally,	   the	   bank	  was	   focused	   on	  China’s	   central	  western	   region	   and	   the	  northeast	  Old	  Industrial	  Bases	  inside	  China.	  Recently,	  however,	  it	  carries	  some	  of	  the	  responsibility	  for	  Chinese	  firms’	  “going	  global”	  strategy,	  supporting	  them	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  or	  institution	  (“official	  direct	  export	  credits“);	  iv).	  The	  net	  acquisition	  by	  governments	  and	  central	  monetary	  institutions	  of	  securities	  issued	  by	  multilateral	  development	  banks	  at	  market	  terms;	  v).	  Subsidies	  (grants)	  to	  the	  private	  sector	  to	  soften	  its	  credits	  to	  developing	  countries	  vi.)	  Funds	  in	  support	  of	  private	  investment	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seeking	   markets	   and	   avoiding	   risks	   in	   Africa.	   In	   2011,	   the	   bank	   supported	  several	  leading	  Chinese	  enterprises	  extending	  their	  overseas	  business	  –	  such	  as	  CITIC	  Group,	  China	  Three	  Gorges	  Corporation,	  Goldwind	  Science	  &	  Technology,	  and	  Chery	  Automobile	  –	  and	  provided	  loans	  to	  small-­‐	  and	  medium-­‐sized	  African	  companies	   from	   29	   countries	   (CDB,	   2009).	   As	   the	   biggest	   investment	   fund	   to	  Africa,	   the	  CDB	  has	   launched	  US$1	  billion	   loans	  at	   the	  beginning,	   in	  2007,	  CDB	  Vice	  Chairman	  Hu	  Zhirong	  also	  promised	  to	  invest	  US$5	  billion	  through	  special	  loans	   to	   African	   SMEs	   in	   2011.	   He	   encouraged	   joint	   projects	   between	  state-­‐owned	   or	   private	   Chinese	   firms	   and	   African	   companies	   on	   commercial	  activities,	   including	   agriculture,	   manufacturing,	   electricity,	   transportation,	  telecommunications,	  urban	  infrastructure	  and	  in	  the	  resource	  exploration	  sector	  on	   the	   continent	   (Hou,	  December	   4	   2012).	   CDB	  Chairman	  Chen	  Yuan	   revealed	  that,	  by	   the	  end	  of	   June	  30,	  2011,	  CDB	  had	  signed	  special	   loan	  contracts	  worth	  US$320	  million,	   and	   committed	   US$617	  million	   to	   various	   regions	   (See	   Chart	  5.2).	   This	   follows	   projects	   worth	   over	   US$1.1	   billion	   covering	   more	   than	   25	  African	  countries	  (CDB,	  2009).	   	  	  Beijing’s	   support	   of	   the	   policy	   bank	   as	   an	   aid	   vehicle	   reveals	   that	   the	   central	  government	   has	   a	   grand	   ambition	   to	   explore	   the	   infrastructure	   construction	  business	   and	   energy	   industry	   in	   Africa.	   But	   the	   low	   credibility	   of	   African	  borrowers	   and	   their	   poor	   risk	   assessment	   capability	   have	   prevented	   China’s	  domestic	   capital	   sources	   from	   investing	   in	   large	   projects,	   as	   they	   do	   not	   have	  much	  motivation	  or	  capability	  for	  taking	  political	  and	  economic	  risks	  in	  Africa.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  policy	  banks	  have	  taken	  Beijing’s	  pledges	  on	  FOCAC	  and	  expanded	  their	  business	  to	  African	  governments	  and	  companies.	  Despite	  the	   fact	   that	   the	  central	   policy	   banks	   lack	   transparency	   in	   their	   overseas	   business,	   the	   analysts	  believe	  that	  these	  banks	  have	  a	  higher	  tolerance	  of	  bad	  loans	  and	  late	  payments,	  which	  may	   lead	   to	  a	   larger	  amount	  of	  bad	   loans	  and	  dead	  debts	   (Dong,	  2012).	  Fitch’s	  analysis	  also	  echoes	  this	  argument,	  by	  saying	  that	  Chinese	  official	  loans	  to	  African	   countries	   are	   very	   flexible.	   They	   usually	   provide	   longer	   repayment	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Figure	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Chart	  5.2	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advanced	   corporate	   norms,	   add	   to	   this	   the	   fact	   that	   corporate	   social	  responsibility	   is	   a	   new	   term	   for	   many	   Chinese	   enterprises,	   and	   they	   tend	   to	  categorise	   charity	   as	   CSR	   while	   ignoring	   the	   protection	   of	   labour	   and	  environment.	   This	   was	   reflected	   in	   the	   interviews	   when	   subjects	   were	   asked	  about	  his/her	  company’s	  responsibility	  to	  local	  people:	  all	  of	  them	  talked	  about	  charity,	  but	  none	  of	  them	  mentioned	  the	  creation	  of	  employment	  opportunities,	  nor	   the	  protection	  of	   labour	   safety,	  welfare	  and	  environment.	  Additionally,	   the	  dependence	  on	  Chinese	  corporations	  is	  unsustainable.	  The	  contributions	  to	  local	  communities	   rely	   on	   the	   companies’	   profit	   in	   the	   short	   run.	   In	   the	   long	   term,	  infrastructure	   construction	   will	   become	   less	   and	   less	   attractive	   to	   African	  countries	   as	   their	   economies	  develop.	  Take	  Angola	   as	   an	  example:	   the	   country	  was	  considered	  one	  of	   the	  most	   successful	  models	  of	   “oil	   for	   infrastructure”	   in	  Africa.	   Chinese	   infrastructure	   helped	   the	   country	   to	   swiftly	   finish	   its	   post-­‐war	  reconstruction.	   But,	   as	  more	   infrastructures	  were	   built	   by	   Chinese	   companies,	  the	   country	   was	   reluctant	   to	   receive	   more	   infrastructure	   projects.	   Instead,	   it	  sought	  other	  financial	  support	  to	  fuel	  its	  economic	  development.	   	   	  	  In	   addition,	   compared	   to	   the	  West,	  Chinese	  private	   companies	  and	  NGOS	  were	  rarely	   seen	   in	   foreign	   aid	   area.	   Analysis	   suggested	   that	   USAID	   has	   closely	  cooperated	  with	  3,500	  US	  companies	  and	  300	  NGOS,	  as	  well	  as	  organisations	  in	  the	   recipient	   countries	   (USAID,	   2012).	   US	   private	   companies	   had	   committed	  US$2.8	  billion	  for	  foreign	  aid	  in	  2000,	  and	  its	  pharmaceutical	  industry	  has	  shared	  US$0.8	  billion,	  twice	  that	  of	  the	  World	  Health	  Organisation	  (USAID,	  2012).	  At	  the	  same	   time,	   its	  NGOs	   have	   contributed	  more	   funds	   than	  Denmark,	  Norway	   and	  Sweden’s	  ODA	  (as	  calculated	  by	   the	   figures	  provided	  by	   the	  OECD	  website	  and	  the	   USAID	   website).	   By	   comparison,	   China’s	   private	   charity	   is	   largely	   lagging	  behind.	  For	  a	  private	  company	  in	  Africa,	  as	  a	  latecomer,	  the	  potential	  benefits	  of	  engaging	  in	  local	  charity	  are	  not	  worth	  investment	  without	  government	  support.	  Witness	  20	  said,	  as	  far	  as	  he	  knows,	  the	  reason	  for	  private	  companies	  to	  invest	  in	  Africa	   is	   mainly	   out	   of	   economic	   motives,	   and	   because	   the	   company	   may	   be	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operating	  on	  a	  very	  small	  scale,	  they	  haven’t	  yet	  considered	  making	  investments	  to	   the	   local	  society.	  Meanwhile,	  China	  has	  no	  mature	  domestic	  NGO	  system,	   let	  alone	   one	   for	   foreign	   assistance.	   The	   credibility	   of	   Chinese	   NGOs	   has	   been	  challenged	   by	   scandal	   and	   non-­‐transparency.	   China’s	   non-­‐governmental	  assistance	   to	  Africa	   is	   still	   underdeveloped.	   It	   should	  be	  noted	   that	   there	  does	  not	   exist	   any	   de	   facto	   NGOs	   in	   China.	   This	   is	   because,	   according	   to	   China’s	  “Regulations	  on	  the	  Registration	  and	  Administration	  of	  Social	  Organisations”,	  an	  NGO	  must	   first	   find	   a	   government	   or	   Party	   sponsor	   and	   get	   their	   approval	   to	  register.	  After	  its	  establishment,	  the	  sponsor	  must	  continue	  to	  play	  a	  supervisory	  role	  by	  carrying	  out	  annual	  reviews,	  approving	  budgets	  and	  staffing	  plans,	  and	  so	  forth.	   In	   this	   case,	   the	   NGOs	   in	   China	   act	   more	   like	   a	   quasi-­‐governmental	  organisation,	   which	   shares	   the	   features	   of	   both	   government	   and	   private	  organisations.	  	  The	   majority	   of	   Chinese	   NGOs	   are	   either	   government-­‐organised	   NGOs	   or	  quasi-­‐official	   NGOs,	   while	   individually	   organised	   NGOs	   initiated	   from	   the	  bottom-­‐up	  are	  relatively	  small	  and	  less	  influential,	  sometimes	  illegal.	  Those	  large,	  national-­‐level	   organisations	   receive	  most	   of	   the	   funding	   from	   the	   government.	  Meanwhile,	   their	   employees	   were	   assigned	   by	   the	   government,	   too.	   They	  predominantly	   play	   a	   role	   in	   facilitating	   cooperation	   with	   foreign	   NGOs,	  providing	   a	   channel	   for	   civil	   diplomacy.	   Although	   these	   organisations	   lack	  autonomy	  from	  government,	  in	  practice	  “the	  close	  connection	  with	  government	  is	  beneficial,	  allowing	  these	  NGOs	  to	  operate	  more	  effectively	  within	  the	  unique	  political,	  economic	  and	  social	  context”	  (Elizabeth,	  1997).	  	  As	  China	  enthusiastically	  pursued	  a	  presence	  in	  Africa,	  the	  NGOs	  set	  foot	  on	  the	  continent	  as	  well.	  Government-­‐organised	  NGOs	  were	  pioneers	  as	  usual.	  In	  2007,	  China’s	  largest	  poverty	  reduction	  organisation,	  the	  China	  Foundation	  for	  Poverty	  Alleviation	  launched	  a	  series	  of	  assistance	  projects	  in	  Guinea,	  ranging	  from	  small	  amount	  credit	   loans,	  emergency	  rescue	  and	  health	  care	  for	  puerperal	  fever	  and	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newborn	   babies.	   From	   29th	   to	   30th	   August	   2011,	   the	   first	   China-­‐African	   Civil	  Forum	   was	   held	   in	   Nairobi,	   Kenya,	   with	   the	   joint	   support	   of	   the	   China	   NGO	  Network	   for	   International	   Exchanges	   and	   the	   Kenya	   NGO	   Coordination	   Board.	  Twenty	   Chinese	   NGOs23	   and	   more	   than	   two	   hundred	   representatives	   from	  African	  NGOs	  attended	  the	   forum.	  However,	  during	   the	   forum,	  when	  compared	  to	   the	   African	   organisations,	   the	   Chinese	   NGOs	   showed	   less	   enthusiasm.	   The	  Chinese	   participants	   focused	   on	   discussing	   some	   principles	   or	   guidelines	   in	  terms	   of	   mutual	   dialogue	   and	   understanding,	   climate	   change	   and	   NGO	  development,	   while	   the	   African	   counterparts	   expected	   some	   more	   tangible	  results	  (ifeng,	  July	  10	  2012).	  	   	  This	  reflected	  the	  current	  situation	  of	  China-­‐Africa	  NGOs.	  After	  some	  corruption	  scandals	  in	  Chinese	  national	  organisations,	  personal	  donations	  have	  significantly	  decreased.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   there	   has	   been	   a	   lot	   of	   domestic	   pressure	   and	  doubts	   as	   to	   “why	   prioritise	   foreign	   countries’	   demands	   without	   solving	   the	  domestic	   problem	   first”.	   (Observation	   from	   BBS)	   In	   this	   case,	   the	  government-­‐led	  NGOs	   in	   China	   have	   been	   very	   prudent	   in	   their	   assistance	   for	  Africa.	   Enterprise-­‐sourced	   NGOs	   performed	   more	   actively	   than	   the	  nationally-­‐funded	  ones.	  In	  2011,	  some	  entrepreneurs	  launched	  the	  China-­‐African	  Project	  Hope	   in	   five	  African	   countries	   -­‐	   Rwanda,	   Burundi,	   Kenya,	  Namibia	   and	  Tanzania.	  It	  promised	  to	  expand	  the	  famous	  Project	  Hope	  from	  China	  to	  Africa	  by	  establishing	  primary	   schools	   for	   local	   children.	   Since	  enterprises	  often	  become	  involved	  in	  assistance	  projects	  with	  the	  hope	  of	  gaining	  business	  opportunities,	  the	   cost	   of	   building	   a	   primary	   school	   is	   worth	   less	   to	   them.	   Therefore,	   some	  doubts	  remain,	  and	  there	  have	  been	  some	  scandals	  connected	  to	  these	  projects.	  The	   space	   for	   NGO	   development	   in	   Africa	   is	   therefore	   limited	  without	   central	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 It	   included	   some	   large	   government-­‐owned	   NGOs,	   for	   instance,	   All	   China	   Women’s	   Federation,	   the	  Chinese	   People’s	   Association	   for	   Friendship	   with	   Foreign	   countries,	   China	   Association	   for	   Science	   and	  Technology,	   China	   Federation	   of	   Literary	   and	   Art,	   Chinese	   Association	   for	   international	   Understanding,	  Chinese	  People’s	  Association	  for	  Peace	  and	  Disarmament	  and	  so	  forth.	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government	  support.	  
5.2.3 Conclusion As	  analysed	   in	   the	  previous	  section,	  China	  has	  a	  different	  aid	  system	  to	   that	  of	   	  OECD	   countries.	   Although	   China’s	   African	   assistance	   policy	   is	   made	   and	  authorised	  by	  the	  three	  official	  departments	  -­‐	  MOFCOM,	  MOFA	  and	  China	  Exim	  Bank	   -­‐	   the	   implementation	   of	   China’s	   foreign	   aid	   policy	   relies	   on	   Chinese	  corporations	  mainly	  in	  terms	  of	  completed	  projects.	  Not	  only	  do	  the	  three	  major	  decision-­‐making	  departments	  have	  their	  own	  agendas	  in	  mind,	  but	  the	  Chinese	  companies	  with	  their	  economic-­‐driven	  nature	  often	  deviate	  from	  official	  African	  policy	   during	   the	   implementation	   process	   as	   well.	   Despite	   what	   outside	  observers	  believe,	  Beijing	  lacks	  monolithic	  control	  of	  all	  Chinese	  actors	  in	  Africa,	  nor	   does	   it	   have	   mature	   and	   independent	   NGOs	   to	   monitor	   the	   assistance	  projects.	  Hence,	  at	  the	  implementation	  level,	  the	  win-­‐win	  situation	  advocated	  by	  Beijing	  is	  not	  always	  as	  smooth	  as	  pledged/promised.	  This	  section	  has	  explained	  the	   reasons	   for	   China	   not	   being	   fully	   responsible	   for	   its	   own	   side.	   The	   case	  studies	   chapters	   will	   further	   explain	   with	   the	   added	   consideration	   of	   Africa’s	  environment.	   	  
5.3	  Explanation	  of	  China’s	  overseas	  economic	  system	  
5.3.1	  An	  Ambiguous	  Classification	  of	  China’s	  overseas	  Actors	  Beijing	  has	  maintained	  a	  close	  relationship	  with	  African	  countries	  and	  provided	  a	  large	  amount	  of	  investment	  to	  this	  continent.	  However,	  the	  people	  who	  worked	  on	  the	  “front	  line”,	  and	  had	  a	  chance	  to	  communicate	  with	  local	  communities	  are	  far	   removed	   from	   the	   officials	   in	   Beijing.	   This	   means,	   although	   central	  government	   may	   have	   a	   strategic	   African	   policy,	   it	   has	   to	   be	   implemented	  through	   economic-­‐driven	   enterprises	   and	   local	   governments	   who	   prioritised	  their	   own	   local	   strategies.	   The	   “fragmented	   authoritarianism”	   appears	   more	  often	   in	   China’s	   overseas	   business	   than	   its	   foreign	   aid.	   Regarding	   China-­‐Africa	  economic	  activities,	  (it	   is	  hard	  to	  define	  whether	  or	  not	   it	  belonged	  to	  aid	  or	  to	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foreign	  investment),	  three	  kinds	  of	  actors	  worked	  on	  site	  within	  the	  fragmented	  system.	   1)	   State-­‐owned	   enterprises	   mainly	   undertook	   the	   tasks	   of	  government-­‐funded	  projects	  in	  infrastructure	  and	  public	  buildings;	  2)	  provincial	  supported	  enterprises,	  often	   in	  competition	  with	  other	  province	  to	  promote	   its	  own	  exports	   to	  Africa;	  3)	  while	   small-­‐	   and	  medium-­‐sized,	  mostly	  private	   firms	  entered	  the	  continent	  and	  focused	  on	  commodities	  and	  trade.	  	  The	  classification	  above	  is	  ambiguous,	  as	  there	  are	  problems	  with	  identifying	  the	  role	   of	   SOEs	   and	   private	   firms,	   government	   agencies	   and	   non-­‐government	  sectors	  in	  practice.	   	  	  Between	  1980-­‐1990,	  China	  experienced	  a	  transition	  from	  radical	  Maoism,	  which	  was	   characterised	   by	   privatising	   state-­‐owned	   and	   Township	   &	   Village	  Enterprises.	   However,	   it	   brought	   forth	   the	   issue	   of	   how	   to	   classify	   the	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises.	  As	  Nolan	  has	  described	  it,	  the	  “ownership	  maze”	  (Nolan,	  2005,	   p.	   169).	   For	   instance,	   the	   old	   SOEs,	   namely	   “owned	   by	   all	   the	   people”	  (quanmin	   suoyou	   全民所有)	   were	   sold	   at	   a	   very	   low	   price	   to	   the	   former	  enterprises’	   leaders,	   or	   those	   who	   had	   connections	   with	   local	   governments	  during	  the	  reforms.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  new	  owners	  were	  often	  relatives	  or	  friends	  of	  state	  officials.	  Although	  today	  the	  state	  or	  local	  governments	  hold	  less	  than	  50	  per	  cent	  of	   the	  equity,	  which	  should	  be	  categorised	  as	  “private”	   in	  China,	   these	  firms	  often	  took	  advantage	  of	  their	  connections	  with	  governments	  for	  tender	  or	  policy	   support.	   Similarly,	   “many	   SOEs	   function	   as	   conduits	   for	   private	   gains”,	  which	  means	  the	  people	  who	  profit	  from	  the	  enterprises	  sometimes	  are	  not	  only	  the	   owners	   of	   the	   firms,	   but	   also	   government	   officials	   (Kaplinsky	   &	   Morris,	  2009).	  	  Due	  to	   their	  ambiguous	   identities,	   it	   is	  hard	  to	  distinguish	  between	  official	  and	  private	  ownership,	  and	  yet	  all	   the	  activities	  are	  credited	   to	   “China”	  as	  a	  whole,	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even	  if	  the	  central	  government’s	  control	  over	  the	  players	  in	  question	  is	   limited.	  Especially	  for	  Chinese	  SOEs	  that	  have	  been	  involved	  in	  official	  aid	  projects	  in	  key	  sectors	  such	  as	  infrastructure,	  refining	  and	  telecommunications,	   it	   is	  difficult	  to	  separate	  foreign	  investment	  flows	  from	  other	  kinds	  of	  capital	  flows.	  
5.3.2	  Various	  Players	  in	  China-­‐Africa	  Economic	  Links	  China’s	  investment	  in	  Africa	  has	  experienced	  a	  dramatic	  increase	  in	  this	  decade.	  The	   former	   vice	  minister	   of	  MOFCOM	  Sun	  Guangxiang	  has	   revealed	   that	  China	  had	  invested	  US$13	  billion	  in	  Africa	  by	  the	  end	  of	  2010,	  twenty	  times	  the	  2003	  level.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  value	  has	  risen	  from	  a	  level	  of	  US$1.5	  million	  in	  1991	  (ERA,	  October	  2009).	  Chinese	  Ambassador	   to	  South	  Africa	  Zhong	   Jianhua	  also	  pointed	  out	  the	  annual	  return	  on	  investment	  (ROI)	  in	  China	  is	  around	  3-­‐4%,	  whilst	  on	  the	  African	  continent	  it	  is	  20%,	  and	  in	  South	  Africa	  19%	  (FOCAC,	  April	  17	   2012).	   Despite	   these	   impressive	   figures,	   only	   half	   of	   the	   enterprises	   have	  successfully	  “gone	  out”.	  A	  McKinsey	  Report	  estimated	  that	  67%	  of	  Chinese	  firms	  failed	   in	   their	   overseas	   mergers	   and	   acquisitions,	   due	   to	   bankruptcy	   and	  unprofitability	  that	  is	  higher	  than	  the	  world	  average	  rate	  50%	  (Xiaojuan,	  January	  2	   2012).	   UNCTAD	   suggested	   that,	   although	   the	   investment	   was	   widely	  distributed	  across	  the	  continent,	   five	  countries	  (Sudan,	  Algeria,	  Zambia,	  Nigeria	  and	   South	   Africa)	   accounted	   for	   approximately	   half,	   which	   increased	   the	  vulnerability	  of	  their	  investment	  (Kaplinsky	  &	  Morris,	  2009).	  	  China	  is	  a	  latecomer	  to	  the	  continent.	  In	  the	  beginning,	  large	  SOEs	  owned	  by	  the	  State	  Council	  were	  the	  vanguards	  entering	  Africa.	  They	  took	  advantage	  of	  loans	  from	   policy	   banks	   and	   “operated	   under	   formal	   state-­‐to-­‐state	   agreements”	  (Kaplinsky	   &	  Morris,	   2009).	   Initially	   serving	   the	   continent	   as	   an	   aid	   provider,	  those	   firms	   have	   gradually	   transformed	   into	   international	   contractors	   and	  developers	  who	  undertake	  the	  responsibility	  of	  seeking	  unexplored	  reserves	  and	  markets.	  The	  funds	  from	  national	  banks	  and	  preferential	  policies	  have	  facilitated	  these	  SOEs	  to	  combine	  investment	  with	  aid	  projects	  and	  further	  to	  gain	  access	  to	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politically	  risky	  markets.	  Therefore,	  as	  Lum	  and	  Fischer	  have	  argued,	  China	  has	  preferred	  “projects	  in	  countries,	  areas	  that	  developed	  multinational	  corporations	  have	   avoided”,	   because	   the	   Chinese	   firms	   have	  more	   capability	   of	   taking	   risks	  with	   the	   financial	   support	   of	   the	   central	   government	   and	   preferred	   less	  competition	   from	   traditional	   players	   (Lum	   et	   al.,	   2009).	   At	   the	   same	   time,	  internal	  cheap	  labour	  and	  friendly	  relationships	  with	  African	  governments	  have	  nurtured	  Chinese	  firms’	  competitiveness	  in	  African	  markets.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  CPC	  Organisation	  Department	   is	   in	  charge	  of	  appointments	  and	  removal	  of	  senior	   personnel	   from	   the	   118	   SOEs	   under	   supervision	   by	   the	   SASAC	  (State-­‐Owned	  Asset	  Supervision	  and	  Administration	  Commission).	  Theoretically	  the	   central	   government	   and	   the	   large	   SOEs	   could	   work	   together	   as	   a	   team	   to	  achieve	   the	  central	  strategy	  of	   taking	  advantage	  of	   the	  underdeveloped	  African	  market	   and	   shaping	   those	   enterprises	   into	   internationally	   competitive	  multinational	  corporations.	   	  	  However,	  ostensibly	  the	  government	  has	  called	  on	  the	  “going	  out”	  strategy	  and	  organised	   these	   leading	   enterprises	   (longtou	   qiye	   龙头企业 )	   together	   to	  establish	   a	   national	   team	   for	   its	   foreign	   policy.	   In	   practice,	   the	   central	  government’s	   policy	   not	   only	   spurred	   Chinese	   foreign	   economic	   activities,	   but	  also	   reflected	   the	   enterprises’	   interests.	   In	   other	   words,	   Chinese	   enterprises	  involving	   in	   Africa	   are	   driven	   by	   various	   demands	   besides	   just	   following	   the	  central	  government’s	  commands.	   	  	  First,	  as	  mentioned	  above,	  the	  central	  government	  controls	  the	  careers	  of	  senior	  SOE	   managers.	   Additionally,	   “senior	   SOE	   managers	   can	   be	   promoted	   into	  government	   or	   Party	   positions,	   and	   cadres	   can	   be	   promoted	   into	   positions	   of	  influence	   in	   SOEs.”	   (Fan,	   Morck,	   &	   Yeung,	   2012,	   p.	   3)	   Sometimes,	   the	   senior	  manages	   of	   an	   SOE	   could	   be	   assigned	   to	   its	   competitor	   by	   the	   central	  government	  -­‐	  such	  as	  happened	  on	  April	  8,	  2011,	  when	  the	  central	  government	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assigned	   Fu	   Chengyu,	   the	   former	   chairman	   of	   China	   National	   Offshore	   Oil	  Corporate	   (CNOOC)	   to	   China	   Petroleum	   and	   Chemical	   Corp	   (SINOPEC),	   while	  replacing	   Fu	   with	   the	   Wang	   Yilin,	   the	   former	   manager	   of	   China	   National	  Petroleum	  Corp.	  (CNPC).	  On	  the	  same	  day,	  former	  manager	  of	  SINOPEC	  Su	  Shulin	  was	  promoted	  to	  Party	  Leader	  of	  Fujian	  Province.	  (People’s	  Daily,	  April	  8	  2011)	  This	   notwithstanding,	   what	   the	   government	   can	   replace	   is	   a	   position,	   not	   the	  interests	  of	  these	  SOEs.	  Zhao	  Zhongxiu	  has	  argued	  that	  evidence	  shows	  the	  SOEs’	  influence	   over	   central	   decisions	   and	   even	   has	   an	   impact	   on	   the	   central	  government’s	  grand	  strategy.	  For	  instance,	  the	  central	  government	  had	  to	  put	  an	  end	  to	  its	  negotiations	  with	  Gulf	  States	  over	  free	  trade	  zones	  due	  to	  a	  conflict	  of	  interest	  with	  SINOPEC.	  In	  light	  of	  “mutual	  benefits”,	  the	  Gulf	  States	  would	  like	  to	  be	   involved	   in	   the	   refinery	   industry	   around	   the	   downstream	  Yangtze	  River,	   in	  exchange	   for	   Chinese	   companies	   entering	   their	   textile	   and	  other	   light	   industry	  markets.	  Yet	  this	  “win-­‐win”	  situation,	  advocated	  for	  by	  the	  central	  government,	  has	  been	  called	  off	  as	  SINOPEC	  wasn’t	  prepared	  to	  share	   the	  domestic	  refinery	  market	  with	  foreign	  competition	  (Z.	  Zhao,	  November	  24	  2011).	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  promotion	  to	  higher	  positions	  within	  SOE	  management	  or	  into	  government	   and	   party	   positions	   is	   based	   on	   meritocracy.	   Promotions	   are	  outcomes	   of	   an	   extremely	   competitive	   tournament	   based	   substantially	   on	  quantitative,	   if	   imperfect	   and	   pliable,	   performance	  metrics	   (Hongbin	   Li,	  Meng,	  Wang,	  &	  Zhou,	  2008;	  Lü,	  2000).	  Therefore,	  the	  managers	  of	  SOEs	  tend	  to	  prefer	  economic	   profits	   while	   sacrificing	   some	   other,	   less	   important	   elements	   in	   the	  evaluation	  criteria,	  such	  as	  loyalty	  to	  the	  central	  policy,	  efficiency,	  environmental	  protection,	   labour	   laws,	   and	   local	   community	   relations.	   Unfortunately,	  when	   it	  comes	  to	  Africa,	  this	  economic	  motivation	  often	  doesn’t	  cohere	  with	  the	  original	  target	   set	   by	   the	   central	   government.	   In	   practice,	   the	   central	   assignment	   and	  “leader	   saying	   counts”	   (yiyantang	   一言堂)	   management	   style	   may	   lead	   top	  managers	   to	   prioritise	   personal	   gains	   and	   corporate	   economic	   profits	   rather	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than	  political	  and	  diplomatic	  strategy.	  Even	  worse,	  recently	  many	  scandals	  have	  been	  revealed	  regarding	  SOEs’	  high-­‐level	  corruption,	  improper	  decision-­‐making,	  illegal	  fund	  raising	  -­‐	  such	  as	  the	  China	  Aviation	  Oil	  incident,	  huge	  deficits	  of	  China	  National	   Cotton	   Reserves	   Corporation	   (CNCRC),	   the	   former	   chairman	   Capital	  Airports	   Holding	   Company	   Li	   Yingping’s	   embezzlement,	   Chen	   Tonghai,	   the	  former	  chairman	  of	  SINOPEC	  corruption/theft	  of	  190million	  RMB,	  Kang	  Rixin’s	  economic	   crime	   during	   his	   leading	   the	   China’s	   National	   Nuclear	   Corporation.	  Their	  personal	  interest	  frequently	  deviated	  from	  the	  central	  government	  policy.	  	  Third,	  although	  the	  118	  large	  SOEs	  were	  supervised	  by	  SASAC,	  each	  corporation	  has	   their	   own	   subsidiary	   companies	   and	   provincial	   branches,	   while	   their	  subsidiary	   companies	   hold	   other	   companies	   as	   further	   subsidiary	   branches	   as	  well.	   Take	   SINOPEC	   as	   an	   example,	   it	   has	   16	   oilfield	   companies,	   31	   refinery	  factories,	   26	   distribution	   companies,	   eight	   design	   and	   construction	   firms,	   nine	  research	  institutions,	  and	  ten	  others,	  including	  eight	  newspapers	  and	  magazines,	  and	   12	   overseas	   branches,	   let	   alone	   its	   ‘grandson’	   subsidiary	   companies.	  Different	  from	  state-­‐owned,	  these	  are	  joint-­‐stock	  companies	  which	  suggests	  the	  central	   government	   can	   hardly	   control	   their	   operations.	   Witness	   23	   revealed	  that	  those	  subsidiary	  companies	  usually	  operate	  independently,	  and	  the	  leaders	  of	   these	   companies	   lack	   the	   ambition	   to	   be	   promoted,	   because	   the	   subsidiary	  company	  may	  offer	  better	  pay/compensation.	   	  	  Alongside	  the	   large	  SOEs	  owned	  by	  the	  central	  government	  and	  accountable	  to	  the	   State	   Council,	   “the	   provincially	   owned	   firms	   often	   reflect	   the	   initiatives	   of	  their	  decentralized	   state	  administrations	  and	  often	  build	  on	   regional	  diaspora”	  (Kaplinsky	  &	  Morris,	  2009).	  Because	  many	  of	  those	  entrepreneurs	  rely	  critically	  on	   local	   connections,	   their	   CEOs	   and	   boards	   benefit	   from	   the	   advice	   of	   their	  dedicated	   enterprise-­‐level	   Party	   Secretaries	   and	   Party	   Committees	   (Fan	   et	   al.,	  2012).	  Regarding	  China-­‐African	  economic	  activities	  where	   the	  decision-­‐making	  is	   highly	   centralized,	   provincial	   governments	   and	   local	   party	   leaders	   remain	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significant	   in	   political	   economic	   relations.	   Benefiting	   from	   local	   relations,	  provincial	   companies	   came	   to	  Africa	   early	   through	  extended	   connections,	   such	  as	   sister-­‐city	   and	   industrial	   zones.	   Generally	   speaking,	   two	   bureaus	   –	   the	  provincial	   Foreign	   Affairs	   Office	   (FAO)	   and	   Foreign	   Trade	   and	   Economic	  Cooperation	  Commission	  (FTECC)	  –	  have	  the	  responsibility	  for	  implementing	  the	  national	   foreign	   policy,	   locally	   supervised	   by	   MOFA	   and	   MOFCOM.	   They	  collaborated	  with	  provincial	  Asset	  Supervision	  and	  Administration	  Commission	  who	  took	  control	  of	  local	  SOEs	  and	  branches	  of	  national	  foreign	  trade	  companies	  for	  foreign	  economic	  activities.	  Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  national	  SOEs	  were	  pioneers	  in	  Africa	  and	  mostly	  engaged	  in	  resource-­‐rich	  countries,	  SOEs	  of	  provincial	  and	  municipal	   levels,	   especially	   those	   from	   south-­‐east	   provinces,	   were	   mainly	  contributing	   to	   exports	   in	   the	   form	   of	   manufactured	   goods	   ranging	   from	  machinery,	  textiles	  and	  garments,	  to	  electronics,	  and	  accounted	  for	  one-­‐quarter	  of	   China’s	   outward	   FDI	   to	   Africa.	   Due	   to	   local	   protectionism	   and	   competition,	  these	  local	  SOEs	  served	  not	  only	  as	  a	  project	  builder	  or	  aid	  provider,	  but	  also	  an	  investors	   and	   exporters	  who,	   to	   some	   extent,	   have	   local	   autonomy	   (Z.	   Chen	  &	  Jian,	  2009).	  As	  Witness	  3	  pointed	  out,	   for	   those	   central	  policies	   that	   related	   to	  national	   interests,	   the	   implementer	   -­‐	   local	   government	   and	   agency	   -­‐	   	   may	  over-­‐implement	  if	  they	  will	  benefit	  locally,	  but	  if	  not	  they	  may	  under-­‐implement.	  For	  example,	  the	  central	  government	  has	  actively	  responded	  to	  African	  countries’	  trade	   deficits,	   specifically	   to	   those	   least	   developed	   countries	   (LDCs)	  with	   rare	  resource	  reserves.	  Since	  2004,	  it	  has	  gradually	  offered	  zero-­‐tariffs	  to	  the	  LDCs	  to	  promote	  their	  exports	  to	  China	  through	  FOCAC.	  During	  a	  June	  2006	  visit	  to	  South	  Africa,	   Premier	   Wen	   Jiabao	   announced	   that	   China	   would	   impose	   voluntary	  export	   restrictions	   on	   the	   export	   of	   textiles	   to	   South	   Africa	   (PERE,	   2007).	  However,	  Witness	  21	  says	  until	  now	  the	  textiles	  industry	  is	  still	  playing	  a	  major	  role	   in	   China’s	   exports	   to	   South	   Africa	   because	   it	   is	   a	   large	   destination	   of	  manufacture	   goods	   from	   South-­‐east	   Province.	   And	   the	   provincial	   companies	  have	  right	   to	  cancel	  or	  change	  the	  restrictions.	  Given	  the	   fact	   that	  as	  ambitious	  traders	   and	   investors,	   most	   of	   the	   provinces	   have	   their	   own	   motivations	   and	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priorities	   instead	   of	   the	   central	   one.	   This	   contributes	   to	   China’s	   trade	   surplus	  with	  Africa	  and	  brings	  an	  intense	  competition	  with	  their	  African	  counterparts.	  	  The	   potential	   contradiction	   exists	   not	   only	   between	   provincial	   economic	  demands	   and	   national	   objectives,	   but	   also	   among	   the	   interests	   of	   provinces	  themselves.	   The	   Chinese	   coastal	   provinces	   pursued	   economic	   growth	   through	  export	  of	  low-­‐technical	  manufacturing	  goods	  as	  more	  high-­‐technical	  goods	  could	  not	   find	   an	   African	  market;	   on	   the	   other	   hand	   the	   inland	   provinces	  were	   also	  seeking	   low-­‐technical	   goods	   markets	   bringing	   the	   two	   into	   competition.	   But	  Beijing	   lacks	   a	   mechanism	   for	   coordinating	   the	   fragmented	   actors	   from	   each	  province.	   Due	   to	   the	   lateral	   links,	   provincial	   companies	   formed	   a	   better	   team	  than	  the	  national	  level.	  When	  the	  pioneering	  firms	  settled	  in	  Africa,	  they	  had	  to	  seek	   sources	   for	   parts	   and	   equipment.	   Unfortunately,	   most	   of	   the	   African	  countries	   have	   a	   weak	   supply	   chain	   and	   did	   not	   have	   the	   necessary	  infrastructure.	   Consequently,	   they	   have	   to	   seek	   supply	   from	   other	   Chinese	  companies,	   especially	   from	   their	   same	   province	   with	   close	   connections	   and	  gradually-­‐formed	   a	   trade	   zones.	   As	   a	   result,	   some	   coastal	   provinces,	   such	   as	  Zhejiang,	   Guangdong,	   Fujian,	   Jiangsu	   and	   Shandong,	   have	   established	   a	   more	  mature	  clustering	  of	  business	  than	  others	  (Z.	  Chen	  &	  Jian,	  2009).	  	   	  The	  Chinese	  government	  has	  launched	  a	  series	  of	  measures	  to	  support	  domestic	  innovative	   small	   and	   medium-­‐sized	   enterprises,	   while	   tightly	   restricting	  high-­‐energy-­‐consuming	   and	   high-­‐emission	   industries	   (two-­‐high	   industry)	   at	  home.	   In	  order	   to	  upgrade	   its	  economic	  development	  mode,	  according	   to	  MOF,	  China	   spent	   a	   total	   of	   26.8	   billion	   yuan	   (US$	   4.4	   billion)	   to	   support	   the	  innovation	   by	   small	   and	  medium-­‐sized	   enterprises	   from	   1999	   to	   2013	   (China	  Daily,	  October	  26	  2013).	  During	  the	  same	  period,	  the	  state	  council	  has	  issued	  the	  Plan	  for	  Eliminating	  Outdated	  and	  Excess	  Capacity	  in	  Key	  Industries	  to	  regulate	  the	   two-­‐high	   industries	  (People’s	  Daily	  October	  15	  2013).	  This	  domestic	  policy	  has	  an	  indirect	  impact	  on	  Africa.	  As	  the	  analysis	  indicated,	  due	  to	  the	  shortage	  of	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resource,	   excess	   products,	   labour	   cost	   and	   pollution,	   many	   small	   and	  medium-­‐sized	   enterprises	   in	   high-­‐energy-­‐consuming	   and	   high	   emission	  industries	   have	   chosen	   to	  move	   into	   Africa	   or	   have	   dumped	   their	   low-­‐quality	  products	   into	   African	  markets	   in	   order	   to	   survive	   (Zhibiao	   Li,	   2007).	   This	   has	  brought	  some	  unwelcome	  private	  firms	  to	  the	  continent.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	   private	   contingent	   is	   comprised	   of	   a	   limited	   number	   of	   very	   large	  corporations	   and	   numerous	   medium	   and	   small	   companies,	   which	   have	  increasingly	  become	  key	  players	   in	  China-­‐Africa	  economic	  exchanges.	  Since	  we	  have	   noted	   the	   close	   connections	   between	   large	   private	   corporations	   and	   the	  government,	  the	  private	  firms	  here	  refer	  to	  the	  medium	  and	  small	  ones	  who	  “act	  autonomously	   from	   Chinese	   government’s	   policy	   frameworks	   and	   existing	  bilateral	   arrangements”	   (Gu,	   2009).	   As	   Gu	   revealed	   in	   her	   research,	   few	   small	  and	  medium	  companies	   entered	  Africa	   following	  Beijing’s	   “going	  out”	   strategy.	  Instead,	   they	   held	   a	   strong	   entrepreneurial	   motivation.	   Some	   of	   them	   have	  already	  established	  mature	  operations	  processes	  in	  China,	  while	  also	  extending	  themselves	  into	  Africa	  where	  there	  are	  fewer	  energy,	  environmental	  restrictions.	  Others	  started	  their	  business	  on	  the	  African	  continent	  through	  pouring	  Chinese	  imports,	  sometimes	  through	  illegal	  ways.	  For	  them,	  business	  was	  built	  on	  family	  or	   community	   links.	   These	   Chinese	   immigrants	   become	   a	   big	   threat	   to	  African	  communities,	  especially	  in	  terms	  of	  work	  opportunities.	   	  	  Compared	   to	  SOEs,	   the	  central	  government’s	   control	  over	   these	  groups	   is	  even	  weaker.	  A	  manager	   from	  a	  private	  company	   in	  Africa	  has	  a	   typical	  explanation	  for	   the	   gap	  between	  policy	   and	   its	   implementation:	   “We	  heard	   there	   are	   some	  policies,	   but	   we	   do	   not	   know	   what	   they	   are	   about.”	   (Gu,	   2009)	   Witness	   2’s	  information	   echoes	   the	   manager,	   and	   complained	   that	   “they	   (the	   Chinese	  companies)	  only	  came	  for	  help	  from	  the	  embassy	  when	  they	  got	  into	  trouble”.	  It	  revealed	   that	   due	   to	   information	   asymmetry	   and	  weak	   policy	   implementation	  capability,	   the	   top-­‐down	   methods	   had	   been	   deviated	   or	   neglected	   by	   these	  private	   companies.	   For	   instance,	   the	   central	   government	   has	   launched	   some	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tangible	   measures	   by	   establishing	   Small-­‐Medium	   Enterprises	   International	  Market	  Development	  Fund	  to	  support	  qualified	  private	  companies.	  According	  to	  MOFCOM,	  76,000	  out	   of	   40	  million	   firms	  have	  benefited	   from	   this	   fund	  with	   a	  maximum	   amount	   of	   US$10,000	   respectively.	   But	   in	   all	   the	   interviews	   with	  owners	  of	  small	  and	  medium	  companies,	  and	  through	  the	  observation	  of	  the	  QQ	  chat	  groups	  and	  BBS,	  none	  have	  confirmed	  they	  or	   their	  counterparts	   in	  Africa	  have	  ever	  taken	  advantage	  of	  these	  funds.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  none	  of	  them	  have	  attended	  any	  seminar	  or	  training	  session	  on	  foreign	  investment	  laws,	  culture	  and	  communications.	   It	   could	   infer	   that	   Beijing’s	   funds	   have	   not	   been	   fully	   taken	  advantage	  of	  by	  the	  private	  companies	  in	  Africa	  or	  the	  companies	  that	  operated	  in	  Africa	  are	  not	  qualified.	  And	   the	  entrepreneurs	   in	  Africa	  have	  not	  been	  well	  informed	  about	  Beijing’s	  policy	  in	  Africa.	  In	  all	  these	  circumstances,	   it	   indicates	  that	  Beijing	  has	  a	  weak	  capability	  to	  control	  its	  agencies	  and	  actors	  in	  Africa.	  	   	   	  As	   a	   result,	   the	  medium	   and	   small	   enterprises	   came	   to	   Africa	  mostly	   on	   their	  own	  volition.	  This	   suggests	   that	   they	  often	  performed	  more	  oriented	   for	  profit	  gain.	   Their	   employees	   were	   considered	   to	   work	   much	   harder	   than	   their	  counterparts,	   while	   the	   employers	   were	   more	   likely	   to	   take	   the	   risk	   of	   doing	  business	   in	   risky	   areas	   or	   the	  markets	  where	   profits	   are	   very	   low	   and	   supply	  chains	  are	  weak.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  they	  have	  to	  try	  anything	  to	  limit	  their	  costs	  due	  to	  the	  increasingly	  fierce	  competition	  between	  Chinese	  firms.	  It	  could	  be	  said	  that	  these	  types	  of	  companies	  can	  perform	  more	  flexibly	  in	  the	  local	  conditions	  and	   provide	   affordable	   localized	   products	   and	   service	   for	   ordinary	   people.	  However,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   low	   cost	   and	   low	   quality	   industries	   have	  become	   a	   threat	   to	   their	   newly	   emerging	   local	   counterparts.	   From	   this	  perspective,	   these	   types	  of	  enterprises	  can	  hardly	  meet	   the	  expectations	  of	   the	  African	  countries’	  demands,	  in	  terms	  of	  skills	  transfer,	  social	  and	  environmental	  development.	   	  	  Because	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  necessary	  African	  market	  knowledge,	  most	  of	  private	  firms	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tend	  to	  use	  the	  same	  management	  style	  as	  they	  were	  familiar	  with	  in	  China.	  They	  take	   for	   granted	   overtime	   hours,	   poor	   working	   conditions,	   disrespect	   for	  intellectual	   property,	   and	   the	   logic	   of	   sacrificing	   the	   environment	   for	  development.	   For	   community	   relations,	   they	   prefer	   to	   deal	   with	   bureaucrats.	  Even	  worse,	   some	   small	   firms	   closed	  down	  by	   the	  Chinese	   government	  due	   to	  environmental	  pollution	  or	  poor	  quality	  products	  have	  relocated	  to	  Africa	  where	  they	   enjoy	   lower	   scrutiny	   and	   less	   development.	   (Observed	   from	   the	   QQ	   chat	  group)	   Their	   poor	   behaviour	   has	   largely	   violated	   China’s	   image	   as	   a	   whole.	  Witness	  5	  has	  argued	  that	  “There	  are	  hundreds	  of	  thousands	  of	  Chinese	  people	  in	   Africa,	   but	   there	   is	   no	   national	   responsibility	   awareness	   among	   individual	  people”	  as	  a	  result,	  for	  various	  players	  in	  Africa,	  China’s	  “image	  is	  not	  very	  good”.	   	  	  The	  three	  types	  of	  enterprises	  in	  Africa	  have	  reflected	  the	  key	  players’	  attitudes	  towards	  the	  continent.	  Their	  features	  of	  them	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Table	  5.2:	   	  	  	  
Table	  5.2	  Different	  types	  of	  Chinese	  enterprises	  in	  Africa	  	  
Ownership	   Central	  state	   Province/Municipal
ity	   	  
Private	  
Time	  and	  Motivation	  of	  entering	  Africa	  
Since	   the	  foundation	   of	   PRC,	  implemented	  Chinese	   aid	  projects;	  Mid-­‐1990s	  resource	  and	  market	  seeking	  
1980s	  implemented	  state	  to	  state	  contracts;	  2000	  actively	  involved	  in	  economic	  cooperation	  zones	  
2000	  African	  market	  opportunity	  and	  high	  competitive	  domestic	  market	  	  
Main	  Sector	   Resources	  and	  infrastructure	   	   Manufacturing,	  wholesale	   	   Manufacturing	  and	  retail	  fund	   Central	  government;	  EXIM	  Bank	  
Central	  development	  fund;	  provincial	  and	  municipal	  financial	  support	  
Self-­‐financed	   	  
Connections	   	   Accountable	  to	  State	  Council	   Central	  government	  and	  provincial	  government	   	  
Act	  Independently	  of	  government	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Transparency	   	   	   Relative	  well-­‐documented;	  Some	  has	  released	  CSR	  report	  
Not	  always	  transparent	   Only	  through	  some	  interviews	  
Commitments	  to	  Africa	   Technological,	  managerial	  skills	  transfers;	  infrastructure/	  Public	  sector	  buildings;	  
Supply	  Chains;	  economic	  cooperation	  zones	  
Employment	  opportunity;	  Affordable	  products	  
Negative	  impact	  to	  Africa	   	   Connive	  at	  the	  autarchy,	  bad	  governance	  and	  corruption	   	   	  
Take	  advantage	  of	  local	  export	  opportunity,	  such	  as	  AGOA	  and	  threat	  the	  development	  of	  some	  local	  industry	  
Bad	   quality	  products;	  Bad	   working	  conditions;	  Disrespect	   local	  intellectual	  property	   	  
Source:	  author	  
5.4	  Conclusion	   	  In	   summary,	   as	   Shaun	   Breslin	   noted,	   “some	   non-­‐China	   specialists	   still	   seem	  somewhat	  surprised	  to	  discover	  that	  China	  is	  not	  a	  monolithic	  political	  structure	  with	   all	   power	   emanating	   from	   Beijing”.	   In	   fact,	   many	   actors	   with	   their	   own	  agendas	   have	   involved	   themselves	   between	   the	   policy	   formulation	   and	   policy	  implementation	  (Breslin,	  2007).	  In	  theory,	  the	  power	  of	  the	  key	  actors	  in	  Africa	  was	   authorized	   by	   the	   central	   government;	   however,	   the	   key	   actors’	   interests	  have	   affected	   policy	   implementation.	   In	   other	   words,	   even	   if	   the	   central	  government	   may	   have	   a	   broad	   African	   policy,	   it	   has	   to	   be	   achieved	   through	  Chinese	   enterprises	   with	   economic-­‐driven	   natures	   and	   officials	   with	   growing	  autonomy	  who	  may	  not	  share	  the	  central	  vision	  (Taylor,	  2009).	  Both	  assistance	  teams	  and	  enterprises	  have	   their	  own	  motivations	  and	   flexibility,	  but	  as	   for	  an	  outsider,	   their	   misbehaviour	   in	   the	   continent	   shaped	   the	   image	   of	   China	   as	   a	  whole.	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Part	  1	  Conclusion	   	  The	   first	   section	   has	   presented	   a	   framework	   for	   the	   analysis	   of	   China’s	  responsibility	   in	  Africa.	   First,	   the	   introduction	   launched	   three	  hypotheses	  with	  six	   questions	   to	   evaluate	   to	   what	   extend	   China	   has	   or	   has	   not	   shown	   a	  willingness	   to	   shoulder	   its	   obligations	   to	   and	   accountability	   for	   Africa’s	  development.	  The	   answers	   to	   this	  question	   can	  be	  discussed	   in	   three	  ways:	   1)	  what	  are	  the	  proper	  criteria	  for	  being	  a	  responsible	  stakeholder	  based	  on	  China’s	  national	   capabilities	   and	   development	   status	   in	   the	   international	   arena?	   This	  question	   argues	   that	   the	   criteria	   should	   be	   complemented	   by	   adding	   the	  developing	   countries’	   perspective.	   2)	   According	   to	   the	   established	   criteria,	   is	  China	   a	   responsible	   actor	   in	   Africa?	   Whether	   or	   not	   China	   is	   responsible	   is	  difficult	   to	   ascertain,	   and	   depends	   on	  which	   aspects	   are	   to	   be	   considered	   and	  what	  perspectives	  are	  used.	  To	  further	  explore	  the	  question,	  it	  could	  be	  viewed	  through	  macro-­‐	  and	  microscopes.	  The	  international	  (mainly	  Western),	  or	  China’s	  and	  Africa’s	  standpoints	  should	  be	  reflected,	  while	  also	  assessing	  which	  domestic	  governmental	   branches	   or	   departments	   are	   involved,	   and	   how	   they	   have	  influenced	   China’s	   performance	   in	   Africa	  must	   be	  measured	   as	  well.	   Although	  China-­‐Africa	   relations	   have	   drawn	   a	   lot	   of	   criticism	   (from	   both	   the	  West	   and	  Africa),	   cooperation	   between	   China	   and	   traditional	   donors	   could	   be	   found	   in	  China’s	   African	   policy	   in	   helping	   to	   solve	   the	   local	   crisis,	   addressing	   African	  poverty	  level	  and	  promoting	  its	  economic	  development.	  3)	  Hypothesis	  III	  of	  this	  thesis	   addresses	   the	   major	   problem	   for	   China	   being	   not	   fully	   responsible	   in	  Africa:	   that	   is,	   the	   gap	  between	  China’s	   foreign	  policy	   strategy	   and	   the	   actions	  and	  agendas	  of	   the	  various	  actors	  operating	   in	   the	   implementation	  process.	  To	  clarify	  which	  branches	  may	  cause	   the	  problems,	  Chapter	  Five	  will	   address	   this	  from	  Chinese	  side,	  which	  includes	  1)	  the	  policy	  maker	  (central	  government	  and	  MOFA);	   2)	   the	   state	   implementer	   (MOC,	   local	   embassies,	   central	   financial	  institutions,	   local	   governments,	   state-­‐owned	   enterprises),	   and	   other	   important	  players	  (the	  sub-­‐contractors	   in	  Africa,	  medium	  sized	  and	  small	  enterprises	  and	  NGO).	  Despite	  the	  dynamism	  of	  the	  two	  levels,	  not	  to	  mention	  the	  fact	  that	  they	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are	  close	  connected	  with	  each	  other,	  the	  literature	  and	  interviews	  have	  indicated	  that	   Beijing’s	   control	   over	   the	   implementer	   is	   not	   as	   tight	   as	   one	   may	   have	  expected.	  In	  addition,	  the	  duelling	  policy-­‐	  and	  strategy-­‐oriented	  government	  and	  profit-­‐driven	   corporations	   further	   deepens	   the	   gap	   between	   policy	   and	  implementation.	   	   	   	  	  With	   the	   consideration	   of	   feasibility	   and	   accessibility,	   elite	   interviewing,	  observation	  and	  critical	  documentation	  and	  discourse	  analysis	  are	  mainly	  used	  to	   examine	   the	   hypotheses.	   Corresponding	   to	   the	   research	   target,	   the	  interviewees	  are	  divided	  into	  four	  groups:	  1)	  central	  government	  officers	  (most	  of	  them	  are	  from	  MOFA);	  2)	  SOE	  employees	  who	  have	  been	  assigned	  to	  Africa;	  3)	  Chinese	  self-­‐employers	  in	  Africa;	  and	  4)	  China’s	  African	  researchers.	   	  	  The	   theoretical	   structure	   starts	   with	   the	   conceptual	   chapter	   on	   international	  responsibility.	  By	  reviewing	  the	  definition	  of	  “international	  responsibility”,	  three	  influential	  factors	  and	  five	  criteria	  have	  been	  introduced.	  It	  argued	  international	  expectations,	   “donors”	   domestic	   situation	   and	   the	   recipients’	   demands	   are	   the	  three	  key	  influential	  factors	  in	  shaping	  an	  international	  responsibility	  policy.	  The	  responsibility	  policy	  is	  a	  compromised	  result	  of	  the	  dynamic	  interaction	  among	  the	   three	   factors.	   In	  general,	   the	   three	   factors	  have	  all	  affected	  China’s	  attitude	  towards	   African	   problems	   to	   some	   extent.	   In	   some	   cases,	   like	   Sudan,	  international	  pressures	  have	  pushed	  China	  to	  become	  more	  positive	  and	  active	  on	   the	  Darfur	   issue.	   In	  some	  other	  cases,	  where	   there	   is	  a	   lack	  of	   international	  attention,	   China	   is	   more	   likely	   to	   behave	   according	   to	   its	   own	   foreign	   policy	  strategy	  and	  respond	  to	  the	  host	  country’s	  demands.	  The	  case	  studies	  chapters	  will	   discuss	   how	   these	   three	   factors	   work	   together	   to	   shape	   China’s	   policy	   in	  each	  country,	  and	  how	   it	   is	  compatible	  with	   international	  expectations	  and	   the	  host	  country’s	  requirements.	   	   	   	   	   	  	  Furthermore,	   five	   standards	   for	   the	   evaluation	   of	   international	   responsibility	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have	   been	   established	   to	   be	   considered	   before	   making	   a	   judgment	   on	  responsibility:	  1)	  good	  governance;	  2)	  expression;	  3)	  the	  subject’s	  capability	  and	  behaviour;	  4)	  consequences	  and	  impact	  of	  action	  and	  feedback;	  5)	  international	  expectations.	   Apart	   from	   the	   first	   criterion	   on	   good	   governance,	   which	   is	  considered	   to	   be	   the	   basic	   responsibility	   of	   any	   sovereignty	   state,	   China’s	  responsibility	  in	  Africa	  should	  start	  from	  an	  examination	  of	  the	  policy	  level.	  That	  is,	  whether	  China’s	  African	  policy	  design	  has	  been	  compatible	  with	  international	  expectations	  and	  African	  demands.	   	  	  Chapter	  four	  evaluated	  China’s	  African	  policy.	  Generally,	  Beijing	  has	  highlighted	  its	  compliance	  with	  the	  UN	  Charter	  and	  African	  Union	  Charter	  in	  its	  engagement	  with	   the	   continent.	  After	  2000,	  China	   introduced	   the	  high-­‐profile	  FOCAC.	   Since	  then,	   investment,	   preferential	   loans,	   assistance	   projects,	   medical	   teams,	  scholarships	  for	  African	  students,	  and	  many	  other	  kinds	  of	  assistance	  have	  been	  pledged	   to	  African	   states,	  which	  echoed	   the	  global	   agenda	  of	  development	  and	  poverty	   alleviation	   on/for	   the	   continent.	  While	   China	   paid	   lots	   of	   attention	   to	  tangible	   assistance	   to	   African	   states,	   the	   West	   made	   efforts	   to	   establish	  normative	  principles	  such	  as	  freedom,	  democracy,	  human	  rights,	   laws,	  equality,	  and	  good	  governance.	  These	  different	  attitudes	  presented	  two	  different	  types	  of	  development	  model.	  Despite	  China’s	  different	  approach	  and	  political	  philosophy,	  such	  as	  the	  non-­‐intervention	  principle	  and	  oil	  for	  infrastructure,	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  Africa,	   it	   is	   not	  necessary	  working	   against	   the	   existing	   efforts	   by	   traditional	  OECD	  donors	   and	  Africa’s	   demands.	   All	   the	   players	   have	   a	   shared	   aim	   to	   help	  develop	   the	   poor	   continent	   politically	   and	   economically.	   Since	   there	   is	   little	  consensus	   on	  who	   is	   best	   suited	   to	   help	   African	   countries,	   given	   the	   different	  political	   strategy	   of	   the	   traditional	   donors,	   in	   most	   cases,	   legitimacy	   refers	   to	  differences	   with	   the	   Western	   style,	   which	   is	   not	   an	   appropriate	   criteria	   with	  which	  to	  judge	  whether	  China	  is	  responsible	  or	  not.	  	  China	   has	   its	   own	   political,	   energy	   and	   economic	   interests	   in	   Africa.	   Its	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self-­‐identity,	   capability	   and	   foreign	   strategy	   all	   play	   a	   role	   in	   determining	   its	  interests	   in	   Africa.	   Further	   to	   this,	   China’s	   national	   interests,	   together	   with	  African	  demands	  and	  international	  pressures	  have	  shaped	  China’s	  African	  policy.	  Chapter	   4	   discussed	   China’s	   African	   policy	   and	   argued	   that	   even	   if	   China	   has	  conducted	  a	  different	  approach	  to	  Africa,	  its	  policy	  has	  shared	  similar	  aims	  –	  that	  of	   a	   stable	   and	  developing	   continent.	  Keeping	   the	  different	  methods	  of	  African	  engagement	  in	  mind,	  it	  is	  worth	  exploring	  further	  from	  where	  the	  accusations	  of	  irresponsibility	  issue.	  In	  order	  to	  locate	  the	  blame	  more	  specifically,	  one	  should	  examine	   which	   Chinese	   departments	   or	   branches	   have	   been	   involved	   in	  China-­‐Africa	  projects,	  to	  what	  extent	  and	  how	  they	  can	  impact	  the	  achievement	  of	  a	  pledge	  of	  assistance.	  Chapter	  5	   talked	  about	   the	   implementation	   level,	  and	  explained	  China-­‐Africa	  policy	  in	  practice	  from	  China’s	  perspective.	  It	  introduced	  two	  main	  aspects	  of	  China-­‐African	  engagement:	  China’s	  aid	  and	  China’s	  economic	  involvement.	   Not	   only	   this,	   but	   the	   chapter	   clarified	  which	   Chinese	   actors	   are	  involved	   in	   China-­‐Africa	   assistance	   and	   economic	   links,	   and	  how	   they	  worked.	  The	   chapter	   also	   highlighted	   the	   fact	   that	   Chinese	   government	   and	   Chinese	  enterprises	  ostensibly	  work	  as	  a	  national	  team	  on	  overseas	  projects.	  In	  fact,	  due	  to	  the	  profit-­‐oriented	  nature	  of	  corporations	  and	  the	  loose	  cooperation	  between	  Chinese	   governmental	   branches,	   the	   central	   government’s	   control	   over	   their	  African	  policy	  implementers	  is	  not	  as	  tight	  as	  one	  may	  expect.	  The	  gap	  between	  policy	   design	   and	   its	   implementation	   affects	   the	   efforts	   and	   contributions	   to	  Africa	  a	  great	  deal.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  complete	  projects:	  the	  central	  government	  plays	  a	  guiding	  role	  in	  its	  African	  policy,	  MOFCOM	  –	  with	  the	  help	  of	  MOFA	  –	  is	  responsible	  for	  policy	  design,	  the	  China	  Exim	  bank	  provides	  the	  financial	  support,	  and	  the	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises	  supervised	  by	  SASAC	  under	  the	  State	  Council	  are	  the	  implementers.	  Lacking	   an	   independent	   aid	   agency,	   it	   requires	   different	   actors	  with	   receptive	  interests	  and	  aims	  to	  work	  together.	  This	   is	  where	  the	  gap	  between	  policy	  and	  implementation	  comes	  about.	  Especially	  at	  the	  enterprises	  level,	  despite	  the	  fact	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that	  Chinese	  state-­‐owned,	  parastatal	  and	  even	  some	  private	  corporation	  to	  some	  extent	  all	  have	  governmental	  backgrounds,	  the	  enterprises’	  profit-­‐driven	  nature	  remains	  the	  biggest	  motivation	  for	  their	  daily	  operations	  in	  the	  African	  market	  -­‐	  not	   to	   mention	   the	   motivations	   of	   the	   medium	   and	   small	   companies,	  unregistered	   small	   business	   and	   retailers.	   When	   the	   owners	   of	   some	   small	  businesses	  focus	  on	  corporate	  interests,	  they	  can	  lack	  the	  ability	  to	  think	  about	  long-­‐term	  interests.	  However,	  their	  overseas	  misbehaviour	  leads	  to	  China	  being	  criticised,	   rather	   than	   each	   individual	   corporation	  or	   official	   branch.	  That	   is	   to	  say,	  the	  accusation	  of	  China	  as	  irresponsible	  is	  caused	  by	  a	  bottom-­‐up	  process.	  	  Since	  Chinese	  actors	  involved	  in	  African	  countries	  are	  almost	  the	  same,	  by	  which	  I	  mean	   there	  are	  no	  official	  branches	  or	  departments	  aimed	  at	   specific	  African	  countries,	  this	  thesis	  has	  discussed	  China’s	  implementation	  level	  as	  a	  whole.	  Yet,	  considering	   a	   diversified	   Africa,	   the	   case	   studies	   chapters	   will	   discuss	   China’s	  policy	  implementation	  in	  each	  host	  country	  respectively.	   	  	  In	   pursuing	   China’s	   African	   agenda,	   Beijing	   has	   constructed	   a	   series	   of	  relationships	   with	   different	   types	   of	   African	   states.	   These	   range	   from	   the	  relatively	   developed	   and	   democratic	   government	   (South	   Africa)	   to	   the	   least	  developed	  and	  pariah	  regime	  (Sudan).	  The	  host	  African	  countries	  with	  different	  domestic	   situations,	   demands	   and	   agendas	   have	   partly	   framed	   the	   way	   China	  implements	  its	  responsibilities	  as	  well.	   	  	  Based	  on	  the	  framework	  discussion	  and	  combining	  the	  unique	  situation	  in	  each	  kind	  of	  African	  country,	   the	  case	  studies	  will	   further	  test	   the	  hypotheses,	  while	  also	  echoing	  and	  complementing	  the	  identified	  framework	  in	  the	  following	  way:	  
	  1)	   China	   holds	   an	   alternative	   approach	   to	   African	   states	   in	   contrast	   to	   the	  traditional	   donors.	   However,	   since	   the	   effectiveness	   and	   success	   of	   Western	  methods	   has	   been	   challenged,	   it	   is	   bias	   and	   unfair	   to	   judge	   China’s	   level	   of	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responsibility	   to	   Africa’s	   development	   simply	   because	   it	   is	   different	   to	   the	  Western	  way.	  More	  criteria	   should	  be	  applied	   to	  evaluate	  China’s	  performance	  on	  the	  continent.	  The	  framework	  section	  has	  divided	  China-­‐Africa	  responsibility	  into	  two	  layers,	  policy	  and	  implementation.	  The	  case	  studies	  will	  test	  further	  to	  prove	   China’s	   Africa	   policy	   and	   approaches	   align	   with	   the	   four	   countries’	  demands	  and	  respond	  to	  international	  pressures.	   	   	  	  2)	   In	  chapter	  3	  it	  argues,	  generally,	  China’s	  responsibilities	  in	  Africa	  are	  driven	  by	  three	  major	  factors:	  1)	  international	  pressure	  and	  expectation	  -­‐	  for	  instance,	  Beijing’s	  mediation	  for	  the	  Bashir	  regime	  in	  Sudan	  under	  international	  pressures	  aimed	  at	  its	  Olympic	  Games	  in	  2008;	  2)	  China’s	  motivation	  and	  national	  interests,	  which	   can	   be	   summarised	   as	   political	   support	   in	   the	  world	   arena,	   sustainable	  energy	  supply,	  markets	  and	  diplomatic	  influence	  and	  an	  improved	  reputation;	  3)	  Africa’s	  demands,	  including	  political	  support	  and	  economic	  assistance.	  The	  case	  studies	   will	   compare	   China’s	   national	   interests	   with	   international	   and	   African	  demands,	  and	  explore	  to	  what	  extend	  the	  three	  factors	  could	  work	  together.	   	  	  3)	  Chapter	  4	  has	  discussed	  China’s	  presence	  in	  Africa	  with	  its	  own	  features	  and	  characteristics.	   In	   the	   case	   studies	   chapters,	   each	   case	   will	   specifically	   talks	  about	  one	  of	  the	  features:	  “non-­‐intervention”	  in	  Sudan;	  “oil	  for	  infrastructure”	  in	  Nigeria;	  Chinese	  exportations	  in	  South	  Africa	  and	  China	  as	  a	  model	  in	  Ethiopia.	  	  4)	  Chapter	  5	  has	   argued	   that,	   although	   the	   central	   government	   is	   the	   strategic	  designer	  who	  provides	  policy	  and	   financial	   support	   to	   its	  African	  projects,	   it	   is	  the	  local	  embassies,	  corporations	  and	  assistance	  teams	  who	  do	  the	  work	  on	  the	  front	  lines.	  Their	  behaviour	  dictates	  to	  what	  extent	  China	  can	  fulfill	  its	  pledges.	  In	  the	  case	  studies,	  the	  thesis	  will	  go	  deeper	  and	  look	  at	  the	  other	  side	  –	  the	  African	  [economic	   and	  Political]	   environment’s	   impact	   on	  China’s	   ability	   to	   act	   and	   be	  responsible.	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The	  four	  African	  states	  -­‐	  Sudan,	  Nigeria,	  South	  Africa	  and	  Ethiopia	  -­‐	  are	  selected	  to	  examine	  and	  compare	  China’s	  responsibility	  there.	   	  	  In	  order	  to	  test	  hypotheses	  II	  and	  III,	  and	  to	  answer	  the	  questions	  “Are	  China’s	  motivations	   and	   African	   requirements	   (and	   international	   expectations)	  incompatible?”	   and	   “How	   does	   the	   situation	   of	  many	   actors	   in	  many	   different	  environments	   affect	   China’s	   ability	   to	   be	   a	   responsible	   actor	   in	   African	  development?”,	  the	  four	  case	  chapters	  are	  designed	  with	  the	  following	  structure:	   	  	  1)	   Each	   case	   will	   start	   with	   a	   brief	   introduction	   and	   highlight	   the	   bilateral	  interactions	   and	   important	   events	   between	   China	   and	   the	   host	   country.	   This	  section	  will	  set	  the	  foundations	  for	  further	  discussion.	  	  2)	   In	  each	  case	   chapter,	   the	   second	  section	  will	   explore	   to	  what	  extent	  China’s	  African	  policy	  can	  meet	  with	  Africa’s	  demands	  and	  international	  expectation.	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  the	  three	  major	  factors	  all	  have	  impacted	  China’s	  attitudes	  and	  performances.	  But	  for	  some	  countries,	  a	  single	  factor	  is	  particularly	  important	  to	  Beijing’s	   policy-­‐makers.	   Take	   Sudan	   as	   an	   example:	   international	   pressure	   has	  played	  a	  greater	  role	  in	  Beijing’s	  attitude	  towards	  Bashir’s	  regime;	  in	  contrast	  to	  some	   other	   countries,	  where	   there	   are	   lower	   international	   expectations,	   other	  factors	  may	  be	  more	  important.	   	  	  3)	   As	   was	   mentioned	   in	   the	   framework	   section,	   in	   order	   to	   evaluate	   China’s	  responsibility	   in	  Africa,	   it	   is	  necessary	  to	   look	  at	  China’s	  capabilities.	  Regarding	  Africa,	  this	  refers	  not	  only	  to	  China’s	  national	  strength	  and	  influence,	  but	  also	  the	  cooperation	   from	  African	   countries	   to	   take	  advantage	  of	  China’s	   commitments.	  As	   a	   result,	   each	   case	   will	   discuss	   China’s	   capabilities	   and	   limitations	   in	  shouldering	   responsibility	   in	   the	   host	   countries,	   combined	   with	   domestic	  influence	   in	   China	   and	   the	   African	   countries’	   political	   and	   economic	  environments.	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Part	  2	  Case	  Studies	   	  
Chapter	  6	  Sudan	  Francis	   et	   al.	   argue,	   “No	   external	   power	   has	   as	  much	   at	   stake	   in…	   [Sudan	   and	  South	  Sudan],	  nor	  has	  any	  other	  country	  been	  as	  deeply	  engaged	   in	   the	  region	  over	  the	  past	  decade	  as	  China”	  (Francis,	  Madasamy,	  Sokkary,	  &	  You,	  2012,	  p.	  15).	  Being	   an	   important	   player	   in	   this	   region,	   China’s	   involvement	   is	   critical	   to	   the	  war-­‐torn	  country.	  The	  analysis	  of	  China’s	  responsibility	  in	  Sudan	  illustrates	  not	  only	  an	  assessment	  of	  China’s	   impact	  on	  African	  states	  that	  suffer	   from	  serious	  civil	  war	   and	   crises,	   but	   also	   offers	   a	   typical	   example	   of	   the	   international	   and	  host	  country’s	  influence	  on	  China	  being	  responsible	  (or	  not).	   	  	  This	  chapter	  begins	  with	  an	   introductory	  background	  of	   the	  conflicts	   in	  Darfur	  and	   South	   Sudan,	   which	   clarify	   the	   fundamental	   reasons	   behind	   the	   current	  conflicts	   and	   also	   China’s	   growing	   interests	   in	   this	   area.	   The	   second	   section	  describes	   the	   three	   most	   influential	   factors	   in	   shaping	   China’s	   responsibility	  policy	   in	   Sudan	   as	   responses	   to	   the	   three	   dynamic	   factors	   of	   international	  responsibility	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  3.	  It	  highlights	  the	  influence	  of	  “international	  pressure”	  and	  “the	  host	  country’s	   situation”	  on	  China’s	   responsibility	   in	  Sudan,	  and	  argues	   that,	  despite	   international	  criticism,	  China’s	   interests	  do	  not	  always	  collide	  with	   the	   external	   demands.	   The	   third	   section	   discusses	   China’s	   limited	  role	  in	  resolving	  the	  crises	  in	  Sudan	  using	  the	  cases	  of	  Darfur	  and	  South	  Sudan,	  and	  argues	  that,	  although	  the	  China-­‐Sudan	  relationship	  is	  asymmetric	  in	  favour	  of	  China,	  Beijing’s	  capability	  to	  shoulder	  responsibility	  in	  Sudan,	  and	  the	  effect	  of	  its	  Sudan	  policy	  is	  constrained	  by	  the	  environment	  in	  Sudan	  and	  the	  oppositions	  forces	   in	  Sudan.	  Finally,	   this	  chapter	  will	  employ	  the	  cases	  of	  Darfur	  and	  South	  Sudan	  to	  test	  hypotheses	  III	  –	  the	  gap	  between	  China’s	  Sudan	  policy	  and	  various	  players	   in	  China-­‐Sudan	  relations,	  which	   is	   the	  main	  reason	   for	  China	  being	  not	  fully	   responsible.	   The	   Darfur	   case	   reflects	   China’s	   evolving	   foreign	   policy	  interpretation	   towards	   the	   traditional	   “non-­‐interference”	   principle,	   and	   a	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transition	   in	   diplomatic	   relations	   with	   Sudan.	   Meanwhile,	   the	   case	   of	   South	  Sudan	   reveals	   China’s	   pragmatic	   agenda	   in	   protecting	   its	   foreign	   economic	  interests.	   But,	   in	   terms	   of	   implementation,	   the	   rebel	   group	   in	   Darfur	   failed	   to	  recognise	  China’s	  developing	  Sudan	  policy,	  and	  China	  was	  also	  drawn	  into	  the	  oil	  impasse	   between	   Sudan	   and	   South	   Sudan.	   Not	   only	   was	   its	   international	  reputation	  damaged	  by	  the	  humanitarian	  crisis	  in	  Darfur,	  but	  also	  it	  has	  limited	  capability	  to	  protect	  its	  oil	  supply	  in	  the	  region.	   	   	   	   	   	  
6.1.	  Background	  Introduction	  –	  Conflicts	  in	  Sudan	  Sudan	   achieved	   independence	   relative	   peacefully	   in	   1955.	   However,	   the	   state	  inherited	   many	   problems	   after	   the	   hasty	   withdrawal	   of	   the	   British.	   The	  Anglo-­‐Egyptian	  colonists	  left	  Sudan	  with	  a	  fragile	  government	  ruled	  by	  a	  handful	  of	   Arabic	   elites.	   The	   interests	   between	   tribal	   communities,	   a	   hardly	   merged	  north-­‐south	   region;	   marginalised	   black	   Africans	   in	   the	   South;	   and	   a	   one-­‐crop	  economy	   with	   weak	   infrastructure	   and	   education	   have	   hindered	   Sudan’s	  peaceful	  development	  ever	  since	  its	  independence.	  Although	  the	  north	  and	  south	  signed	  the	  Addis	  Ababa	  peace	  agreement	  in	  1972,	  which	  ended	  the	  first	  civil	  war	  in	  Sudan,	   the	  conflicts	   -­‐	   such	  as	   for	  national	   identity,	   religion,	   land	  and	  water	   -­‐	  are	  far	  from	  resolved.	  In	  1983,	  President	  Nimairi	  instituted	  Islamic	  Sharia	  Law	  as	  “the	   sole	   guiding	   force	   behind	   the	   law	   of	   the	   Sudan”	   (Lesch,	   1998,	   p.	   55).	  Afterwards,	   the	   government	   split	   southern	   Sudan	   into	   three	   provinces	  (Equatoria,	  Bahr	  al-­‐Ghazal	  and	  Upper	  Nile),	  which	  was	  aimed	  at	  weakening	  the	  south	   and	   prevent	   it	   from	   forming	   a	   united	   sovereignty.	   Unfortunately,	   this	  triggered	   the	  second	  civil	  war,	  which	   lasted	  about	  22	  years.	  Both	  conflicts	   “left	  over	   two	  million	   Sudanese	   dead	   and	   uprooted	  millions	  more”	   (Large	  &	   Patey,	  2011,	  p.	  1).	  	  With	   international	   mediation,	   Khartoum	   and	   the	   Sudan	   People's	   Liberation	  Movement/Army	  (SPLM/A)	  signed	  a	  Comprehensive	  Peace	  Agreement	  in	  2005,	  and	  conducted	  a	  referendum	  after	  six	  years.	  When	  the	  southern	  people	  voted	  for	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independence	  in	  2011,	  the	  once-­‐largest,	  yet	  also	  one	  of	  the	  least	  developed	  states	  in	  Africa,	  was	  divided	   into	   two	  countries.	  However,	   this	  was	  not	   the	  end	  of	   the	  problems	  for	  the	  two	  countries,	  as	  the	  demarcation	  of	  the	  border	  between	  north	  and	  south,	  the	  status	  of	  the	  areas	  of	  Abyei,	  the	  Nuba	  Mountains	  and	  the	  Southern	  Blue	  Nile,	  and	  financial	  arrangements	  have	  disrupted	  the	  fragile	  peace	  from	  time	  to	  time.	  Tensions	  in	  Darfur	  remain	  unresolved.	  Oil-­‐production,	  revenues	  and	  the	  use	   of	   the	   pipeline	   to	   Port	   Sudan	   continue	   to	   cause	   unrest.	   In	   summary,	   the	  conflicts	   in	   Sudan	   are	   multifaceted,	   where	   the	   marginalised	   areas	   and	   people	  with	  different	  ethnic,	  religious	  and	  tribal	  backgrounds	  fight	  for	  key	  resources	  (oil	  and	  water)	  and	  freedom.	   	  	  Against	   such	   a	   background,	   the	   traditional	   players	   put	   strict	   sanctions	   on	  Bashir’s	   government.	   China	   was	   initially	   reluctant	   to	   support	   international	  military	   intervention	   and	   economic	   sanctions.	   After	   the	   situation	   deteriorated,	  with	  increasing	  violations	  of	  human	  rights,	  and	  mounting	  international	  pressure,	  China	  started	  to	  pressure	  Bashir	  to	  cooperate	  with	  international	  political	  efforts.	  Different	  from	  the	  traditional	  donors,	  China	  attributed	  Sudan’s	  crisis	  as	  a	  conflict	  of	   interests,	   which	   should	   be	   resolved	   through	   economic	   development.	   The	  following	   sections	   will	   discuss	   China’s	   impact	   on	   Sudan,	   and	   its	   limitations	   in	  solving	  the	  crisis.	   	  
6.2	  Shaping	  China’s	  responsibility	  in	  Sudan	   	  
6.2.1	  China’s	  motivation	  
I.	  Politically	   	  
Ali	   argued	   there	  are	   two	  main	  periods	   in	   the	  history	  of	  China-­‐Sudan	   relations:	  before	  and	  after	  oil	  (Ali,	  2006).	  He	  distinguished	  China’s	  involvement	  before	  and	  after	  the	  1990s,	  which	  highlighted	  the	  importance	  of	  oil	  in	  China-­‐Sudan	  relations.	  Oil	   is	   an	   important	   factor	   in	   bilateral	   relations,	   but	   China’s	   responsibility	   in	  Sudan	  is	  motivated	  by	  its	  interests	  in	  this	  country,	  which	  has	  developed	  from	  a	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largely	   political	   consideration	   to	   a	   strategic	   and	   multi-­‐faceted	   engagement,	  rather	   than	   oil	   thirst.	   First	   of	   all,	   the	   two	   countries	   have	   a	   close	   diplomatic	  relationship.	  Beijing	  and	  Khartoum	  have	  conducted	  frequent	  exchanges	  between	  senior	   leaders	   on	   party-­‐to-­‐party	   levels	   between	   the	   CPC	   and	  NCP.	   Despite	   the	  fact	  that	  South	  Sudan	  discovered	  substantial	  oil	  deposits24	   during	  the	  late	  1970s	  and	  early	  1980s,	  China	  was	  involved	  in	  the	  country	  much	  earlier	  than	  the	  1970s.	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   China’s	   financial	   aid,	   loans	   and	   grants	   after	   the	  discovery	   of	  Sudan’s	   oil	   were	   invested	   in	   the	   construction,	   manufacturing,	   healthcare	   and	  agriculture	   sectors	   as	   well	   (Nour,	   2010).	   Furthermore,	   China’s	   increasing	  investment	  in	  Sudan,	  along	  with	  the	  close	  relationship	  with	  Khartoum	  in	  1990s,	  was	   not	   simply	   driven	   by	   China’s	   need	   to	   secure	   oil	   supplies,	   but	   by	   political	  opportunity.	  In	  the	  1990s,	  the	  Western	  governments	  sanctioned	  Sudan	  due	  to	  its	  support	   of	   terrorism.25	   According	   to	   the	   US’s	   Department	   of	   State,	   it	   imposed	  economic,	   trade	   and	   financial	   sanctions	   on	   Sudan	   and	   banned	   US	   companies	  from	  doing	  business	   in	   Sudan	   in	   the	  1990s.	   For	   example,	   the	  Marathon	  Oil	   26	  Corporation	  –	  based	   in	  Texas	   –	  was	   forced	   to	   give	  up	  all	   activities	   in	   Sudan	   in	  1985	   due	   to	   the	   outbreak	   of	   the	   civil	   war	   (Dralle,	   2008).	   Another	   example	   is	  Chevron:	  the	  well-­‐known	  company	  from	  the	  United	  States	  started	  its	  oil	  business	  in	  Sudan	  in	  1974,	  and	  had	  to	  quit	  in	  1992	  due	  to	  the	  sanctions	  imposed	  by	  the	  US	  government	   (Rone,	   2003,	   p.	   123).	   Some	   other	   companies	   left	   due	   to	   Sudan’s	  deteriorating	  security	  conditions.	  For	  instance,	  Talisman	  Energy,	  a	  Canadian	  oil	  and	  gas	  company,	  has	  withdrawn	  its	  oil	  business	  from	  Sudan	  (Dralle,	  2008).	  The	  company’s	   annual	   report	   revealed	   that	   European	   companies	   such	   as	   Total	   (a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 The	  Bentiu	  district	   (a	  border	  area	  between	   the	  north	  and	   the	  south)	   in	  1978,	   southern	  Kordofan,	  and	  Upper	  Blue	  Nile	  in	  1979,	  Unity	  oilfields	  in	  1980,	  Adar	  oilfields	  in	  1981	  and	  Heglig	  in	  1982 
25 Northern	   Sudan’s	   new	   hard-­‐line	   Islamist	   government	   promoted	   a	   domestic	   project	   of	   Islamist	   social	  transformation	  and	  renewed	  its	  war	  on	  Southern	  Sudan	  against	  the	  Sudan	  People’s	  Liberation	  Army	  (SPLA).	  Islamist	  support	  for	  Iraq	  and	  Saddam	  Hussein	  during	  the	  1991	  Gulf	  War,	  notably	  by	  Hassan	  Turabi,	  caused	  problems	   for	   Khartoum	   with	   America	   and	   Europe.	   The	   NIF	   was	   associated	   with	   support	   for	   terrorism,	  including	   the	   attempted	   assassination	   of	   the	   Egyptian	   president	   in	   June	   1995,	   which	   deepened	   Sudan’s	  regional	  isolation	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  26	   Marathon	  eventually	  sold	  its	  interests	  in	  Sudan	  in	  March	  2008.	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French	   oil	   company)	   and	   Lundin	   (Swedish)	   suspended	   their	   operations	   in	   the	  unstable	  country.	  Along	  with	  investment,	  traditional	  donors’	  foreign	  aid	  has	  been	  suspended	  as	  well.	  Since	  1993,	  the	  IMF	  and	  World	  Bank	  -­‐	  Sudan’s	  largest	  donors	  in	   1970s	   and	   1980s	   -­‐	   suspended	   their	   assistance	   to	   Sudan	   due	   to	   the	  accumulation	   of	   Sudan’s	   debt	   and	   deterioration	   of	   the	   relationship	   with	   the	  international	   financial	   institutions.	   Large	   numbers	   of	   western	   companies’	  absence	  has	  created	  an	  oil	  export	  vacuum	  for	  China	   to	  exploit,	  as	  well	  as	  some	  other	  Asian	   countries	   -­‐	   for	   instance,	  Malaysia	   and	   India.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	  foreign	   aid	   from	   traditional	  western	  donors	  has	   largely	  declined,	  which	   forced	  Khartoum	   to	   find	   alternative	   sources	   of	   financial	   assistance.	   Vice	   versa,	   China	  had	  been	  isolated	  by	  the	  West	  because	  of	  the	  Tiananmen	  Square	  Crisis,	  and	  was	  in	  need	  of	   international	  support.	  China’s	   increasing	  economic	  ambition	  and	  the	  calling	  for	  “going	  abroad”	  by	  the	  central	  government	  required	  it	  to	  explore	  new	  markets.	  An	  Agreement	  on	  Economic	  and	  Technical	  Cooperation	  was	  signed	  with	  Sudan	   in	   1990,	   and	   another	   agreement	   on	   Economic,	   Trade	   and	   Technical	  Cooperation	   followed	   in	   1992.	  But	   the	  pioneering	  Chinese	   oil	   enterprise	   CNPC	  did	  not	  enter	  the	  Sudanese	  oil	  industry	  until	  1995.	  As	  a	  result,	  one	  could	  say	  that	  political	  interests	  and	  economic	  strategy	  put	  the	  two	  states	  together,	  rather	  than	  pure	  energy	  thirst.	   	  
II	  Economically	   	  
Sudan	  met	  about	  5%	  of	  China’s	  oil	  supply	  [needs],	  and	  ranked	  the	  sixth	   largest	  supplier	   to	   China	   before	   the	   secession	   of	   South	   Sudan.	   Oil	   investment	   also	  brought	  a	  series	  of	  Chinese	  businesses	  to	  Sudan,	  which	  positioned	   it	  as	  China’s	  third	   largest	   trading	   partner	   in	   Africa.	   Yun	   described	  Khartoum	   as	   “a	   friendly,	  resource	  rich	  state”	   to	  China,	  and	  “a	   long-­‐term	  overseas	  oil	  supply	  base	  and	  an	  arena	  to	  support	  the	  global	  development	  of	  Chinese	  corporations”	  (Large,	  2009).	  Driven	  by	  political,	  energy	  and	  economic	  motivations,	  China’s	  agenda	  in	  Sudan	  is	  to	  protect	  its	  citizens	  and	  facilitate	  its	  overseas	  investment.	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III.	  Diplomatically	   	  
Further	   to	   political	   and	   economic	   interests,	   along	   with	   deteriorating	   crises	   in	  Darfur	   and	   South	   Sudan,	   China	   has	   increasing	   awareness	   of	   its	   international	  reputation	  in	  Sudan.	  Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  Sudan	  supplied	  5%	  of	  China’s	  oil,	  and	  received	   large	   amounts	   of	   Chinese	   investment	   for	   its	   infrastructure,	   when	  compared	   to	   China’s	   foreign	   strategy	   as	   whole,	   especially	   at	   a	   time	   when	  international	   society	  was	   strongly	   criticising	   Beijing	   for	   its	   position	   on	  Darfur,	  and	  Khartoum’s	  non-­‐cooperation	  and	  inability	  to	  control	  its	  territory,	  China	  did	  not	  intent	  to	  sacrifice	  its	  international	  reputation	  to	  support	  Bashir	  government.	   	  	  Three	  explanations	  illustrate	  the	  combined	  interests	  of	  China	  in	  Sudan.	  The	  first	  is	  to	  protect	  its	  citizens	  and	  economic	  investment	  in	  Sudan.	  The	  second	  is	  to	  play	  a	  more	  cooperative	  part	  in	  engaging	  with	  solution	  of	  conflicts.	  Both	  of	  these	  offer	  a	   self-­‐interest-­‐based	   reason	   for	  China	   to	  promote	   stability	  and	  peace	   in	  Sudan.	  Considering	   China’s	   traditional	   support	   for	   Bashir,	   and	   its	   large	   amounts	   of	  investment	   in	   northern	   Sudan,	   Beijing	   tends	   to	   believe	   in	   the	   proper	   and	  legitimate	   role	   of	   the	   Bashir	   regime	   in	   maintaining	   stability	   and	   avoiding	   the	  fragmentation	   of	   the	   state.	   Therefore,	   Beijing	   is	   very	   cautious	   about	   external	  intervention	   in	   the	   country,	   and	   is	   concerned	   that	   international	   sanctions	  may	  catalyse	   “regime	   change”	   without	   any	   improvement.	   But,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	  international	   society’s	   and	   Bashir’s	   failure	   to	   attain	   any	   improvement	   on	   the	  crisis	  pressured	  China	  to	  rethink	  its	  relationship	  with	  Khartoum.	  
6.2.2	  Sudan	  and	  South	  Sudan’s	  demands	  The	   government	   of	   Sudan	   receives	   half	   of	   its	   revenues	   from	   oil,	   while	   the	  government	   of	   South	   Sudan	   receives	   98%	   from	   oil.	   In	   this	   case,	   Francis	   et	   al.	  argue	  that	  Sudan	  and	  South	  Sudan	  may	  need	  China	  more	  than	  China	  needs	  them,	  as	  China	  is	  the	  largest	  consumer	  of	  the	  region’s	  oil	  (Francis	  et	  al.,	  2012).	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Sudan,	  after	  its	  limited	  GDP	  growth	  in	  the	  1990s,	  has	  made	  slight	  progress	  with	  “a	  corresponding	  average	  annual	  growth	  rate	  in	  per	  capita	  income	  of	  4.0	  per	  cent”	  (Maglad,	   2008).	   It	   is	   worth	   noting	   that	   the	   growth	   during	   this	   period	   largely	  relied	  on	  agriculture.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1990s,	  it	  accounted	  for	  about	  50%	  of	  total	  GDP.	  Agriculture	  and	  related	  industries	  employed	  about	  80%	  of	  the	  labour	  force.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  agriculture	  industry	  was	  key	  to	  the	  country’s	  economic	  wellbeing	  and	   the	   maintenance	   of	   the	   living	   standards	   for	   large	   proportion	   of	   the	  population.	   When	   its	   agricultural	   industry	   suffered	   from	   stagnancy	   and	  drawback,	  the	  government	  had	  to	  seek	  another	  other	  supportive	  industry.	  After	  Sudanese	   President	   Omar	   al-­‐Bashir	   visited	   China	   in	   1995,	   China’s	   national	   oil	  company	   CNPC	   launched	   cooperation	   in	   the	   oil	   industry	   between	   the	   two	  countries,	   which	   fulfilled	   Sudan’s	   longstanding	   ambition	   to	   become	   an	   oil	  exporter.	   After	   Bashir’s	   trip,	   CNPC	   signed	   an	   agreement	   with	   the	   Sudanese	  government	  to	  develop	  Block	  6	  in	  the	  Muglad	  Basin.	  The	  next	  year,	  CNPC	  quickly	  won	   the	   contract	   to	   develop	   Block	   1/2/4	   in	   the	   region	   and	   formed	   a	   joint	  operating	   company	  –	   the	  Greater	  Nile	  Petroleum	  Operating	  Company	   (GNPOC)	  the	  year	  after	   (CNPC,	  2010).	   In	   return,	  China	  built	  a	  1,506km	  oil	  pipeline	   from	  the	  oil	  fields	  to	  the	  Port	  of	  Sudan,	  which	  enabled	  Sudan’s	  transformation	  from	  an	  oil	  importer	  to	  an	  oil	  exporter.	  In	  2000,	  construction	  of	  the	  Khartoum	  Refinery,	  with	  an	  annual	  crude	  processing	  capacity	  of	  2.5	  million	  tons,	  was	  completed.	  The	  operation	  of	  this	  refinery	  brought	  an	  end	  to	  Sudan’s	  long	  history	  of	  dependence	  on	  imported	  oil	  products	  (CNPC,	  2010).	  Production	  of	  oil	  has	  brought	  changes	  to	  Sudan’s	  external	  trade	  and	  trading	  structure.	  With	  the	  boom	  of	  oil	  production,	  oil	  exports	  earned	  US$276	  million	  and	  accounted	  for	  35	  per	  cent	  of	  total	  exports	  in	  1999.	  It	  rose	  to	  US$1.3	  billion	  in	  2000,	  representing	  75	  per	  cent	  of	  exports,	  and	  resulted	   in	   a	   trade	   surplus	   of	   US$254	   million	   after	   decades	   of	   trade	   deficits.	  (Maglad,	  2008).	  	  Apart	   from	   oil,	   Sudan	   ranked	   as	   one	   of	   the	   largest	   Chinese	   FDI	   recipients	   in	  Africa,	  with	  a	  46%	  share	  of	  China’s	  net	  non-­‐financial	  direct	  investment	  in	  Africa	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as	  a	  whole	   in	  2004,	  and	  22%	  of	  accumulated	  net	  overseas	  direct	   investment	   in	  Africa	  by	  the	  end	  of	  2005	  (Large,	  2008).	  According	  to	  the	  statistics	  of	  the	  Bank	  of	  Sudan,	  China’s	  share	  of	  Sudan’s	  overall	  imports	  has	  increased	  from	  8%	  in	  2002	  and	   1%	   in	   2004	   to	   20.8%	   in	   2006,	   mainly	   focusing	   on	   the	   manufacturing	  industry,	   such	   as	  machinery,	   transport	   equipment,	   textiles	   and	   chemicals.	   The	  manufacturing	  investment	  in	  Sudan	  has	  stimulated	  the	  relevant	  industrial	  chain,	  such	  as	  material,	  service	  industry	  and	  equipment.	  Additionally,	  there	  has	  been	  a	  strong	  Chinese	   involvement	   in	  Sudan’s	   infrastructure	  and	  construction	  sectors,	  as	   in	  other	  African	  countries.	  The	  China	  Exim	  Bank,	   together	  with	  a	  number	  of	  Middle	   Eastern	   investors,	   has	   underwritten	   the	   construction	   of	   the	  approximately	   $1.5billion	   Merowe	   Dam	   (Schiere,	   Ndikumana,	   &	   Walkenhorst,	  2011).	  The	  Harbin	  Power	  Plant	  Engineering	  Company	  completed	   the	  second	  of	  the	  planned	  four	  phases	  of	  the	  El	  Gaili	  Power	  Plant	  in	  2007.	  Transport	  is	  another	  important	  sector,	  and	  China	  has	  been	  involved	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  highways,	  bridges	  and	   railways.	   In	  2007,	   the	  China	  Railway	  Engineering	  Corporation	  and	  its	   subsidiary	   Trans-­‐Tech	   Engineering	   won	   a	   US$1billion	   contract	   to	   build	   a	  700km-­‐long	  railway	  in	  Sudan,	  between	  Khartoum	  and	  Port	  Sudan	  (Foster	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  	  Sudan	  also	  served	  as	  a	  major	  recipient	  of	  China’s	  foreign	  assistance.	  According	  to	  the	   statistics	   provided	   by	   the	   Sudan	   Ministry	   of	   National	   Cooperation	   Report	  2008,	   the	   aid	   and	   development	   assistance	   to	   Sudan	   amounted	   to	   US$3427.2	  million	  between	  1997-­‐2008	  (Nour,	  2010).	  
	  Despite	   the	   asymmetric	   economic	   relations	   between	   China	   and	   Sudan/South	  Sudan,	   the	   two	   governments	   have	   been	   far	   from	   passive	   recipients	   of	   China’s	  political	   and	   economic	   largesse.	   Instead,	   they	   attempted	   to	   incorporate	   China	  into	  their	  own	  foreign	  strategies.	  Initially,	  Khartoum	  needed	  Beijing’s	  support	  for	  its	   defensive	   diplomatic	   tactics	   among	   international	   players.	   For	   example,	   it	  requested	   China	   not	   to	   allow	   international	   intervention	   and	   sanction.	   Nafi	   Ali	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Nafi,	   assistant	   and	   adviser	   to	   the	   president	   and	   deputy	   president	   for	   political	  affairs	  of	  the	  NCP,	  openly	  criticised	  China	  when	  he	  asked,	  “Why	  is	  China	  waiting	  to	  use	  the	  right	  of	  veto	   in	  the	   face	  of	  unfair	  resolutions	  that	   target	   its	   friends?”	  (Ahmed,	  2010,	  p.	  8)	  After	  the	  secession	  of	  South	  Sudan,	  Khartoum	  used	  political	  and	  economic	  pressures	  and	  expected	  China	  to	  continue	  supporting	  the	  NCP	  and	  hinder	   South	   Sudan’s	   interests	   in	   new	   oil-­‐related	   infrastructure	   that	   might	  by-­‐pass	  the	  existing	  route	  through	  the	  North.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Juba	  didn’t	  trust	  Beijing	   due	   to	   its	   historical	   stance	   with	   the	   North,	   but	   it	   wanted	   China	   to	  pressure	   Khartoum	   for	   a	   reasonable	   deal	   in	   the	   oil	   revenue	   distribution	   and	  foreign	   assistance	   to	   this	   newly	   established	   country.	   In	   April	   2012,	   South	  Sudanese	   President	   Kiir	   visited	   Beijing	   requesting	   development	   funds	   and	  proposed	  plans	  to	  build	  a	  new	  pipeline	  to	  export	  oil	  from	  the	  newly	  independent	  state	  (Waal,	  February	  7	  2013).	  	  Besides	  the	  contradicting	  demands	  from	  Sudan	  and	  South	  Sudan,	  there	  are	  other	  voices	  within	  Sudanese	  society.	  The	  central	  government	   in	  Khartoum	  struggled	  over	  control	  of	  its	  territory	  and	  resources,	  suggesting	  that	  there	  was	  a	  huge	  gap	  between	   the	  central	  governments’	   interests	  and	   that	  of	   local	   communities.	  The	  diverse	  local	  interests	  should	  not	  be	  neglected.	  The	  attacks	  targeting	  Chinese	  oil	  operations	  and	  Chinese	  workers	  revealed	  opposition	  groups’	  dissatisfaction	  with	  China’s	   close	   relations	   with	   Khartoum,	   after	   being	   marginalised	   in	   Sudan’s	  political	  discourse	  and	  economic	  distribution.	  They	  held	  that	  China	  was	  liable	  for	  the	  NCP’s	  violent	  battle	  against	  insurgency	  in	  Darfur.	   	  
6.2.3	  International	  expectation	  On	   the	   Darfur	   issue,	   international	   society	   has	   placed	   significant	   pressure	   on	  China.	  EU	  ministers	  of	  foreign	  affairs	  called	  for	  China’s	  more	  active	  involvement	  in	  solving	  the	  conflicts	  during	  the	  8th	  Asia–Europe	  Meeting	  in	  Germany,	  in	  May	  2007	  (NetEase,	  May	  28	  2007).	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  more	  than	  a	  hundred	  members	  of	   the	   UK	   parliament	   sent	   a	   message	   to	   Chinese	   President	   Hu	   Jintao,	   on	   29	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October,	  2007,	  appealing	  to	  China	  to	  review	  its	  policy	  towards	  Sudan	  and	  to	  try	  to	  convince	  the	  Sudanese	  government	  to	  stop	  attacks	  against	  civilians,	  disarm	  its	  militias,	  co-­‐operate	  with	  the	  ICC,	  and	  facilitate	  relief	  operations	  (Ahmed,	  2010,	  p.	  18).	  Western	  celebrities	  and	  politicians	  added	  their	  voices	  to	  calls	  for	  a	  boycott	  of	  the	  Beijing	  2008	  Olympics	  to	  push	  China	  into	  using	  its	  leverage	  on	  Khartoum	  (Sudan	   Tribune,	   April	   1	   2007).	   Later,	   the	   European	   parliament	   sanctioned	  Chinese	   oil	   company	   CNPC	   over	   its	   unwillingness	   to	   pressure	   Sudan	   to	   halt	  violence	   in	   Darfur	   (Sudan	   Tribune,	   March	   18	   2008).	   Under	   this	   international	  pressure,	   Beijing	   responded	   with	   a	   more	   cooperative	   and	   effective	   approach,	  because	   Chinese	   decision-­‐makers	   had	   been	   aware	   that	   its	   policy	   towards	   the	  Khartoum	  government	  would	  affect	  the	  wider	  interests	  of	  China	  as	  a	  responsible	  stakeholder	  in	  the	  international	  community.	  EU	  Special	  Representative	  for	  Sudan	  and	  South	  Sudan	  Dame	  Rosalind	  Marsden	  clearly	  listed	  the	  EU’s	  core	  concerns	  in	  Sudan	   and	   South	   Sudan,	   which	   included	   peace,	   security,	   stability,	  democratisation,	   good	   governance,	   human	   rights,	   and	   humanitarian	   and	  development	   assistance	   (European	   Union	   Committee,	   June	   14	   2011).	   As	   for	  China’s	  role	  in	  this	  process,	  Doug	  Bandow,	  a	  senior	  fellow	  at	  Washington's	  Cato	  Institute,	   said,	   “If	   they	   (the	   Chinese)	   see	   a	   practical	   reason	   to	   try	   to	   solve	   the	  Sudan	  problem,	  well	  the	  U.S.	  and	  the	  Europeans	  also	  want	  to	  solve	  that.	  We	  can	  work	  together	  as	  opposed	  to	  being	  at	  odds.”	  (Stearns,	  May	  10	  2012)	  
6.2.4	  Discussions	  on	  Shaping	  China’s	  responsibility	  in	  Sudan	  (South	  Sudan)	  Among	  the	  three	  major	  influential	  factors	  on	  China’s	  responsibility	  in	  Sudan,	  two	  external	   issues	   have	   pushed	   Beijing	   to	   reconsider	   its	   traditional	  “non-­‐interference”	   policy	   that	   it	   has	   followed	  when	   dealing	  with	  most	   African	  countries	   and	   also	   its	   close	   relationship	   with	   the	   Bashir	   regime.	   The	   first	  significant	  episode	  was	   international	  pressure,	  notably	  a	   campaign	  named	   “the	  Genocide	  Olympics”	  to	  boycott	   the	  2008	  Beijing	  Olympic	  Games,	  due	  to	  China’s	  resistance	   to	   a	   UN	   Security	   Council	   resolution	   condemning	   the	   Bashir	  Government	  over	  Darfur	  crisis.	  The	  second	  was	  Darfurian	  the	  attack	  on	  Chinese	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oil	   operations	   in	   Defra,	   Kordofan	   in	   October	   2007,	   by	   the	   rebel	   Justice	   and	  Equality	  Movement,	  which	  also	  issued	  an	  ultimatum	  to	  Beijing	  to	  withdraw	  from	  Sudan	  within	  one	  week.	  It	  made	  China	  aware	  of	  the	  gap	  between	  its	  approach	  to	  Sudan	   with	   the	   politics	   of	   “non-­‐interference”,	   the	   provision	   of	   aid	   with	  “no-­‐strings”	   (economics),	  and	   its	  role	  as	  a	  responsible	  stakeholder	   in	  Sudan.	   In	  response	   to	   the	   international	   expectations	   and	   the	   appeals	   from	   Sudan’s	  opposition	  forces,	  China	  showed	  a	  willingness	  to	  develop	  its	  Sudan	  policy	  with	  a	  flexible	   interpretation	   of	   its	   long-­‐term	   “non-­‐interference”	   foreign	   strategy.	   It	  became	  more	   active	   in	   trying	   to	   persuade	   the	   Khartoum	   regime	   to	   cooperate	  with	   the	   international	   community.	   President	   Hu	   Jintao	   pressured	   Sudanese	  President	   Bashir	   on	   the	   humanitarian	   crisis	   in	   Darfur,	   and	   urged	   Sudan’s	  cooperation	  with	  the	  UN	  on	  his	  visit	  to	  Khartoum	  in	  2007.	  Beijing	  also	  appointed	  a	  full-­‐time	  envoy,	  Liu	  Guijin,	  tasked	  with	  assisting	  in	  the	  resolution	  of	  the	  Darfur	  crisis	  (Abramowitz	  &	  Kolieb,	  June	  5	  2007).	  It	  revealed	  China’s	  strategy	  in	  Africa	  as	   not	   simply	   driven	   by	   national	   economic	   interests;	   instead,	   it	   is	   a	   combined	  calculation	  of	  various	  factors,	  including	  oil	  security,	  economic	  benefits,	  and	  also	  a	  responsible	   image	   and	   political	   influence.	   It	   would	   not	   blindly	   grab	   energy	   or	  economic	   profits	   at	   the	   cost	   of	   its	   international	   reputation.	   The	   Chinese	  government	   has	   shown	   some	   willingness	   to	   change	   its	   approach	   when	   faced	  with	   international	   pressure	   or	   local	   dissatisfaction.	   Therefore,	   even	   if	   it	   is	   not	  realistic	  to	  expect	  China	  to	  change	  fundamentally	  its	  foreign	  policy,	  there	  is	  still	  space	   to	  encourage	  and	  push	  China	   to	  cooperate	  with	   the	   traditional	  actors	  on	  Sudan	   for	   the	   mediation	   of	   conflicts	   and	   humanitarian	   assistance.	   Large	  concluded	   that	   the	  broadly	  social	  constructivist	  explanation	   for	  China	   in	  Sudan	  as	   “external	   advocacy	   catalys[ing]	   a	   normative	   evolution	   in	   Beijing	   towards	   a	  more	  constructive	  engagement	  on	  Sudan”	  (Large,	  2009,	  p.	  612).	  
6.3	  China’s	  capability	  and	  limitations	  in	  Sudan	  All	  the	  motivation	  above	  may	  account	  for	  the	  dynamics	  of	  China’s	  engagement	  at	  the	   policy	   level.	   It	   would	   also	   be	   useful	   to	   look	   at	   how	   the	   motivations	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work/appear	  on	  the	  ground	  in	  Sudan.	  To	  assess	  China’s	  responsibility	  in	  Africa,	  it	   is	   necessary	   to	   look	   at	   the	   situation	   in	   the	   host	   country.	   As	   for	   Sudan,	   the	  central	   government	   is	   unable	   to	   exert	   effective	   control	   over	   all	   of	   its	   territory.	  The	  interests	  and	  demands	  within	  Sudanese	  society	  are	  diverse,	  which	  increases	  the	   complexity	   of	   China’s	   role.	   This	   section	   will	   discuss	   China’s	   constraints	   in	  seeking	   a	   responsible	   role	   in	   Sudan,	   including	   Darfur	   and	   Sudan-­‐South	   Sudan	  issues.	   	  
6.3.1	  Darfur	   	  As	   mentioned	   in	   the	   previous	   section,	   China,	   with	   significant	   political	   and	  economic	  ties	  to	  Khartoum,	  has	  been	  seriously	  criticised	  by	  international	  actors	  and	   local	   Sudanese	   opposition	   forces.	   They	   have	   accused	   Beijing	   of	  unconditionally	   supporting	   the	  Bashir	   regime,	  which	  undermined	   international	  resolutions	  on	  Darfur	  conflicts.	  However,	  far	  from	  benefiting	  from	  the	  close	  ties	  with	  Khartoum,	  China	  was	  in	  an	  uncomfortable	  position	  and	  paid	  a	  considerable	  price	  for	  Darfur	  issues.	   	  
I.	  China’s	  influence	  on	  Khartoum	  is	  limited	  
Since	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Darfur	  crisis	  in	  2003,	  China	  has	  defended	  the	  stance	  for	  the	   Sudanese	   government	   by	   arguing	   that	   the	   conflicts	   were	   Sudan’s	   internal	  affairs	   and	   external	   intervention	   would	   lead	   the	   conflicts	   to	   become	  internationalized.	  However,	   international	   pressure	   calling	   for	   China	   to	   adopt	   a	  “responsible	  stakeholder”	  role	   in	   international	  affairs	  pushed	  Beijing	   to	  change	  its	  position	  on	  Darfur,	  and	  become	  more	  cooperative	  with	  other	  major	  powers.	  After	   that,	   China	   began	   a	   serious	   of	   diplomatic	   effort	   to	   urge	   the	   Bashir	  government	   to	   improve	   the	   humanitarian	   situation	   in	   the	   Darfur	   region	   by	  assigning	  special	  envoys	  and	  abstaining	  from	  the	  UN’s	  resolution	  of	  international	  intervention	  in	  Darfur.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  Beijing	  tried	  to	  persuade	  Khartoum	  to	  “stop	  the	  killing	  and	  make	  a	  real	  effort	  to	  solve	  the	  crisis,	  and	  not	  to	  confront	  the	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international	  community	  through	  a	  hardline	  approach	  or	  publicity	  only”	  (Ahmed,	  2010,	  p.	  7).	  But	  Khartoum	  ignored	  the	  pressures	  from	  Beijing	  and	  continued	  to	  conduct	  aggressive	  policies	  to	  arm	  [the]	  Janjaweed	  in	  Darfur,	  while	  using	  oil	  as	  a	  bargaining	  chip	  to	  lobby	  Beijing	  for	  further	  support.	  Despite	  the	  opposition	  and	  rejection	   from	  Khartoum,	   China	   put	   forward	   stronger	   pressures.	   In	   November	  2006,	   Wang	   Guangya,	   Chinese	   ambassador	   to	   the	   UN,	   made	   important	  behind-­‐the-­‐scenes	   interventions	   to	   secure	   the	   Sudanese	   government’s	  agreement	  to	  the	  “Annan	  Plan”,	  which	  called	  for	  an	  expanded	  UN	  peacekeeping	  role	  in	  Darfur	  (ICG,	  April	  17	  2009).	  The	  Chinese	  government	  made	  further	  efforts	  on	   the	  Darfur	   issue	  during	  President	  Hu	   Jintao’s	  visit	   to	  Khartoum	  in	  February	  2007.	  He	   encouraged	   Sudan	  President	  Bashir	   to	   show	   flexibility	   and	   allow	   the	  deployment	   of	   the	   AU/UN	   hybrid	   force.	   Chinese	   public	   statements	   about	   the	  need	   for	   a	   “comprehensive	   ceasefire”	   and	   an	   acceleration	   of	   “the	   political	  negotiation	   process”	   involving	   rebel	   non-­‐signatories	   to	   the	   Abuja	   Accord,	   plus	  the	   need	   for	   humanitarian	   assistance,	   were	   revealing.	   President	   Hu	   Jintao	   is	  reported	   to	  have	   told	  President	  Bashir	   that	   “Darfur	   is	   a	  part	  of	  Sudan	  and	  you	  have	   to	   resolve	   this	   problem”	   (McDoom,	   February	   2	   2007).	   Later,	   Beijing	  appointed	  Assistant	  Foreign	  Minister	  Zhai	   Jun	  as	  a	  special	  envoy	  –	  and	  later,	   in	  May,	   appointed	   Ambassador	   Liu	   Guijin	   as	   a	   special	   representative	   for	   Darfur,	  upgrading	  China’s	  diplomatic	  role	  over	  Darfur.	   	  
Sudanese	  officials	  responded	  in	  anger:	  Nafi	  Ali	  Nafi,	  assistant	  and	  adviser	  to	  the	  president	  and	  deputy	  president	  for	  political	  affairs	  of	  the	  NCP,	  refused	  to	  accept	  the	  international	  resolution	  and	  China’s	  advocacy	  of	  international	  peacekeeping	  and	  openly	  criticised	  China	  when	  he	  asked,	  “Why	  is	  China	  waiting	  to	  use	  the	  right	  of	  veto	  in	  the	  face	  of	  unfair	  resolutions	  that	  target	  its	  friends?”	  (Ahmed,	  2010,	  p.	  8)	  The	  official	  spokesman	  of	  the	  Sudanese	  MFA,	  Ali	  al-­‐Sadig,	  also	  expressed	  his	  anxiety	   over	   China’s	   close	   cooperation	   with	   US.	   Al-­‐Sadig	   said:	   “China	   is	   a	  strategic	  ally	  of	  the	  Sudan.	  It	  should	  work	  with	  the	  Sudan,	  through	  the	  systematic	  diplomatic	   dialogue	   between	   us,	   and	   any	   American	   move	   towards	   Beijing	   is	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fruitless.”	  (Ahmed,	  2010,	  p.	  9)	  Moreover,	  the	  Sudanese	  government	  escalated	  its	  military	   actions	   and	   bombarded	   the	   Jebel	  Moon	   area	   in	  western	   Sudan,	  which	  resulted	   in	   more	   killings	   and	   further	   displacement	   of	   the	   region’s	   population	  (South	  China	  Morning	  Post,	  Feb.	  26th,	  2008).	  The	  statement	  from	  the	  Sudanese	  government	  revealed	  that,	  although	  China	   is	  an	   important	  ally	  to	  Khartoum,	   its	  pressures	   on	   Bashir	   regime	  were	   limited.	   China’s	   mediation	   role	   between	   the	  international	   community	   and	   Sudanese	   government	   failed	   to	   persuade	   the	  Bashir	  regime	  to	  conduct	  a	  more	  contributive	  approach	  to	  control	  the	  situation	  in	  Darfur.	   In	   contrast,	  Khartoum	   felt	   angry	  about	  Beijing’s	   changing	  policy	  and	  refused	  to	  cooperate	  with	  Beijing	  and	  facilitate	  an	  international	  intervention.	   	   	  
II.	  The	  criticism	  of	  oppositions	  in	  Darfur	  to	  China’s	  stance	  
Even	  though	  China	  made	  considerable	  progress	  in	  urging	  Khartoum	  to	  improve	  the	  humanitarian	  situation	  in	  Darfur,	  the	  crisis	  deteriorated.	  Therefore,	  most	  of	  the	   rebellions	   failed	   to	   acknowledged	   China’s	   commitment;	   instead,	   they	   saw	  China	  as	  being	  in	  line	  with	  the	  NCP	  and	  served	  as	  an	  obstacle	  to	  the	  resolution	  to	  the	   conflict.	   Minni	   Minnawi,	   the	   senior	   presidential	   assistant	   of	   the	   Sudanese	  president	   (who	   is	   also	   the	   leader	   of	   the	   SLA	   and	   a	   signatory	   of	   the	  May	   2006	  Abuja	  Peace	  Agreement)	  declared	  that	  the	  NCP	  ignored	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  people	  of	  Darfur	  and,	  if	  the	  “NCP	  continues	  to	  ignore	  these	  needs,	  a	  return	  to	  war	  would	  likely	  be	  an	  option.	  The	  DPA	  is	  implemented	  only	  5%”	  (Abdelrahman,	  December	  30	   2009).	   They	   complained	   that	   China	   ignored	   their	   leadership	   and	  representatives	  in	  this	  region.	  Furthermore,	  Hu	  Jintao’s	  visit	  to	  Sudan	  in	  2007	  to	  pressure	   Khartoum	   was	   interpreted	   as	   to	   evidence	   that	   China	   “supports	   the	  Khartoum	  regime	  without	  caring	  about	  the	  war	  crimes	  committed	  by	  it	  in	  Darfur,	  and	  that	  [China]	  continues	  to	  provide	  the	  international	  political	  cover	  for	  Sudan	  to	   continue	   its	   massacres”	   (Ahmed,	   2010,	   p.	   16).	   China’s	   proposal	   to	   send	   a	  peacekeeping	  force	  as	  part	  of	  a	  joint	  UN	  and	  African	  Union	  mission	  to	  Darfur	  was	  rejected	  by	  the	  rebels.	  The	  key	  Justice	  and	  Equality	  Movement	  (JEM)	  rebel	  group	  
	   168	  
accused	  China	  of	  being	  complicit	   in	   the	  Darfur	  conflict.	  Following	  the	  arrival	  of	  the	  engineers,	   JEM	   leader	  Khalil	   Ibrahim	  advocated	   for	   the	   removal	  of	   the	  135	  Chinese	  peacekeepers	   from	   the	   Sudanese	   region,	   and	   said	   that	   they	  would	  not	  allow	   the	  Chinese	   into	   areas	   controlled	   by	   their	   forces,	   because	   oil	   sold	   to	   the	  Chinese	   was	   being	   used	   to	   fund	   the	   government’s	   operations	   in	   Darfur	   (BBC,	  November	  24	  2007).	  
The	   criticism	   from	   rebel	   groups	   in	  Darfur	   grew	   from	   condemnation	   of	   China’s	  policies	   to	   the	   threat	  of	   attack	  against	  Chinese	  economic	   interests	   in	   Sudan.	   In	  October	   2007,	   JEM,	   led	   by	   Khalil	   Ibrahim,	   attacked	   the	   Defra	   oil	   field	   in	   the	  Kordofan	   area,	   a	   site	   managed	   by	   the	   Greater	   Nile	   Petroleum	   Operating	  Company,	  with	  which	   the	  Chinese	  National	  Petroleum	  Corporation	   is	   affiliated.	  The	  group	  abducted	  two	  foreign	  oil	  workers	  and	  released	  a	  statement	  claiming	  that,	   “the	   attack	   on	   the	   Defra	   field	   is	   a	   message	   to	   China	   which	   arms	   the	  Khartoum	   Government”.	   Moreover,	   Ahmed	   Togo,	   the	   senior	   JEM	   negotiator,	  indicated	  in	  a	  statement	  to	  Reuters	  that,	  “the	  arms	  which	  we	  captured	  from	  the	  government	  soldiers	  during	  the	  attack	  were	  Chinese	  made”	  (BBC,	  December	  11	  2007).	  
On	   one	   hand,	   the	   opposition	   in	   Darfur	   failed	   to	   recognise	   China’s	   role	   in	   the	  resolution	  of	  the	  crisis,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  Beijing	  made	  many	  efforts	  to	  apply	  pressure	   on	   Khartoum,	   and	   provided	   considerable	   humanitarian	   assistance	   to	  the	   unstable	   state.	   They	   responded	   to	   China’s	   increasing	   commitment	   to	  resolving	   the	   conflicts	   with	   criticism	   and	   attacks.	   What	   made	   it	   more	  complicated	  was	   those	  attitudes	   towards	  China	  and	  Chinese	   companies	   among	  each	  rebel	  group	  was	  different.	  Minni	  Minnawi’s	  SLP,	  the	  Darfur	  rebel	  group	  who	  signed	  a	  peace	  deal	  and	  ended	  its	  conflict	  with	  the	  Khartoum	  government,	  have	  claimed	  to	  help	  free	  kidnapped	  Chinese	  engineers	  (Global	  Times,	  September	  20	  2010).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Witness	  8	  holds	  that	  the	  hard	  line	  of	  rebel	  groups	  in	  Darfur	   increased	   China’s	   difficulty	   in	   facilitating	   the	   negotiations	   between	  Khartoum	   and	   their	   opposition.	   The	   hostile	   attitude	   towards	   China’s	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involvement	   and	   the	   attacks	   on	   Chinese	   companies	   forced	   Beijing	   to	   seek	  cooperation	   with	   the	   Sudanese	   government	   in	   order	   to	   protect	   its	   overseas	  citizens	  and	  interests.	  
6.3.2	  South	  Sudan	  After	   South	   Sudan’s	   independence,	   issues	   including	   oil	   payments,	   the	   status	   of	  each	   country’s	   citizens	   resident	   in	   the	   other,	   disputed	   border	   areas	   and	   the	  contested	  Abyei	  region	  still	  unsettled	  the	  peace	  of	  the	  two	  countries	  from	  time	  to	  time.	  China	  has	  long	  been	  seen	  as	  an	  important	  supporter	  of	  Khartoum.	  Even	  if	  it	  has	  gradually	  built	  up	  a	  diplomatic	  presence	  in	  Juba	  since	  the	  implementation	  of	  CPA,	   it	   is	   still	   difficult	   for	   China	   to	   gain	   trust	   from	   South	   Sudan.	   After	   the	  establishment	   of	   South	   Sudan	   in	   2011,	   Beijing	   was	   put	   in	   a	   dilemma	   position	  between	  the	  two	  governments.	   	  	  Before	   the	   secession	   of	   South	   Sudan,	   the	   Sudanese	   government	   relied	   on	   oil	  income	  to	  fuel	  its	  economy	  and	  facilitate	  its	  war	  against	  the	  south.	  China,	  as	  the	  largest	  consumer	  of	  Sudan’s	  oil,	  is	  considered	  as	  acting	  as	  a	  shield	  for	  Khartoum	  against	   the	   UN	   Security	   Council,	   protecting	   it	   from	   punishment	   for	   its	  humanitarian	  violations	  during	  the	  civil	  war,	  and	  issuance	  of	  an	  arrest	  warrant	  for	   Sudanese	  President	  Bashir	   for	   crimes	   against	   humanity	   and	  war	   crimes	  by	  the	   International	   Criminal	   Court.	   Since	   China	   has	   a	   long	   friendship	   with	  Khartoum	   and	   considerable	   economic	   investment	   in	   Sudan,	   it	   is	   unlikely	   that	  Beijing	  will	  abandon	  Khartoum	  in	  the	  short	  term.	  However,	  after	  South	  Sudanese	  independence,	  China	  was	  faced	  with	  an	  oil	  impasse:	  roughly	  three	  quarters	  of	  the	  remaining	   oil	   now	   belongs	   to	   the	   South,	   but	   the	   infrastructure	   to	   exploit	   it	   –pipelines,	  refineries	  and	  export	  terminals	  built	  by	  the	  Chinese	  –	  is	  located	  in	  the	  north	   (ICG,	   April	   4	   2012,	   p.	   26).	   Therefore,	   Beijing	   has	   pursued	   a	   difficulty	  strategy,	  working	  on	  a	  balanced	  relationship	  between	  Sudan	  and	  South	  Sudan	  -­‐	  that	  is,	  its	  traditional	  support	  for	  Khartoum	  with	  its	  new	  engagement	  in	  Juba.	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China’s	   historic	   support	   to	   Khartoum	   and	   resultant	   the	   distrust	   from	   South	  Sudan,	   have	   affected	   China’s	   efforts	   in	   playing	   a	   balanced	   role.	   The	   South	  Sudanese	  people	  see	  China’s	  support	  for	  the	  government	  of	  Sudan	  as	  the	  root	  of	  much	  of	  their	  suffering	  during	  the	  civil	  war	  (Francis	  et	  al.,	  2012,	  p.	  14).	  Juba	  was	  unhappy	  about	  China’s	   “non-­‐interference”	   stance	   regarding	   its	   civil	   conflicts.	  A	  senior	  minister	   from	   Juba	  noted	   that,	   “As	   things	   stand	  now,	   the	   relationship	   is	  not	   between	   us	   and	   China”.	   If	   China	   was	   reluctant	   to	   demonstrate	   its	  commitment	  to	  the	  relationship	  with	  the	  South,	  then	  Juba	  would	  seek	  to	  leverage	  Beijing’s	   increasingly	   uncomfortable	   position	   (ICG,	   April	   4	   2012,	   p.	   28).	  Additionally,	  because	  China	  has	  benefited	  from	  the	  oil	  flow	  from	  the	  South	  to	  the	  North,	  its	  position	  on	  problem	  solving	  is	  questioned	  by	  South	  Sudan.	  The	  South	  Sudanese	   are	   deeply	   suspicious	   of	   China’s	   motivations	   and	   its	   role	   as	   a	   fair	  negotiator,	   despite	   the	   considerable	   assistance	   it	   has	   given	   to	   the	   newly	  established	  country.	   	  
6.4	  The	  Gap	  between	  China’s	  policy	  in	  Sudan	  and	  its	  implementation	  Initially,	   China’s	   engagement	   in	   Sudan	   was	   similar	   to	   its	   approach	   to	   other	  African	   countries.	  During	   the	  early	   stages	  of	   the	  Darfur	   crisis	   and	  Sudan’s	   civil	  war,	  Beijing	  defended	  Khartoum	  by	  arguing	   that	   the	   conflicts	  were	  an	   internal	  affair	   that	   should	   be	   left	   to	   the	   Sudanese	   central	   government	   to	   solve.	   At	   the	  same	   time,	   China	   has	   gradually	   become	   a	   major	   donor	   to	   Khartoum,	   as	   its	  involvement	  in	  Sudan	  increased.	  Between	  1970-­‐2008,	  according	  to	  the	  criteria	  of	  the	  OECD,	   China’s	   aid	   and	   development	   assistance	   to	   Sudan	  was	   equivalent	   to	  US$2,488.6	  million.	   It	   estimated	   that	   total	   loans	   and	   grants	   provided	   by	   China	  during	   the	   period	   2002-­‐2006	   amounted	   to	   US$1.1	   billion,	   which	   represented	  about	  37%	  of	  the	  US$2.8	  billion	  of	  total	  loans	  and	  grants	  received	  by	  Sudan	  from	  other	   sources	   during	   that	   period.	   In	   2005,	   Chinese	   loans	   accounted	   for	  three-­‐quarters	  (75.9%)	  of	  the	  total	  loans	  received	  by	  Sudan	  in	  that	  year	  (Maglad,	  2008,	   p.	   5).	   As	   the	   situation	   in	   Sudan	   deterioration,	   the	   Chinese	   government’s	  support	   and	   assistance	   turned	   out	   to	   be	   an	   obstacle	   to	   international	   sanctions	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against	  Khartoum,	  and	  a	   financial	  source	   for	   funding	  the	  cost	  of	   the	  war.	  Later,	  China	   shifted	   its	   policy	   on	   Sudan,	   and	   became	   more	   cooperative	   with	   the	  international	   society.	   But	   its	   efforts	   had	   little	   effect	   on	   the	   crisis	   and	   instead	  drew	  China	   into	   a	  difficult	   situation	  between	  Sudan	  and	   the	  new	  South	  Sudan.	  This	   section	   will	   compare	   China’s	   original	   strategy	   to	   Sudan	   and	   its	   actual	  implementation	  within	   the	   country,	   and	  analyse	  why	  and	  where	  China’s	  policy	  has	   deviated	   from	   its	   targets.	   Then	   it	   will	   test	   hypothesis	   III	   –	   if	   China’s	  (ir)responsible	   activities	   mostly	   were	   constrained	   by	   various	   factors	   and	  players.	  
6.4.1	  Features	  of	  China’s	  policy	  in	  Sudan	  The	  crisis	   in	  Sudan	  was	   caused	  by	  a	  variety	  of	   factors,	   including	  history,	   tribal	  tensions	  and	  religion	  conflicts	  and	  poverty.	  In	  terms	  of	  the	  resolution,	  China	  held	  a	  different	  approach	  and	  logic	  to	  that	  of	  the	  traditional	  actors	  in	  the	  region.	  The	  US	  and	  other	  Western	  countries,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  international	  financial	  institutions,	  preferred	  sanctions	  in	  order	  to	  pressure	  Khartoum	  into	  democratic	  reforms	  and	  better	  governance.	  For	  them,	  the	  root	  of	  the	  north-­‐south	  conflict	  was	  the	  political	  system	   and	   poor	   governance.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   China,	   who	   prioritised	   the	  economy,	  and	  attributed	  the	  unstable	  society,	  poverty	  and	  frequent	  civil	  wars	  to	  lack	   of	   development,	   a	   weak	   economy,	   and	   conflicts	   of	   interest.	   For	   China,	  Witness	  24	  said,	  	   We	  have	  emphasised	  the	  right	   to	  development	  and	  the	  right	   to	  survival.	  We	   shared	   similar	   poverty	   experience	  with	   African	   countries	  while	   the	  Westerners	  didn’t.	  People,	  who	  put	  political	  system	  establishment	  in	  front	  of	   poverty	   reduction	   have	   not	   been	   to	   Africa	   themselves.	   You	   will	   be	  shocked	   by	   what	   is	   happening	   in	   the	   continent.	   Currently,	   the	   only	  solution	  of	  the	  Sudan	  conflicts	  lies	  in	  economic	  development.	   	  	  They	  believed	  that	  the	  people’s	  dissatisfaction	  with	  Khartoum	  was	  mainly	  due	  to	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its	  poor	  economic	  performance	  and	  unfair	  wealth	  distribution.	  Without	  resolving	  the	  poverty	  in	  Sudan,	  any	  government	  would	  likely	  be	  unsustainable.	  In	  this	  case,	  China’s	  Sudan	  policy	  can	  be	  summarised	  threefold.	  	  First,	  even	  Beijing	  has	  specific	  economic	  and	  resource	  interests	  in	  Sudan,	  and	  the	  overall	  relationship	  serves	  China’s	  political,	  economic	  and	  diplomatic	  strategy	  as	  a	  whole.	  The	  future	  of	  China’s	  relations	  with	  Khartoum	  is	  yet	  to	  be	  determined	  according	  to	  Sudan’s	  situation.	  As	  Witness	  8	  said,	  China’s	  support	  for	  Khartoum	  was	   not	   only	   a	   quid	   pro	   quo	   for	   oil,	   but	   it	   also	   served	   China’s	   interests	   by	  allowing	   the	   Sudanese	   government	   to	   provide	   security;	   because	   China’s	   oil,	  infrastructure,	   and	   other	   interests	   depended	   on	   stability	   and	   security	   in	   the	  country.	   It	   implied	   that	   China’s	   support	   for	   Khartoum	   was	   driven	   by	   the	  conditions	  for	  a	  stable	  environment	  rather	  than	  courting	  Khartoum.	  Evidence	  for	  this	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  China’s	  attitude	  towards	  Darfur	  issues.	  Beijing	  would	  support	  Khartoum	  as	  long	  as	  the	  government	  could	  control	  the	  situation,	  but	  it	  would	  not	  challenge	   the	   international	   society	  when	   the	   Darfur	   crisis	   deteriorated,	   nor	   to	  conspire	  with	  the	  Bashir	  government	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  its	  international	  “responsible	  role”.	  	  Second,	   as	   long	   as	   the	   ruling	   government	   showed	   signs	   of	   controlling	   the	  situation,	   and	   compared	   to	   sanctions,	   China	   preferred	   to	   solve	   the	   problem	  through	  diplomatic	  means.	  The	  permanent	  representative	  of	  China	  to	  the	  UN,	  Li	  Baodong,	  pointed	  out	  that	  China	  would	  always	  be	  very	  cautious	  about	  the	  use	  or	  threat	   of	   sanctions.	   He	   point	   out	   that	   “China	   has	   always	   maintained	   that	   the	  international	   community	   should	   take	   an	   objective,	   impartial	   and	   balanced	  position	   on	   Sudan	   and	   South	   Sudan,	   and	   avoid	   taking	   sides	   or	   imposing	  unbalanced	   pressure	   on	   the	   parties,	   and	   refrain	   from	   interfering	   in	   the	  mediation	   efforts	   of	   the	   African	   Union	   and	   other	   regional	   organisations	   and	  countries”	  (Xinhua	  News,	  May	  3	  2012).	  Witness	  9	  further	  explained	  the	  reasons	  for	  not	  supporting	  external	  sanctions	  against	  Khartoum.	  As	  it	  was	  not	  a	  solution	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to	   the	   conflicts,	   they	  may	   actually	   have	  made	   the	   situation	  more	   complicated:	  because,	  if	  the	  sanctions	  failed	  to	  solve	  the	  crisis	  in	  a	  short	  period,	  Sudan	  could	  be	  drawn	   into	   a	   back	   and	   forth	   battle.	   In	   this	   case,	   the	   international	   sanctions	  would	  have	  weakened	  the	  Sudanese	  government’s	  capacity	  to	  end	  the	  crisis.	  In	  a	  country	   desperately	   in	   need	   of	   financial	   and	   material	   assistance,	   what	   Sudan	  demanded	  was	  not	  sanctions	  but	  international	  support	  and	  mediation.	   	  	  Third,	  China	  tended	  to	  attribute	  the	  crisis	  in	  Sudan	  to	  economic	  problems.	  Hence,	  instead	   of	   an	   emphasis	   on	   good	   governance,	   it	   preferred	   to	   provide	   tangible	  commitments	   to	   the	   country.	   Taking	   the	  Darfur	   issue	   as	   an	   example,	   evidence	  shows	  that	  more	  people	  could	  have	  died	  from	  tribal	  clashes	  than	  from	  Janjaweed	  or	   government	   forces	   (Abramowitz	   &	   Kolieb,	   June	   5	   2007).	   Also,	   the	  independent	  South	  Sudan	  still	   fell	   into	  a	  civil	  war.	  One	  could	  say	  that	  the	   inner	  power	   struggles	   of	   the	   rebellion	   and	   the	   number	   of	   displaced	   people	   are	   also	  serious	   obstacles	   to	   peace.	   In	   this	   case,	   Witness	   2	   believed	   that,	   since	   the	  advantage	   of	   a	   better	   government	   takes	   time	   to	   be	   seen,	   African	   (Sudanese)	  people	   are	   more	   eager	   to	   see	   some	   tangible	   improvements	   and	   benefits.	   The	  “four-­‐point	   plan”27	   proposed	   to	   Sudan	   by	   President	   Hu	   Jintao	   highlighted	   the	  importance	   of	   improving	   “local	   people’s	   living	   standard[s]”,	   which	   reflected	  China’s	  concentration	  on	  economic	  improvements	  for	  the	  Sudanese	  people.	   	   	  
6.4.2	  The	  implementation	  of	  China’s	  Sudan	  Policy	   	  China’s	   approach	   to	   solving	   Sudan’s	   crisis	   was	   different	   from	   that	   of	   the	  traditional	  players.	  To	  what	  extend	  this	  approach	  worked,	  lay	  with	  the	  Sudanese	  government’s	  capability	  and	  effectiveness	  in	  controlling	  the	  country.	  Only	  if	  the	  central	   government	   could	   execute	   effective	   measures	   to	   deal	   with	   the	   crisis,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 The	   plan:	   1)	   respecting	   Sudan’s	   sovereignty	   and	   territorial	   integrity	   as	   the	   principles	   for	   settling	   ‘the	  Darfur	  issue’;	  2)	  persisting	  in	  dialogues	  and	  consultations	  for	  the	  settlement	  of	  the	  issue	  on	  an	  equal	  footing	  and	   through	  peaceful	  means;	  3)	  encouraging	   the	  AU,	   the	  UN,	  and	  pertinent	  parties	   to	  play	  a	   constructive	  role	   in	   the	  peace-­‐keeping	   issue	   in	  Darfur;	  4)	  and	   facilitating	   the	  stability	  of	   the	  regional	  situation	  and	  the	  improvement	  of	  the	  local	  people’s	  living	  conditions.	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could	  China’s	  assistance	  have	  the	  tangible	  effects	  that	  Beijing	  advocated.	  In	  terms	  of	  Sudan,	  where	  the	  situation	  was	  complicated,	   there	  are	  gaps	  between	  China’s	  original	  Sudan	  policy	  goals	  and	  the	  actual	  effects.	   	  
I.	  Darfur	  
Since	   the	   Darfur	   conflict’s	   outbreak	   in	   2003,	   China	   expressed	   support	   for	  Khartoum	   in	   the	   UN	   Security	   Council	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   its	   “non-­‐interference”	  principle.	   When	   it	   realised	   the	   seriousness	   of	   the	   situation,	   the	   extent	   of	   the	  violations	   of	   human	   rights	   and	   Khartoum’s	   incompetence	   in	   dealing	   with	   the	  crisis,	  China	  started	  to	  re-­‐interpret	  the	  scope	  of	  “interference”.	  On	  July	  30th,	  2004,	  China	   opened	   the	   door	   for	   Western	   countries	   to	   pressure	   Khartoum	   by	  abstaining	   from	   the	   vote	   for	   Security	  Council	  Resolution	  1556,	  which	   required	  the	   Sudanese	   government	   to	   fulfil	   its	   commitments	   to	   disarm	   the	   Janjaweed	  militias	  and	  bring	  those	  leaders	  who	  had	  carried	  out	  human	  rights	  violations	  in	  Darfur	  to	  justice	  (Ahmed,	  2010).	  In	  November	  2006,	  Chinese	  ambassador	  to	  the	  UN,	   Wang	   Guangya,	   made	   important	   behind-­‐the-­‐scenes	   moves	   to	   secure	   the	  Sudanese	   government’s	   agreement	   to	   the	   ‘Annan	   Plan’,	   which	   called	   for	   an	  expanded	  UN	  peacekeeping	  role	   in	  Darfur	   (ICG,	  April	  17	  2009).	   In	  2007,	  China	  took	  a	   further	  step	  to	  support	  the	  hybrid	  UN-­‐African	  Union	  peacekeeping	  force	  and	  exerted	  pressure	  on	  Khartoum	  to	  accept	  an	  international	  peacekeeping	  force	  by	   voting	   in	   favour	   of	   UN	   Resolution	   1769	   –	   this	   despite	   the	   Sudanese	  government	  suggestion	  that	  only	  an	  AU	  force	  be	  allowed	  to	  enter	  Darfur.	   	  	  The	   western	   political	   elites	   encouraged	   China’s	   efforts.	   US	   Deputy	   Assistant	  Secretary	  on	  African	  Affairs	   James	   Swan	  praised	  Wang	   for	  playing	   “a	   vital	   and	  constructive	  role”	  (Swan,	  May	  3	  2007).	  US	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Condoleezza	  Rice,	  affirmed	   that	   “the	  United	  States	   appreciates	  Chinese	   efforts	   in	   resolving	   issues	  such	  as	  Darfur,	  and	  hopes	  China	  will	  continue	  to	  play	  a	  positive	  role.”	  (Qin	  &	  Li,	  February	   27	   2008)	   The	   US	   special	   envoy	   to	   Sudan,	   Andrew	   Natsios,	   echoed	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Rice’s	   statement	   by	   saying	   that	   Beijing’s	   role	   in	   Darfur	  was	   “very	   crucial”	   and	  “very	  helpful”	  (China	  Daily,	  April	  12	  2007).	  At	  the	  regional	  level,	  the	  Arab	  League	  praised	  China’s	   contributions	   to	   international	   stability	  and	  peace,	   especially	   its	  role	  on	   the	  Darfur	  question	  and	   its	   efforts	   to	   find	  a	   comprehensive	   solution	   to	  the	  crisis	  (Ahmed,	  2010,	  p.	  18).	  
However,	   neither	   the	   international	   community,	   nor	   the	   rebel	   groups	   in	  Darfur	  recognised	   China’s	   flexibility.	   Notably,	   the	   launch	   of	   the	   “Genocide	   Olympics”	  campaign,	   which	   criticised	   China’s	   stance,	   served	   to	   obstruct	   many	   UN	  resolutions	  aimed	  at	  improving	  conditions	  in	  the	  region	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  local	   population,	   and	   forcing	   the	   Sudanese	   government	   to	   suspend	   its	   support	  for	  the	  violence	  in	  Darfur.	  The	  rebels	  in	  Darfur	  also	  viewed	  China	  as	  a	  supporter	  of	   Khartoum	   and	   connected	   the	   violence	   to	   China.	   In	   February	   2007,	   former	  President	  Hu	  Jintao	  visited	  Khartoum.	  The	  Chinese	  national	  media	  reported	  that	  Hu’s	   meeting	   with	   President	   Bashir	   was	   to	   emphasise	   the	   need	   for	   a	  “comprehensive	   ceasefire”	   and	   an	   acceleration	   of	   “the	   political	   negotiation	  process”	   involving	  rebel	  non-­‐signatories	   to	   the	  Abuja	  Accord,	  plus	   the	  need	   for	  humanitarian	   assistance	   (Xinhua	   News,	   February	   2	   2007).	   President	   Hu	   is	  reported	   to	  have	   told	  President	  Bashir	   that	   “Darfur	   is	   a	  part	  of	  Sudan	  and	  you	  have	  to	  resolve	  this	  problem”	  (McDoom,	  February	  2	  2007).	  Economic	  assistance	  came	  alongside	  Hu’s	  visit	  and	  the	  two	  governments	  signed	  contracts	  for	  building	  new	   schools,	   a	   new	   presidential	   palace,	   reduced	   import	   tariffs	   on	   certain	  Sudanese	  goods,	  a	  loan	  of	  600	  million	  Yuan	  (US$77.4	  million;	  €59.5	  million)	  for	  infrastructure,	   and	   gave	   a	   grant	   of	   a	  US$40	  million	   (€30.7	  million).	   China	   also	  canceled	  debts	  of	  470	  million	  Yuan	  (US$60.7	  million;	  €46.6	  million)	  and	  US$19	  million	  (€14.6million)	  (UN	  Mission	  in	  Sudan,	  Feb	  19th,	  2008).	   	  	  Hu	   Jintao’s	   visit	   triggered	   some	   international	   criticism.	   More	   than	   a	   hundred	  members	  of	  the	  UK	  parliament	  sent	  a	  message	  to	  the	  President	  Hu	  Jintao,	  on	  29	  October	  2007,	  appealing	  to	  China	  to	  review	  its	  policy	  towards	  Sudan	  and	  to	  try	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to	  convince	  the	  Sudanese	  government	  to	  stop	  its	  attacks	  against	  civilians,	  disarm	  its	   militias,	   and	   co-­‐operate	   with	   the	   ICC	   and	   facilitate	   relief	   operations.	   One	  public	   statement	   by	   the	   National	   Salvation	   Front	   (one	   of	   the	   armed	   groups	   in	  Darfur)	  claimed	  during	  President	  Jintao’s	  visit	  that	  “China’s	  record	  in	  the	  Darfur	  case	   was	   shameful	   and	   depressing”,	   and	   also	   added	   that	   China	   “supports	   the	  Khartoum	  regime	  without	  caring	  about	  the	  war	  crimes	  committed	  by	  it	  in	  Darfur,	  and	  that	  [China]	  continues	  to	  provide	  the	  international	  political	  cover	  for	  Sudan	  to	   continue	   its	   massacres”	   (Holslag,	   August	   15	   2007).	   Chinese	   political	   elites	  called	   upon	   their	   counterparts	   in	   the	   West	   to	   influence	   the	   rebel	   groups	   to	  engage	   in	   dialogue	   and	   facilitate	   the	   mediation	   between	   rebels	   and	   the	  Khartoum	   government	   (Zeng,	   2012).	   However,	   it	   failed	   in	   the	   mediation	   role,	  because	  the	  rebels	  were	  suspicious	  of	  China’s	  intention	  to	  bring	  about	  a	  fair	  and	  peaceful	  solution	  to	  the	  conflict.	  Instead,	  the	  Darfur	  rebels	  took	  the	  opportunity	  of	  Hu	  Jintao’s	  trip	  to	  launch	  a	  violent	  campaign	  against	  the	  Chinese	  stance	  on	  the	  crisis.	   	   	  	  Additionally,	   what	  made	   China	   unreliable	   for	   the	   opposition	   in	   Darfur	  was	   its	  arms	   trade	  with	   Khartoum.	   Since	   the	   1990s,	   China	   has	   been	   one	   of	   the	  major	  global	  suppliers	  of	  military	  equipment	  and	  arms	  to	  Sudan.	  Documented	  reports	  note	   the	   sale	   of	   fifty	   Chinese-­‐manufactured	   Z-­‐6	   helicopters	   to	   the	   Sudanese	  government,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   provision	   of	   technical	   repair	   services	   by	   Harbin	  Dongan	  Engine,	  a	  Chinese	  company	  (Kotecki,	  2008).	  According	  to	  UN	  Comtrade,	  Chinese	   weapons	   manufactures	   Changhe	   Aircraft	   Industries	   and	   Dongfeng	  Aeolus	  exported	  small	  arms	  -­‐	  including	  rifles,	  shotguns,	  and	  handguns	  –	  to	  Sudan.	  A	  report	  by	  the	  UN	  Panel	  of	  Experts	  established	  under	  Resolution	  1591	  (2005)	  found	  that	  “shell	  casings	  collected	  from	  various	  sites	  in	  Darfur	  suggest	  that	  most	  ammunition	  currently	  used	  by	  parties	  to	  the	  conflict	   in	  Darfur	   is	  manufactured	  either	  in	  the	  Sudan	  or	  in	  China”	  (Kleine-­‐Ahlbrandt	  &	  Small,	  2008).	  It	  furthermore	  found	   that	   222	   military	   vehicles	   were	   procured	   from	   Dongfeng	   Automobile	  Import	  and	  Export	  Limited	  in	  China.	  In	  addition,	  a	  number	  of	  further	  high-­‐level	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meetings	   took	   place	   in	   Beijing	   and	   Khartoum	   during	   the	   2000s.	   Participants	  included	   the	   highest-­‐ranking	   members	   of	   the	   SAF,	   China’s	   Central	   Military	  Commission,	   and	   the	   People’s	   Liberation	   Army	   (PLA).	   Some	   criticism	   tends	   to	  connect	   arms	   trade	   with	   oil.	   However,	   despite	   China’s	   oil	   interests	   in	   Sudan,	  there	   is	  no	  particular	  or	  preferential	  military	  aid	   to	  Khartoum	  when	  compared	  with	  other	  countries	  who	  have	  similar	  relationships	  with	  Beijing.	  Furthermore,	  some	   African	   scholars	   assumed	   that	   the	   arms	   trade	   “stemmed	   from	   Beijing’s	  apparent	  expectation	  that	  Khartoum	  would	  achieve	  an	  early	  military	  resolution	  to	  the	  conflict	  in	  Darfur.”	  Evidence	  can	  be	  found	  showing	  that	  high	  level	  military	  cooperation	  was	  mainly	  held	  in	  2002,	  when	  Khartoum	  was	  attempting	  to	  crush	  the	   Darfur	   uprising	   while	   simultaneously	   negotiating	   with	   the	   Sudan	   Peoples’	  Liberation	   Movement/Army	   (SPLM/A)	   to	   end	   the	   long-­‐standing	   war	   with	   the	  south	   (Large,	  2008).	  As	   time	  went	  by,	   and	  Beijing	   realized	   the	  deterioration	   in	  Darfur,	  it	  changed	  its	  strategy	  in	  Sudan.	  Additionally,	  special	  envoy	  Ambassador	  Liu	  Guijin	   argued	   that	  China	  was	  not	   the	  only	   arms	   supplier	   to	   Sudan.	  A	   small	  arms	  survey	  reported	  that	  the	  Chinese	  ammunition	  that	  could	  be	  found	  in	  Sudan	  changed	   from	   heavy	   weapons	   to	   small	   arms,	   and	   was	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   both	  government	  troops	  and	  rebels	  (Gramizzi	  &	  Tubiana,	  2012,	  p.	  46).	  Hence,	  it	  would	  be	  over-­‐simplified	  to	  criticize	  that	  Chinese	  arms	  supplies	  to	  Sudan	  were	  only	  to	  support	  Khartoum	  in	  return	  for	  access	  to	  its	  oil	  interests.	  Chances	  are,	  the	  arms	  trade	  was	  not	  always	  provided	  by	  the	  Chinese	  central	  government	  to	  support	  its	  oil	   friend	   in	   Khartoum.	   Granted,	   Beijing	   clearly	   regarded	   the	   arms	   industry	   as	  critical	   to	  China’s	  national	  security,	  and	  while	  privatized,	  was	  kept	  under	  much	  tighter	  supervision	  than	  other	  reformed	  SOEs.	  However,	  the	  supervision	  of	  arms	  exports	   is	   another	   matter	   entirely	   (Taylor,	   2009).	   The	   small	   arms	   found	   in	  Darfur	   often	   made	   their	   way	   there	   through	   middlemen	   on	   the	   global	   arms	  market.	   Nevertheless,	   a	   negative	   image	   was	   created	   of	   China	   supporting	  Khartoum	  with	  weaponry	  and	  aircraft	  used	  in	  Darfur	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  control	  of	  the	  wealth	  of	  the	  region.	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Throughout	   the	   Darfur	   crisis,	   it	   could	   see	   that	   Beijing	   made	   great	   efforts	   to	  maintain	   the	   stability	   in	   Sudan.	   It	   attempted	   to	   assure	   Khartoum	   that	   only	   a	  diplomatic	   solution	   would	   bring	   an	   end	   to	   the	   conflicts.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   it	  called	   on	  Western	   countries	   to	   bring	   the	   rebels	   back	   to	   the	   negotiation	   table.	  However,	  in	  reality,	  both	  the	  international	  community	  and	  opposition	  in	  Darfur	  didn’t	  acknowledge	  Beijing’s	  efforts,	  and	  China	  was	  unable	  to	  convince	  other	  that	  it	   took	  a	  balanced	  role,	  due	  to	   its	   friendly	  attitude	  towards	  Khartoum.	  Western	  activists	  and	  media	  continued	  to	  criticise	  China	  over	  its	  perceived	  unconditional	  ties	  with	  the	  government	  in	  Khartoum.	  The	  rebels	  even	  launched	  attacks	  against	  Chinese	  oil	  fields	  and	  Chinese	  workers.	   	  
II.	  South	  Sudan	  
Since	   the	   independence	   of	   South	   Sudan	   in	   2011,	   Khartoum	   was	   left	   with	   the	  majority	   of	   the	   former	   nation’s	   oil	   reserves.	   However,	   South	   Sudan	   lacked	   the	  infrastructure	  to	  refine	  or	  transport	  the	  oil,	  and	  it	  has	  to	  export	  the	  oil	  through	  pipelines	  in	  the	  north.	  Both	  countries	  heavily	  rely	  on	  oil	  income	  for	  its	  revenue:	  roughly	  50%	  for	  Sudan	  and	  98%	  for	  South	  Sudan.	  The	  two	  sides	  have	  had	  a	  long	  dispute	  over	  transit	  fees	  which	  South	  Sudan	  pays	  for	  the	  use	  of	  pipelines	  in	  the	  north.	   Additionally,	   their	   long	   history	   of	   conflict	   complicates	   any	   resolution	   of	  the	   oil	   transportation	   issue.	   South	   Sudan	  has	   accused	   Sudan	  of	   stealing	   the	   oil	  and	  threatened	  to	  shut	  down	  oil	  production	  (BBC	  News,	  January	  27	  2012),	  while	  Khartoum	   has	   blamed	   Juba’s	   continued	   support	   for	   the	   Sudan	   Revolutionary	  Front	   (SRF)	   rebels	   fighting	   Khartoum	   on	   multiple	   fronts	   and	   declared	   that	   it	  would	  block	  the	  pipeline	  carrying	  South	  Sudan’s	  crude	  all	  the	  way	  to	  the	  Red	  Sea	  coastal	   city	   of	   Port	   Sudan	   (Sudan	   Tribune,	   June	   10	   2013).	   China,	   who	   has	  considerable	   oil	   interests	   in	   Sudan,	   has	   invested	   more	   than	   US$20	   billion	   in	  these	  two	  countries.	  (Lum	  et	  al.,	  2009)	  It	  has	  the	  motivation	  and	  weight	  to	  help	  mediate	   the	   dispute.	   Even	   if	   much	   criticism	   of	   Beijing	   has	   focused	   on	   its	  relationship	  with	  the	  Bashir	  regime,	   it	   is	  more	  of	  a	  symbolic	  rather	  than	  actual	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political	   tie.	   Indeed,	   if	  China	  was	  not	  a	  neutral	  actor	  between	  Sudan	  and	  South	  Sudan,	   this	  was	   less	  because	  of	   its	  own	  choices	   in	  supporting	  Khartoum	  but	   in	  response	  to	  limitations	  within	  the	  existing	  situation	  beyond	  its	  control.	   	   	  	  In	   April	   2012,	   South	   Sudanese	   President	   Kiir	   visited	   Beijing,	   and	   asked	   for	  China’s	   political	   and	   financial	   support	   in	   its	   oil	   difficulties.	   During	   this	   trip,	  President	  Kiir	  sought	  the	  investment	  of	  Chinese	  oil	  companies	  to	  take	  part	  in	  the	  development	   of	   an	   alternative	   pipeline	   (of	   Sudan)	   construction	   project	   in	   his	  meeting	  with	  the	  President	  of	  CNPC	  Jiang	  Jiemin	  (Kenneth,	  April	  26	  2012).	  The	  oil	  dilemma	   for	  Beijing	   is	  a	  political	   issue	  between	  Khartoum	  and	   Juba,	  but	   for	  CNPC	  it	  is	  more	  of	  a	  business	  issue.	  CNPC	  entered	  Sudan’s	  oil	  industry	  in	  1990s	  when	  the	  Western	  oil	  companies	  withdrew	  from	  the	  country.	  Since	   then,	  CNPC	  and	   the	   Sudanese	   government	   have	   signed	   a	   series	   of	   oil	   contracts	   for	   the	  exploration	  of	  Block	  6	  (in	  1995),	  Block	  1/2/4	  (1997),	  Block	  3/7	  (2000),	  Block	  15	  (2005)	   and	   block	   12	   (2007)	   (CNPC,	   2010).	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   it	   has	   been	  estimated	  that	  CNPC	  has	  invested	  more	  than	  US$7	  billion	  in	  the	  region	  (X.	  Chen,	  January	  3	  2014	  )	  and	  constructed	  most	  of	  the	  oil	  infrastructure	  in	  Sudan,	  which	  includes	  the	  only	  oil	  pipeline	  from	  South	  Sudan	  (Heglig)	  to	  the	  Port	  of	  Sudan	  via	  Khartoum,	  and	  the	  Suakim	  oil	  terminal	  at	  Port	  Sudan	  on	  the	  Red	  Sea.	  However,	  these	   business	   investments	   have	   been	   criticised	   as	   a	   financial	   source	   for	  Khartoum	  during	  the	  civil	  war.	  After	  the	  construction	  of	  this	  infrastructure,	  “the	  Sudanese	  government	  openly	  boasted	   that	  oil	  would	   fund	   the	  civil	  war:	   ‘Sudan	  will	  be	  capable	  of	  producing	  all	  the	  weapons	  it	  needs	  thanks	  to	  the	  growing	  oil	  industry’,	  stated	  General	  Mohamed	  Yassin	  shortly	  after	  oil	  began	  flowing	  out	  of	  the	  new	  pipeline	   into	  supertankers	  at	   the	  Red	  Sea	  port”	   (Taylor,	  2006a,	  p.	  26).	  Witness	   17	   from	   CNPC	   argued,	   “CNPC’s	   overseas	   investment	  was	  more	   out	   of	  business	  consideration	  with	  no	  preference	  to	  support	  any	  kind	  of	  government”.	  Witness	  4	  admitted	   that	  Chinese	  oil	  companies	  have	   long	  been	  marginalised	   in	  the	   international	  market,	   and	   as	   a	   result	   they	   have	   no	   other	   choice	   but	   to	   do	  business	  with	  questionable	  governments.	  Actually,	  CNPC’s	   investment	   in	  Sudan	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was	  conducted	  with	  a	  similar	  approach	  of	  “oil	  for	  infrastructure”	  as	  in	  any	  other	  oil-­‐rich	   African	   state.	   The	   problems	   arose	   out	   of	   the	   Sudan	   government’s	  inability	   to	  maintain	   security	   and	   properly	   arrange	   distribution	   of	   oil	   income,	  rather	  than	  Chinese	  oil	  companies’	  involvement.	   	   	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  CNPC	  was	  drawn	  into	  a	  difficult	  situation	  as	  well.	  In	  January	  2012,	  South	  Sudan	  shut	  down	  all	   its	  oil	  production	  due	   to	  both	  sides	   failing	   to	  agree	  on	  pipeline	  fees.	  CNPC’s	  oil	  exploration	  and	  production	  company,	  PetroDar	  Operating	  Company	  Ltd.	  (PDOC),28	   which	  was	  responsible	  for	  the	  operations	  in	  Block	  3/7,	  with	  more	  than	  600	  oil	  wells	  in	  South	  Sudan,	  was	  one	  of	  the	  largest	  oil	  investors	  in	  this	  region	  (CNPC,	  2010).	  Not	  only	  would	  turning	  off	  wells	  lead	  to	  a	  loss	   of	   250	   thousand	   barrels	   per	   day	   within	   ten	   days	   for	   CNPC,	   but	   also,	  according	   to	   CNPC’s	   chief	   engineer	   in	   Sudan	   Chen	   Shudong,	   southern	   officials	  pushed	   the	   oil	   firms	   to	   close	   the	  wells	   so	   quickly	   that	   there	  was	   a	   risk	   of	   the	  heavy,	  sticky	  crude	  oil	   from	  the	  eastern	  fields	  congealing,	  which	  would	  damage	  the	   pipelines	   (Dziadosz,	   November	   14	   2012).	   However,	   officials	   from	   South	  Sudan	  thought	  PDOC	  intentionally	  delayed	  the	  government’s	  decision.	  Since	  they	  use	  the	  shutdown	  of	  oil	  production	  as	  a	  bargaining	  chip	  at	  the	  negotiation	  table	  with	   Khartoum,	   South	   Sudan	   officials	   considered	   PDOC’s	   slowness	   as	   CNPC’s	  tacit	   support	   for	   Khartoum.	   Chen	   complained	   that	   officials	   from	   South	   Sudan	  were	  not	  professional	   in	   the	  oil	   industry,	   “they	  were	  bursting	   to	   shut	  down	  all	  the	   wells	   in	   one	   day”,	   and	   refused	   PDOC’s	   proposal	   of	   turning	   off	   the	   wells	  gradually	  according	  to	  the	  safety	  standard	  operating	  procedure.	  Additionally,	  as	  the	  two	  countries	  could	  not	  reach	  an	  agreement	  on	  the	  transition	  fees,	  Khartoum	  then	  decided	  it	  could	  no	  longer	  wait	  for	  an	  agreement	  and	  started	  to	  seize	  part	  of	  Juba’s	   oil	   pumped	   through	   the	   pipelines	   as	   payment	   in	   kind.	   South	   Sudan	  accused	   the	   oil	   companies	   (mainly	   CNPC)	   of	   collaborating	   with	   Khartoum	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 The	   PetroDar	   Operating	   Company	   Ltd	   is	   a	   consortium	   of	   oil	   exploration	   and	   production	   companies	  operating	   in	   Sudan	   with	   its	   headquarters	   in	   Khartoum.	   The	   consortium	   was	   incorporated	   in	   the	   Virgin	  Islands	  on	  31	  October	  2001.	  PetroDar	  is	  composed	  of	  the	  China	  National	  Petroleum	  Corporation	  (CNPC)	  (41%	  share)	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“stealing”	   and	  marketing	   the	   crude	   it	   confiscated	   (Sudan	  Tribune,	   February	  23	  2012).	  As	  a	  result,	  it	  expelled	  the	  head	  of	  Petrodar	  Liu	  Yingcai	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  “non-­‐cooperation”.	  The	  next	  day,	  South	  Sudan	  said	  it	  had	  started	  reviewing	  all	  oil	  contracts	   signed	  by	   the	  government	  of	  neighbouring	  Sudan	  before	   the	   region’s	  independence.	  South	  Sudan’s	  oil	  minister	  Stephen	  Dhieu	  pointed	  out	   that	  “they	  cannot	   have	   it	   both	  ways.	   Cooperate	  with	   Khartoum	   in	   stealing	   oil	   and	   at	   the	  same	   time	   pretend	   to	   be	   partners	  with	   us.	   It	   does	   not	  work	   like	   that”	   (Sudan	  Tribune,	   February	  22	  2012b).	   Chen	   explained	   the	   limitation	   of	   CNPC	   and	   said,	  “In	   fact,	   the	  ports	   [are]	   locate[d]	   in	  Sudan,	   it	  would	  not	  have	  been	  an	  effective	  response	  to	  confront	  the	  Sudanese	  government”	  (ifeng,	  May	  16	  2012).	  Soon,	  the	  Chinese	  government	  weighed	   in,	   calling	   for	   joint	   efforts	   to	   resolve	   the	  dispute.	  Chinese	   Foreign	  Ministry	   spokesman	  Hong	   Lei	   said	   in	   his	   daily	   news	   briefing,	  “We	  hope	  that	  relevant	  sides	  step	  up	  communication	  and	  consultations	  and	  put	  an	  end	  to	  misunderstandings	  to	  benefit	  long-­‐term	  cooperation”	  (Sudan	  Tribune,	  February	  24	  2012).	  In	  response,	  Pagan	  Amum,	  South	  Sudan's	  top	  negotiator	  for	  talks	  with	   Sudan	   over	   oil	   payments,	   said	   “relations	  with	   China	  were	   good	   but	  added	   there	  were	   difficulties	  with	   some	   oil	   companies”	   (Reuters,	   February	   23	  2012).	  This	  brought	  CNPC	   into	  an	  uncomfortable	  position.	  CNPC’s	  officials	  said	  South	  Sudan	  government	  was	  supposed	  to	  dismiss	  Liu	  Yingcai	  according	  to	  the	  companies’	   procedures	   (as	   proposed	   at	   a	   stockholders’	   meeting),	   rather	   than	  make	  the	  decision	  unilaterally.	  Furthermore,	  even	  if	  Liu	  was	  dismissed	  due	  to	  his	  “non-­‐cooperation”,	  as	  an	  employee	  of	  PDOC	  who	  hadn’t	  done	  anything	  illegal,	  he	  should	  not	  have	  been	  expelled	  by	   the	   South	   Sudan	  government	   (ifeng,	  May	  16	  2012).	  Witness	   18	   revealed	   that	   Chinese	   national	   companies	  were	   not	   always	  satisfied	   with	   MOFA’s	   attitude	   towards	   African	   countries,	   especially	   when	   the	  host	   countries’	   regulations	   conflicted	   with	   the	   Chinese	   companies’	   interests,	  because	   the	   MOFA	   did	   little	   to	   protect	   them.	   The	   informant	   held	   that	   MOFA	  should	  mediate	  when	  there	  existed	  unfair	  governmental	  regulations.	  Witness	  17	  said,	   “From	   CNPC’s	   perspective,	   they	   expected	   the	   Chinese	   government	  would	  use	   diplomatic	   measures	   to	   intervene	   when	   Chinese	   people’s	   safety	   and	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economic	  interests	  were	  violated	  in	  African	  countries”.	   	  
In	  fact,	  since	  the	  secession	  of	  South	  Sudan,	  Beijing	  has	  continued	  to	  send	  special	  envoys	   to	   Sudan;	   first	   Liu	   Guijin,	   later	   Zhong	   Jianhua,	   both	   of	   whom	   are	  diplomatic	  veterans	  in	  African	  affairs,	  and	  tried	  to	  mediate	  the	  conflicts	  between	  north	   and	   south	   and	   protect	   its	   oil	   companies’	   interests.	   However,	   Beijing’s	  desire	  to	  maintain	  balanced	  relations	  was	  constrained	  by	  the	  situation	  in	  Sudan,	  and	  hence	  not	  fully	  acknowledged	  by	  South	  Sudan	  or	  international	  actors.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  South	  Sudan	  was	  unhappy	  about	  Chinese	  companies’	   involvement	   in	  the	   oil	   sector	   and	   threatened	   to	   expel	   Chinese	   companies	   operating	   in	   its	  territories	  if	  they	  were	  proven	  to	  be	  complicit	  with	  Khartoum	  in	  what	  Juba	  terms	  the	  stealing	  of	  South	  Sudan’s	  oil.	  Meanwhile,	   it	  also	   tried	  to	  replace	  Chinese	  oil	  companies	  with	  Western	  companies	  (Sudan	  Tribune,	  February	  22	  2012a).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  sought	  China’s	  political	  and	  financial	  support	  for	  an	  alternative	  oil	  pipeline	  in	  order	  to	  pump	  oil	  through	  neighbouring	  countries	  but	  not	  Sudan.	  Its	  demands	   brought	   CNPC,	   the	   largest	   purchaser	   of	   South	   Sudan’s	   oil,	   into	   a	  deadlock.	   In	   2012,	   advisor	   of	   CNPC	   International	   Tong	   Xiaoguang	   suggested	  CNPC	  produced	  495	  thousand	  barrels	  of	  oil	  per	  day	  in	  Sudan	  in	  2009.	  The	  figure	  was	  considerably	  reduced	  in	  2010	  and	  2011.	  Currently	  as	  South	  Sudan	  has	  shut	  down	   its	   oil	   production,	   only	  Block	   6	   in	   the	   north	   has	   operated	   and	  produced	  less	  than	  one-­‐tenth	  the	  amount	  of	  oil,	  compared	  to	  the	  2011	  figure.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  Sudan	  and	  South	  Sudan	  border	  conflicts	  over	  the	  oil	  rich	  Heglig	  region	  has	  seriously	   damaged	   oil	   facilities	   constructed	   by	   CNPC.	   It	   estimates	   that	   it	   will	  require	  more	   than	   two	  years	   to	   repair	   (Tong,	   September	  6	  2012).	  The	  earliest	  CNPC	  contracts	  in	  Heglig	  will	  expire	  in	  2016,	  while	  the	  latest	  will	  expire	  in	  2026.	  At	  such	  a	  time,	  even	  without	  consideration	  for	  Khartoum,	  CNPC	  will	  still	  needs	  to	  approach	  cautiously	  President	  Kiir’s	  proposal	   for	  an	  alternative	  oil	  pipeline	   for	  South	  Sudan.	  What’s	  more,	  Chen	  revealed	  that	  his	  company	  has	  already	  covered	  its	  costs	  and	  investment	  through	  oil	  imports	  from	  Sudan,	  it	  even	  has	  made	  some	  profits	   from	   the	   Sudan	  market.	   Therefore,	   it	   is	   not	   economical	   to	   abandon	   the	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established	  pipelines	  in	  Sudan	  and	  construct	  a	  new	  one.	  He	  added,	  “Constructing	  an	   alternative	   pipeline	   is	   a	   systemic	   project	   that	   requires	   a	   lot	   of	   work	   and	  research	   en	   route,	   geology,	   feasibility	   and	   bid.	   CNPC	   cannot	   make	   a	   decision	  without	  meeting	  with	  other	  stockholders.”	  (ifeng,	  May	  16	  2012)	  
In	   the	   case	   of	   South	   Sudan,	   the	   Chinese	   government	   failed	   to	   mediate	   the	  conflicts	   between	   Sudan	   and	   South	   Sudan,	   and	   facilitated	   oil	   cooperation	   for	  Chinese	  companies.	  At	  the	  policy	  level,	   it	  tried	  to	  have	  a	  balanced	  role	  between	  each	  side	  and	  protect	  its	  oil	  interests	  in	  these	  two	  countries.	  But,	  in	  practice,	  the	  Khartoum	  and	  Juba	  governments	  used	  oil	  as	  bargaining	  chips	  to	  gain	  economic	  support	  from	  China,	  while	  both	  sides	  lacked	  a	  willingness	  to	  cooperate	  with	  the	  other	   and	   the	   capability	   to	   maintain	   its	   internal	   stability.	   The	   crisis	   in	   South	  Sudan	   drew	   Beijing	   into	   an	   uncomfortable	   position	   that	   resulted	   in	   losses	   for	  Chinese	  oil	  companies.	   	   	  
6.5	  Conclusion	  Beijing	   has	   had	   a	   relationship	  with	  Khartoum	   for	  more	   than	   two	  decades,	   and	  initially	   its	   engagement	   in	   Sudan	   had	   no	   major	   difference	   with	   Beijing’s	  engagement	  with	  other	  African	   countries.	  But	   the	   extreme	   crisis	   in	  Darfur	   and	  South	   Sudan	   challenged	   China’s	   role	   and	   impact	   in	   Sudan.	   In	   response	   to	   the	  changing	  politics	  and	  different	   issues	  within	  the	  country,	  Beijing’s	  Sudan	  policy	  developed	  towards	  a	  more	  pragmatic	  and	  complex	  approach.	  China’s	  role	  in	  the	  ongoing	   conflicts	   in	   Darfur	   and	   attitude	   towards	   the	   newly	   established	   South	  Sudan,	   showed	   that	  China	  has	   interests	  beyond	  access	   to	   resources	  and	  purely	  business-­‐related	   considerations	   in	   Africa.	   The	   Sudan	   case	   tested	   the	   limits	   of	  China’s	   traditional	   “non-­‐interference”	   principle	   and	   its	   “oil	   for	   infrastructure”	  approach.	   In	   the	   face	   of	   international	   pressure	   and	   the	   negative	   impact	   on	  Beijing’s	   reputation,	   China	   has	   pursued	   a	   more	   comprehensive	   approach	   to	  Sudan,	  with	  more	  cooperation	  on	  international	  intervention	  and	  resolutions.	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	   that	  Beijing’s	  priority	  does	  not	   intrinsically	   contradict	   that	  of	   the	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international	   community.	   Its	   concern	   with	   investment	   protection	   requires	  political	   stability	   and	   peace	   in	   Sudan.	   The	   extent	   to	   which	   the	   Chinese	  government	  is	  inclined	  to	  support	  Khartoum	  is	  not	  driven	  by	  its	  oil	  demands,	  nor	  arms	  trade	  profits,	  but	  is	  rather	  because	  of	  the	  perceived	  capability	  of	  the	  Bashir	  regime	  to	  control	  the	  situation	  and	  maintain	  peace	  in	  the	  region.	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Chapter	  7	  Nigeria	  No	   bilateral	   China-­‐Africa	   relationship	   is	   evolving	   faster,	   nor	   impacts	   a	   greater	  number	   of	   people	   than	   the	   one	   between	   China	   and	   Nigeria	   (Egbula	   &	   Zheng,	  November	  2011).	  Compared	  to	  other	  states	  in	  West	  Africa,	  Nigeria’s	  democracy	  and	  economic	  growth	  perform	  relatively	  better.	  This	  African	  giant	  is	  now	  China’s	  third-­‐largest	  trading	  partner	  in	  Africa	  and	  top	  destination	  for	  Chinese	  exports	  on	  the	  continent.	  In	  2012,	  trade	  value	  between	  the	  two	  countries	  reached	  US$10.57	  billion,	  and	  by	  the	  end	  of	  2012,	  China’s	  non-­‐financial	  direct	  investment	  in	  Nigeria	  amounted	  to	  US$8.7	  billion.	  The	  figure	  is	  so	  notable,	  because	  in	  1998	  it	  was	  $384	  million,	  and	  US$	  1	  billion	  in	  2001	  and	  therefore	  increased	  ten	  times	  in	  the	  next	  decade.	  This	  is	  doubly	  notable	  considering	  this	  growth	  was	  achieved	  against	  the	  background	  of	  the	  global	  recession	  (Taylor,	  2007).	  
China-­‐Nigeria	   relations	   are	   a	   featured	   case	   in	   assessing	  China’s	   engagement	   in	  Africa,	  because	  Nigeria	  is	  the	  rare	  African	  state	  with	  large	  energy	  reserves	  and	  a	  relatively	   democratic	   government	   system.	   These	   two	   key	   Nigerian	  characteristics	  can	  be	  used	  to	  test	  China’s	  attitude	  towards	  an	  oil-­‐rich	  state	  and	  relatively	  democratic	  regime,	  which	  are	  two	  of	  the	  most	  controversial	  elements	  to	   China’s	   activities	   in	   Africa.	   In	   addition,	   by	   assessing	   China’s	   impact	   on	  Nigeria’s	   oil	   industry	   and	   democratic	   development,	   this	   chapter	   will	   analyse	  China’s	   contribution	   to	   and	   the	   deficiencies	   of	   its	   “oil	   for	   infrastructure”	  approach	  in	  Nigeria.	  
This	  chapter	  starts	  with	  a	  brief	  background	  on	  China-­‐Nigeria	  relations.	  Then,	   it	  discusses	   three	   influential	   factors	   in	   shaping	  China’s	   responsibility	   in	  Nigeria	   -­‐	  China’s	  national	  interests,	  Nigeria’s	  demands,	  and	  international	  expectations	  -­‐	  to	  explore	  whether	  these	  two	  countries	  can	  be	  complementary	  at	   the	  policy	   level.	  Some	   scholars	   have	   indicated	   that	   China	   could	   treat	   African	   countries	   like	  colonies,	  yet	  if	  their	  national	  interests	  are	  complementary,	  it	  would	  be	  more	  like	  a	  demand-­‐give	  situation.	  In	  its	  second	  part,	  this	  chapter	  discusses	  which	  factors	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could	   limit	   China’s	   commitment	   to	   Nigeria,	   and	   also	   China’s	   capability	   to	   be	  responsible	   in	  Nigeria.	  Then,	   in	   the	   final	  part,	   this	   chapter	  discusses	   the	  actors	  and	   context	   that	   can	   affect	   China’s	   role	   in	  Nigeria,	   from	  both	   the	  Nigerian	   and	  Chinese	  sides.	   	  	   	  
7.1	  A	  brief	  background	   	  
	  It	  was	  not	  until	  February	  1971,	  that	  Nigeria	  established	  diplomatic	  relations	  with	  the	  PRC,	   the	  same	  year	   that	  Beijing	  officially	   replaced	   the	  ROC	  (Taiwan)	   in	   the	  UN	   and	   on	   the	   Security	   Council.	   Apart	   from	   Nigeria’s	   acceptance	   of	   the	   “One	  China	   Policy”	   and	   Hong	   Kong’s	   return	   to	   China,	   there	   were	   few	   connections	  between	  these	  two	  countries.	  Former	  Premier	  Li	  Peng’s	  official	  visit	  to	  Abuja	  in	  1997	   was	   the	   highest	   level	   visit	   in	   more	   than	   two	   decades.	   During	   the	   early	  period	   of	   this	   relationship,	   pioneering	   Chinese	   investors	   from	  Hong	   Kong	   and	  Taiwan	   concentrated	   on	   the	   manufacturing	   and	   textile	   industries,	   where	  Western	   traditional	   investors	   were	   not	   interested,	   because	   of	   Nigeria’s	   poor	  supply	   chain,	   inadequate	   infrastructure,	   and	   Nigeria’s	   oil	   fields	   have	   been	  operated	   mainly	   by	   several	   Western	   companies.	   From	   the	   late	   1990s,	   China	  started	   to	   establish	   a	   closer	   relationship	   with	   Nigeria,	   and	   pursued	   the	  oil-­‐for-­‐infrastructure	   approach.	   However,	   Nigeria’s	   domestic	   situation	   had	   an	  impact	   on	   the	   successful	   implementation	   of	   China’s	   policy.	   The	   unstable	  relationship	  by	  electoral	  politics	  in	  Nigeria	  and	  its	  poor	  governance	  has	  affected	  China’s	  capability	  to	  play	  a	  fully	  responsible	  role	  in	  Nigeria.	   	  
7.2	  Shaping	  China’s	  responsibility	  in	  Nigeria	  	   	  The	  existing	  literature	  argues	  that	  China’s	  needs	  in	  Africa	  are	  resources,	  markets	  for	  its	  exports,	  and	  political	  support	  on	  its	  territory	  and	  human	  rights	  abuses.	  As	  for	  Nigeria,	   the	  African	   country	  has	   vast	   energy	   reserves	   and	   a	   large	  domestic	  market	  with	  more	   than	  170	  million	   inhabitants,	   both	  of	  which	   certainly	  meets	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China’s	  basic	  needs.	  Apart	   from	  theses	  demands,	  Nigeria,	  as	   the	  most	  populous	  African	   country	   has	   political	   and	   economic	   interests	   beyond	   oil,	   markets	   and	  international	  support.	  Vice	  Versa,	  Nigeria	  needs	  Chinese	  investment,	  technology	  and	   assistance	   to	   fuel	   its	   economic	   growth.	   Hence,	   bilateral	   relations	   have	  developed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  mutual	  demands.	   	  
7.2.1	  China’s	  motivation	   	  
I.	  Politically	   	  
Regarding	   China’s	   political	   motivation	   in	   Nigeria,	   One-­‐China	   policy	   is	   the	  prerequisite	   for	   establishing	   bilateral	   relationship.	   In	   the	   Joint	   Press	  Communiqué	  in	  2008,	  the	  president	  of	  Nigeria	  explicitly	  voiced	  Nigeria’s	  support	  for	  the	  One-­‐China	  (Xinhua	  News,	  February	  28	  2008).	  Nigeria	  has	  also	  spoken	  out	  to	  refuse	  Taiwan	  entry	  into	  the	  UN	  in	  2002.	   	  	  Furthermore,	  Nigeria	  has	  greater	  significance	  to	  China	  than	  other	  African	  states.	  As	  the	  most	  populous	  country	  in	  the	  continent,	  Nigeria	  has	  played	  a	  leading	  role	  in	  West	  Africa.	  In	  2010,	  US	  President	  Obama	  stated	  that	  “Nigeria	  is	  critical	  to	  the	  rest	   of	   the	   continent	   and	   if	   Nigeria	   does	   not	   get	   it	   right,	   Africa	  will	   really	   not	  make	  more	   progress,”	   during	   his	   talk	  with	   the	   then-­‐acting	   President	   Jonathan	  (allAfrica,	  April	  13	  2010).	  On	  one	  hand,	  it	  indicated	  that	  Nigeria’s	  domestic	  peace	  and	   stability	   has	   influenced	   regional	   security	   and	  development	   as	   a	  whole.	  On	  the	   other	   hand,	   as	   a	   big	   emerging	   nation	   in	   West	   Africa,	   Nigeria	   has	   a	  responsibility	   to	   maintain	   the	   regional	   peace	   and	   stability.	   The	   Nigerian	  government	   has	   recognised	   its	   critical	   role	   in	   the	   region,	   and	   expressed	   its	  ambition	   to	   become	   an	   African	   leader.	   Not	   only	   has	   it	   actively	   participated	   in	  regional	  peacekeeping	  operations	  in	  Chad,	  Liberia,	  Sierra	  Leone,	  the	  Democratic	  Republic	  of	  Congo,	  Angola,	  Cote	  d’Ivoire,	  Somalia	  and	  Darfur	  in	  Sudan,	  but	  it	  has	  also	  made	   efforts	   to	   form	  an	  African	   voice	   in	   the	   international	   arena.	   In	   2013,	  during	  his	  visit	  to	  Cote	  d’Ivoire,	  President	  Jonathan	  called	  on	  all	  leaders	  from	  the	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Economic	   Community	   of	  West	   African	   States	   (ECOWAS)	   to	  work	   together	   and	  create	   a	   peaceful	   and	   stable	   political	   environment	   in	   order	   for	   economic	  development	  (Thisdaylive,	  March	  1	  2013).	  Nigeria’s	  desire	  to	  become	  a	   leading	  African	   voice,	   and	   its	   influence	   in	   western	   Africa	   provided	   China	   with	   the	  motivation	  to	  establish	  deeper	  political	  ties	  with	  this	  country.	  The	  two	  sides	  have	  expressed	   a	   willingness	   to	   cooperate	   in	   solving	   Africa’s	   various	   conflicts.	   In	   a	  joint	  press	  communiqué	   in	  2008,	   the	  parties	  highlighted	   that	   “the	  Chinese	  side	  hailed	  Nigeria's	  long-­‐standing	  role	  in	  the	  cause	  of	  peace	  in	  Africa”,	  and	  in	  return	  the	  “Nigerian	  side	  applauded	  the	  contribution	  made	  by	  China	   in	  support	  of	   the	  efforts	   of	   the	   African	   Union	   in	   the	   peaceful	   resolution	   of	   conflict	   situations	   in	  Africa.”	  (Xinhua	  News,	  February	  28	  2008)	   	  
II.	  Economically	   	  
As	   the	   former	   section	  has	   indicated,	   the	  massive	  oil	   reserves	   and	   an	   emerging	  market	   with	   170	   million	   potential	   customers,	   located	   in	   the	   strategic	   Gulf	   of	  Guinea	  region,	  has	  not	  only	  provided	  China	  with	  a	  diverse	  oil	  supply,	  but	  also	  an	  exports	   and	   investment	   destination	   for	   its	   construction,	   communication,	  manufacturing	  and	  retail	  industries.	   	  
One	  cannot	  deny	  the	  fact	  that,	  apart	  from	  the	  political	  aspect,	  energy	  security	  is	  a	  key	   driving	   force	   for	   China’s	   interactions	   with	   and	   actions	   in	   Nigeria	   for	   the	  following	  reasons:	  First,	  China’s	  domestic	  political	  economy	  is	  heavily	  reliant	  on	  energy-­‐intensive	  industry.	  In	  order	  to	  achieve	  its	  national	  economic	  objectives,	  it	  has	   to	   secure	   foreign	   supplies	  of	   oil	   and	   refined	  oil	   products	   for	  domestic	  use.	  Second,	  attempting	  to	  lower	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  international	  commodity	  market	  on	  oil	  supply	  and	  price,	  Beijing	  has	  sought	  reliable	  markets	  with	  less	  competition	  from	   traditional	   developed	   countries.	   Nigeria	   has	   ranked	   as	   the	   largest	   oil	  producer	   in	   Africa	   and	   the	   11th	   largest	  worldwide.	   It	   produces	   approximately	  2.28	  million	  barrels	  per	  day	  and	  has	  a	  proven	  oil	  reserve	  of	  37.2	  billion	  barrels.	  It	  is	  estimated	  that,	  at	  current	  rates,	  this	  could	  be	  45	  years	  of	  supply	  even	  if	  no	  new	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oil	   fields	   were	   found.	   In	   addition,	   Nigeria’s	   fragile	   democracy	   and	   domestic	  violence	  have	  made	   its	  energy	  market	   too	  risky	   for	   traditional	  oil	   importers	   to	  access,	  which	  provided	  Chinese	  oil	  companies	  with	  chances	  to	  move	  in	  without	  (much)	   competition.	   The	   successful	   engagement	   in	   the	   Nigerian	   oil	   industry	  could	   diversify	   China’s	   sources	   of	   oil	   and	   reduce	   its	   dependence	   to	   the	   highly	  competitive	  markets	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  As	  Witness	  22	  said,	  
Lots	  of	  people	  have	  talked	  about	  China	  choosing	  to	  invest	  in	  the	  high	  risk	  energy	  areas,	  it	  sounds	  as	  if	  we	  have	  a	  choice.	  The	  safe	  oil	  fields	  with	  good	  quality	   energy	   reserves	   have	   long	   been	   controlled	   by	   the	   western	  companies.	   As	   a	   latecomer,	   China	   has	   to	   start	   from	   these	   marginalised	  areas.	   	   	   	  
In	  short,	  China	  is	  an	  energy-­‐import-­‐oriented	  country,	  and	  will	  need	  plenty	  of	  oil	  due	  to	  its	  economic	  growth	  and	  domestic	  growth.	  With	  its	  abundant	  oil	  reserves,	  China	  needs	  access	  to	  Nigerian	  oil	  fields.	  
Furthermore,	   Nigeria	   is	   also	   considered	   to	   have	   great	   potential	   for	   rapid	  economic	   growth.	   Economist	   Jim	   O'Neill	   has	   introduced	   Nigeria	   as	   a	   “Mint”	  country,29	   to	  indicate	  its	  potential	  to	  become	  an	  emerging	  economic	  giant.	  (BBC,	  January	   5	   2014)	   Nigeria’s	   annual	   gross	   domestic	   product	   (GDP)	   in	   2012	   was	  estimated	  at	  US$268	  billion,	  the	  second	  highest	  in	  Africa	  after	  South	  Africa.	  As	  a	  large	   potential	   market	   with	   the	   largest	   population	   in	   Africa,	   Nigeria	   had	   an	  import	   volume	   of	   US$4.18	   billion	   in	   2012.	   The	   imports	   mainly	   included:	  industrial	  supplies	  (32%	  of	  total),	  transport	  equipment	  and	  parts	  (23%),	  capital	  goods	   (24%),	   food	   and	   beverage	   (11%),	   and	   consumer	   goods.	   (MOFCOM	   &	  China's	   Embassy	   to	   Nigeria,	   2013)	   The	   diversity	   and	   potential	   of	   the	   Nigerian	  market	   has	   attracted	   Chinese	   labour-­‐intensive	   industries,	   mainly	   textiles,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 The	  term	  was	  coined	  by	  economist	  Jim	  O'Neill,	  who	  has	  now	  identified	  the	  "Mint" countries	  -­‐	  Mexico,	  Indonesia,	  Nigeria,	  and	  Turkey	  -­‐	  as	  emerging	  economic	  giants.	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industrial	   machinery,	   telecom	   equipment,	   electrical	   equipment,	   vehicles,	   and	  other	  manufactures.	  It	  provides	  a	  good	  export	  destination	  for	  China’s	  expanding	  industry	   that	   has	   limited	   customer	   bases	   in	   either	   its	   domestic	   or	   other	  developed	  markets.	  Nigerian	  customers’	  demands	  for	  low-­‐price	  products	  helped	  Chinese	   enterprises	   to	   transfer	   their	   uncompetitive	   industries	   to	   this	   country.	  Consequently,	   Chinese	   consortiums	  have	   established	   free	   trade	   zones	   in	   Lagos	  and	   container	   areas	   at	   the	   Lagos	   port.	   Chinese	   FDI	   reached	  US$7.24	   billion	   in	  2009	   (MOFCOM	  &	  China's	  Embassy	   to	  Nigeria,	   2013).	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   China	  has	  become	  Nigeria’s	  largest	  import	  partner,	  and	  accounted	  for	  17%	  of	  Nigeria’s	  total	   volume.	   Between	   2005-­‐2012,	   Nigeria	   had	   the	   largest	   share	   of	   Chinese	  investment	   in	   Africa	   -­‐	   roughly	   US$15.6	   billion	   out	   of	   US$97.8	   billion.	   (Odeh,	  2013)	  
Meanwhile,	   according	   to	   a	   report	   by	   Citigroup,	   Nigeria	   will	   experience	   the	  highest	   average	   GDP	   growth	   worldwide	   between	   2010	   and	   2050,	   (Vanguard,	  September	   23	   2011)	  which	   places	   it	   as	   one	   of	   only	   two	   countries	   from	  Africa	  among	   the	   11	   Global	   Growth	   Generators	   countries.	   The	   dramatic	   growth	   has	  brought	   a	   substantial	   appetite	   for	   new	   infrastructure	   along	   with	   increasing	  consumer	  demands,	  which	  have	  attracted	  lots	  of	  Chinese	  enterprises.	   	   	  In	  summary,	  Alaba	  Ogunsanwo,	  the	  distinguished	  Nigerian	  academic	  and	  former	  diplomat,	  has	  described	   “third	  World	   countries”	   like	  numerous	   “ants”	   standing	  behind	   China,	   “the	   elephant”.	   (Mthembu-­‐Salter,	   2009)	   Even	   if	   China	   had	   the	  power	   of	   an	   elephant,	   Nigeria,	   with	   its	   location,	   resources,	   size	   and	   political	  influence,	  can	  hardly	  be	  compared	  to	  an	  ant.	  Considering	  its	  political	  ambitions	  and	   considerable	   oil	   reserves,	   China	   has	   plenty	   of	   motivation	   to	   get	   involved	  with	  this	  country.	  To	  assess	  China’s	  responsibility	  in	  Nigeria,	  one	  should	  explore	  to	   what	   extend	   China’s	   national	   interests	   meet	   the	   demands	   of	   Nigeria	   and	  international	  society.	  
7.2.2	   	   	   Nigeria’s	  demands	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As	   mentioned	   in	   the	   preceding	   section,	   Nigeria,	   with	   its	   abundant	   energy	  reserves,	  potential	  economic	  growth,	  and	  human	  resources,	  could	  be	  considered	  an	   influential	   power	   in	   this	   region.	   Its	   active	   contributions	   to	   peacekeeping	  operations	   and	   its	   critical	   role	   in	   promoting	   the	   end	   of	   the	   slave	   trade	   and	  colonialism	  in	  Southern	  Africa,	  has	  gained	  it	  support	  and	  improved	  its	  reputation	  with	  other	  African	   countries.	  Acknowledging	   its	   regional	   influence,	  Nigeria	  has	  ambitions	   to	   represent	   the	   continent	   on	   the	   global	   platform.	   In	   2005,	   the	  Nigerian	  Foreign	  Minister	  Oluyemi	  Adeniji	  expressed	  Abuja’s	  quest	  to	  represent	  the	   African	   voice	   in	   an	   expanded	   permanent	   membership	   on	   the	   UN	   Security	  Council.	  In	  2013,	  Nigeria	  was	  elected	  as	  a	  non-­‐permanent	  member	  of	  the	  UN,	  the	  fourth	   time	   the	   country	   undertook	   this	   role.	   The	   AU	   (African	   Union)	   has	   also	  endorsed	  Nigeria	  as	  the	  only	  candidate	  from	  the	  continent	  in	  the	  coming	  election	  for	   the	   UN	   non-­‐permanent	   seat	   (Vanguard,	   October	   26	   2013)	   to	   pursue	   the	  interests	   of	   the	   continent	   and	  maintain	   international	   peace	   and	   security.	   Also,	  Nigeria	   became	   the	   largest	   economy	   in	   Africa	   in	   2013	   (Xinhua	   News,	   April	   7	  2014).	  These	   facts	   all	   indicate	   that	  Nigeria	   could	  be	   the	   leading	   representative	  for	  Africa.	  
However,	  due	  to	   its	  weak	  democracy,	  unstable	  political	  environment,	  economic	  problems	  and	  corruption,	  Nigeria	  has	  shown	  its	  weaknesses.	  Militant	  insurgents	  from	  the	  northeast	  have	   launched	  a	  series	  of	  attacks	  aimed	  at	  destabilising	   the	  country.	   Largely	   relying	   on	   energy	   exports	   has	   hindered	   the	   diversity	   of	   its	  economy,	   especially	   the	   development	   of	   its	   agricultural	   industry.	   Lacking	  refinery	   facilities,	   the	   state	   still	   remains	   an	   oil	   importer	   despite	   its	   abundant	  energy	  reserves.	  According	  to	  an	  investigation	  by	  the	  local	  newspaper	  Punch	  at	  the	   end	   of	   2012,	   “over	   N5tn	   (US$32.3billion)	   in	   government	   funds	   have	   been	  stolen	  through	  fraud,	  embezzlement	  and	  theft	  since	  President	  Jonathan	  assumed	  office	  in	  May	  2010”	  (OGUNSEYE,	  OKPI,	  &	  BAIYEWU,	  November	  25	  2012).	  
Combining	   the	   two	   faces	  of	  Nigeria,	   the	   state	  needs	   to	   compete	  with	   the	  other	  two	  African	  giants,	  South	  Africa	  and	  Egypt,	   for	  the	  two	  seats	  that	   the	  continent	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has	  pursued	  at	  the	  UN	  Security	  Council.	  At	  this	  point,	  it	  has	  to	  seek	  support	  from	  the	  AU	  and	  big	  powers	  from	  other	  continents.	  China	  traditionally	  considers	  itself	  a	   representative	   of	   developing	   countries	   and	   the	   developing	  member	   states	   of	  the	   UN	   Security	   Council.	   Therefore,	   it	   became	   a	   key	   political	   supporter	   of	  Nigeria’s	  request.	  In	  2005,	  then-­‐Chinese	  Foreign	  Minister	  Li	  Zhaoxing	  exchanged	  such	   views	   with	   Nigerian	   Foreign	   Minister	   Oluyemi	   Adeniji	   on	   UN	   reform	  (People's	   Daily,	   June	   5	   2005).	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   China’s	   chief	   spokesman	   Liu	  Jianchao	  said	  that	  China	  supports	  Africa,	  the	  continent	  with	  the	  largest	  number	  of	  developing	  countries,	  playing	  a	  greater	  role	  in	  the	  UN,	  including	  participation	  on	   the	   Security	   Council.	   (MOFA,	   March	   29	   2005)	   Nigeria’s	   political	   needs	   can	  motivate	  it	  to	  stand	  with	  China	  for	  political	  considerations.	  
Economically,	  Nigeria	  needs	  China	  for	  its	  economic	  reform:	  funds	  for	  structural	  transformation,	  economic	  aid,	  and	   local	  production	  to	  prevent	  over-­‐reliance	  on	  oil	  exports.	  Despite	  large	  amounts	  of	  energy	  reserves,	  Nigeria	  has	  not	  fully	  taken	  advantage	   of	   its	   oil	   income	   to	   generate	   national	   wealth.	   The	   oil	   industry	   has	  played	  a	  dominant	   role	   in	  Nigeria’s	  national	   income.	  However,	   the	   rural	   sector	  has	   been	   neglected.	   When	   the	   global	   oil	   price	   declined	   during	   the	   1980s,	   the	  country’s	   development	   stagnated,	   which	   led	   to	   the	   deterioration	   of	   Nigeria’s	  economic	   and	   social	   conditions.	   Simultaneously,	   the	   structural	   adjustment	  introduced	  by	  World	  Bank	  and	   IMF	  has	  been	  challenged	  by	  domestic	  pressure.	  “Towards	  the	  end	  of	  1990,	  the	  Government	  began	  to	  retreat	  from	  the	  reforms”	  -­‐	  meaning,	   the	   loans	   provided	   by	   the	   funding	   sources	   were	   suspended	   (Moser,	  Rogers,	  Van	  Til,	  Kibuka,	  &	  Lukonga,	  April	  4	  1997).	  During	  the	  same	  period,	   the	  Chinese	   enterprises	   had	   entered	   Nigeria	   market,	   and	   bilateral	   trade	   began	   to	  develop.	   Beijing,	  with	   its	   large	   amount	   of	   funds,	   provided	   the	   country	  with	   an	  alternative	   opportunity,	   especially	   after	   assistance	   from	   the	   Western	   world	  dropped	   significantly	   from	   2008,	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   global	   recession.	   China	  appears	  to	  be	   filling	  this	  gap.	  As	  an	  emerging	  economic	  power,	  China	   is	  able	  to	  provide	   investment,	   loans	   and	   other	   kinds	   of	   financial	   assistance	   for	   which	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Nigeria	  is	  thirsty.	   	  
Compared	  to	  most	  other	  African	  countries	  that	  are	  in	  need	  of	  funds,	  Nigeria	  has	  a	  more	   ambitious	   demand.	   The	   state	   experienced	   a	   period	   of	   yearning	   for	  economic	   transformation,	   from	   being	   dependent	   on	   imports	   to	   boosting	   local	  production.	   Nigeria’s	   representative	   to	   UNIDO,	   Dr.	   Patrick	   Kormawa	   said	   that	  “the	  only	  way	  Nigeria	  can	  attain	  the	  goal	  of	  an	  industrialised	  nation	  is	  when	  the	  country	  gets	  out	  of	  the	  habit	  of	  a	  consumption-­‐based	  economy	  to	  one	  driven	  by	  production	  and	  value	  addition”.	  (Thisdaylive,	  July	  2	  2013)	  As	  a	  country	  exporting	  crude	   oil	   but	   relying	   on	   petrol	   imports,	   Nigeria	   had	   to	   develop	   an	   industrial	  sector	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  job	  creation,	  food	  security,	  poverty	  reduction,	  and	  sustainable	  growth.	  Similarly,	  having	  the	  largest	  population	  on	  the	  continent,	  the	  country	  is	  able	   to	   provide	   cheap	   labour	   force.	   In	   this	   case,	   China’s	   successful	   economic	  transformation	   and	   industrial	   development	  have	  provided	  Nigeria	  with	   a	   good	  example	  of	  how	   to	  become	  a	   “world	   factory”	   that	  produces	   the	  goods	  not	  only	  consumed	   by	   domestic	   costumers	   but	   also	   exports	   to	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   world.	  Furthermore,	  Beijing	  has	  enough	  funds	  to	  invest	  in	  Nigeria’s	  industrialisation	  by	  providing	   infrastructure	   and	   establishing	   factories	   for	   manufactures.	   It	   offers	  Nigeria	  an	  economic	  opportunity	  to	  achieve	  its	  transformation	  agenda	  if	  political	  elites	  can	  properly	  take	  advantage	  of	  Beijing’s	  pledges.	   	   	  
7.2.3	  International	  Expectation	   	  During	  his	  visit	   to	  Nigeria	   in	  2006,	   former	  British	   foreign	   secretary	   Jack	  Straw	  remarked	  that	  what	  China	  was	  doing	  in	  Africa	  now	  was	  much	  the	  same	  as	  what	  Britain	   had	   done	   150	   years	   earlier	   (Akidi,	   May	   22,	   2012).	   Like	   Straw,	   many	  Western	   scholars	   and	  politicians	   are	   concerned	   that	   China	  may	  become	  a	  new	  colonial	  power	  in	  this	  oil-­‐rich	  country,	  scrambling	  for	  Nigeria’s	  natural	  resources	  and	  harming	   its	  quest	   for	  democracy	  and	   improved	  human	  rights.	  On	  a	   trip	   to	  Zambia,	   former	  US	   Secretary	   of	   State	  Hillary	   Clinton	   directly	   accused	   China	   of	  pursuing	   a	   “new	   colonialism”,	   and	   warned	   that	   “Africans	   should	   be	   wary	   of	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friends	   who	   only	   deal	   with	   elites”.	   “When	   people	   come	   to	   Africa	   to	   make	  investments,	  we	  want	  them	  to	  do	  well	  but	  also	  want	  them	  to	  do	  good,”	  she	  said.	  “We	  don’t	  want	   them	  to	  undermine	  good	  governance	   in	  Africa.”	   (LUSAKA,	   June	  11,	  2011).	   	  In	  short,	  regarding	  international	  expectations,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Nigeria	  international	  society	   has	   less	   concern	   for	   China	   in	   Nigeria	   than	   in	   Sudan,	   not	   only	   because	  China	  is	  not	  a	  major	  player	  in	  this	  state,	  but	  also	  because	  Nigeria’s	  government	  is	  less	   controversial	   than	   the	  Bashir	   regime.	  As	   a	   result,	   China’s	   responsibility	   in	  Nigeria	   lies	   more	   in	   a	   dual	   consideration	   of	   China’s	   national	   interests	   and	  Nigeria’s	  demands.	   	  
7.2.4	  Discussions	  for	  Shaping	  China’s	  responsibility	  in	  Nigeria	  As	  mentioned	  in	  a	  previous	  section,	  international	  society	  is	  less	  concerned	  with	  the	  China-­‐Nigeria	   link	   than	  with	  China’s	   relationship	  with	   Sudan.	  The	  problem	  causing	   the	  most	   concern	   is	   China’s	   ‘oil	   for	   infrastructure’	   approach,	   which	   is	  criticised	   as	   ‘new-­‐colonialism’.	   However,	   some	   Nigerian	   leaders	   refute	   this	  criticism	  at	  the	  policy	  level,	  and	  have	  welcomed	  the	  ‘cooperation’	  between	  China	  and	  Nigeria.	  Bolaji	  Akinyemi,	  Nigeria’s	  former	  foreign	  minister,	  and	  a	  scholar	  of	  Africa’s	  international	  relations,	  has	  said:	   	  
China	   is	   an	   emerging	   world	   power	   with	   a	   booming	   economy.	   She	  needs	   oil.	   Nigeria	   needs	   as	   much	   investment	   as	   possible	   and	   to	  diversify	   the	   sources	   of	   its	   investment.	   In	   the	   Middle	   East,	   the	   US	  regards	   China’s	   incursion	   with	   alarm,	   but	   Nigeria	   is	   more	   virgin	  territory	   for	   suitors	   and	  Washington	   should	   not	   be	   too	   worried.	   It	  insulates	  Nigeria	  from	  influence	  by	  one	  power.	   	   (Nigeria2Day,	  2006)	   	   	  
In	   this	   case,	   China-­‐Nigeria	   relations	   mostly	   arise	   from	   mutual	   demands.	  Regarding	  responsibility	  policy,	  China’s	  motivation	  and	  Nigeria’s	  demands	  have	  more	   weight	   than	   international	   comments	   on	   shaping	   China’s	   policy.	   As	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discussed	  in	  former	  sections,	  China	  has	  political,	  economic	  (energy	  and	  exports)	  interests	   in	   Nigeria,	   while	   Nigeria	   has	   a	   thirst	   for	   financial	   resources	   and	  international	   support.	   The	   two	   sides	   have	   a	   common	   interest	   to	   bond	   their	  relationship	  at	  the	  policy	  level.	  The	  following	  section	  will	  discuss	  to	  what	  extent	  the	  ‘mutual	  demands’	  work	  in	  the	  implementation	  process.	   	  
7.3	  China’s	  capability	  and	  limitation	  in	  Nigeria	  
	  In	  the	  preceding	  section,	  this	  thesis	  argued	  that	  China	  and	  Nigeria	  share	  similar	  goals.	   However,	   this	   situation	   does	   not	   mean	   a	   “win-­‐win”	   situation	   can	   be	  reached	   simply	   because	   of	   mutual	   interests.	   Nigeria’s	   political	   situation	   and	  ambitious	  plan	  for	  local	  industrialisation	  limit	  both	  sides’	  effective	  cooperation.	   	  	  Obviously,	  China	  has	   conducted	   its	   “oil	   for	   infrastructure”	   approach	   in	  Nigeria.	  The	   two	   countries	   have	   a	   supply-­‐side	   and	   a	   demand-­‐side	   logic	   to	   follow	   this	  measure.	   Because	   Nigeria,	   like	   many	   African	   countries,	   wanted	   to	   develop	   its	  infrastructure	   in	  order	  to	   fuel	   the	  growth	  of	   its	  economy,	  a	  solid	   infrastructure	  facilitated	   resource	   extraction	   in	   return.	   But	   compared	   to	   China’s	   most	  successful	  “oil	  for	  infrastructure”	  partner	  in	  Africa,	  Angola,	  Nigeria’s	  oil	  market	  is	  more	   competitive	   for	   Chinese	   oil	   companies.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	   Nigerian	  government	   is	   more	   ambitious	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   diversifying	   its	   economic	  structure.	   President	   Jonathan	   emphasised	   in	   his	   national	   address,	   “growth	   in	  agriculture	  and	  other	  non-­‐oil	  sectors	  are	  crucial,	   to	  help	  diversify	   the	  economy	  and	   to	   generate	   much	   needed	   jobs”.	   Chinese	   Ambassador	   Deng	   Boqing’s	  interview	  concurred	  with	  President	  Jonathan’s	  speech,	  and	  he	  promised	  that	  the	  Chinese	  “shall	  continue	  to	  encourage	  more	  import	  of	  non-­‐oil	  items	  from	  Nigeria,	  especially	   agriculture	   products”.	   But	   considering	   the	   unstable	   situations	   in	  Nigeria,	  this	  goal	  is	  too	  ambitious	  for	  them	  to	  realize.	   	  
Nigeria	   is	   a	   deficient	   democratic	   state.	   The	   electoral	   politics	   have	   brought	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instability	  and	  inconsistency	  to	  its	  foreign	  policy,	  and	  that	  policy	  can	  change	  with	  the	   election	   of	   a	   different	   president.	   The	   Nigerian	   government	   needs	   China’s	  funds	  for	  infrastructure	  to	  show	  its	  political	  achievements,	  but	  could	  also	  discard	  China	  when	  faced	  with	  domestic	  or	   foreign	  problems.	  Witnesses	  3	  and	  20	  both	  admitted	   that	   the	   Nigerian	   people	   were	   very	   ambitious	   about	   their	   national	  strength,	  and	  believed	  Nigeria	   to	  be	  an	   important	  power,	  despite	   the	  country’s	  underdeveloped	   infrastructure,	   unbalanced	   economic	   structure,	   and	   security	  problems.	   Meanwhile,	   when	   spurred	   by	   the	   Western	   media,	   the	   Nigeria	  government	   could	   find	   a	   scapegoat	   for	   these	   problems,	   and	   transfer	   people’s	  attention	  away	  from	  the	  Nigeria	  government	  and	  on	  to	  China.	  Witness	  2	  argued	  that	   China	   is	   an	   easy	   scapegoat	   for	   Africa’s	   developmental	   problems.	   China’s	  approach	  of	  “oil	   for	  infrastructure”	  became	  an	  easy	  target	  for	  African	  economic	  problem.	  It	  could	  reflect	  the	  changes	  in	  President	  Yar’Adua	  administration.	  In	  his	  administration,	   the	   Nigerian	   government	   suspended	   or	   cancelled	   many	   of	   the	  “oil	   for	   infrastructure”	   contracts	   signed	   during	   Obasanjo’s	   tenure,	   because	  Yar’Adua’s	   government	   thought	   the	   oil	   could	   command	   a	   better	   price	   on	   the	  international	  market	  than	  that	  provided	  by	  Chinese	  infrastructure	  construction.	  When	  Jonathan	  took	  office,	  the	  “oil	  for	  infrastructure”	  policy	  was	  re-­‐launched.	  In	  July	  2013,	  President	  Jonathan	  had	  a	  four-­‐day	  visit	  to	  Beijing.	  During	  his	  trip,	  he	  signed	  contracts	   for	  US$1.1	  billion	   in	   loans	   that	   included	  US$0.5	  billion	   for	   the	  construction	  of	  four	  international	  airport	  terminals	  located	  in	  Lagos,	  Abuja,	  Kano,	  and	   Port	   Harcourt	   (Punch,	   July	   10	   2013),	   and	   a	   700-­‐megawatt	   hydropower	  station	   (Bloomberg,	   December	   13	   2013).	   However,	   one	   must	   note	   that	   these	  established	   contracts	   face	   another	   round	   of	   change,	   since	  Nigeria	  will	   have	   its	  new	  election	  in	  the	  coming	  year.	  Given	  Nigeria’s	  power	  transition	  between	  North	  and	   South,	   it	   is	   questionable	   whether	   President	   Jonathan	   could	   serve	   another	  term.	  
In	  summary,	  although	  Nigeria	  demonstrates	  its	  desire	  to	  seek	  a	  sustainable	  and	  balanced	   developmental	   path	   and	   its	   ambition	   to	   become	   a	   big	   power,	   the	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incoherence	   of	   the	   Nigerian	   government’s	   policy	   towards	   China’s	   “oil	   for	  infrastructure”	   approach	   limits	   China’s	   capabilities	   in	   Nigeria.	   Furthermore,	  despite	   the	   fact	   that	   Abuja	   may	   not	   be	   satisfied	   with	   Beijing’s	   “oil	   for	  infrastructure”	   deals,	   they	   have	   not	   established	   an	   alternative	   approach.	   The	  changing	   agenda	   of	   the	   Nigerian	   government	   lacks	   a	   long-­‐term	   plan	   and	   has	  brought	  little	  benefit	  to	  the	  economic	  development	  of	  the	  state,	  even	  less	  to	  local	  communities	   and	   the	   Nigerian	   people.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   due	   to	   inconsistent	  policy	   and	   the	   social	   unrest,	   London-­‐based	   think	   tank	   Chatham	   House	   has	  proven	   that	   China	   and	   other	   Asian	   oil	   companies	   haven’t	   benefited	   from	   their	  investments	  (Vines,	  et	  al.	  August	  2009).	  Superficially,	  Nigeria,	  as	  an	  oil	  rich	  state	  that	   lacks	   industrial	  products,	   seemed	   to	   complement	  China’s	   thirst	   for	   energy	  and	   manufactured	   goods;	   while	   China’s	   huge	   idle	   funds	   and	   experience	   in	  infrastructure	   construction	   would	   benefit	   Nigeria’s	   economic	   development.	  However,	   as	   Witness	   3	   pointed	   out,	   Nigeria’s	   corruption,	   mismanagement,	  incoherent	  policy,	  and	  “oil	  violence”	  have	  constrained	  the	  commitment	  of	  foreign	  investment,	   thus	   making	   its	   oil	   reserves	   an	   illusion	   to	   its	   people	   and	   Chinese	  investors.	   	  
7.4	  The	  Gap	  between	  China’s	  policy	  in	  Nigeria	  and	  its	  implementation	  In	   the	   preceding	   sections,	   this	   thesis	   has	   indicated	   that	   China’s	   and	   Nigeria’s	  national	   interests	   can	   be	   compatible.	   Beijing	   has	   advocated	   for	   creating	   a	  “win-­‐win”	  situation	  to	  explore	  Nigeria’s	  oil	  fields.	  Even	  if	  we	  assume	  that	  Beijing	  has	  a	  policy	   for	   fully	  supporting	  the	  needs	  of	  Nigeria,	   it	  has	  to	   fit	   into	  Nigeria’s	  domestic	  situation,	  and	  political	  changes	   in	  Nigeria	  might	  create	   limitations	   for	  both	   sides.	   Furthermore,	   Larry	   Diamond	   indicates	   that	   “political	   corruption,	  fraud,	   and	   violence”	   have	   existed	   in	   this	   country	   since	   the	   First	   Republic	   of	  Nigeria	   (Diamond,	  2008:	  70).	  Combined	  with	  Nigeria’s	  unstable	  policy	   changes	  and	   political	   changes,	   and	   the	   problems	  with	   its	   democracy,	   there	   are	   various	  issues	   plaguing	   China’s	   capability	   to	   take	   responsibility	   in	   this	   country.	   This	  section	  will	  use	  “oil	  for	  infrastructure”	  as	  a	  start	  to	  deeply	  discuss	  the	  problems	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on	   the	   policy	   implementation	   especially	   the	   impacts	   of	   political	   change,	  mismanagement,	   and	   violence.	   After	   the	   oil	   case,	   the	   problems	   surrounding	  China’s	   business	   involvement	   in	  Nigeria’s	  market	  will	   be	   discussed.	   These	   two	  parts	  are	  designed	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  third	  hypothesis,	  that	  China	  has	  a	  complex	  role	  in	  international	  responsibility	  in	  Nigeria	  because	  of	  these	  varied	  issues.	  
7.4.1	  Oil	  for	  infrastructure	   	  As	  mentioned	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  at	  the	  policy	  level,	  the	  Chinese	  government	  expected	   to	   use	   the	   provision	   of	   infrastructure	   in	   exchange	   for	   access	   for	   the	  exploitation	  of	  Nigeria’s	  oil.	  As	  Witness	  1	  said,	  
“Our	   [China-­‐Africa]	   cooperation	   is	   mutually	   beneficial.	   We	   are	   not	  neo-­‐colonialists,	   we	   are	   not	   robbers,	   the	   colonialists	   came	   to	   Africa	   to	  plunder	   resources,	   and	   the	   African	   people	   hate	   them;	   but	   we	   helped	  Africans	   to	   build	   lots	   of	   infrastructure	   and	   helped	   them	   to	   explore	   and	  refine	  crude	  oil	  with	  Chinese	  development	  finance.	  African	  people	  should	  not	  suffer	  from	  poverty	  with	  rich	  natural	  resources.”	  
Witness	  24	  said,	  
“Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  China	  has	  imported	  oil	  and	  other	  natural	  resources	  from	   Africa,	   China	   has	   financed	   African	   countries	   for	   infrastructure	  construction	   in	   return,	   for	   which	   the	   interest	   rate	   is	   much	   lower	   than	  most	  European	  loans.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  these	  projects	  were	  supported	  by	  the	   Chinese	   government	   and	   constructed	   by	   Chinese	   companies	   that	  lower	  the	  chances	  of	  corruption.”	   	  
Nigeria	   has	   the	   second	   largest	   oil	   reserves	   in	   Africa,	   and	   the	   state’s	   economy	  largely	  relies	  on	  the	  income	  it	  derives	  from	  these	  energy	  resources.	  However,	  the	  funds	   raised	   from	   the	   oil	   industry	   have	   not	   been	   successfully	   transferred	   into	  diversified	  economic	  development.	   Instead,	   the	  money	  is	  consumed	  by	  political	  spending	   and	   corruption.	   This	   mismanagement	   of	   oil	   income	   has	   created	   a	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vicious	   circle.	   Nigeria	   failed	   to	   develop	   its	   agricultural	   and	   manufacture	  industries,	  which	   led	   to	   an	   unbalanced	   economic	   structure,	  which	  weakens	   its	  economy	  and	  makes	  it	  heavily	  reliant	  on	  international	  markets	  and	  funds.	  At	  the	  same	   time,	   the	   backward	   infrastructure,	   unreliable	   power	   supply,	   rural	  agricultural	   industry	   and	   civil	   unrest	   have	   restricted	   Nigeria’s	   economic	  development	  and	  foreign	  investment.	   	  According	  to	  a	  survey	  by	  the	  World	  Bank	  on	  the	  African	  region,	  “infrastructure	  has	  made	  a	  net	  contribution	  of	  around	  1	  percentage	  point	  to	  Nigeria’s	  improved	  per	   capita	   growth	   performance	   in	   recent	   years,	   in	   spite	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   an	  unreliable	   power	   supply	   held	   growth	   back”.	   The	   same	   survey	   suggested	   that	  infrastructure	   constraints	   are	   responsible	   for	   about	   40%	   of	   the	   productivity	  handicap	  faced	  by	  African	  firms”	  (Foster	  and	  Pushak,	  2011).	  In	  contrast,	  lack	  of	  investment	   and	   funds	   meant	   that	   the	   country	   couldn’t	   meet	   its	   demands	   for	  power,	  roads,	  water,	  railways,	  and	  other	  industries.	  Considering	  the	  situation	  in	  Nigeria,	  it	  will	  require	  sustained	  expenditure	  of	  almost	  US$14.2	  billion	  per	  year	  over	   the	   next	   decade,	   which	   would	   account	   for	   about	   12%	   of	   GDP;	   when	  currently	   only	   US$5.9	   billion	   has	   been	   spent	   on	   infrastructure	   construction,	  which	   is	   the	   equivalent	   to	   about	   5%	   of	   GDP,	   let	   alone	   the	   needs	   of	   daily	  operations	  and	  maintenance.	  (All	  Africa,	  Mar.	  19th,	  2013)	  In	  this	  case,	  not	  only	  could	   improving	   the	   country’s	   infrastructure	   contribute	   to	   a	   boost	   to	   its	  economy,	   but	   its	   economy	   requires	   greater	   investment	   in	   infrastructure	  construction.	   Additionally,	   the	   countries’	   underdeveloped	   banking	   system,	  management	  and	   infrastructure,	  power	  and	  water	   supplies,	   and	   transportation	  make	  the	  manufacturing	  industry	  very	  difficult	  to	  operate	  in	  Nigeria.	  Witness	  19	  revealed	   that	  most	   large	   companies	   have	   to	   rely	   on	   imports	   to	  maintain	   their	  operations,	   because	   Nigeria	   doesn’t	   have	   a	   sufficient	   supply	   chain	   and	  infrastructure	   to	   support	   their	  projects.	  The	  medium	  and	   small	   companies	   can	  hardly	   survive,	   because	   of	   the	   high	   benchmark	   interest	   rate, 30 	   poor	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Nigeria’s	  benchmark	  interest	  rate	  was	  12%	  in	  2013,	  while	  most	  economies’	  benchmark	  interest	  rate	  is	  
	   200	  
infrastructure,	  and	  instability.	  Furthermore,	   Nigeria,	   as	   a	   developing	   country	   with	   huge	   oil	   income	   but	  corruption,	   economic	   mismanagement	   and	   lack	   of	   accountability	   and	  transparency,	   has	   suffered	   from	   the	   “resource	   curse”	   (Diamond	   2008:	   74-­‐75,	  called	   it	   oil	   curse,	   and	   he	   indicates	   this	   phenomenon	   can	   be	   found	   in	  most	   oil	  countries).	  With	  large	  amounts	  of	  oil	  wealth,	  the	  Nigerian	  government	  does	  not	  need	   to	   rely	   on	   taxpayers	   for	   its	   income.	   Therefore,	   even	   if	   Nigeria	   has	   a	  defective	  democratic	  political	  system,	  the	  political	  leaders	  do	  not	  have	  to	  answer	  to	  the	  people	  for	  voting,	  but	  rather	  for	  control	  of	  the	  oil	  industry.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  oil	   revenues	   go	   to	   the	   government	   in	   which	   80%	   is	   disbursed	   to	   individual	  governors	  and	  their	  cronies,	  while	  just	  1%	  goes	  to	  the	  Nigerian	  people.	  (Burleigh,	  August	   9	   2013)	   Not	   matter	   how	   large	   Nigeria’s	   oil	   reserves	   are,	   little	   of	   the	  income	   could	   be	   invested	   in	   infrastructure	   and	   local	   society.	   Thus,	   there	   is	   no	  doubt	   that,	   without	   fundamental	   solutions	   to	   its	   governance	   problems,	   the	  Nigerian	   people	   will	   continue	   to	   suffer	   from	   rampant	   corruption	   and	   poor	  economic	  performance.	  However,	  as	  mentioned,	  China’s	  responsibility	  in	  Nigeria	  is	  a	  combination	  of	  national	  interests	  and	  Nigeria’s	  demands.	  It	   is	  unrealistic	  to	  expect	  that	  the	  state	  could	  change	  overnight.	  Infrastructure	  construction	  at	  least	  provides	   the	   country	   and	   the	   people	   with	   some	   tangible	   contributions	   and	  avoids	  the	  abuse	  and	  corruption	  of	  oil	  revenues	  by	  political	  leaders.	   	  
The	   “oil	   for	   infrastructure”	   approach	   was	   initially	   put	   forward	   by	   Beijing	   to	  expand	   its	   oil	   industry	   alongside	   favourable	   infrastructure	   contracts.	   But,	   in	  practice,	   this	   infrastructure-­‐for-­‐resources	   deal	   hasn’t	   worked	   well	   in	   Nigeria.	  Because	   Chinese	   companies	   lack	   experiences	   in	   responding	   to	   the	   changing	  political	   environment	   in	   Nigeria.	   Political	   elites	   in	   this	   country	   have	   differing	  interests	  regarding	  the	  “oil	  for	  infrastructure”	  deals.	  Some	  favour	  infrastructure	  as	  an	  achievement	  for	  their	  electoral	  politics,	  while	  others	  felt	  that	  implementing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  below	  10%	  -­‐	  for	  example,	  China’s	  is	  about	  6%.	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these	  deals	  would	  cut	  them	  off	  from	  the	  profits	  derived	  from	  crude	  oil	  deals	  on	  the	   international	   market.	   In	   addition,	   mismanagement	   and	   violence	   has	  undermined	   the	   Nigerian	   people’s	   ability	   to	   enjoy	   the	   benefits	   from	   the	  Chinese-­‐built	  infrastructure	  and	  Chinese	  companies’	  profits.	   	   	   	   	  
I.	  Weak	  democracy	  and	  Incoherent	  policy	  
As	   the	   thesis	   mentioned	   in	   the	   previous	   section,	   the	   Nigerian	   government	  established	  a	  democratic	  regime	  in	  1999,	  when	  President	  Obasanjo	  returned	  to	  power.	  Since	  then,	  the	  state	  has	  successfully	  conducted	  national	  elections	  three	  times	  –	  in	  2003,	  2007	  and	  2011.	  State	  power	  has	  transferred	  from	  Obasanjo,	  to	  Yar’Adua,	   and	   then	   Jonathan.	  However,	   the	  positive	   steps	  on	   the	  political	   front	  haven't	   brought	   this	   country	   stability	   and	   development	   because	   of	   its	   weak	  democratic	   institutions	   and	   authoritarian	   distribution	   of	   resources.	   After	   two	  democratic	  transitions,	  the	  political	  system	  and	  elections	  still	  remain	  as	  “access	  to	   the	   state	   as	   an	   avenue	   for	   wealth	   accumulation	   and	   conferment	   of	   status”	  (CDD,	  2003).	   	  
Larry	  Diamond	  has	  even	  called	  Nigeria’s	  democracy	  a	  money	  democracy	  because	  in	  this	  country,	   the	  oil	  curse	  has	  caused	  the	  political	  elites	  to	   fight	  against	  each	  other	   for	   the	   benefits	   from	   oil.	   The	   1999	   election	   was	   plagued	   by	   cheating,	  corruption	  and	  vote	  buying,	  and	  one-­‐third	  of	   the	  state	  may	  suffer	   from	  serious	  election	   fraud.	   Even	   in	   the	   2003	   elections,	   these	   problems	   with	   electoral	  cheating	   had	   only	   slightly	   been	   resolved.	   (Diamond,	   2008:	   70-­‐71,	   73-­‐74).	  Therefore,	  elections	  in	  Nigeria	  can	  only	  be	  argued	  to	  appear	  to	  have	  the	  form	  of	  elections,	   rather	   than	   actually	   being	   elections.	   Winning	   an	   election	   will	  determine	  whether	  someone	  is	  able	  to	  have	  access	  to	  the	  resource	  distribution	  process.	   The	   perception	   that	   elections	   are	   zero-­‐sum	   grasps	   of	   wealth	   leads	   to	  unsustainable	   policy	   decisions	   that	   are	   easily	   changed	   in	   future	   presidential	  administrations.	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Obasanjo	   is	   a	   Yoruba	   from	   Nigeria’s	   Christian	   south,	   who	   represented	   the	  interests	  of	  his	  background;	  while	  Yar’Adua	  is	  a	  Fulani	  Hausa	  and	  a	  Muslim	  from	  the	  north.	   It	   seemed,	   therefore,	   that	   “Yar’Adua’s	  northern	  supporters…	  will	  not	  let	  Obasanjo’s	  deals	  proceed	  unless	  they	  are	  included	  in	  them”	  (Mthembu-­‐Salter,	  2009).	  This	  explained	  the	  fact	  that,	  after	  Yar’Adua	  took	  office	  in	  2007,	  he	  swiftly	  reviewed	   the	   agreements	   signed	   during	   Obasanjo’s	   administration.	   It	   led	   to	   a	  large	  number	  of	  “oil	  for	  infrastructure”	  deals	  signed	  between	  Nigeria	  and	  other	  Asian	  companies	  to	  either	  be	  suspended	  or	  cancelled.	  Meanwhile,	  “no	  coherent…	  policy	  has	  replaced	  Obasanjo’s	  discarded	  one”,	   the	  government	  was	  ambiguous	  about	  what	  they	  wanted:	  cash	  or	  infrastructure	  (Wong,	  2009).	   	  
When	  President	  Jonathan	  took	  office	  in	  2010,	  the	  bilateral	  economic	  relationship	  between	  Beijing	  and	  Abuja	  had	  rebounded.	  Nigerian	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  Olugbenga	   Ashiru	   pointed	   out	   in	   an	   interview	   that	   President	   Jonathan’s	  “Transformation	   Agenda	   with	   its	   strong	   emphasis	   on	   infrastructural	  development:	   roads,	   power,	   railways,	   etc.	   makes	   relationship	   with	   China	   very	  crucial	   and	   imperative”	   (Guardian,	   Jul.	   19th	  2013).	  Evidence	   can	  also	  be	   found	  for	   an	   increasing	   number	   Chinese	   SOEs	   contracts	   in	   Nigeria.	   In	   July	   2012,	   the	  China	   Machinery	   Engineering	   Corporation	   (CMEC)	   worked	   with	   the	   Delta	  government	  to	  build	  a	  vehicle	  assembly	  plant	  at	  Issele-­‐Uku,	  in	  the	  Aniocha	  North	  Local	  Government	  Area	   of	   the	   state	   (City	   Flavour	   International,	   Jul.	   9th	   2012).	  Soon	   after,	   the	   Nigeria	   government	   endorsed	   a	   locomotive	   contract	   that	   cost	  about	  US$28	  million,	   for	  Chinese	   carriages	  and	   railway.	  This	  purchase	  brought	  Chinese	  companies	  an	  opportunity	  to	  enter	  Nigeria	  and	  other	  African	  emerging	  markets	  (MOFCOM,	  2012).	  It	  estimated	  that	  Chinese	  companies	  had	  already	  built	  roads	  across	  Nigeria	   in	   contracts	  worth	  $1.7	  billion.	   In	   return,	  China’s	  demand	  for	  crude	  oil	  produced	  in	  Nigeria	  is	  expected	  to	  rise	  tenfold	  to	  200,000	  barrels	  a	  day	  by	  2015,	  Nigerian	  officials	  said,	  and	  AFP	  reports.	   (BBC	  Jul.	  11th	  2013)	  It	   is	  worth	  noting	  that	  Chinese	  shares	  of	  oil	  exploration	   in	  the	  Niger	  Delta	  area	  was	  mainly	   gained	   through	   acquisitions	   from	   the	   traditional	   multinational	   oil	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companies,	  rather	  than	  directly	  from	  the	  Nigerian	  government	  during	  Jonathan’s	  administration.	  In	  2009,	  Sinopec	  bought	  Addax	  petroleum	  –	  a	  company	  based	  in	  Switzerland	  and	   listed	   in	   the	  UK	  and	  Canada,	   for	  US$7.2	  billion.	  This	  purchase	  ensured	  China’s	  engagement	  in	  Nigeria	  and	  other	  West	  Africa	  oil	  producers,	  like	  Gabon	  and	  Cameroon	   (Guardian,	   June	  24th	  2009).	  At	   the	  end	  of	  2012,	   Sinopec	  paid	  US$2.5	  billion	   for	  a	   stake	   in	  OML	  138	   from	  the	  French	  oil	   company	  Total,	  which	   accounted	   for	   20%	   of	   its	   offshore	   oilfields	   in	   Nigeria	   (BBC,	   Nov.	   19th	  2012).	  
Table	  7.1	  Nigeria’s	  elected	  presidents	  
Years	   of	  Rule	   Name	   Type	   of	  government	   Ethnicity	   Religion	   Place	  of	  Birth	  Departure	  from	  Government	  
1999-­‐	  2007	   Olusegun	  Obasanjo	   	   Civilian	   Yoruba	   Christian	   South-­‐West	  (Ogun)	   Election	  
2007-­‐	  2010	   Umaru	  Yar’Adua	   Civilian	   Hausa-­‐	  Fulani	   Muslims	   North	  (Katsina)	   Election	  
2010-­‐	   Goodluck	  Jonathan	   	   Civilian	   Lijaw	   Christian	   South	  (Ogbia)	   Succeed	  /	  Election	  
 	  
Politically,	   the	   electoral	   cycle	   has	  made	   the	   deals	   between	   Chinese	   companies	  and	  the	  Nigerian	  government	  unstable,	  sometimes	  even	  the	  “legal”	  contracts	  may	  be	   suspended	   or	   cancelled	   because	   of	   the	   election	   of	   one	   political	   leader	   over	  another	  -­‐	  especially	  when	  the	  regime	  changes	  hands	  from	  a	  northern	  Muslim	  to	  a	  southern	   Christian.	   Since	   the	   new	   presidential	   election	  will	   come	   in	   2015	   and	  considering	  Nigeria’s	  electoral	  alternative	  between	  north	  and	  south,	  the	  future	  of	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China’s	  contracts	  is	  doubt.	  As	  a	  Western	  diplomat	  described:	  “When	  it	  comes	  to	  ‘oil	  for	  infrastructure’,	  I	  think	  the	  Angolans	  understood	  the	  point	  that	  you	  either	  get	  the	  infrastructure	  or	  the	  money.	  The	  Nigerians	  thought	  you	  got	  both	  …	  But	  it	  turns	   out	   that,	   forced	   to	   choose…”	   (Mthembu-­‐Salter,	   2009).	   Lacking	   a	   clear	  message	   on	  Nigeria’s	   demands	  made	   it	   hard	   for	   China	   to	  make	   a	   judgment	   on	  how	  to	  “be	  responsible”	  in	  the	  country.	  In	  addition,	  the	  incoherent	  policy	  left	  the	  country	  with	  lots	  of	  unfinished	  projects;	  a	  waste	  of	  both	  Chinese	  investment	  and	  Nigeria’s	  development	  funds.	  
Theoretically,	   Chinese	   construction	   companies	   have	   the	   advantages	   of	   China’s	  high-­‐level	   political	   dialogue	   and	   financial	   support	   from	  China’s	   national	   banks.	  The	   infrastructure	   construction	   projects	   were	   introduced	   as	   a	   complement	   to	  their	   oil	   deals,	   but	   in	   reality	   the	   projects	   did	   not	   go	   through	   smoothly.	   Take	  railway	  construction	  as	  an	  example:	  in	  2002,	  a	  project	  for	  the	  modernisation	  of	  Nigeria’s	   railway	   system	  was	   proposed,	  which	   China	   offered	   to	   finance	  with	   a	  US$1	   billion	   soft	   loan	   from	   the	   China	   Exim	   Bank.	   On	   October	   30th	   2006,	   the	  CCECC	   and	   the	  Nigerian	  Ministry	   of	   Transport	   signed	   a	   contract	  worth	  US$8.3	  billion	  for	  the	  Lagos-­‐Kano	  Railway	  Modernisation	  Project	  (China	  Daily,	  Sept.	  3rd	  2012),	   which	   was	   linked	   with	   the	   2006	   China-­‐Nigeria	   “Oil	   for	   infrastructure	  agreement”.	   However,	   it	   was	   suspended	   in	   2008,	   due	   to	   the	   Yar’Adua	  government’s	   austerity	   measures	   and	   financial	   difficulties.	   The	   Nigerian	  government	   has	   presented	   a	   sharply	   contrasting	   attitude	   towards	   the	   project	  from	   high-­‐profile	   support	   under	   President	   Obasanjo	   to	   a	   suspension	   order	  contained	  in	  a	  letter.	  (oyibosonline,	  2008)	   	  
CCECC	  was	  frustrated	  by	  the	  changing	  policy,	  because	  this	  company	  had	  lobbied	  for	   the	   US$1	   billion	   loan	   from	   Chinese	   government	   in	   order	   to	   facilitate	   the	  project	   in	   the	   first	   place.	  On	   the	  other	   side,	  Nigeria	   complained	   about	  CCECC’s	  sluggish	  performance	  by	  claiming	  that,	  “in	  spite	  of	  the	  $250	  million	  released	  to	  the	   contractor	   for	   the	   take-­‐off	   of	   the	   project,	   Nigerians	   were	   yet	   to	   see	   any	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improvement	   in	   the	   rail	   sector”.	   (oyibosonline,	   2008)	   CCECC	   held	   a	   different	  perspective:	  Chi	  Hongbing	  said	  that	  even	  though	  Nigeria	   just	  paid	  the	  company	  $250	  million,	  which	   only	   accounted	   for	   3%	  of	   the	   entire	   project,	   the	   company	  had	   made	   progress	   on	   the	   1,315km	   Lagos-­‐Kano	   double	   track	   standard	   gauge	  rehabilitation,	  which	  is	  the	  first	  phase	  of	  the	  25-­‐year-­‐long	  project.	  (Weekly	  Trust,	  Nov.	   14th	   2009)	  Witness	   7	   revealed	   that	   construction	   projects	   in	   Africa	   were	  difficult,	   due	   to	   financial	   difficulties,	   mismanagement	   and	   corruption,	   which	  meant	   that	   some	   African	   government-­‐led	   projects	   often	   delayed	   payment	   and	  lacked	  credibility.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  since	  most	  African	  countries	  don't	  have	  a	  sustainable	   supply	   chain	   to	   maintain	   such	   a	   big	   project,	   lots	   of	   materials	   and	  equipment	   for	   the	   projects	   had	   to	   be	   imported.	   It	   often	   happened	   that,	   when	  some	  big	  projects	  were	  undertaken	  in	  the	  same	  period,	  the	  projects	  were	  easily	  delayed	   by	   the	   shortage	   of	   some	   key	   materials.	   What’s	   worse,	   the	   shortages	  created	  an	  unbalanced	  supply-­‐demand	  of	  these	  materials	  in	  local	  markets,	  which	  led	   to	   an	   increase	   in	   their	   cost	   and	  made	   the	   completion	   of	   the	   projects	   even	  harder.	   	  
CCECC’s	   project	   re-­‐launched	   in	   2009.	   The	   price	   of	   the	   project	  was	   reduced	   to	  US$8	  billion,	  and	  China	  agreed	  to	  help	  finance	  the	  project	  with	  a	  US$2.5	  billion	  loan,	   comprised	   of	   export	   credit	   for	   US$2	   billion	   at	   a	   competitive	   commercial	  rate,	   and	   a	   preferential	   export	   credit	   of	   US$500	   million.	   In	   order	   to	   relieve	  Nigeria’s	   financial	   difficulty,	   the	  project	  was	   to	  be	   implemented	   in	  phases.	  The	  first	   phase	   of	   the	   project	   included	  modernising	   the	   186.5km	   Abuja-­‐to-­‐Kaduna	  section	  of	   the	  1,313km	  railway	   from	  Lagos	   to	  Kano.	  The	  cost	  of	   the	   first	  phase	  was	  projected	  to	  be	  US$849,750,903	  and	  would	  be	  constructed	  over	  36	  months.	  The	  second	  phase	  of	   the	  project	  was	  the	  Lagos-­‐Ibadan	  section	  of	   the	  railway,	  a	  double-­‐track	  line	  with	  a	  total	  length	  of	  156.8km	  and	  a	  projected	  speed	  of	  150km	  per	  hour,	   for	  both	  passengers	  and	   freight	   transportation.	  This	  portion	   is	  worth	  approximately	   US$1.487	   billion,	   with	   a	   construction	   period	   of	   36	   months.	  (Xinhua,	   Jul.	   5th	   2013)	   In	   July	   2013,	   the	  Minister	   of	   Transportation	   confirmed	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that	  68%	  of	   the	  work	  on	  the	  Abuja-­‐Kaduna	   line	  had	  been	  completed,	  while	   the	  contract	  for	  the	  Lagos-­‐Ibadan	  double	  track	  had	  been	  signed	  but	  was	  pending	  the	  completion	   of	   an	   agreement	   with	   the	   China	   Exim	   bank	   (Aid	   Data).	   The	  stop-­‐and-­‐go	   Chinese	   projects	   in	   Nigeria	   reflect	   Nigeria’s	   changing	   political	  priority	   and	   fragile	   contacts	   impact	   on	   both	   Chinese	   enterprises	   and	   Nigerian	  development.	   As	   this	   is	   an	   area	   abandoned	   by	  most	   of	   the	  western	   countries,	  China’s	   ‘oil-­‐for-­‐infrastructure’	   approach	   cannot	   provide	   effective	   commitments	  to	  local	  development.	  
II.	  Mismanagement	  
The	  previous	  paragraph	  indicated	  that	  the	  elections	  in	  Nigeria	  are	  characterised	  by	   corruption	   and	   vote-­‐buying,	   and	   that	   this	   leads	   to	   mismanagement	   in	   this	  country.	  Despite	  President	  Obasanjo	  attempts	  to	  form	  a	  financial	  crime	  section	  to	  combat	  corruption	  and	  the	  financial	  problems	  in	  the	  oil	  sector,	  which	  prevented	  some	  governors	  and	  political	  leaders	  from	  appropriating	  oil	  revenues	  for	  private	  use	   benefit,	   he	   still	   tried	   to	   buy	   parliament	  members	   to	   give	   himself	   the	   third	  term	  as	  president	  (Diamond,	  2008:	  72-­‐73).	  Oil	  companies	  in	  Nigeria	  are	  the	  core	  problem	   that	   leads	   to	   mismanagement.	   Currently,	   foreign	   companies	   that	  operate	   in	   Nigeria	   have	   worked	   on	   joint	   ventures	   with	   Nigeria’s	   national	   oil	  companies.	  In	  May	  2002,	  the	  Nigerian	  government	  commercialised	  the	  Nigerian	  National	   Petroleum	   Corporation	   (NNPC),	   and	   increased	   its	   independence.	   (NG	  MOFCOM,	  2003)	  In	  this	  case,	  foreign	  companies	  could	  increase	  their	  shares	  and	  involvement	   of	   Nigeria’s	   oil	   industry.	   However,	   Witness	   3	   explained	   that	   this	  measure	  did	  not	  prevent	  bureaucratisation	  and	  corruption;	  instead	  it	  turned	  out	  to	   be	   a	   transference	   of	   oil	   interests	   from	   the	   government	   to	   bureaucrats,	  plutocrats,	   and	   individuals.	   For	   example,	   South	  Atlantic	   Petroleum,	  which	   sold	  OML	  130	   to	  CNOOC,	  was	  owned	  by	   the	  ex-­‐Nigerian	  Defence	  Minister	  Danjuma.	  Witness	   20	   complained	   that	   Chinese	   companies	   were	   confused	   about	   the	  Nigerian	   governments’	   role	   in	   its	   oil	   industry.	   After	   a	   series	   of	   oil	   reforms,	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exploration	   and	   operation	   were	   still	   controlled	   by	   a	   few	   political	   elites,	   and	  sometimes	   Nigerian	   oil	   ministers	   handed	   out	   licenses	   at	   their	   own	   discretion.	  Although	  not	  illegal,	  it	  did	  not	  follow	  the	  practice	  of	  using	  open	  bids.	  In	  addition,	  the	   serious	   corruption	   and	   bureaucracy	  meant	   the	   Chinese/foreign	   companies	  have	  to	  pay	  extra	  “public	  relations”	  fees	  in	  order	  to	  win	  the	  bidding.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	   situation	   left	   Chinese	   investors	  with	   not	  many	   choices,	   except	  maintaining	  relationships	  with	  a	  few	  Nigerian	  political	  elites.	  Sometimes,	  as	  Witness	  20	  said,	  “you	  have	  no	  other	  methods	  than	  bribe	  the	  local	  governors”.	  Similar	  experiences	  were	  had	  by	  Western	  multinational	  oil	  companies	  as	  well.	  In	  2000,	  the	  Nigerian	  government	  announced	  that	  it	  would	  issue	  oil	   licenses	  through	  open	  bidding	  in	  order	   to	   prevent	   corruption.	   Two	   years	   later,	   there	   was	   a	   scandal	   that	   US	   oil	  company	  Ocean	  Energy	  paid	  an	  extra	  US$245	  million	  to	  the	  government	  in	  order	  to	  win	   the	   bid	   for	   OPL	   256.	   As	   Diamond	   indicates,	   political	   leaders	   in	   this	   oil	  country	  all	  scrambled	  for	  oil	  revenues	  (Diamond,	  2008:	  77),	  and	  because	  these	  political	  leaders	  cooperate	  with	  business	  leaders,	  the	  wealth	  of	  the	  states	  cannot	  be	   fully	   deployed	   to	   serve	   the	   people;	  most	   of	   the	  wealth	   from	   oil	   just	   serves	  these	  elites.	  The	  corruption	  and	  mismanagement	   cannot	  be	  effectively	   stopped	  in	   these	   countries.	   This	   situation	   cannot	   be	   ascribed	   to	   China’s	   being	  irresponsible	   to	   the	   host	   country,	   and	   this	   issue	   exists	   widely	   in	   most	   oil	  countries.	  
III.	  Violence	  
The	  energy	  industry	  is	  a	  highly	  sensitive	  sector	  in	  Nigeria.	  Improper	  involvement	  and	  operation	  has	  not	  only	   the	  danger	  of	  economic	   loss,	  but	  also	  of	  high	   risks.	  The	  Movement	  for	  the	  Emancipation	  of	  the	  Niger	  Delta	  (MEND),	  a	  group	  that	  has	  allegedly	  been	  involved	  in	  numerous	  armed	  attacks	  in	  the	  region	  –	  as	  a	  response	  to	  what	   they	   regard	   as	   the	   exploitation	   and	   oppression	   of	   the	   people	   and	   the	  degradation	  of	   the	  natural	  environment	   in	   the	  Niger	  Delta	  (Hazen,	  2007)	  –	  has	  complained	   about	   the	   record	   of	   Chinese	   companies	   in	   other	  African	   countries.	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They	  believed	  “an	  entry	  into	  the	  oil	  industry	  in	  Nigeria	  will	  be	  a	  disaster	  for	  the	  oil-­‐bearing	   communities”,	   as	   a	   result,	   they	   have	  warned	   Chinese	   companies	   to	  “stay	  well	  clear	  of	  the	  oil	  producing	  Niger	  delta	  or	  risk	  facing	  attack”	  (FT,	  2006).	  From	   local	   people’s	   perspective,	   oil	   companies	   bring	   few	  benefits,	   but	   they	   do	  contribute	  to	  the	  ecological	  and	  environmental	  deterioration	  and	  water	  pollution.	  Plus,	   the	  unbalanced	  distribution	  system,	  with	  “limited	  economic	  opportunities	  and	  numerous	  social	  and	  political	  grievances”,	  has	  bred	  lots	  of	  armed	  groups	  and	  increasing	   violence	   and	   also	   kidnappings	   (Hazen,	   2007).	   Witness	   3	   has	  explained,	  	   “As	  people	  may	   say,	   the	  Chinese	  has	  paid	  back	  African	   countries	  by	   the	  construction	   of	   infrastructure.	   The	   newly	   built	   facilities	   often	   are	   not	  located	   in	   or	   near	   oil	   fields.	   People	   from	   oil	   field	   communities	   cannot	  enjoy	  the	  commitments	  by	  China.”	  	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   Chinese	   oil	   companies	   make	   significant	   losses	   from	  oil-­‐related	   violence	   and	   also	   oil	   theft.	   Witness	   22	   said,	   for	   the	   overseas	  companies,	  what	  concerns	  them	  the	  most	  is	  the	  safety	  of	  their	  employees.	  But,	  in	  the	   case	   of	   Nigeria,	   both	   employee	   safety	   and	   economic	   safety	   are	   at	   risk.	  According	  to	  a	  report	  by	  Nuhu	  Ribadu,	  the	  former	  anti-­‐corruption	  chief,	  Nigeria	  has	   “lost	  out	  on	   tens	  of	  billions	  of	  dollars	   in	  oil	   and	  gas	   revenues	  over	   the	   last	  decade	   from	   cut-­‐price	   deals	   struck	   between	   multinational	   oil	   companies	   and	  government	   officials”	   (FT,	   Oct.	   24	   2012).	   The	   destruction	   of	   pipelines	   and	   oil	  theft	  that	  cost	  oil	  companies	  significant	  losses	  have	  also	  contributed	  to	  the	  drop	  in	  Nigeria’s	  oil	  exports	  in	  2013.	   	  	  Generally,	   China’s	   “oil	   for	   infrastructure”	   policy	   has	   brought	   Nigeria	   loans,	  technology,	  and	  facilities	  to	  improve	  the	  Nigerian	  people’s	  living	  conditions	  and	  ensure	   the	   distribution	   of	   Nigeria’s	   oil	   income	   on	   public	   services,	   while	  effectively	   preventing	   corruption.	   But,	   due	   to	   the	   political	   struggles	  within	   the	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Nigerian	  government,	  its	  policy	  is	  unpredictable	  to	  Chinese	  investors,	  which	  has	  led	  some	  to	  suspend	  and	  cancel	  projects,	  which	  is	  a	  waste	  of	  time	  and	  resources	  for	   both	   sides.	   In	   addition,	   the	   interest	   gap	   between	   political	   elites	   and	   the	  majority	  of	   people	   living	   in	  oil-­‐rich	   areas	  has	  drawn	  Chinese	   companies	   into	   a	  hard	   position:	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   they	   have	   to	   satisfy	   the	   officials	   to	   gain	   the	  contracts;	   while	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   they	   have	   the	   responsibility	   to	   meet	   the	  demands	  of	   local	  communities.	  As	  a	  new	  comer	   to	   the	  country	  where	   is	   left	  by	  the	  western	  experiences’	  investors,	  Beijing’s	  policy	  is	  incapable	  of	  protecting	  its	  assets	  and	  citizens	  in	  Nigeria.	  The	  “oil	  for	  infrastructure”	  fails	  to	  benefit	  majority	  of	  Nigeria	  people.	  
7.4.2	  Chinese	  business	  Nigeria	   experts	   suggested	   that	   they	   ‘appreciated	   that	   Chinese	   investment	   gave	  African	   new	   leverage’	   and	   urged	   ‘China	   to	   relocate	   some	   of	   its	   industries	   to	  Africa’	  (Amosu,	  2007).	  Meanwhile,	  Nigerian	  officials	  have	  voiced	  concern	  about	  Chinese	  products.	  The	  Supervising	  Minister	  of	  National	  Planning,	  Bashir	  Yuguda,	  has	  said	  to	  the	  Chinese	  Ambassador	  to	  Nigeria,	  Gu	  Xiaojie:	  On	   our	   own	   part,	   we	   have	   been	   striving	   to	   ensure	   that	   Nigerian	  businessmen	  do	  not	  go	  to	  China	  to	  demand	  for	  substandard	  products.	  We	  also	  try	  to	  discourage	  them	  by	  ensuring	  that	  as	  much	  as	  possible	  such	   products	   do	   not	   cross	   our	   borders.	  We	  want	   China	   to	   also	   be	  able	   to	   control	   things	   from	   their	   end,	  because	  we	  believe	   that	   there	  should	   be	   a	  minimum	   standard	   for	   all	   countries.	   There	   is	   no	   doubt	  that	  fake	  products	  have	  a	  potential	  of	  hurting	  both	  economies.	  	   (Osayande,	  2014)	   	  
This	  section	  argues	  that,	  although	  the	  Chinese	  government	  may	  not	  need	  to	  take	  responsibility	  for	  the	  policy	  level,	  Chinese	  businesses	  may	  still	  be	  the	  actors	  that	  prevent	   China	   from	   being	   a	   fully	   responsible	   player	   in	   Nigeria.	   There	   are	   two	  major	   problems	   related	   to	   Chinese	   businesses	   in	   Nigeria:	   The	   dumping	   and	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quality	  issues	  of	  Chinese	  goods,	  and	  the	  culture	  differences	  between	  Chinese	  and	  Nigerian	   labourers.	  The	  Chinese	  government	   is	   trying	  to	  solve	  this,	  but	  has	  not	  offered	  an	  effective	  and	  comprehensive	  solution	  to	  Nigeria's	  complaints.	  
For	  the	  first	  issue,	  as	  Director	  General	  of	  Nigerian	  Textile	  Garment	  and	  Tailoring	  Employers'	   Association	   JP	   Olarewaju	   has	   complained,	   since	   the	   Nigerian	  government	   eliminated	   the	   import	   ban	   on	   textiles	   in	   1997,	   Chinese	   products	  swarmed	   into	   the	  Nigerian	  market,	   and	   some	  of	   them	  entered	  Nigeria	   through	  smuggling.	  (Fibre2Fashion	  interview)	  These	  products	  have	  a	  negative	  impact	  on	  the	  local	  textile	  manufacturing	  industry,	  As	  Olarewaju	  said,	  in	  1994	  when	  he	  had	  just	   taken	   the	   position	   of	   Director	   General	   of	   Nigerian	   Textile	   Garment	   and	  Tailoring	   Employers’	   Association,	   they	   had	   124	   members.	   But,	   in	   2013,	   there	  were	  only	  30	  left.	  The	  number	  of	  employees	  in	  the	  textile	  industry	  has	  reduced	  from	   170,000	   to	   25,000	   (BBC,	   Jan.	   8th	   2013).	   By	   contrast,	   veteran	   Chinese	  businessman	   in	   Nigeria	   Sun	   Guoping	   responded	   to	   the	   criticism,	   saying	   that	  Chinese	   businessman	   can	   only	   survive	   in	   Nigeria	   because	   the	   Nigerian	   people	  accepted	   the	   products.	  Most	   of	   the	   Chinese	   came	   as	   investors	   rather	   than	   the	  labourers.	  Therefore,	   instead	  of	   stealing	   jobs	   from	   the	  Nigeria	  people,	  many	  of	  them	   have	   created	   employment	   opportunities	   (BBC,	   Jan	   23rd.	   	   2013).	   Their	  argument	   revealed	   that	   China’s	   involvement	   has	   dual	   impact	   on	   Nigeria’s	  manufacturing	   industry.	   Chinese	   manufacturing	   operations	   contribute	   to	   the	  country’s	   employment,	   but	   also	   bring	   tough	   competition	   for	   local	   producers.	  Comparing	   the	   claims	   from	   both	   sides,	   Nigeria’s	   manufacturing	   industry	   has	  welcomed	  the	  Chinese	  in	  terms	  of	  investment,	  rather	  than	  Chinese	  products.	   	  
Nigeria’s	  manufacturing	  industry	  is	  under-­‐performing	  for	  China.	  This	  is	  reflected	  in	   the	   fact	   that	   bilateral	   trade	   is	   unbalanced.	   According	   to	   China	   Customs,	   the	  bilateral	   trade	   value	   between	   China	   and	   Nigeria	   in	   the	   first	   half	   year	   of	   2013	  reached	   US$6.02	   billion,	   up	   by	   18.8%.	   During	   this	   year,	   China’s	   exports	   to	  Nigeria	  were	  valued	  at	  US$5.43	  billion,	  up	  by	  28%;	  while	  China’s	   imports	   from	  Nigeria	  were	  US$590	  million,	   down	  by	  28.3%.	   China	  had	   a	   surplus	   of	  US$4.84	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billion.	  There	  are	  mixed	  reasons	  for	  this	  large	  trade	  deficit,	  and	  the	  manufacture	  industry	  offers	  a	  look	  at	  the	  whole	  picture.	  Even	  the	  Director	  General	  of	  Nigerian	  Textile	   Garment	   and	   Tailoring	   Employers'	   Association	   JP	   Olarewaju	   admitted	  that	   the	   reason	   for	   Nigerian	   products	   being	   uncompetitive	   lies	   with	   the	   poor	  infrastructure.	   He	   argued	   that,	   “we	   are	   unable	   to	   compete	   with	   the	   Chinese,	  because	  the	  power	  supply	  here	  is	  insufficient.	  Our	  factories	  need	  to	  generate	  the	  electricity	   by	   themselves.	   They	   need	   a	   generator.	   The	   generators	   need	   gas	   or	  diesel.	   The	   production	   of	   textiles	   also	   needs	   energy.	   Additionally,	   the	  transportation	   in	   Nigeria	   is	   very	   poor	   in	  which	   the	   railway	   could	   not	   operate	  smoothly	  while	  the	  road	  is	  unreliable	  as	  well.	  The	  logistics	  is	  very	  expensive	  due	  to	  the	  high	   insurance.	  As	  a	  result,	   the	  cost	  of	  our	  products	   is	  much	  higher	  than	  China’s”	   (BBC,	   Jan.	   8th	  2013).	  Nigeria’s	  domestic	   textile	   industry	   is	  not	   able	   to	  cope	  with	  cheap	  imports	  and	  increased	  smuggling	  from	  China.	   	  
Another	  complaint	   from	  Nigerians	   is	   the	  quality	  of	  Chinese	  goods.	   Inferior	  and	  fake	  Chinese	  products	  are	   considered	   to	   swarm	   into	  Nigeria’s	  market.	   Some	  of	  them	  have	  even	  violated	  Nigeria’s	   intellectual	  property.	  They	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  tariff	  concessions,	  but	  copy	  Nigeria’s	  designs,	  which	  harms	  the	  development	  of	  local	  industries.	  In	  response	  to	  this	  criticism,	  Witness	  1	  said,	   	  
“As	   a	   Chinese	   saying	   goes,	   'in	   a	   big	   forest	   there	   is	   every	   kind	   of	   bird.'	  Among	   the	   huge	   volume	   of	   Chinese	   products,	   and	   besides	   the	   ones	  manufactured	   for	   the	   high	   end	   markets,	   there	   also	   exists	   fair	   quality	  products	   targeted	   for	   the	   medium	   and	   low	   end	   markets,	   as	   well	   as	  disqualified	   ones	   manufactured	   by	   a	   small	   number	   of	   lawless	  businessmen.“	   	  
Witness	  23	  argued,	  
“Even	   if	   the	  quality	  of	  Chinese	  products	  does	  not	  enjoy	  good	  reputation,	  as	   a	   ‘world	   factory’,	   the	   Chinese	  manufacturing	   industry	   has	   developed	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enough	  to	  become	  a	  production	  line	  of	  the	  famous	  brands	  of	  high	  quality.	  That	   proves	   Chinese	  manufacturing	   has	   the	   capability	   to	  meet	   the	   high	  quality	   requirements.	   Constrained	   by	   African	   countries’	   limited	  purchasing	   capability	   and	   consumption	   level,	   Africa	   became	   the	   most	  vulnerable	  destination	  for	  the	  low	  quality	  products.”	  
Due	   to	   a	   limited	   consumption	   level	   and	   capability,	   economic	   products	   are	  welcome	  in	  Nigeria’s	  market.	   	  
Witness	  20	  offered	  another	  reason,	   	  
“We	   have	   no	   other	   choice,	   the	   African	   middleman	   offered	   low	   prices,	  which	   leaves	   little	   profit	   to	   the	   Chinese	   manufactures.	   Thus,	   the	  producers	   lowered	   the	   quality.	   And	   due	   to	   the	   mismanagement,	  smuggling	   is	   rampant	   in	   Nigeria.	   You	   cannot	   imagine	   how	   serious	  corruption	  is	  in	  Africa.	  Money	  can	  do	  anything.”	  
Actually,	   the	   flood	   of	   inferior	   Chinese	   products	   affected	   not	   only	   Nigerian	  companies,	   but	   Chinese	   local	   investment	   as	   well.	   Many	   of	   the	   textile	   factories	  that	  have	  been	   forced	   to	   shut	  down	  were	  Chinese-­‐owned	  plants	   that	  had	  been	  operating	   in	   Kaduna	   since	   the	   1970s	   (Egbula	   and	   Zheng,	   2011).	   Those	  low-­‐quality	   products	   labeled	   “Made	   in	   China”	   have	   affected	   African	   people’s	  confidence	   in	  Chinese	  products.	   It	  has	  required	  both	  governments	   from	  Beijing	  and	  Abujia	  to	  levy	  stricter	  regulations.	  Witness	  3	  said	  that:	   	  
Beijing	  has	  launched	  various	  ways	  to	  control	  the	  spread	  of	  inferior	  products.	  The	  government	  has	   set	  up	  monitoring	  and	  complaint	  platforms,	   conducted	   special	  controlling	   programmes,	   urged	   enterprises	   to	   assume	   responsibility	   for	   the	  quality	   and	   safety	   of	   their	   products,	   enriched	   the	   quality	   and	   safety	   standard	  system,	   and	   worked	   to	   speed	   up	   the	   perfection	   of	   the	   quality	   inspection	   and	  supervision	  system.	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Additionally,	  it	  has	  attached	  particular	  importance	  to	  the	  quality	  of	  products	  for	  export,	  and	  taken	  steps	  to	  conduct	  a	  comprehensive	  quality	  inspection	  of	  those	  goods,	   in	   order	   to	   prevent	   an	   outflow	   of	   substandard	   products	   (tribune,	   Dec.	  15th	   2013).	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   these	   measures	   need	   the	   cooperation	   of	   the	  Nigeria	   government	   as	   well.	   In	   March	   2011,	   the	   Chinese	   embassy	   in	   Nigeria,	  together	  with	  the	  National	  Association	  of	  Nigerian	  Traders,	  co-­‐hosted	  a	  seminar	  on	  China-­‐Nigeria	  Trade	  Promotion	  to	  exchange	  ideas	  on	  how	  to	  raise	  the	  quality	  of	  Chinese	  products	  in	  Nigeria,	  and	  to	  push	  forward	  the	  sustained	  development	  of	   bilateral	   trade	   relations	   (Ng-­‐embassy,	   Dec.	   13th	   2012).	   But	   due	   to	   the	  fragmented	   authoritarianism	   problem	   discussed	   in	   chapter	   5,	   these	   measures	  have	  not	  been	  well	  informed	  and	  implemented	  by	  local	  Chinese	  business.	   	  
Furthermore,	  labour	  unions	  also	  complain	  about	  working	  conditions	  in	  Chinese	  companies,	  where	  “they	  say	  Nigerian	  workers	  are	  poorly	  paid	  and	  rarely	  rise	  to	  management	  level.	  Chinese	  companies	  have	  been	  accused	  of	  flouting	  labour	  laws	  and	  discouraging	  unions”	   (Egbula	  and	  Zheng,	  2011).	  Recently,	   there	  have	  been	  protests	   over	   poor	   labour	   practices	   in	   Lagos.	   The	   Nigerian	   workers	   of	   CCECC	  protested	  against	  the	  abuse	  from	  and	  anti-­‐labour	  treatment	  by	  the	  management	  in	   February	   2013.	  What	  made	   them	   unsatisfied	  was	   their	  welfare.	   Complaints	  included	   “no	   medical	   facility	   for	   workers”,	   “poor	   salaries”,	   “working	   in	   other	  areas	  with	   no	   additional	  wage”,	   “work	   on	   public	   holidays	   and	  weekends”,	   and	  “lack	   of	   labour	   union”.	   After	   the	   protest,	   Deputy	   Manager,	   Materials	   and	  Equipment	  Department,	  CCECC,	  Wang	  Chunjing	  promised	  that	  the	  company	  was	  planning	   to	   increase	   the	   workers’	   salaries.	   Concerning	   the	   other	   allegations,	  however,	  he	  offered	  no	   specific	   solutions.	  The	   complaints	  by	  Nigerian	  workers	  reflected	  cultural	  differences	  between	  the	  Chinese	   labour	   force	  and	  Nigerian.	  A	  carpenter,	  Mr.	  Henry	  Okoye,	  complained	  that,	  “I	  was	  hired	  as	  a	  carpenter,	  but	  I	  am	   forced	   to	  work	  as	  a	  gardener	  and	  bricklayer	  on	   the	   same	  pay.”	  Meanwhile,	  the	  deputy	  manager	  Mr.	  Wang	  explained,	  “that	  if	  a	  carpenter	  or	  mason’s	  job	  was	  finished,	  the	  company	  could	  use	  the	  person	  in	  the	  section	  or	  area	  that	  had	  tasks	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so	   as	   not	   to	   lay	   them	   off…	   You	   cannot	   deploy	   a	   bricklayer	   to	   be	   a	   personal	  manager.	   The	  manual	   job	   is	   where	   he	   can	   function	  well.	   I	   do	   not	   see	   what	   is	  wrong	  with	  a	   carpenter	  being	  asked	   to	  be	  a	  gardener.”	   (AllAfrica)	  The	  Chinese	  working	  environment	  is	  flexible;	  it	  may	  need	  an	  employee	  to	  serve	  multiple	  roles	  with	   one	   title,	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   and	   it	   is	   normal	   to	   work	   over	   time.	   This	  difference	  led	  the	  Chinese	  management	  to	  consider	  the	  Nigerian	  workers	  as	  not	  work	  as	  hard	  working	  as	  Chinese	  workers,	  while	   the	  Nigerians	   feel	  mistreated.	  What’s	  more,	   although	   CCECC	   is	   a	   state-­‐owned	   company,	   their	   employees	   are	  categorised	  in	  different	  levels.	  According	  to	  its	  website,	  CCECC,	  handling	  several	  construction	  contracts	  across	   the	  country,	  has	  about	  50	  regular	  staff	  and	  more	  than	  200	  casual	  workers	  who	  are	  paid	  by	   their	  supervisors,	  and	  engages	  more	  casuals	  workers	  if	  there	  are	  more	  jobs	  to	  be	  done.	  Although	  these	  casual	  workers	  worked	   for	   the	   Chinese	   project	   of	   CCECC,	   the	   company	  does	   not	  manage	   their	  payment	  and	  welfare.	  As	  a	  result,	  a	   large	  number	  of	  workers	  actually	  work	   for	  their	   supervisors,	   a	  management	  more	   like	   a	   private	   company,	   in	   the	   name	   of	  CCECC.	  The	  management	  of	  these	  supervisors	  differs	  and	  is	  random.	  Witness	  16	  also	  mentioned	  this	  phenomenon	  by	  saying,	   	  	   	   	   It	  is	  admitted	  that	  the	  working	  condition	  in	  Chinese	  companies	  is	  not	  as	  good	   as	  western	   companies.	   But	   African	   labour	   force	   is	   not	   as	   good	   as	  Chinese	   worker	   as	   well.	   We	   have	   to	   hire	   local	   supervisor	   to	   monitor	  them…..	  Sometimes,	  in	  order	  to	  finish	  the	  on-­‐going	  construction	  on	  time,	  we	  may	  require	  the	  workers	  to	  work	  at	  weekends	  or	  public	  holidays	  and	  pay	   them	   extra	   money.	   Despite	   the	   workers	   can	   refuse	   to	   work	   extra	  hours,	  yet	  as	  a	  casual	  worker,	  they	  may	  easily	  be	  replaced	  by	  other	  people	  in	  the	  excuse	  of	  laziness	  or	  disobedience.	   	  	  The	   criticisms	   of	   Chinese	   business	   in	   Nigeria	   exist	   in	   the	   majority	   of	   African	  countries,	  including	  the	  quality	  of	  products,	  poor	  working	  conditions,	  and	  lack	  of	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labour	   force	   protection.	  During	   the	   interviews,	   nearly	   all	  witnesses	   recognised	  Chinese	   companies’	   deficiencies	   and	   admitted	   the	   distance	   between	   Chinese	  companies	  and	  Western	  multinationals.	  Witness	  22	  suggested	  that,	   	  “In	  response	  to	  these	  criticisms,	  there	  are	  only	  two	  ways:	  the	  first	  one	  is	  to	  expel	  all	  Chinese	  business,	  and	  the	  second	  one	  is	  to	  improve.	  Whether	  expelling	  all	  China’s	  presence	  in	  Africa	  is	  good	  to	  the	  continent?”	   	   	   	   	  	  Witness	  22	  admitted	  that	  the	  problem	  of	  China’s	  business	  in	  Nigeria	  is	  caused	  by	  Chinese	   enterprises.	   But	   currently	   he	   holds	   that	   the	   companies	   operate	  independently	   in	   the	  host	   country,	   and	   the	   central	   government	   lacks	   ability	   to	  control	  them:	  	   “I’ve	  done	   fieldwork	   in	   lot	  of	  African	  countries.	  None	  of	   them	  have	  ever	  thought	  about	  China’s	   image.	  What	   they	  cared	  about	  was	  very	  practical,	  such	   as,	   when	   the	   Chinese	   government	   could	   help	   to	   simplify	   the	   visa	  application	  process	  in	  African	  countries.”	  	  Therefore,	  the	  witnesses	  also	  agreed	  that,	  even	  as	  the	  government	  and	  academia	  have	  recognised	  Chinese	  companies	  and	  businessmen’s	  irresponsible	  behaviour	  in	  Nigeria,	  which	  may	  violate	  China’s	  international	  reputation	  as	  a	  whole,	  there	  are	  no	  tangible	  methods	  to	  solve	  the	  problems	  from	  the	  top	  on	  down	  in	  the	  short	  run.	  	  In	  summary,	  this	  thesis	  indicates	  that	  Chinese	  businesses	  in	  Nigeria	  may	  need	  to	  be	   responsible	   to	   complaints	   from	   Nigerians,	   or	   even	  Western	   countries.	   The	  Chinese	  government	  cannot	  avoid	   these	   issues	  without	  a	  sound	  supervision	  on	  its	   overseas	   business,	   but	   Chinese	   businesses	   also	   face	   difficulties	   in	   Nigeria,	  such	  as	  a	  lack	  of	  electricity	  or	  diligent	  labourers.	  Yet,	  as	  witnesses	  indicated,	  the	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Chinese	   government	   does	   not	   offer	   any	   feasible	   solutions	   to	   help	   Chinese	  businesses,	   and	   eventually	   Chinese	   businesses	   only	   care	   about	   their	   revenue,	  rather	  than	  China’s	  image.	  
7.4.3	  Summary	  To	   summarise,	   China’s	   state	   development	   economy	   and	   large	   amount	   of	  investment	   is	   attractive	   to	   the	   Nigerian	   government	   and	   people.	   The	   two	  countries	   have	   a	   broader	   chance	   of	   cooperation	   on	   economic	   development.	  Theoretically,	   the	   ‘oil	   for	   infrastructure’	   approach	  meets	   both	  demands.	  At	   the	  implementation	   level,	  because	  of	   the	  constrictions	   in	  Nigeria	  and	  the	  weakness	  of	  Beijing,	  China	  was	  not	  a	  fully	  responsible	  actor	  in	  the	  country.	  For	  the	  Nigerian	  side,	   a	   weak	   democracy,	   incoherent	   policies,	   mismanagement,	   corruption,	   and	  violence	  all	  create	  serious	  problems	  that	  hinder	  Nigeria’s	  demands,	  which	  were	  mentioned	   in	   the	   previous	   sections.	   Weak	   democracy	   and	   incoherent	   policies	  lead	   to	   an	   unstable	   attitude	   towards	   the	   oil-­‐for-­‐infrastructure	   policy;	  mismanagement	  and	  corruption	  directly	  weaken	  the	  ability	  of	  Nigeria	  to	  use	  its	  oil	   revenue	   to	   improve	   infrastructure	   for	   industries	   and	   transform	   their	  economic	  structure.	  Political	  elites	  are	  only	  seeking	  a	  share	  of	  the	  oil	  revenues	  to	  benefit	  themselves,	  rather	  than	  the	  people	  or	  the	  state.	  Violence	  can	  exacerbate	  the	   problems	   within	   Nigeria,	   rather	   than	   solve	   them.	   As	   for	   China’s	   side,	  although	  Beijing	   has	   launched	   some	  measures	   to	   solve	   the	   problems	   rising	   by	  Chinese	  business,	  such	  as,	  the	  quality	  of	  Chinese	  products	  and	  the	  protection	  of	  local	   labourers,	   it	   is	   not	   very	   effective,	   because	   the	   Chinese	   companies	   lack	   of	  motivation	   to	   follow	   the	   policy	   and	   measures.	   As	   a	   result,	   both	   governments	  need	  to	  focus	  on	  their	  own	  problems	  and	  present	  feasible	  policy	  solutions.	  	  
7.5	  Conclusion	  China-­‐Nigeria	   relations	   grew	   closer	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   diplomatic	   and	   economic	  motivations.	  In	  the	  bilateral	  meetings	  and	  visits	  between	  high-­‐level	  officials,	  both	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countries	  have	  confirmed	  their	  willingness	  to	  broaden	  cooperation.	  Beijing’s	  “oil	  for	  infrastructure”	  approach	  does	  not	  have	  many	  significant	  challenges	  that	  must	  be	   solved	   if	  both	  are	   to	   realise	   their	   economic	  demands.	  And,	   according	   to	   the	  Pew	   Research	   Centre,	   the	   Nigerian	   people	   generally	   hold	   a	   positive	   attitude	  towards	  China.	  Thus,	   the	  discussions	   in	  the	   first	  section	  of	   the	  chapter	   indicate	  that	   at	   the	   policy	   level,	   China	   and	   Nigeria	   could	   cooperate	   with	   each	   other	  because	  both	  countries	  have	  complementary	  motivations	  and	  demands.	   	  	  However,	   a	   clear	   limitation	   that	   could	   affect	   China’s	   capability	   of	   taking	  responsibility	   in	  Nigeria	  has	  also	  been	   suggested	   in	   the	  middle	  of	   this	   chapter.	  Nigerian	   political	   elites	   do	   not	   continuously	   follow	   the	   same	  energy-­‐for-­‐resources	   deal,	   and	   are	   also	   ambitious	   to	   develop	   their	   own	  industries	  rather	  than	  getting	  infrastructure	  projects	  from	  China.	  Beijing,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  was	  been	  slow	  to	  respond	  to	  Nigeria’s	  changing	  policy.	  Its	  efforts	  on	  infrastructure	  construction	  are	  undermined	  by	  Nigeria’s	  high	  cost	  of	  governance.	  And,	  due	  to	  the	  ruling	  People’s	  Democratic	  Party’s	  (PDP)	  political	  upheavals	  and	  domestic	  crises,	  the	  Nigeria	  government	  has	  been	  unable	  to	  provide	  sustainable	  and	   long-­‐term	   economic	   stability	   for	   foreign	   investors.	   These	   situations	   all	  directly	  limit	  China’s	  capability	  for	  responsibility	  in	  Nigeria.	  Since	  there	  will	  be	  a	  general	  election	  in	  2015,	  the	  Nigerian	  government	  is	  estimated	  to	  concentrate	  on	  politics	  and	  struggles	  between	  the	  two	  major	  parties,	  PDP	  and	  APC;	  which	  means	  they	  may	  be	   slow	   in	  dealing	  with	   certain	   economic	  problems,	   such	   as	   oil	   theft	  and	  the	  Nigeria's	  Petroleum	  Industry	  Bill	  (PIB).31	   It	  will	  likely	  increase	  Chinese	  investors’	  concerns	  for	  the	  environment	  in	  the	  Nigerian	  oil	  industry.	   	  	  The	   main	   factors	   in	   Nigeria	   that	   affect	   the	   country’s	   development	   and	   cause	  problems	   for	   China	   are	   Nigeria’s	   weak	   democracy,	   incoherent	   governmental	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 PIB	  is	  a	  controversial	  bill,	  which	  aims	  at	  oil	  reform.	  It	  is	  believed	  to	  have	  a	  huge	  impact	  to	  oil	  mutilations	  in	  Nigeria	  if	  passed.  
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policies,	  mismanagement,	   corruption,	   and	  a	  political	   elite	   that	   fights	  with	   itself	  for	  control	  over	  oil	   revenues,	  and	  violent	  groups.	  Chinese	  companies	  have	  also	  become	   problems	   for	   Nigeria,	   hindering	   its	   ambitions	   and	   worsening	   its	  domestic	   situation.	   Chinese	   goods	   are	   not	   welcome	   in	   this	   country	   for	   many	  reasons.	  Meanwhile,	  those	  Chinese	  employers	  who	  are	  willing	  to	  do	  business	  in	  Nigeria	   often	   neglect	   the	   accepted	   working	   standards	   on	   employment,	  environment,	   security,	   and	   local	   community	   in	   order	   to	   boost	   profits.	   This	  exacerbated	  the	  dissatisfaction	  of	  the	  Nigerian	  people.	   	  	  In	  short,	  it	  can	  be	  concluded	  that	  China‘s	  presence	  in	  Nigeria	  has	  partly	  met	  the	  country’s	  policy	  level	  demands,	  especially	  with	  regards	  to	  financial	  support	  and	  “infrastructure	  for	  oil”,	  for	  its	  economic	  development.	  However,	  its	  effectiveness	  is	   constrained	   by	   Nigeria’s	   political	   elites,	   weak	   democracy,	   mismanagement,	  violent	   groups,	   and	   Chinese	   businesses’	   lack	   of	   awareness	   of	   corporate	   social	  responsibility.	   These	   actors	   and	   contexts	   hinder	   the	   capability	   of	   China	   to	   be	  responsible	  in	  Nigeria.	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Chapter	  8	  South	  Africa	   	  The	   relationship	   between	   China	   and	   South	   Africa	   represents	  many	   features	   of	  emerging	   states	   and	   newly	   industrialised	   countries	   (NICs),	   such	   as	   resource	  conflicts,	   South-­‐South	   cooperation,	   and	   regionalism.	   South	  Africa,	   as	   the	   single	  “superpower”	  on	  the	  continent,	  is	  included	  among	  the	  BRICS,	  with	  expectations	  to	   serve	   as	   a	   bridge	   between	   fragile	   states	   and	   developed	   states	   politically,	  economically,	  and	  diplomatically,	  and	  serve	  as	  a	  representative	  for	  sub-­‐Saharan	  and	  south	  African	  countries.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  it	  has	  yet	  to	  become	  a	  competitor	  to	   emerging	   powers	   in	   this	   region,	   due	   to	   its	   political	   and	   economic	   interests.	  This	  chapter	  will	  discuss	  South	  Africa’s	  role	  in	  China-­‐Africa	  links	  and	  the	  impact	  of	  China’s	  engagement	  on	  the	  state.	  	  China-­‐South	   Africa	   relations	   are	   a	   featured	   case	   for	   assessing	   the	   impact	   of	  Chinese	  business	  on	  Africa,	  because	  South	  Africa	  is	  the	  most	  developed	  country	  on	  the	  continent,	  its	  economic	  structure	  is	  the	  most	  similar	  to	  that	  of	  China’s,	  by	  which	  it	  means	  South	  Africa’s	  industry	  is	  most	  likely	  to	  be	  able	  to	  compete	  with	  Chinese	  business	  involvement,	  and	  also	  be	  impacted	  by	  its	  Chinese	  counterparts.	  Hence,	   this	   chapter	   will	   analyse	   China’s	   contributions	   and	   deficiencies	   in	   its	  engagement	  with	   South	   Africa.	   The	   chapter	   starts	  with	   a	   brief	   background	   on	  China-­‐South	   Africa	   relations.	   Then	   it	   discusses	   three	   influential	   factors	   in	  shaping	  China’s	   responsibility	   in	   the	  country	   -­‐	  China’s	  national	   interests,	  South	  Africa’s	   demands,	   and	   international	   expectations	   -­‐	   to	   explore	   to	   what	   extent	  China’s	   policy	   can	   help	   South	   Africa.	   In	   the	   second	   section,	   the	   chapter	   will	  discuss	  China’s	  capability	  to	  be	  responsible	  in	  South	  Africa.	  In	  the	  final	  part,	  this	  chapter	  will	   explore	   the	   actors	   and	   contexts	  which	   could	   affect	   China’s	   role	   in	  South	  Africa,	  from	  both	  South	  Africa’s	  and	  China’s	  perspectives.	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8.1	  A	  brief	  background	  introduction	  	  China	   became	   South	   Africa’s	   largest	   export	   and	   import	   partner	   in	   2009,	   and	  South	   Africa	   is	   also	   China’s	   largest	   trading	   partner	   in	   Africa,	   with	   bilateral	  trading	   volume	   reaching	   US$60	   billion	   in	   2012.	   However,	   bilateral	   official	  relations	  were	  not	  established	  until	  1998.	  Before	   that,	  South	  Africa	  had	  official	  relations	  with	   Taiwan.	   Since	   January	   1998,	   Pretoria,	   under	   the	   government	   of	  Mandela,	   switched	   its	   official	   recognition	   from	   the	   ROC	   to	   the	   PRC	   due	   to	  strategic	   and	   economic	   considerations.	   Bilateral	   political	   and	   economic	  communication	   developed	   quickly	   after	   recognition,	   with	   frequent	   high	   level	  visits	  and	  a	  forty-­‐fold	  increase	  in	  trading	  volume.	  	  In	   2000,	   during	   Chinese	   President	   Jiang	   Zemin’s	   visit	   to	   South	   Africa,	   the	   two	  countries	  signed	  the	  Pretoria	  Declaration	  on	  Partnership	  Relations.	  In	  the	  same	  year,	   they	   established	   a	   Bi-­‐National	   Commission,	   under	   which	   five	   sector	  committees	   were	   established:	   diplomatic	   affairs,	   trade,	   education,	   science	   and	  technology,	  and	  defence.	  Soon	  after,	  in	  2004,	  during	  then-­‐Chinese	  Vice	  President	  Zeng	   Qinghong’s	   visit	   to	   South	   Africa,	   the	   two	   countries	   further	   defined	   their	  relationship	  as	  a	   strategic	  partnership	  of	  equality,	  mutual	  benefit	  and	  common	  development.	   In	   2006,	   China	   and	   South	   Africa	   signed	   13	   agreements	   on	  cooperation	  for	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  fields,	  such	  as	  politics,	  economics,	  trade,	  national	  defence,	  agriculture,	  technology	  and	  sciences,	  as	  well	  as	  an	  agreement	  to	  deepen	  the	   strategic	   partnership	   between	   the	   two	   states	   during	   then-­‐Premier	   Wen	  Jiabao’s	   trip	   to	   South	   Africa.	   One	   year	   later,	   when	   then-­‐President	   Hu	   Jintao	  conducted	  his	  eight-­‐nation	  African	  tour,	  he	  highlighted	  the	  agreements	  reached	  during	   the	  Beijing	  summit	   in	  2006,	   including	  eight	  measures	   to	  benefit	  African	  countries,	  which	  pushed	   the	  China-­‐South	  Africa	   strategic	  partnership	   to	   a	  new	  height.	   Bilateral	   mechanisms	   for	   strategic	   dialogue	   were	   established	   in	   2008,	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and	  four	  rounds	  of	  meetings	  were	  held	  over	  the	  next	  four	  years.	  In	  2010,	  when	  President	  Jacob	  Zuma	  first	  visited	  China,	  he	  signed	  the	  Beijing	  Declaration	  with	  Chinese	   President	   Hu	   Jintao,	   establishing	   the	   comprehensive	   strategic	  partnership.	   The	   Parliamentary	   Regular	   Exchange	   Mechanism	   of	   the	   two	  countries	  was	   set	   up	   in	   2011,	   and	   has	   already	   conducted	   two	   rounds	   of	   talks.	  (Embassy	  of	  PRC	  in	  South	  Africa)	  	  Economically,	   South	   Africa	   became	   China’s	   largest	   trading	   partner	   in	   in	  Sub-­‐Saharan	   Africa	   in	   1993.	   Despite	   the	   trade	   value	   in	   that	   year	   being	   only	  US$660	  million,	   it	  accounted	  for	  a	  quarter	  of	  Beijing’s	  trade	  with	  the	  continent.	  At	  the	  time	  when	  official	  bilateral	  relations	  were	  established,	  this	  figure	  grew	  to	  US$1.5	  billion.	  It	  rose	  40	  times	  in	  15	  years,	  and	  almost	  reached	  US$60	  billion	  in	  2012.	  According	  to	  the	  statistics	  from	  MOFCOM,	  the	  growth	  rate	  of	  China-­‐South	  Africa	  trade	  was	  larger	  than	  China-­‐US	  and	  China-­‐ASEAN	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  2013.	  In	  2012,	  China-­‐South	  Africa	  imports	  and	  exports	  volume	  was	  US$24.7	  billion	  -­‐	  of	  which,	  South	  Africa	  exported	  US$10.1	  billion	  and	  imported	  US$14.6	  billion	  from	  China,	  with	  a	  deficit	  of	  US$	  447	  million.	  Compared	  to	  other	  African	  states,	  South	  Africa’s	   deficit	   with	   China	   is	   relatively	   small,	   but	   the	   products	   exported	   from	  South	  Africa	  are	  low	  value-­‐added,	  such	  as	  raw	  materials,	  while	  it	  imported	  high	  value-­‐added	  products	  from	  China,	  including	  mechanical	  and	  electrical	  products,	  textiles,	   and	   telecommunications.	   This	   unbalanced	   economic	   relationship	  prevails	   in	   other	   African	   countries	   as	   well,	   and	   is	   a	   widely-­‐held	   concern	   of	  African	  political	  elites.	   	  
8.2	  Shaping	  China’s	  responsibility	  in	  the	  South	  Africa	    	  The	  motivation	  for	  China’s	  engagement	  in	  South	  Africa	  is	  clearer	  than	  with	  other	  states,	  since	  the	  country	  is	  a	  regional	  leader	  with	  the	  strongest	  economy	  on	  the	  continent.	  However,	  in	  terms	  of	  responsibility,	  as	  the	  national	  strengths	  of	  these	  two	  countries	  are	  much	  closer	  than	  in	  China’s	  relations	  with	  other	  African	  states,	  China’s	  assistance	  in	  South	  Africa	  has	  produced	  less	  concern	  in	  both	  the	  country	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and	   international	   community	   than	   with	   other	   African	   states.	   This	   section	   will	  explore	   China’s	   political	   and	   economic	   interests,	   and	   to	   what	   extent	   they	  complement	  South	  Africa’s	  agenda	  and	  international	  expectations.	   	  
8.2.1	  China’s	  motivation	  South	   Africa,	   as	   a	   regional	   power	   accounting	   for	   approximately	   a	   third	   of	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  African	  GDP,	  is	  no	  doubt	  of	  great	  significance	  to	  China.	  Not	  only	  is	  South	  Africa	  a	  major	  player	  on	  the	  continent,	  but	  it	  is	  also	  a	  mediator	  of	  China’s	  strategic	  expansion	  in	  the	  region.	  
I.	   	   Politically	  
1)	  Friendly	  governments	  
	  The	  Chinese	  government	  has	  attached	  great	  importance	  to	  its	  relationship	  with	  South	  Africa.	  This	  is	  evidenced	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  South	  Africa	  is	  the	  first	  developing	  country	  with	  which	  China	  established	  a	   “comprehensive	  strategic	  partnership”,	  and	   the	   two	  governments	  have	  maintained	   frequent	  high-­‐level	   visits.	   Since	   the	  establishment	   of	   bilateral	   relations	   15	   years	   ago,	   almost	   every	   senior	   Chinese	  politician,	  provincial	  governor	  and	  municipal	  mayor	  has	  travelled	  to	  South	  Africa.	  South	   African	   government	   delegations	   are	   also	   frequent	   visitors	   to	   Beijing.	  Leaders	  of	  both	  countries	  have	  met	  at	  all	  kinds	  of	   international	  conferences.	   In	  2012,	   then-­‐President	   Hu	   Jintao	  met	  with	   President	   Zuma	   four	   times.	   The	   new	  Chinese	  President	  Xi	   Jinping	   chose	   South	  Africa	   as	   his	   first	   overseas	   trip.	   Such	  frequent	   high-­‐level	   exchanges	   have	   brought	   the	   two	   countries	   closer	   together.	  During	   Xi	   Jinping’s	   trip	   to	   South	   Africa,	   both	   countries	   agreed	   to	   make	   the	  relationship	   the	   “strategic	   pivot	   and	   priority”	   of	   each	   other’s	   foreign	   policy,	  highlighting	   the	   strategic	   significance	   of	   the	   relationship	   (Tian,	   June	   28	   2013).	  Additionally,	   they	   have	   set	   up	   various	   exchange	   mechanisms	   for	   closer	  diplomatic	   relations.	   Apart	   from	   the	   Bi-­‐National	   Committee	   at	   the	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vice-­‐presidential	  level	  mentioned	  earlier,	  the	  two	  countries	  have	  also	  established	  regular	  exchanges	  between	  the	   two	  parliaments,	   the	  strategic	  dialogue	  and	   the	  joint	   working	   group.	   South	   Africa	   is	   now	   the	   African	   host	   of	   the	   Forum	   on	  China-­‐Africa	  Cooperation	  and	  a	   rotating	  chair	  of	  BRICS	   (MOFA,	   July	  2	  2013).	   It	  can	  be	  said	  that	  through	  various	  communication	  platforms	  and	  channels,	  the	  two	  governments	  have	  been	  in	  a	  “honeymoon”	  period	  during	  their	  15	  years	  of	  official	  ties.	  
	  
2)	  Diplomatic	  support	   	  	  Internationally,	  Witness	  11	  argued	  that	  all	  developing	  countries	  shared	  the	  same	  or	   similar	  views	  on	   international	   affairs:	   that	   is,	   calling	   for	   a	   fair	   and	  balanced	  new	   global	   political	   and	   economic	   order,	   as	   opposed	   to	   the	   North-­‐dominant	  system	   in	   place.	   Africa,	   as	   the	   continent	   long-­‐ignored	   by	   international	   society,	  has	   a	   quieter	   voice	   and	   receives	   few	   benefits	   from	   the	   current	   international	  system.	  South	  Africa,	  as	  one	  important	  member	  of	  the	  continent,	  is	  fated	  to	  play	  a	  constructive	   role	   in	   promoting	   the	   reform	   of	   global	   governance,	   and	  safeguarding	   the	   interests	   of	   developing	   countries.	   Witness	   11’s	   argument	  reveals	  that	  Beijing	  considers	  South	  Africa	  to	  be	  a	  significant	  ally	  on	  “south-­‐south	  cooperation”	   and	   multilateral	   cooperation	   among	   developing	   countries.	   In	   a	  Bilateral	   Joint	   Communiqué,	   “the	   two	   sides	   appealed	   to	   countries	   all	   over	   the	  world	   to	   establish	   a	   more	   equal	   and	   balanced	   global	   partnership	   for	  development,	   and	  address	  global	   challenges	   through	  unity	  and	  cooperation	   for	  mutual	   benefit.”	   Emphasising	   their	   shared	   identity	   as	   developing	   countries	  allowed	   China	   to	   gain	   greater	   understanding	   and	   support	   from	   South	   Africa.	  Although	  the	  two	  states	  have	  different	  domestic	  political	  systems,	  they	  still	  can	  stand	  on	  the	  same	  side	  on	   international	  events;	  as	  evidenced	  by	  two	  countries’	  cooperation	   on	   climate	   change	   negotiations,	   within	   the	   BRICS	   framework.	  During	   President	   Xi	   Jinping’s	   trip	   to	   Pretoria,	   the	   two	   countries	   “called	   for	  upholding	  the	  legitimate	  rights	  and	  interests	  of	  developing	  countries	  and	  making	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the	   international	   order	   and	   system	   fairer	   and	   more	   equitable”	   (China	   Daily,	  March	  27	  2013).	  	  Regionally,	   South	  Africa’s	   domestic	   achievements,	   international	   reputation	   and	  position	   in	   Africa	   place	   the	   country	   in	   the	   role	   of	   a	   regional	   leader.	   It	   is	  commonly	   agreed	   that	   the	   peace,	   security	   and	   development	   of	   Africa	   requires	  joint	   efforts	   from	   continental	   leaders	   and	   external	   commitments.	   South	   Africa	  offers	   not	   only	   a	   successful	   model	   of	   transformation	   from	   apartheid	   to	  democratic	   government,	   but	   also	   plays	   an	   instrumental	   role	   in	   fostering	  engagement	   with	   external	   actors	   on	   conflict	   resolution	   in	   the	   continent.	  Considering	  Africa’s	   constraints,	  South	  Africa	   is	  expected	   to	  deliver	   the	  African	  agenda	   for	   the	   region’s	   “hot	   spots”	   to	   a	   broader	   platform	   in	   order	   for	   gain	  support	   and	   resolutions.	   It	   is	   worth	   noting	   that,	   despite	   Pretoria’s	   different	  political	  system	  to	  that	  in	  Beijing	  and	  more	  effective	  cooperation	  with	  the	  North	  than	   China,	   the	   state	   exhibits	   more	   similar	   stances	   with	   Beijing	   on	   some	   hot	  issues	   -­‐	   notably,	   the	   attitude	   towards	  military	   intervention	   in	   Libya	   and	   Syria.	  South	   Africa	   was	   reluctant	   to	   agree	   to	   the	   use	   of	   force	   in	   resolving	   African	  countries’	   domestic	   crises,	   especially	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   host	   government	  approval.	  It	  revealed	  that	  Pretoria’s	  awareness	  and	  greater	  concern	  for	  its	  status	  as	   a	   developing	   African	   country	   than	   for	   the	   collective	   policies	   of	   the	   North.	  Given	   its	   role	   as	   mediator	   in	   Africa’s	   regional	   conflicts	   and	   in	   finding	  international	   peaceful	   resolutions,	   as	   well	   as	   its	   position	   in	   the	   AU	   and	   other	  regional	   organisations,	   South	   Africa’s	   attitude	   reflected	   the	   regional	   collective	  security	  concerns.	  Along	  with	  its	  support,	  Beijing	  could	  strengthen	  its	  influence	  and	   increase	   its	   identity	   as	   a	   developing	   country	  within	   this	   area.	   As	   a	   result,	  Chinese	  President	  Xi	   Jinping	  “pledged	  cooperation	  with	  South	  Africa	  on	  African	  affairs,	   and	   vowed	   to	   play	   a	   constructive	   role	   in	   matters	   concerning	   African	  peace	  and	  security”	  during	  his	  state	  visit	  to	  South	  Africa	  (China	  Daily,	  March	  27	  2013).	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   both	   sides	   “called	   on	   the	   international	   community	   to	  pay	   more	   attention	   to	   and	   offer	   greater	   support	   for	   Africa,	   respect	   African	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countries'	  efforts	   to	  solve	  regional	   issues	  on	  their	  own,	  and	  help	  them	  enhance	  capability	  for	  self-­‐generated	  growth”.	  (Xinhua	  News,	  March	  27	  2013)	  	  
3)	  Domestic	  agenda	  support	  
	  Before	  the	  establishment	  of	  diplomatic	  relations	  between	  China	  and	  South	  Africa,	  the	  recognition	  problem	  was	  a	  major	  barrier	  to	  bilateral	  official	  communication.	  Due	   to	   South	   Africa’s	   diplomatic	   and	   economic	   requirements,	   it	   switched	   its	  official	   ties	   from	  Taipei	   to	  Beijing,	   in	   1998.	   After	   that,	   nearly	   all	   South	  African	  presidents	   have	   recognised	   Beijing	   as	   the	   representative	   of	   China	   in	   many	  circumstances.	   In	   his	   speech	   at	   the	   University	   of	   Pretoria,	   in	   2011,	   President	  Zuma	  reconfirmed	  South	  Africa’s	   support	   for	   the	   “One	  China	  Policy”	  by	   saying,	  “the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China	  is	  the	  only	  representative	  of	  the	  Chinese	  people”	  (City	  Press,	  2011).	  Even	  if	  South	  African	  officials	  have	  claimed	  their	  support	  for	  the	  “One	  China	  policy”,	   it	  could	  be	  realistic	   to	  admit	   that	  “most	  Africans	  do	  not	  care	  much	  who	  the	  real	  China	  is	  or	  with	  whom	  official	  diplomatic	  ties	  should	  be	  established”	   (Taylor,	   2009).	   Pretoria	   itself	   has	   put	   forward	   a	   “Two	   China’s”	  situation	   in	   order	   to	   “maximize	   South	   Africa’s	   manoeuvrability	   and	   overseas	  investment	  from	  the	  two	  rival	  countries”	  (Byrnes,	  1996).	   	  
	  The	  issue	  of	  the	  Dalai	  Lama’s	  visa	  application	  in	  2009	  and	  2011	  also	  presents	  a	  similar	  situation.	  In	  2009,	  the	  South	  African	  government	  refused	  to	  grant	  a	  visa	  to	  the	  Dalai	  Lama,	  who	  was	  to	  attend	  a	  peace	  conference	  in	  Johannesburg;	  it	  was	  “a	  matter	  of	  relations	  between	  states,”	  explained	  South	  Africa’s	  finance	  minister	  Trevor	  Manuel	  (Mail	  and	  Guardian,	  March	  27	  2009).	  Beijing	  considered	  the	  Dalai	  Lama’s	  trip	  a	  political	  statement	  about	  the	  secession	  of	  Tibet.	  Meanwhile,	  South	  Africa’s	  Nobel	  Peace	  Prize	  winners,	  Archbishop	  Desmond	  Tutu	  and	  FW	  de	  Klerk,	  berated	  Pretoria,	  saying	  it	  was	  “disgraceful	  to	  ban	  the	  Dalai	  Lama	  from	  attending	  following	  Chinese	  pressure”	  (McGreal,	  March	  23	  2009).	  In	  2011,	  the	  Dalai	  Lama	  had	   been	   invited	   to	   South	  Africa	   to	   receive	   the	  Mahatma	  Gandhi	   International	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Award	   for	   Peace	   and	   Reconciliation,	   and	   to	   speak	   at	   a	   number	   of	   events,	  including	  a	  lecture	  in	  honour	  of	  Tutu’s	  80th	  birthday.	  However	  he	  withdrew	  his	  visa	   application	   after	   South	  Africa’s	   delay	   (CNN,	  October	   4	   2011).	   This	   caused	  much	   debate	   in	   South	   Africa,	  where	   some	   accused	   South	   Africa’s	   home	   affairs	  department	   of	   “unlawful”	   practices,	   and	   being	   “not	   entitl[ed]	   to	   deliberately	  procrastinate”,	   while	   some	   others	   were	   concerned	   with	   the	   pressure	   from	  Beijing,	  as	  China	  is	  South	  Africa’s	  largest	  trading	  partner.	   	  
Both	   cases	   revealed	   that	   anti-­‐secession	   is	   a	   core	   interest	   of	   Beijing’s,	   and	   also	  that	  there	  are	  pre-­‐conditions	  in	  China’s	  political	  and	  economic	  relationships	  with	  African	  countries.	  China	  tends	  to	  use	  its	  muscle	  and	  influence	  to	  get	  recognition	  and	  political	  support	  on	  issues	  related	  to	  Taiwan	  and	  Tibet.	  African	  countries,	  on	  the	   other	   hand,	   are	   affected	   by	   Beijing’s	   commercial	   and	   diplomatic	   clout	   and	  have	  to	  express	  their	  support	   for	  China’s	  positions	   in	  many	  circumstances.	  The	  acknowledgement	   is	   a	   calculation	   of	   national	   interest.	   The	   next	   section	   will	  explain	  the	  close	  China-­‐South	  Africa	  relationship	  from	  South	  Africa’s	  perspective.	  
II.	  Economically	   	  
South	  Africa	  has	  the	  largest	  and	  most	  sophisticated	  economy	  on	  the	  continent	  –	  its	  GDP	  of	  US$384.3	  billion	  was	   ten	   times	   larger	   than	   the	  average	  sub-­‐Saharan	  economy	   in	   2012.	   Its	   GDP	   represents	   24%	   of	   the	   total	   African	   economy,	   and	  constitutes	   18%	   of	   sub-­‐Saharan	   Africa’s	   economy.	   With	   one	   of	   the	   best	  investment	   environments	   in	   Africa,	   South	   Africa	   has	   a	   stable	   and	   democratic	  government,	   a	   sound	   legal	   system,	   a	   relatively	   well-­‐developed	   social	  environment,	   and	  better	   infrastructure	   for	   foreign	   investors.	  At	   the	   same	   time,	  South	   Africa,	   compared	   to	   other	   African	   countries,	   has	  much	  more	   experience	  with	   foreign	   investment	   and	   international	   standards,	   which	   makes	   its	   market	  easier	  to	  access.	  Furthermore,	  as	  a	  member	  of	  the	  WTO	  and	  the	  most	  developed	  country	  in	  Africa	  which	  enjoyed	  the	  Cotonou	  Agreement,	  AGOA,	  gained	  the	  state	  advantages	   in	   accessing	   occidental	   markets.	   Consequently,	   according	   to	   China	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Customs,	  bilateral	  trade	  value	  reached	  US$59.9	  billion	  in	  2012,	  and	  the	  data	  from	  China	   MOFCOM	   showed	   that	   Chinese	   enterprises	   have	   undertaken	   projects	  worth	   US$700	   million	   and	   assigned	   3,000	   workers	   to	   South	   Africa	   in	   2012.	  What’s	  more,	  Chinese	  direct	  non-­‐financial	  investment	  into	  the	  country	  approved	  or	  registered	  by	  MOC	  has	  accounted	  for	  US$170	  million.	  In	  return,	  South	  Africa	  has	  invested	  206	  projects	  worth	  US$145.78	  million	  (MOFCOM,	  2013b).	   	  	  Another	   attractive	   feature	   of	   South	   Africa	   is	   its	   rich	   mineral	   resources.	   South	  Africa	  has	  large	  amounts	  of	  mineral	  reserves.	  It	  is	  the	  world’s	  largest	  producer	  of	  chrome,	  manganese,	  platinum,	  and	  vermiculite,	  and	  the	  second	  largest	  producer	  of	  limonite,	  palladium,	  rutile,	  and	  zirconium.	  Also,	  the	  state	  has	  a	  large	  reserve	  of	  coal	  and	  iron	  ore.	  Since	  1994,	  the	  government	  has	  released	  a	  series	  of	  reforms	  to	  develop	   its	  mining	   industry	  and	  make	   it	   an	  economic	  pillar	   sector.	   In	   contrast,	  China	  has	  a	  strong	  demand	  for	  these	  minerals,	  and	  imports	  US$100	  billion	  worth	  of	  base	  metals	   every	  year.	   In	  2012,	   South	  Africa	  overtook	   India	   to	  become	   the	  world’s	   third	   biggest	   iron	   ore	   supplier	   to	   China,	   who	   is	   the	   world’s	   largest	  consumer	   of	   iron	   ore.	   As	   the	   Mineral	   Resources	   Minister	   Susan	   Shabangu	  described,	   “there	   is	   a	   lot	   of	   interest	   from	   China.	   They	   are	   interested	   in	  manganese,	   platinum,	   uranium	   and	   I	   would	   say	   almost	   every	   commodity”	  (Macharia,	  March	  10	  2013).	  Echoing	   this,	  Chinese	  analysts	  also	  speak	  highly	  of	  South	   Africa’s	   mining	   industry	   and	   technology,	   which	   are	   equipped	   to	   meet	  China’s	  increasing	  demand	  for	  resources	  (Yong	  Wang,	  2012).	  Currently,	   leading	  Chinese	  mining	  companies	  have	  become	  actively	  involved	  in	  the	  state;	  Sinosteel,	  Zijin,	  Minmetals	  and	   Jiaquan	   Iron	  and	  Steel	  have	  made	   investments	   in	   the	  past	  decade.	   	  	  Additionally,	   South	   Africa	   gained	   advantages	   because	   of	   its	   strategic	   role	   in	  facilitating	  China’s	  access	  to	  the	  African	  continent.	  Currently,	  South	  Africa’s	  GDP	  is	  US$384.3	   billion,	  with	   a	  market	   similar	   to	   southern	   and	   northern	  Africa.	   Its	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membership	  in	  SADC	  and	  the	  negotiation	  of	  expansion	  of	  COMESA－EAC－SADC	  (Common	  Market	  for	  Eastern	  and	  Southern	  Africa-­‐	  The	  East	  African	  Community-­‐	  Southern	   African	   Development	   Community)	   provided	   South	   Africa	   with	   an	  opportunity	   for	   foreign	   investors	   to	   access	   a	   free	   trade	   zone	   of	   560	   million	  consumers,	  with	  a	   total	  GDP	  of	  US$1,000	  billion	   from	  27	  countries.	  Along	  with	  South	   Africa’s	   inclusion	   into	   BRICS,	   it	   facilitates	   developing	   states’	   possible	  future	  entry	  to	  Africa.	  As	  for	  China,	  all	  five	  major	  Chinese	  banks	  have	  established	  a	  presence	  in	  South	  Africa	  to	  support	  trade	  and	  investment	  between	  China,	  South	  Africa,	  and	   the	  rest	  of	  Africa,	   including	  providing	  services	   to	  existing	   (Chinese)	  clients,	  which	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  market-­‐sustaining	  investment	  (Gelb,	  2010).	  According	  to	  the	  data	  from	  an	  institute	  in	  Johannesburg,	  the	  majority	  of	  Chinese	  firms	   with	   a	   long-­‐term	   strategy	   appear	   to	   have	   entered	   South	   Africa	   for	  market-­‐seeking	  purposes,	  selling	  into	  the	  domestic	  South	  African	  market	  as	  well	  as	   the	   regional	   Southern	   African	   market.	   Meanwhile,	   the	   China-­‐Africa	  Development	   Fund	   (CADFund)	   showed	   the	   same	   feature	   of	   South	  Africa	   as	   an	  important	  place	  for	  Chinese	  companies’	  expansion	  into	  the	  region,	  evidenced	  by	  the	   fact	   that	   among	   the	  60	  projects	   in	  over	  30	   countries	   in	  Africa,	   eight	   are	   in	  South	  Africa,	  which	   is	   the	   largest	  number	   in	  any	  country.	  The	   total	   investment	  CADFund	   has	  made	   in	   South	   Africa	   exceeds	   US$400	  million,	  which	   is	   also	   the	  largest	  total	  CADFund	  investment	  in	  any	  African	  countries.	   	  	  In	   short,	   South	  Africa,	   as	   the	   regional	   leader,	  has	  great	   significance	   to	  China	   in	  terms	   of	   political,	   economic,	   and	   diplomatic	   strategy.	  Not	   only	   do	   its	   domestic	  resource	  reserves	  and	  markets	  attract	  Chinese	  investors,	  but	  its	  government	  also	  is	   a	   supporter	   of	   China	   on	   both	   international	   events	   and	   China’s	   stance	   in	   the	  international	  arena.	   	  
8.2.2	  South	  Africa’s	  demands	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I.	  Politically	  
Present	  Zuma,	  who	  is	  friendlier	  to	  Beijing	  than	  his	  predecessor,	  identified	  China	  as	   a	   “key	   strategic	   partner	   for	   South	   Africa”	   during	   his	   trip	   to	   the	   Sino-­‐South	  African	   Business	   Forum	   in	   Beijing.	   Dr.	   Mills,	   former	   National	   Director	   of	   the	  South	  African	  Institute	  of	  International	  Affairs,	  also	  commented	  on	  the	  frequent	  high-­‐level	  visits	  between	  these	  two	  governments,	  and	  stressed	  that	  “South	  Africa	  should	   take	   advantage	   of	   its	   strong	   governance	   institutions	   to	   form	   a	   robust	  relationship	   with	   China”	   (KPMG,	   October	   19	   2011),	   because	   China	   plays	   an	  important	  role	  in	  bringing	  the	  African	  agenda	  to	  the	  world	  stage,	  which	  enlarges	  the	  significance	  of	  South	  Africa.	   	  
In	   December	   2010,	   when	   China	   was	   the	   rotating	   chair	   of	   BRIC,	   President	   Hu	  Jintao	  issued	  an	  invitation	  letter	  to	  South	  African	  President	  Jacob	  Zuma,	  inviting	  him	  to	  attend	  the	  third	  BRIC	  leaders’	  meeting	  to	  be	  held	  in	  Beijing	  (Xinhua	  News,	  December	  24	  2010).	  Since	  then,	  BRIC	  enlarged	  to	  become	  BRICS,	  in	  which	  South	  Africa	   is	   expected	   to	   represent	   Africa	   as	   an	   emerging	   power,	   despite	   its	   small	  population	   and	   economy.	   With	   this	   invitation,	   South	   Africa	   could	   expand	   its	  trade	  with	  the	  BRIC	  countries.	  
South	  Africa	  made	  efforts	  to	  join	  the	  BRICS,	  as	  its	  minister	  of	  Trade	  and	  Industry,	  Dr.	   Rob	   Davies	   said	   at	   the	   fifth	   BRICS	   summit:	   “the	   Importance	   of	   BRICS	   can	  never	  be	  over	  emphasized”.	  As	  for	  South	  Africa,	  its	  trade	  and	  economic	  relations	  with	  the	  BRICS	  countries	  has	  increased	  since	  its	  participation	  began,	  Total	  trade	  between	  South	  Africa	  and	  other	  BRICS	  countries	  has	  grown	  from	  11.6%	  to	  27%	  in	   the	   next	   year.	   In	   2013,	   31	   projects	   by	   25	   companies	   from	   BRICS	   countries	  were	  constructing	  in	  South	  Africa,	  accounting	  for	  R12.6	  billion,	  (the	  Daily	  Times,	  2013).	   Additionally,	   South	   Africa’s	   partnership	  within	   BRICS	   could	   benefit	   the	  continent	  as	  a	  whole.	  It	  has	  increased	  the	  weight	  of	  the	  long-­‐marginalised	  region	  and	  brought	  more	  industrialisation	  and	  integration	  to	  the	  area.	  Take	  the	  recent	  fifth	  BRICS	  summit	  as	  an	  example:	  the	  five	  countries	  jointly	  establish	  a	  business	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council	   in	   the	   hope	   of	   strengthening	   trade	   and	   investment	   among	   members.	  South	  Africa	   is	   expected	   to	  become	  a	  mediator	  between	   the	   emerging	  markets	  and	   Africa,	   and	   to	   help	   BRIC	   countries	   understand	   the	   continent,	   while	  negotiating	  bilateral	  agreements.	  
Additionally,	   China	   and	   South	   Africa	   appear	   to	   share	   similar	   stances	   on	   some	  recent	  issues,	  ranging	  from	  the	  conflicts	  on	  the	  continent	  to	  climate	  conferences.	  Along	  with	   Beijing’s	   high	   profile	   emphasis	   on	   the	   continent,	   South	   Africa	   also	  took	   this	   opportunity	   to	   gain	   support	   on	   the	   world	   stage.	   During	   the	   latest	  election	  for	  the	  African	  Union	  commission,	  South	  Africa’s	  candidate,	  Nkosazana	  Dlamini-­‐Zuma,	   sought	   support	   from	   China	   based	   on	   South	   Africa’s	   friendly	  attitude	   towards	   Beijing,	   and	   expressed	  willingness	   to	   strengthen	   cooperation	  between	  the	  African	  Union	  and	  China.	  In	  2012,	  Dlamini-­‐Zuma	  defeated	  Jean	  Ping,	  whose	   father	   is	   a	  Chinese	   trader,	   from	  Gabon,	   and	  was	  elected	  as	   chairperson.	  (Bathembu,	  July	  16	  2012)	   	   	  
II.	  Economically	  
Along	   with	   the	   increasing	   significance	   of	   its	   political	   influence,	   South	   Africa	  showed	  a	  willingness	  to	  transfer	  the	  political	  significance	  and	  economic	  relations	  into	   regional	   and	   domestic	   social	   and	   economic	   benefits.	   This	   means	   that	   the	  Zuma	   administration’s	   strategy	   is	   to	   connect	   its	   diplomatic	   achievements	  with	  the	  key	  issues	  in	  this	  region	  -­‐	  notably,	  infrastructure,	  employment	  opportunities	  and	   poverty	   reduction.	   In	   2010,	   Zuma	   was	   elected	   as	   the	   president	   of	   the	  Programme	  for	  Infrastructure	  Development	  in	  Africa	  (PIDA),	  a	  project	  dedicated	  “to	   promote	   socio-­‐economic	   development	   and	   poverty	   reduction	   in	   Africa	  through	   improved	   access	   to	   integrated	   regional	   and	   continental	   infrastructure	  networks	   and	   services”	   (NEPAD,	   2010).	   Pretoria	   “particularly	   championed	   the	  cause	   for	   infrastructure	   investment	   in	   the	   region	   as	   a	   precursor	   to	   regional	  integration”	  in	  the	  BRICS	  summit	  in	  Durban.	  (BRICS,	  March	  27	  2013)	  At	  the	  first	  BRICS	  Business	  Council	  meeting,	  South	  Africa’s	  Trade	  and	  Industry	  Minister	  Rob	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Davies	  declared	  that	  “We	  need	  to	  promote	  a	  much	  more	  value-­‐added	  economy.	  We	  need	  to	  do	  this	  by	  integrating	  our	  continent	  [Africa].	  We	  need	  to	  consolidate	  this	  by	  a	  massive	  infrastructure	  development	  programme	  on	  the	  continent."	  (SA	  News,	  August	  19	  2013)	  The	  BRICS	  members	  expressed	  support	  and	   interest	   in	  infrastructure	  construction	  on	  the	  continent,	  which	  is	  particularly	  significant	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  economic	  crises	  experience	  by	  the	  developed	  economies.	  China,	  as	  the	   largest	  economy	  among	  BRICS,	  with	   large	  amounts	  of	   funds	  and	   interest	   in	  this	   region,	   became	   an	   alternative	   resource	   to	   support	   the	   growth	   and	  modernisation	   of	   the	   continent’s	   infrastructure.	   The	   economic	   ties	   between	  China	   and	   other	   southern	   African	   countries	   could	   provide	   South	   Africa	   with	  stronger	  and	  more	  reliable	  economic	  growth	  opportunities	  and	  drivers.	  	  Considering	   the	   domestic	   priorities,	   South	   Africa	   is	   seeking	   value-­‐added	   trade	  with	   China	   and	   also	   to	   change	   its	   current	   economic	   status	   as	   a	   source	   of	   raw	  material,	   while	   pursuing	   a	   wish/dream	   to	   become	   a	   key	   player	   in	   the	   global	  economy.	   At	   the	   fifth	   Forum	   on	   China-­‐Africa	   Co-­‐operation	   in	   2012,	   President	  Zuma	   described	   the	   unbalanced	   economic	   relationship	   with	   China	   as	  “unsustainable”	   in	   the	   long	   term,	   and	   expressed	   a	   willingness	   to	   export	  value-­‐added	  products	   from	  South	  Africa	   to	  China.	  Especially,	   after	  South	  Africa	  suffered	   from	   widespread	   strikes,	   export	   deficits,	   and	   the	   depreciation	   of	   the	  Rand,	  the	  country	  relied	  on	  changing	  its	  trade	  deficit	  and	  unbalanced	  situation	  in	  order	  to	  encourage	  future	  economic	  growth.	  South	  Africa	  would	  like	  to	  diversify	  its	  exports	  by	  exporting	  more	  industrial	  products.	  Meanwhile,	   it	  requires	  China	  to	  increase	  its	  investment	  and	  create	  employment	  opportunities.	  
In	   addition,	   like	  many	  other	  developing	  economies,	   South	  Africa	  has	   shown	  an	  interest	   in	   the	   development	   model	   of	   Asian	   countries	   as	   well.	   The	   Zuma	  administration	   launched	   the	   “New	   Growth	   Path”	   in	   2010	   for	   employment	  creation	   and	   economic	   growth.	   The	   centre	   of	   this	   plan	   is	   to	   use	   “massive	  investment	  in	  infrastructure	  as	  a	  critical	  driver	  of	  jobs	  across	  the	  economy”,	  and	  
	   232	  
to	   establish	   “smarter	   coordination	   between	   government	   and	   private	   sector”	  (gov.za,	  2010).	  The	  focus	  on	  infrastructure	  and	  the	  greater	  role	  of	  government	  is	  similar	   to	   China’s	   development	   path.	   The	   new	   approach	   is	   in	   contrast	   with	  former	   President	   Mbeki’s	   more	   free-­‐market	   approach.	   In	   this	   case,	   the	   state	  played	   an	   active	   role	   in	   the	   economy.	   As	   the	   head	   of	   the	   ANC’s	   Economic	  Transformation	  Committee	  put	  it,	  “The	  Chinese	  model	  of	  building	  infrastructure	  and	  growing	  jobs	  will	  be	  a	  key	  focus	  of	  the	  ANC’s	  economic	  policy”.	  To	  be	  specific,	  the	  China	  model	  here,	   interpreted	  as	  state	  capitalism,	  requires	  a	  greater	  role	  of	  government	   in	   the	  markets.	  Despite	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  China	  model	   itself	   is	  very	  controversial,	   Beijing	   still	   invited	   African	   leaders	   to	   training.	   South	   Africa’s	  Minister	   of	   Public	   Enterprises	   Malusi	   Gigaba	   and	   Economic	   Development	  Minister	   Ebrahim	   Patel	   have	   visited	   China	   to	   study	   how	   the	   Chinese	   use	   their	  parastatals	  to	  control	  strategic	  assets	  and	  grow	  the	  economy.	  Gigaba,	  specifically,	  was	  assigned	  the	  task	  of	  learning	  how	  the	  Chinese	  consolidated	  their	  parastatals	  under	  one	  umbrella	  (Naidoo,	  Molele,	  &	  Letsoalo	  February	  3	  2012).	   	  
8.2.3	  Discussions	  for	  Shaping	  China’s	  responsibility	  in	  South	  Africa	  China	  has	  a	  strong	  motivation	  to	  engage	  with	  South	  Africa,	  not	  only	  is	  the	  state	  a	  regional	   leader	   that	   has	   significant	   influence	   on	   the	   continent,	   but	   also	   its	  friendly	  relations	  with	  Beijing	  have	  provided	  China	  with	  political	  support	  for	  its	  “One-­‐China”	  policy	  and	  on	  Tibet	  issues.	  In	  addition,	  South	  Africa’s	  resources	  and	  relatively	  mature	  market	  are	  attractive	  to	  Chinese	  investors	  who	  wish	  to	  expand	  both	  South	  Africa’s	  market	  and	  to	  establish	  a	  gateway	  for	  access	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  continent.	   On	   the	   other	   side,	   South	   Africa	   relies	   on	   China	   to	   expand	   its	  international	  and	  regional	   influence,	  and	  expects	  Chinese	   investment	   to	   fuel	   its	  value-­‐added	  exports	  and	  learn	  about/from	  Chinese	  economic	  development.	   	  	  Comparing	  China’s	   interests	  with	  that	  of	  South	  Africa,	  one	  can	  see	  that	  the	  two	  countries	   find	   it	   relatively	   easy	   to	   reach	   agreements	   on	   political	   issues	   and	  support	   each	  other	   in	   the	   international	   arena.	   China,	   in	   line	  with	   international	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expectations	   and	   South	   Africa’s	   political	   ambitions,	   helps	   South	   Africa	   to	  represent	  the	  continental	  voice	  on	  the	  world	  stage.	  Furthermore,	  both	  countries	  consider	   themselves	   as	   leaders	   of	   developing	   countries,	   they	   have	   a	   similar	  stances	  on	  international	  events,	  calling	  on	  the	  interests	  of	  developing	  countries.	  But,	   at	   the	   economic	   level,	   what	   the	   Chinese	   government	   provides	   to	   South	  Africa	   and	   other	   African	   countries	   is	   mostly	   infrastructure,	   which	   does	   not	  always	  meet	  with	  South	  Africa’s	  demands.	  The	  country	  has	  placed	  value-­‐added	  industry	   at	   the	   centre	   of	   its	   economic	   growth	   strategy,	   which	   has	   led	   to	   an	  economic	   relation	   between	   China	   and	   South	   Africa	   more	   akin	   to	   competitors.	  The	   following	   section	   will	   discuss	   China’s	   impact	   on	   and	   limitations	   in	   South	  Africa.	   	   	   	   	  
8.3	  China’s	  capability	  and	  limitations	  in	  South	  Africa	  
	  As	   has	   been	   mentioned	   in	   the	   previous	   part,	   the	   significance	   of	   South	   Africa	  largely	  relies	  on	  its	  connection	  to	  the	  continent.	  In	  return,	  the	  state	  has	  benefited	  from	  the	  representation	  of	  the	  region.	  Indeed,	  South	  Africa	  has	  the	  most	  political	  power	   political	   and	   economic	   strengthen	   on	   the	   continent,	   with	   Africa’s	  strongest	  voice	  in	  the	  international	  arena,	  even	  more	  so	  than	  Nigeria.	  However,	  there	  are	  still	  plenty	  of	  doubts	  about	  its	  leadership	  and	  representation	  of	  Africa.	  Many	   agree	   that	   the	   country	   is	   still	   a	   junior	   player	   in	   the	   global	   field.	   As	   one	  African	   analyst	   said,	   “It	   wanted	   to	   be	   too	   much	   too	   soon	   whereas	   it	   was	   not	  ready	   for	   this	   international	   role”	   (Marthoz,	   2012).	   Not	   only	   are	   its	   scale	   and	  strength	  unable	   to	  compete	  with	  other	  emerging	  powers,	   its	  acceptance	  on	   the	  continent	   as	   a	   leader	   is	   limited.	   As	   Daniel	   Flemes	   notes,	   “the	   acceptance	   of	  Pretoria’s	  leadership	  seems	  to	  be	  limited	  to	  the	  global	  level.	  The	  acceptance	  of	  its	  regional	   leadership	   is	   constrained	   by	   the	   historical	   legacy	   of	   apartheid”	  (Sidiropoulos,	   2007,	   p.	   2).	   During	   the	   AU’s	   chairperson	   elections	   between	   Ms	  Dlamini-­‐Zuma	   from	   South	   Africa	   and	   Mr.	   Ping	   from	   Gabon,	   voting	   had	   been	  broadly	  split.	   It	  revealed	  that	  South	  Africa’s	   influence	   in	   the	  continent	   is	  not	  as	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much	  as	  one	  might	  expect.	  And	  the	  linguistic,	  religious,	  and	  diversified	  national	  interests	  barriers	  have	  hardly	  given	  the	  continent	  one	  voice.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  role	  of	  South	  Africa	  as	  a	  gateway	  to	  the	  continent	  hasn’t	  yet	  worked	  out	  for	  Beijing.	   	  	  Furthermore,	  as	  a	  relatively	  small	  economy	  compared	  to	  the	  other	  four	  powers,	  South	  Africa’s	   inclusion	  in	  the	  BRICS	  is	  perceived	  as	  a	  gateway	  to	   its	  continent.	  But,	  how	  effective	  South	  Africa	  could	  be	  depends	  on	  a	  lot	  of	  factors:	  such	  as	  the	  coordination	   between	   BRICS	   members,	   South	   Africa’s	   influence	   within	   BRICS,	  and	   to	  what	   extend	   the	   country	   could	   represent	  Africa’s	   broad	   interests.	   First,	  the	   BRICS	   itself:	   like	   many	   other	   organisations,	   it	   has	   some	   basic	   differences	  between	  members.	  China-­‐South	  Africa	  within	  BRICS	  has	  the	  same	  problems.	  One	  is	   the	  most	   successful	   democratic	   state	   in	  Africa,	  while	   the	   other	   is	   autocratic.	  These	  two	  states,	  with	  divergent	  policy,	  diplomatic	  strategy	  and	  different	  forms	  of	  government,	  are	  in	  some	  way	  like	  competitors,	  rather	  than	  allies.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	   the	   strengths	   of	   China	   and	   South	   Africa	   are	   different.	   When	   the	   BRICS	  leaders	  met	   in	   St.	   Petersburg	   before	   the	   G20	   summit	   in	   2013,	   they	   agreed	   to	  establish	   a	   development	   fund	   of	   US$50	   billion,	   and	   a	   reserve	   fund	   of	   US$100	  billion.	  For	  the	  US$100	  billion,	  China	  would	  contribute	  US$41	  billion.	  By	  contrast,	  South	  Africa	  would	   only	   contribute	  US$5	   billion.	   Even	   if	  we	   cannot	   prove	   that	  larger	   donors	   have	   a	   louder	   voice,	   this	   can	   suggest	   the	   difference	   in	   status	   of	  China	  and	  South	  Africa	  in	  this	  club	  of	  emerging	  economies.	   	  
Meanwhile,	   as	   Jinghao	   Lu,	   a	   China-­‐Africa	   analyst	   at	   the	   consultancy	   Frontier	  Advisory	   pointed	   out,	   South	  Africa	   “is	   far	   from	   representing	   the	   complexity	   of	  African	   political	   economy”	   (the	   Guardian,	   March	   24	   2013).	   Currently,	   China	  tends	   to	   deal	   with	   African	   states	   bilaterally.	   As	   Witness	   14	   said,	   it	   is	   more	  common	   to	   see	   Chinese	   enterprises	   doing	   business	   directly	  with	   the	   countries	  they	  want	   to	  engage	  with.	  With	   limited	  capability	   to	  become	  a	  bridge	  between	  China	  and	   the	   continent,	  China-­‐South	  Africa	   trade,	   like	  other	  African	  countries,	  still	  remains	  as	  a	  passive	  recipient	  of	  Chinese	  goods	  and	  an	  exporter	  of	  mineral	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resources.	  Additionally,	  South	  Africa’s	  economic	  relationship	  with	  the	  continent	  is	   like	   China	   and	   other	   emerging	   economies	   -­‐	   that	   is,	   reliant	   on	   its	   energy	  imports	   while	   exporting	   manufactured	   goods.	   This	   trade	   pattern	   has	   shaped	  China	  more	   as	   a	   competitor	   to	   South	  Africa,	   in	   terms	   of	   energy	   resources	   and	  markets.	   	  
China-­‐South	   Africa’s	   friendly	   governmental	   relations	   and	   their	   stance	   on	   the	  South	   does	   not	   change	   the	   fact	   that	   South	   Africa’s	   pillar	   industries,	   such	   as	  mining,	   telecoms	   and	   banking,	   are	   still	   dominated	   by	   the	   global	   North.	   What	  Chinese	   enterprises	   could	   get	   are	   marginalised	   sectors	   in	   the	   downstream	  industry	  chains.	  China	  itself	  operated	  at	  the	  same	  level	  in	  the	  global	  value	  chain	  with	   South	   Africa,	   and	   it	  would	   be	   to	   help	   South	   Africa’s	   industrialisation	   and	  growth	   in	  value-­‐added	  exports.	   Inevitably,	  when	   scrambling	   for	  manufacturing	  markets	   in	   labour-­‐intensive	   sectors,	   China	   has	   demographic	   advantages	   and	   a	  cheaper	   labour	   force	   than	   that	   of	   South	   Africa.	   According	   to	   research	   by	   the	  University	  of	  East	  Anglia,	  South	  African	  exports	  to	  other	  African	  countries	  have	  experienced	   a	   loss	   of	  market	   share,	   from	  20%	   to	  15%	  between	  2001	   to	  2010.	  Meanwhile,	   China	   has	   increased	   its	   share	   from	   5%	   to	   25%	   during	   the	   same	  decade.	  It	  is	  estimated	  that,	  if	  it	  were	  not	  for	  Chinese	  competition,	  South	  Africa’s	  exports	  to	  these	  countries	  would	  have	  been	  almost	  ten	  per	  cent	  higher	  –	  or,	  $900	  million	  more	  (Edwards	  &	  Jenkins,	  2013).	  In	  short,	  the	  overwhelming	  amount	  of	  Chinese	   goods	   available	   has	   had	   a	   negative	   impact	   on	   South	   Africa’s	   domestic	  industries	  and	  its	  exports	  in	  relevant	  sectors.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  in	  China	  there	  are	  some	  voices	  that	  question	  whether	  South	  Africa	   should	   be	   a	   recipient	   of	   Chinese	   aid.	   They	   have	   pointed	   out	   that	   South	  Africa’s	   GDP	   per	   capita	   was	   ranked	   83th,	   with	   US$11,281,	   while	   China	   was	  ranked	   93th	   with	   US$9,005	   in	   2012.	   It	   is	   seen	   as	   unreasonable	   to	   provide	  assistance	  to	  a	  “rich”	  country	  while	  the	  domestic	  population	  remains	  in	  poverty.	  Furthermore,	  South	  Africa	  has	  a	  lead	  in	  mineral	  and	  agricultural	  technology,	  plus	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its	  economic	  pattern	  with	   the	  continent	   is	  similar	   to	  China	  and	  other	  emerging	  economies.	  The	  rival	  status	  has	  brought	  more	  doubts	  and	  domestic	  pressures	  on	  China’s	   assistance	   to	   South	   Africa’s	   development.	   Meanwhile,	   different	   from	  other	  African	  countries,	  South	  Africa’s	  market	  environment	  seems	  less	  attractive	  to	   Chinese	   investors.	   South	   Africa’s	   mining	   industry,	   for	   example,	   which	   is	  believed	  to	  be	  the	  most	  appealing	  sector	  to	  China,	  was	  ranked	  54th	  by	  a	  Global	  Mining	   Survey	   2012/2013,	   issued	   by	   the	   Canadian	   Fraser	   Institute	   -­‐	   this	   is	  behind	  Botswana,	  Namibia,	  Mauritania,	  and	  Zambia	  (Prinsloo	  &	  Marais,	  February	  10	  2013).	  Even	  though	  it	  has	  much	  more	  standardised	  and	  systematic	  policy	  for	  international	  deals	  than	  other	  African	  countries,	  the	  major	  mining	  resources	  are	  controlled	   by	   the	   Northern	   companies,	   and	   the	   small	   ones	   are	   left	   to	   local	  owners.	  Especially	  when	   it	   comes	   to	   the	  BEE	  (Black	  Economic	  Empowerment),	  the	  Chinese	  investors	  have	  to	  find	  local	  black	  partners	  in	  order	  to	  be	  involved	  in	  South	   Africa’s	   mining	   industry.	   However,	   a	   local	   BEE	   qualified	   partner	   often	  lacks	   the	   ability	   to	   complete	   the	   project.	   The	   ambiguous	   ownership,	   language,	  and	  cultural	  barrier,	  as	  well	  as	  unclear	  contracts,	  only	  increases	  the	  uncertainty	  and	  difficulties	  of	  investment.	  Also,	  compared	  to	  other	  African	  countries,	  Chinese	  enterprises	  have	  received	  far	  less	  preference	  and	  fewer	  favorable	  offers.	  As	  Mr.	  Li	  Shenglin,	  the	  Executive	  Director	  of	  CADFund	  pointed	  out,	  “in	  countries	  where	  there	   is	   not	   vibrant	   interest	   of	   foreign	   investment,	   the	   government	   usually	  approaches	  Chinese	  investors	  quite	  actively	  and	  pledges	  with	  a	  lot	  of	  preferential	  conditions,	  such	  as	  lower	  tax…	  We	  never	  receive	  such	  treatment	  in	  South	  Africa”.	  (Y.	  Li,	  2013)	  
8.4	  The	  Gap	  between	  China’s	  policy	  in	  South	  Africa	  and	  its	  implementation	   	  
	  Different	   to	   other	   African	   countries,	   South	   Africa	   displays	   two	   characteristics:	  one	  is	  its	  identity	  as	  an	  African	  state	  with	  low	  economic	  growth,	  and	  the	  other	  is	  its	  democratic	  political	  system	  and	  relatively	  sophisticated	  economy.	  Driven	  by	  these	  two	  features,	  the	  state	  has	  contradictory	  foreign	  strategies,	  falling	  between	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international	   norms	   and	   interests.	   On	   one	   hand,	   based	   on	   its	   history	   of	  anti-­‐apartheid	   struggle,	   the	   democratic	   government	   supports	   the	   liberal	  internationalists	   and	   human	   rights;	   while,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   it	   emphasises	  South-­‐South	   solidarity	   and	   tolerates	   authoritarian	   regimes.	   According	   to	  University	   of	   Johannesburg	   professor	   Chris	   Landsberg,	   South	   Africa	   not	   only	  prioritises	   development	   issues	   and	   issues	   of	   poverty	   and	   inequality,	   but	   also	  advocates	  for	  a	  “fundamental	  redistribution	  of	  both	  power	  and	  resources	  at	  the	  global	   level”	   (Marthoz,	   2012).	   South	   Africa’s	   attitudes	   towards	  “military-­‐humanitarian	  interventions”	  reveal	  its	  values	  and	  identity	  as	  an	  African	  country	   and	   a	   third-­‐world	   state,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   ANC’s	   wariness	   of	   foreign	  interference.	   Additionally,	   the	   unsatisfied	   and	   dual	   economy	   requires	   the	  government	  to	  prioritise	  its	  domestic	  development,	  to	  pay	  more	  attention	  to	  the	  social	  debt	  of	  apartheid	  and	  needs	  of	  the	  majority	  black	  population	  This	  priority	  was	   reflected	  by	   its	   foreign	  policy	  of	   emphasising	   economic	  development	  with	  tangible	  results.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  country’s	  with	  sympathy	  for	  Africa	  and	  who	  can	  offer	  economic	  benefits	  tend	  to	  become	  ideal	  partners	  for	  South	  Africa.	   	  	  China,	  with	  its	  status	  as	  a	  developing	  country,	  who	  has	  also	  experienced	  growth	  and	  development,	  became	  a	  key	  co-­‐operator	   for	  Pretoria.	   Its	   identification	  as	  a	  member	  of	   the	  Global	  South	  and	  the	  G77	  in	  the	  UN	  are	  of	  significance	  to	  South	  Africa,	  because	  both	  countries	  have	  called	   for	  multipolarity	  and	   the	  benefits	  of	  the	   South	   by	   being	   included	   on	   the	   global	   stage.	   In	   recent	   years,	   China’s	  high-­‐profile	   involvement	   in	  Africa	  has	  brought	   the	  continent	   into	   the	   spotlight.	  This	  has	  aligned	  with	  South	  Africa’s	  own	  foreign	  strategy	  that	  prioritises	  African	  peace	   and	   security,	   and	   also	   its	   ambitions	   to	   be	   seen	   as	   an	   African	   leader.	  Beijing’s	   concentration	   on	   African	   affairs	   has	   provided	   South	   Africa	   with	   a	  greater	  voice	  in	  the	  international	  organisations.	  South	  Africa’s	  inclusion	  in	  BRICS	  is	  more	  due	   its	  African	   identity	  rather	   than	   its	  economic	  strengths,	  as	  with	   the	  other	  four	  emerging	  economies.	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8.4.1.	  Politically	  The	  close	  relationship	  with	  China	  has	  brought	  with	  it	  multiple	  effects	  for	  South	  Africa.	  First,	  in	  order	  to	  have	  a	  broader	  representation	  of	  the	  black	  continent	  and	  the	   majority	   of	   black	   people	   at	   home,	   it	   tends	   to	   side	   with	   China	   and	   other	  developing	   countries	   on	   the	   matters	   of	   debt	   relief,	   free	   trade,	   technical	  transformation,	   climate	   issues,	   and	   the	   reform	  of	   international	   institutions	  and	  international	   rules	   to	  make	   them	   less	   favourable	   to	   the	  North.	   In	   terms	   of	   the	  frequent	   African	   conflicts,	   although	   a	   prioritised	   African	   agenda	   has	   pushed	  Pretoria	   to	   make	   more	   contributions	   to	   peacekeeping	   operations,	   it	   has	   also	  made	  the	  state	  more	  cautious	  about	  “foreign	  intervention”.	  South	  Africa	  stood	  in	  the	   company	  of	  Russia	  and	  China	  on	   the	  vote	  over	  Libya	  and	  Syria,	  which	  was	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  setback	  of	  accepted	  norms	  and	  the	  “responsibility	  to	  protect”.	  Also	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Zimbabwe,	   despite	   strong	   pressure	   from	   the	   U.S.	   and	   EU,	  Pretoria	   has	   preferred	   talks	   rather	   than	   confrontation	   and	   the	   imposition	   of	  sanctions.	  South	  Africa’s	  standing	  for	  the	  South	  may	  undermine	  Pretoria’s	  strong	  relationships	  with	  the	  EU	  and	  US.	  Second,	  Beijing	  has	  provided	  South	  Africa	  with	  an	  alternative	  source	  for	  not	  investment	  and	  trade,	  but	  also	  for	  a	  political	  system.	  South	  Africa’s	  transition	  from	  apartheid	  to	  democracy	  has	  set	  an	  example	  for	  the	  rest	   of	   the	   African	   countries.	   It	   successfully	   avoided	   large-­‐scale	   violence	   and	  chaos	   while	   establishing	   a	   stable	   government	   and	   a	   developed	   legal	   system.	  However,	  some	  leading	  liberal	  voices	  feared	  that	  the	  close	  relationship	  between	  the	  ANC	  and	  CPC	  might	  draw	  the	  country	  into	  copying	  China’s	  political	  model	  of	  an	   authoritarian	  developmental	   state.	  The	  ANC	  has	   shown	   signs	  of	   intolerance	  towards	  its	  critics,	  especially	  those	  in	  the	  media.	  The	  South	  African	  Broadcasting	  Corporation	   is	   under	   tight	   political	   control	   and	   a	   law	   of	   secrecy.	   “In	   the	   new	  South	  Africa,	  with	   its	   freedom	  hard-­‐won	   from	  apartheid”,	  Nobel	  Prize	   laureate	  Nadine	  Gordimer	   said	   in	   2012,	   “we	   now	  have	   the	   imminent	   threat	   of	   updated	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versions	   of	   the	   suppression	   of	   freedom	   of	   expression	   that	   gagged	   us	   under	  apartheid”	  (Gordimer,	  May	  24	  2012).	  Meanwhile,	  Pretoria’s	  refusal	  to	  and	  delay	  in	   issue	   the	   Dalai	   Lama	   with	   a	   visa	   has	   been	   criticised	   by	   Nobel	   Peace	   Prize	  laureate	   Archbishop	   Desmond	   Tutu	   as	   unlawful.	   Third,	   China’s	   involvement	  drew	   the	   world’s	   attention	   to	   this	   continent,	   and	   thus	   brought	   international	  strength	   as	   well	   as	   regional	   accountability	   to	   this	   country.	   The	   future	  development	   of	   the	   long-­‐marginalised	   continent	   has	   been	   hotly	   debated	   at	  international	  conferences	  and	  in	  the	  media.	  The	  fifth	  BRICS	  Summit	   in	  2013,	   in	  Durban,	   was	   launched	   with	   the	   theme	   of	   “BRICS	   and	   Africa:	   Partnership	   for	  Development,	   Integration	  and	   Industrialisation.”	  South	  Africa	  as	   the	  host	  had	  a	  platform	   and	   a	   strong	   voice	   to	   deliver	   the	   African	   agenda	   to	   other	   emerging	  countries.	  Also,	  Dlamini-­‐Zuma’s	  leadership	  of	  the	  African	  Union	  has	  placed	  South	  Africa	  as	  a	  better	  and	  more	  visible	  diplomatic	  actor	  in	  international	  affairs.	   	  
8.4.2	  Economically	   	  
I.	  Unbalanced	  trade	  pattern	  
In	  response	  to	  the	  huge	  expectations	  of	  the	  majority	  of	  black	  people,	  the	  ANC	  is	  under	   considerable	   domestic	   pressure	   to	   improve	   the	   social	   and	   economic	  situation	  among	  its	  poor	  population.	  As	  a	  result,	  its	  foreign	  policy	  is	  expected	  to	  make	   tangible	   contributions	   to	   solving	   the	   problems	   of	   poverty	   and	  unemployment,	   as	  well	   as	   to	   reach	   highly	   ambitious	   growth	   and	   development	  goals.	  During	  the	  fourth	  BRICS	  Summit	  in	  India,	  President	  Jacob	  Zuma	  said,	  “Our	  participation	   in	   BRICS	   is	   designed	   to	   help	   us	   achieve	   inclusive	   growth,	  sustainable	  development	  and	  a	  prosperous	  South	  Africa.”	  (dfa.gov.za,	  August	  01	  2014)	  To	  evaluate	  the	  influence	  of	  China’s	   involvement	  based	  on	  South	  Africa’s	  expectations,	   one	   should	   look	   at	   to	  what	   extent	   Chinese	   investment	   and	   trade	  has	  had	  a	  positive	  or	  negative	  impact	  on	  local	  industry	  and	  employment.	  Beijing	  provided	  the	  state	  with	  more	  opportunities	  than	  other	  African	  countries,	  due	  to	  its	  regional	  influence	  and	  economic	  strength.	  Witness	  9	  said	  Chinese	  enterprises	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tend	  to	  choose	  South	  Africa	  as	  their	  first	  centre	  for	  expanding	  their	  business	  in	  Africa.	   The	   leading	   Chinese	   enterprises	   Sinosteel,	   China	   Construction	   Bank,	  CCECC,	  China	  Development	  Bank	  and	  CADF	  all	  established	  their	  headquarters	  in	  Johannesburg.	   Take	   a	   province-­‐owned	   enterprise	   Jinchuan	   Corporate	   as	   an	  example:	  the	  largest	  Platinum	  producer	  in	  China	  has	  purchased	  a	  South	  African	  copper-­‐cobalt	   company,	  Metorex,	  with	   its	   office	   in	   South	  Africa	   and	   its	  mining	  resources	  in	  Zambia	  and	  Congo.	  As	  the	  chief	  delegate	  of	  CADF,	  Zhengyi	  Lu	  said,	  “Johannesburg,	  as	  the	  economic	  and	  financial	  centre	  in	  Southern	  Africa,	  has	  the	  branch	  of	  nearly	  all	  world	  major	  banks,	  including	  China	  Construction	  Bank,	  Bank	  of	   China	   and	   China	   Industrial	   Bank.	   85%	   financial	   operations	   in	   the	   continent	  have	  achieved	  through	  this	  city”	  (China	  News	  and	  Report,	  2013).	  The	  expanding	  number	   of	   centres	   located	   in	   South	   Africa	   have	   brought	   large	   amounts	   of	  financial	  support	  and	  investment	  opportunities	  to	  this	  country.	  According	  to	  the	  statistics	   from	  MOCOM,	   China’s	   non-­‐financial	   investment	   into	   South	  Africa	   has	  reached	   US$170	   million,	   most	   of	   which	   is	   aimed	   at	   infrastructure	   and	  construction	   projects.	   Recently,	   South	   African	   Deputy	   President	   Kgalema	  Motlanthe	   invited	   Chinese	   companies	   and	   investors	   to	   participate	   in	   his	  country’s	   infrastructure	   construction,	   and	   to	   connect	   South	   African	   regions	  through	  new	  railways.	  Soon	  after,	  President	  Xi	  Jinping	  pledged	  new	  support	  for	  Africa's	   infrastructure	   construction,	   and	   the	   funding	   for	   such	   projects	   has	  become	  the	  Group	  of	  20’s	  priority	   (Xinhua	  News,	  October	  30	  2013).	  The	  China	  Development	   Bank	   has	   agreed	   to	   provide	   US$500	   million	   in	   loans	   to	   South	  Africa’s	  national	  transport	  company,	  Transnet,	  for	  its	  repair	  and	  maintenance	  of	  the	   railway	   (Reuters,	  2013).	  According	   to	  data	   from	  CGD,	  Beijing	  has	  provided	  US$230	  million	  in	  financial	  aid	  to	  South	  Africa	  between	  2000	  to	  2011.	  Meanwhile,	  it	   has	   also	   gradually	   emerged	   as	   an	   important	   source	   of	   infrastructure	  development	  in	  this	  country.	   	   	  
South	  Africa,	   like	  any	  other	  African	  country,	  exports	  raw	  materials	  and	  imports	  consumer	  products	  and	  capital	  goods	   from	  China.	  This	   is	   reflected	   in	   the	   trade	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balances	   between	   the	   two	   countries,	   with	   South	   Africa	   having	   surpluses	   in	  exports	  of	   raw	  materials	   and	  primary	  products,	   and	   large	  deficits	   in	   consumer	  and	   capital	   goods.	   Despite	   the	   fact	   that	   South	  African	   President	   Jacob	   Zuma	   is	  friendly	  with	  Beijing,	   he	   has	   still	  warned	   of	   “the	   unbalanced	   nature	   of	   Africa’s	  burgeoning	   trade	   ties	   with	   China	   is	   ‘unsustainable’	   in	   the	   long	   term”.	   Deputy	  Trade	   and	   Industry	   Minister	   Elizabeth	   Thabethe	   also	   called	   for	   a	   strategy	   to	  “foster	   a	  more	   balanced	   and	   sustainable	   trade	   relationship	  with	   China”	   at	   the	  opening	   of	   the	   last	   in	   a	   series	   of	   three	   South	   African	   expos	   in	   Beijing	  (SAnews.gov.za,	  September	  12	  2013).	  South	  Africa	  has	  shown	  keen	  willingness	  to	   change	   the	   current	   “raw	   materials	   and	   commodities	   for	   manufacturing	  products”	   trade	  pattern.	  China’s	  ambassador	  to	  South	  Africa	  Zhong	  Jianhua	  has	  demonstrated	   how	   Beijing	   could	   conduct	   various	   platforms	   to	   promote	   the	  export	   of	   South	   Africa’s	   value-­‐added	   goods.	   In	   September	   2013,	   South	   Africa	  hosted	  a	  six-­‐day	  “South	  Africa	  Expos	  in	  China”	  in	  Beijing,	  Shanghai,	  and	  Xiamen	  under	   the	   supervision	   of	   the	   South	   Africa	  Ministry	   of	   Trade	   and	   Industry	   and	  China’s	  Ministry	  of	  Commerce,	  in	  order	  to	  increase	  the	  reputation	  and	  visibility	  of	   its	   products	   and	   technology	   in	   China.	   The	   promotional	   event	   in	   Beijing	  concentrated	  on	  attracting	  trade	  and	  investment,	  and	  was	  sponsored	  by	  China’s	  MOCOM.	   The	   potential	   cooperation	   area	   in	   this	   expo	   included	   agri-­‐processing,	  chemicals,	   plastics,	   steel,	   aluminium,	   automotive,	   capital	   equipment	   and	   allied	  services,	  electro-­‐technical,	  mining	  and	  refining,	  renewable	  energy,	  infrastructure,	  oil	  and	  gas.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  like	  all	  other	  African	  states,	  South	  Africa	  showed	  an	  interest	   in	   cooperative	   opportunities	   on	   infrastructure	   projects,	   with	   which	  Chinese	  companies	  are	  familiar.	  (China	  Daily,	  September	  23	  2013)	  However,	  the	  results	   of	   these	   promotional	   events	   depended	   on	   whether	   South	   Africa’s	  industries	  could	  provide	  the	  value-­‐added	  products	  to	  Chinese	  markets	  with	  both	  accepted	  levels	  of	  quality	  and	  at	  a	  reasonable	  price.	  
Calculated	   from	   the	   data	   of	   UN	   Comtrade,	   by	   2010	   China	   was	   ranked	   as	   the	  principal	  source	  of	  imports	  to	  South	  Africa	  in	  27	  of	  45	  manufacturing	  industries,	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mainly	   focused	   on	   knitted	   and	   crocheted	   fabrics,	   clothing,	   leather	   and	   leather	  products,	   footwear,	   household	   appliances,	   electrical	   lamps	   and	   furniture.	  Chinese	   products	   accounted	   for	   between	   48%-­‐77%	   of	   total	   South	   African	  imports	  of	  those	  products.	  The	  overwhelming	  tide	  of	  Chinese	  products	  in	  these	  labour-­‐intensive	  industries	  has	  given	  rise	  to	  concern	  for	  South	  Africa’s	  domestic	  manufacture	  industry	  and	  its	  increasing	  unemployment	  rate.	  Comparing	  Chinese	  products’	   share	   of	   South	   Africa’s	   market	   in	   1995	   and	   2010,	   the	   figure	   has	  increased	  from	  less	  than	  half	  a	  per	  cent	  to	  around	  6%	  in	  2010.	  The	  Congress	  of	  South	   African	   Trade	   Unions	   (COSATU),	   South	   Africa’s	   leading	   trade	   union	  confederation,	  identifies	  China	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  South	  Africa’s	  economic	  interests.	   	  
Considering	   the	   imbalances	   in	   the	  bilateral	   trade	  pattern,	   some	   industries	   face	  stiff	   competition	   from	   China.	   Although	   there	   is	   a	   possibility	   that	   an	   increased	  share	  of	  Chinese	  products	  may	  replace	  imports	  from	  other	  countries	  rather	  than	  South	  Africa’s	  domestic	  industry,	  according	  to	  the	  data	  from	  UNComtrade.	  Take	  the	   clothing	   sector	   as	   an	   example:	   its	   loss	   to	   Chinese	   imports	   accounted	   for	  31.1%,	   while	   the	   local	   industry	   declined	   7.6%	   between	   2001	   and	   2011.	   The	  same	  losses	  could	  be	  found	  in	  some	  other	  manufacturing	  sectors.	  It	  revealed	  that	  large	  amounts	  of	  imports	  from	  China,	  especially	  in	  the	  clothing	  and	  textile	  sector	  and	   in	   small	   goods,	   have	   negative	   impacts	   on	   the	   growth	   of	   local	   industry.	  Meanwhile,	   according	   to	   research	   by	   the	   Southern	   Africa	   Labour	   and	  Development	  Research	  Unit,	   South	  Africa	  has	   lost	  market	   share	   to	  China	   in	   its	  major	   export	  markets	   (Edwards	  &	   Jenkins,	   2013)	   in	   these	   sectors	   as	  well.	   The	  decline	  in	  such	  labour-­‐intensive	  industries	  as	  a	  result	  of	  Chinese	  competition	  has	  also	  led	  to	  greater	  unemployment.	  Not	  only	  the	  loss	  of	   jobs	  associated	  with	  the	  bankrupt	   of	   local	   companies,	   but	   cheap	   Chinese	   goods	   have	   resulted	   in	   lower	  profits	   generated	   by	   local	   products.	   In	   order	   to	   increase	   the	   competition	   and	  lower	  the	  cost,	  the	  surviving	  producers	  tend	  to	  reduce	  labourers’	  salaries.	  
Apart	   from	   the	  unbalanced	   trade	   in	   value	   added	   industries,	   the	   two	   countries’	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trade	   value	   is	   also	   said	   to	   be	   in	   favour	   of	   China.	   In	   2004,	   South	   Africa	  acknowledged	   China	   as	   a	   market	   economy	   and	   started	   free	   trade	   agreement	  (FTA)	   talks	  with	  China	  on	  behalf	  of	   the	  Southern	  African	  Customs	  Union.	  After	  that,	   bilateral	   commercial	   activities	   largely	   increased.	   According	   to	   China’s	  Customs,	  China-­‐South	  Africa	  trade	  value	  reached	  US$59.9	  billion,	  with	  growth	  of	  32%	   in	   2011,	   of	   which	   China	   exported	   US$15.3	   billion	   and	   imported	   US$44.6	  billion,	  with	  a	  deficit	  of	  US$29.3	  billion	  (MOFCOM,	  2013b).	  But,	  according	  to	  the	  statistics	  from	  South	  Africa,	  South	  Africa’s	  exports	  to	  China	  were	  just	  over	  R8132	  billion	  in	  2012,	  while	  it	  imported	  from	  China	  was	  R120	  billion	  in	  the	  same	  year,	  which	   indicated	   a	   deficit	   of	   R39	   billion	   to	   South	   Africa	   (South	   African	  Government	  News	  Agency,	  December	  9	  2013).	  This	  revealed	  that	  there	  existed	  a	  huge	   statistical	   gap	   between	   each	   government.	   Since	   all	   the	   statistics	   are	  released	   by	   governmental	  websites,	   the	   figures	   have	   already	   excluded	   illegally	  smuggled	   goods.	   Therefore,	   there	   is	   a	   gap	   generated	   through	   different	  approaches	  to	  making	  the	  calculations.	  As	  for	  South	  Africa,	  the	  data	  is	  based	  on	  an	   annual	   survey	  of	   companies,	  while	   in	  China	   the	   figure	   is	   collected	   from	   the	  approval	   and	   registration	   of	   proposals.	   Additionally,	   many	   companies	   ‘route’	  their	   investments	   through	   third	   countries	   in	   order	   to	   obtain	   favourable	   tax	   or	  regulatory	   treatment,	   or	   to	   disguise	   the	   actual	   source	   or	   destination	   of	   goods	  from	  their	  host	  or	  home	  governments.	  (Aykut	  &	  Ratha,	  2003).	  This	  increases	  the	  difficulties	  in	  data	  collection;	  for	  example,	  knowing	  whether	  the	  figures	  included	  goods	   transferred	   from	   Hong	   Kong,	   or	   the	   gold	   and	   diamonds	   sold	   to	   China	  through	  the	  London	  Metal	  Exchange.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  prerequisite	  of	  reducing	  the	  deficit	   is	   setting	   up	   an	   equal	   criterion	   through	   negotiation	   between	   the	   two	  governments.	   Without	   mutually-­‐accepted	   statistics,	   it	   is	   hard	   to	   find	   further	  solutions.	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 1	   South	   African	   Rand	   approximately	   equals	   to	   0.12－0.14	   to	   US	   dollar	   in	   2011,	   Since	   South	   Africa’s	  currency	  fluctuates	  relatively	  sharply.	  The	  thesis	  has	  used	  the	  original	  source	  calculated	  in	  Rand	  instead	  of	  dollar.	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Lastly,	   the	   SOEs	   that	   came	   to	   South	   Africa	   were	   latecomers	   compared	   to	   the	  traditional	  Northern	  companies.	  Add	   to	   this	   the	   fact	   that	  South	  Africa	  has	   long	  been	   considered	   to	   be	   a	   relatively	   developed	   country,	   it	   is	   hard	   for	   Chinese	  investors	  to	  shoulder	  a	  grand	  energy	  and	  policy	  strategy	  from	  the	  beginning	   in	  such	   a	   state.	   On	   one	   hand,	   as	   Witness	   16	   pointed	   out,	   the	   charity	   projects	  appointed	   by	   headquarters	   as	   a	   part	   of	   the	   companies’	   corporate	   social	  responsibility	   performance	   only	   benefited	   a	   small	   group	   of	   people;	   but,	   for	   a	  large	   portion	   of	   the	   African	   labour	   force	   and	   local	   communities,	   they	   haven’t	  shared	   in	   the	   commitments	   the	   companies	   have	   made.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	  Witness	  15	  suggested	  that	  people	  who	  choose	  to	  come	  to	  Africa	  are	  often	  young	  opportunists,	   most	   of	   whom	   have	   a	   strong	   profit-­‐driven	   motivation	   to	   be	   in	  South	   Africa.	   They	   only	   consider	   the	   country	   as	   a	   place	   to	   earn	  money.	  When	  they	  have	  accumulated	  enough	  funds,	  they	  do	  not	  think	  about	  paying	  back	  to	  the	  local	   community,	   but	   rather	   to	   move	   to	   other	   developed	   countries,	   or	   return	  home.	   As	   a	   result,	   they	   would	   take	   the	   risk	   to	   smuggling,	   disrespecting	   local	  labour	  protection	   laws	  and	  competition,	  and	  violating	  the	  development	  of	   local	  industry.	   	  	  In	  summary,	  as	  the	  largest	  and	  most	  developed	  economy	  in	  Africa	  with	  a	  sound	  constitutional	  system,	  South	  Africa’s	  relationship	  with	  China	  carries	  more	  weight	  than	   most	   other	   African	   states.	   Even	   if	   its	   economic	   strength	   is	   smaller	   than	  China,	   it	   still	   represents	   the	   “S”	   in	   the	   BRICS.	   China-­‐South	   Africa	   interaction	  hence	  presents	  a	  different	  picture.	  Currently,	  considering	  the	  constraints	  on	  both	  sides,	   China’s	   economic	   commitment	   to	   this	   state	   is	   limited.	   The	   ubiquitous	  Chinese	  construction	  projects	  in	  many	  African	  countries	  are	  not	  commonly	  seen	  in	  South	  Africa.	  And	  Chinese	  business’s	  competition	  negatively	  affects	   its	  South	  African	  counterparts	  and	  local	  employment	  opportunities.	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II.	  BEE	  
Constrained	   by	   economic	   structures,	   China’s	   engagement	   in	   South	   Africa’s	  manufacturing	  industry	  has	  not	  benefit	  the	  state.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  China	  as	  a	  latecomer	  to	  the	  state	  has	  experienced	  difficulties	  in	  its	  resources	  market.	  Large	  scale	   Chinese	   engagement	   didn’t	   come	   until	   the	   mid-­‐2000s.	   Initially,	   Chinese	  enterprises	   showed	   strong	   interest	   in	   and	   ambitions	   for	   the	   mining	   industry.	  However,	   this	   didn't	   go	   as	   smoothly	   as	   expected.	   Even	   the	   leading	   mining	  corporations	  backed	  by	  the	  central	  or	  provincial	  government	  have	  encountered	  difficulties	  and	  experienced	  losses.	  It	  reminded	  Chinese	  investors	  that,	  although	  South	   Africa	   has	  more	   developed	   infrastructure	   and	   administrative	   processes,	  the	   risks	   and	   difficulties	   are	   no	   less	   than	   in	   other	   African	   states.	   By	   contrast,	  Compared	   to	   the	   experienced	   multinationals,	   Chinese	   enterprises	   are	   still	  beginners	  and	  have	  a	  long	  way	  to	  “going	  out”.	  	  Sinosteel,	   under	   the	   administration	   of	   China’s	   State-­‐Owned	  Assets	   Supervision	  and	  Administration	  Commission,	  entered	  South	  Africa’s	  mining	  industry	  in	  1996.	  In	  order	   to	  gain	   further	  expansion,	   the	   company	  established	   three	   subsidiaries	  there:	   Sinosteel	   South	   Africa	   (PTY)	   Ltd.,	   ASA	   Metals	   (PTY)	   Ltd.,	   and	   Tubatse	  Chrome	  Minerals	  (PTY)	  Ltd.	  What’s	  more,	  Sinosteel	  paid	  attention	  to	  localization	  in	  its	  operations.	  Among	  its	  total	  employees	  of	  7,000,	  only	  19	  came	  from	  China.	  (New	  Century,	  December	  13	  2013b)	  In	  ASA	  Metals,	  the	  Chinese	  were	  responsible	  for	  production,	  while	  local	  managers	  took	  charge	  of	  operations,	  community	  and	  human	   resources.	   In	   2008,	   ASA	   Metals,	   in	   which	   Sinosteel	   holds	   60%	   of	   its	  shares,	   made	   a	   bold	   decision	   to	   conduct	   an	   expansion	   project	   named	   “Xuri”	  (rising	  sun).	  The	  whole	  project	  cost	  about	  US$440	  million,	  and	  included	  a	  closed	  electric	   furnace	   with	   an	   annual	   output	   of	   240,000	   tons	   of	   ferrochrome,	   a	  pelletizing	   plant	   of	   600,000	   tons	   per	   year,	   a	   broken	   ore	   factory	   that	   is	   able	   to	  deal	   with	   100	   tons	   of	   ore	   per	   hour,	   two	   new	   slopes	   each	   with	   an	   annual	  production	  of	  540,000	  tons	  of	  chrome	  ore,	  and	  a	  concentrating	  mill	  factory	  that	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has	   an	   annual	   chrome	   ore	  mining	   capacity	   of	   1.1	  million	   tons	   (People’s	   Daily,	  February	  22	  2008).	  The	  ambitious	  project	  was	  supposed	   to	   start	  operations	   in	  May	  2009.	  It	  is	  estimated	  that,	  with	  the	  operation	  of	  this	  new	  factory	  and	  plant,	  ASA	  Metals	  would	  produce	  one	  million	  tons	  of	  chrome	  ore	  and	  380,000	  tons	  of	  ferrochrome	  per	  year.	   It	  would	  place	  ASA	  Metals	  as	   the	  second	   largest	  chrome	  producer,	  behind	  only	  Xstrata33.	   	   	   	  	   	  However,	   large	   amounts	   of	   investment	   have	   also	   brought	   another	   side	   to	   the	  story.	  Due	  to	  the	  BEE	  programme	  released	  by	  South	  Africa	  government	  in	  2007,	  Sinosteel	   has	   experienced	   bitter	   losses	   in	   order	   to	  maintain	   its	   control	   of	   ASA	  Metals.	  Currently,	   the	  ownership	  and	  exclusive	   selling	   rights	  problems	  are	   still	  waiting	  to	  be	  solved.	  According	  to	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  ASA	  Metals	  biography,	  the	  company	  was	  set	  up	  as	  a	  joint	  venture	  between	  East	  Asia	  Metals	  Investment	  Co.,	   Ltd.	   (EAMI)	   and	   Limpopo	   Economic	   Development	   Enterprise	   (LimDev,	  former	   NPDC)	   in	   1996.	   Since	   EAMI	   is	   Sinosteel	   Corporation’s	   wholly-­‐owned	  subsidiary,	   Beijing	   has	   a	   60%	   stake	   in	   ASA	   Metals,	   while	   LimDev	   from	   South	  Africa	  has	  only	  40%.	  But	  Beijing’s	  control	  of	  ASA	  Metals	  has	  been	  challenged	  by	  the	  BEE	  programme,	  because	  its	  partner	  LimDev	  is	  not	  a	  BEE	  company.	  In	  order	  to	   meet	   the	   requirements,	   ASA	   Metals	   has	   to	   sell	   25%	   of	   its	   shares	   and	   a	  one-­‐vote	   veto	   to	   BEE	   share	   holders	   (Black	   share	   holders).	   It	  means	   EAMI	   and	  LimDev	  should	  sell	  25%	  of	  their	  60%	  and	  40%	  shares	  respectively.	  In	  this	  case,	  as	   for	   Sinosteel,	   its	   share	   would	   reduce	   to	   just	   44%,	   which	   would	   lead	   to	  Beijing’s	   loss	  of	   control	  of	  ASA	  Metals.	  This	  has	  created	  a	  dilemma.	  On	   the	  one	  hand,	  in	  such	  a	  risky	  investment	  in	  mining	  industry,	  Sinosteel	  can	  hardly	  ensure	  its	   interests	  without	   the	   controlling	   stake.	  Plus,	   the	   company	  has	   launched	   the	  “Xuri	   project”	   for	   further	   expansion	   against	   a	   backdrop	   that	   global	   chromium	  prices	  were	  increasing	  in	  2007	  and	  2008.	  Without	  holding	  shares	  of	  the	  company,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Xstrata	   is	   an	   Anglo-­‐Swiss	  multinational	  mining	   company	   headquartered	   in	   Zug,	   Switzerland.	   It	   was	   a	  major	  producer	  of	  coal	  (and	  the	  world's	  largest	  exporter	  of	  thermal	  coal),	  copper,	  nickel,	  primary	  vanadium	  and	  zinc	  and	  the	  world's	  largest	  producer	  of	  ferrochrome.	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the	   huge	   investment	   would	   be	   meaningless.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   holding	   a	  controlling	  stake	  may	  violate	  the	  BEE	  programme.	   	  	  In	   order	   to	  maintain	   control	   of	  ASA	  Metals,	   Beijing	   has	   sought	   help	   from	   local	  political	   elites.	   Chinese	   diplomat	   Ji	   Peiding	   used	   his	   personal	   connections	   to	  Moeletsi	  Mbeki,	  the	  younger	  brother	  of	  former	  President	  Thabo	  Mbeki,	  a	  critic	  of	  BEE	   (New	   Century,	   December	   13	   2012b).	   He	   claimed	   that	   “BEE	   is	   legalized	  corruption…	  that	  has	  enriched	  a	   small	  black	  elite	  while	  doing	  nothing	   to	  boost	  South	  Africa’s	   economy”	   (Harrison,	   June	   19	   2009).	  He	   also	   said	   that	   “BEE	   had	  been	  all	  about	  shuffling	  ownership	  of	  assets”	  (LEBELO,	  March	  27	  2004).	   	   Since	  the	   ownership	   of	   the	   Dilokong	   mine	   belongs	   to	   the	   Limpopo	   Province	   rather	  than	  Sinosteel	  or	  ASA	  Metals,	  Sinosteel	  tried	  to	  argue	  that	  BEE	  companies’	  shares	  should	   come	   from	   the	   province.	   Under	   pressure	   from	   local	   political	   elites	   and	  their	  thirst	  for	  China’s	  investment,	  then-­‐Premier	  of	  Limpopo	  Mr.	  Moloto	  agreed	  that	  the	  provincially-­‐owned	  company	  LimDev	  would	  sell	  30%	  of	  its	  shares,	  with	  5%	  to	  the	  Maroga	  community	  and	  25%	  to	  BEE	  companies.	  In	  this	  case,	  Sinosteel	  could	  maintain	  its	  60%	  stake.	   	   	  	  This	  was	  not	  the	  end	  of	  the	  story,	  however.	  The	  BEE	  programme	  was	  introduced	  by	  the	  South	  African	  government	  as	  a	  measure	  to	  balance	  the	  huge	  gap	  between	  Caucasian	   elites	   and	   black	   people,	   and	   to	   transfer	   the	   economy	   from	   one	  dominated	  by	  white	  people	   to	  one	  shared	  by	   the	  majority	  of	   the	  population,	   in	  order	   to	   create	  more	   employment	   opportunities.	   However,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   ASA	  Metals,	  it	  only	  benefited	  a	  few	  of	  the	  new	  black	  elite,	  rather	  than	  the	  majority	  of	  black	  people.	  Local	  newspaper	  The	  Sunday	  Times	  disclosed	  that	  in	  the	  ASA	  deal,	  the	  Limpopo	  government	  decided	  to	  sell	  BEE	  shares	  to	  five	  consortiums	  from	  43	  bidders.	  Each	  of	  them	  would	  get	  a	  12.5%	  stake	  from	  the	  total	  30%	  of	  shares.	  If	  you	   kept	   an	   on	   eye	   on	   the	   five	   consortiums,	   you	   would	   find	   those	   who	   were	  “involved	   in	   the	  deal	   include[d]	   soccer	  boss	   Irvin	  Khoza,	   Chairman	  of	  National	  Empowerment	   Fund	  Ronnie	  Ntuli	   and	  Kgomotso	  Motlanthe,	   the	   son	   of	   deputy	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president	   Kgalema	   Motlanthe”	   (Fin24.com,	   March	   14	   2010).	   A	   Chinese	  newspaper	  exposed	  that	  some	  of	  the	  five	  consortiums	  were	  even	  owned	  by	  the	  relatives	  of	  the	  Limpopo	  governors	  (Deng,	  July	  2	  2011).	   	  
Instead	  of	  making	  more	  people	  enjoy	  the	  benefits	  of	  the	  chrome	  mine,	   the	  deal	  instead	   launched	   infighting	   and	   struggles	   among	   black	   political	   elites	   at	   the	  expense	  of	   their	   impoverished	  communities.	  The	  party,	  unions	  and	  community	  all	   struggled	   to	   get	  more	   of	   the	   benefits	   from	   the	   deal.	   It	   is	   reported	   that	   the	  controversial	  politician,	  Commander-­‐in-­‐Chief	  of	  the	  Economic	  Freedom	  Fighters	  political	  movement,	  Julius	  Malema	  used	  to	  be	  involve	  in	  the	  deal	  as	  well,	  but	  was	  forced	   out	   due	   to	   media	   exposure.	   Later,	   he	   publicly	   advocated	   for	   the	  nationalisation	   of	  mines.	   Despite	   a	   local	   newspaper	   suggesting	   that	   “Malema's	  increasingly	  strident	  calls	  for	  nationalisation	  were	  designed	  to	  deflect	  attention	  away	   from	   the	   ASA	   transaction”	   (Fin24.com	   March	   14	   2010),	   his	   voice	  represented	   the	  majority	  of	  black	  people’s	  widespread	  anger	  over	   inequalities,	  and	   their	   willingness	   to	   share	   the	  mining	   income.	   Therefore,	   even	   though	   the	  ANC	   rejected	   the	   nationalisation	   plans,	   “the	   supporters	   of	   nationalisation”	  including	   an	   impoverished	   population	   and	   the	   ANC	   Youth	   League,	   “have	  remained	  vocal	  and	  active”	  (York,	  December	  20	  2012).	  Superficially,	  it	  is	  China’s	  aggressive	  control	  of	  the	  mines	  that	  fanned	  the	  struggles	  and	  conflicts	  between	  black	  elites,	  but	  Sinosteel	  had	  its	  sorrows	  as	  well.	   	   	  
What	   made	   the	   deal	   more	   complicated	   was	   the	   reality	   that	   many	   of	   the	   new	  black	  elites	  have	   little	  or	  no	  experience	  of	  business,	  nor	  sufficient	   funds.	   In	   the	  ASA	  deal,	  Sinosteel	  paid	  not	  only	  funds	  for	  the	  expansion	  plan,	  the	  “Xuri”	  project	  which	   was	   estimated	   to	   considerably	   increase	   the	   Dilokong	   mine’s	   value,	   but	  also	   the	   responsibility	   to	   help	   BEE	   consortiums	   financing.	   In	   2010,	   after	  investing	  US$350	  million	  for	  the	  “Xuri”	  project,	  Sinosteel	  and	  LimDev	  could	  not	  reach	  an	  agreement	  on	  how	  to	  finance	  the	  five	  BEE	  consortiums,	  and	  the	  price	  of	  LimDev’s	   30%	   shares.	   LimDev	   held	   that,	   since	   the	   five	   BEE	   companies	   were	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ready,	   Sinosteel	   should	   finance	   them	   to	   get	   the	   stakes.	   Meanwhile	   Sinosteel	  would	  prefer	   to	   help	   them	  by	   finding	   loans	   from	  China	   or	   abroad,	   rather	   than	  providing	   the	   loans	   themselves,	   because	   Sinosteel	   already	   had	   a	   debt	   ratio	   of	  90%.	  Even	  the	  funds	  for	  the	  expansion	  project	  were	  borrowed	  from	  China’s	  Exim	  Bank	   -­‐	   US$275	   million	   out	   of	   the	   US$350	   million	   needed.	   Currently,	   the	   deal	  remains	  suspended,	  because	  if	  LimDev	  stopped	  selling	  its	  shares,	  Sinosteel	  may	  lose	  its	  control	  of	  the	  mines.	  In	  contrast,	  Sinosteel	  lacks	  the	  capability	  to	  finance	  the	  BEE	  companies	  (Deng,	  July	  2	  2011).	   	  
Sinosteel’s	  case	  in	  South	  Africa	  reveals	  many	  of	  the	  problems	  facing	  both	  China	  and	  South	  Africa.	  As	  for	  South	  Africa,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  state	  has	  a	  sound	  legal	   system,	   implementation	   is	   another	  matter	   entirely.	   The	   interest	   conflicts	  between	   white	   and	   black,	   elites	   and	   population,	   ANC,	   labor	   unions	   and	   local	  communities	   present	   a	   harsh,	   complex	   and	   unclear	   environment	   for	   foreign	  investors.	  In	  order	  to	  argue	  for	  their	  stances,	   foreign	  involvement	  is	  the	  easiest	  scapegoat	   for	   domestic	   social	   problems,	   and	   therefore	   their	   interests	   are	   the	  easiest	  to	  be	  sacrificed.	   It	   is	  worth	  noting	  that	  the	  foreign	  interest	  and	  national	  interest	  are	  not	  always	  contradicted	  by	  each	  other.	  Enjoying	  high	   international	  expectation,	  South	  Africa’s	  society	  should	  be	  prepared	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  it.	  As	  for	   the	   case	  of	  Sinosteel,	  ASA’s	   former	  manager	  Suwei	  Zhang	   revealed	   that	   the	  company	  had	  an	  annual	  profit	  of	  US$77	  million	  before	   the	  dilemma;	  but	   it	  has	  lost	  US$3	  million	  per	  month	  due	  to	  the	  unsettled	  problem	  (L.	  Liu,	  July	  5	  2011).	  If	  South	  Africa	  had	  a	  more	  sustainable	  and	  favourable	  investment	  environment	  for	  Sinosteel,	   chances	   are	   that	   Chinese	   enterprises	   may	   bring	   in	   more	   funds	   for	  further	  expansion,	  and	  hence	  more	  employment	  opportunities.	   	  
Regarding	   China,	   it	   has	   strong	   ambitions	   to	   safeguard	   its	   national	   resource	  security,	   but	   in	   reality	   the	   state-­‐owned	   enterprises	   are	   far	   from	  working	   as	   a	  national	   team.	   The	   gap	   between	   national	   strategy	   and	   enterprises’	   operations	  makes	  it	  hard	  for	  all	  the	  relevant	  actors	  involved.	  Take	  Sinosteel	  in	  South	  Africa	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as	  an	  example:	  as	  a	  state-­‐owned	  enterprise,	  it	  has	  shouldered	  the	  responsibility	  for	  Beijing’s	  “going	  out”	  strategy	  as	  well	  as	  the	  profit-­‐driven	  business	  strategy.	  In	  order	  to	  explore	  overseas	  resources,	  the	  central	  government	  and	  national	  banks	  provide	   loans	   to	   support	   the	   pioneering	   enterprises.	   In	   return,	   it	   requires	  proportional	   imports	   of	   resources	   back	   to	   China.	   The	   administrative	  intervention	  violates	  the	  profit-­‐driven	  nature	  of	  enterprises,	  and	  can	  sometimes	  even	  harm	  the	  survival	  of	  the	  enterprise.	  The	  pressure	  of	  national	  grand	  strategy	  contributed	   to	   ASA’s	   failure.	   Before	   2008,	   its	   main	   ferrochrome	   export	  destinations	  were	  Japan,	  the	  US	  and	  Europe,	  because	  chrome	  prices	  in	  overseas	  market	   were	   13%-­‐15%	   higher	   than	   domestically	   (New	   Century,	   December	   13	  2010a).	   However,	   after	   getting	   the	   loans	   from	   China	   Exim	   Bank	   for	   its	   “Xuri”	  Expansion	   plan,	   ASA	   had	   to	   reserve	   20%	   of	   its	   production	   for	   the	   domestic	  Chinese	   market.	   From	   the	   central	   government’s	   perspective,	   it	   diversified	   its	  mining	   supply	  and	  assured	   its	  national	   resources	   security.	  Though,	   in	   terms	  of	  ASA,	  due	  to	  the	  long	  maritime	  distance	  from	  South	  Africa	  to	  China,	  its	  products	  could	   hardly	   compete	   against	   those	   imported	   from	   Turkey	   or	   Kazakhstan.	   In	  addition,	  human	  resources	  and	  costs	  in	  China	  are	  lower	  than	  in	  South	  Africa,	  and	  it	   is	  therefore	  more	  worthwhile	  to	  import	  chrome	  ore	  rather	  than	  the	  products	  from	   ASA	   Metals.	   The	   contradiction	   between	   Beijing’s	   strategy	   and	   ASA’s	  interests	  make	   it	   harder	   for	   the	   company	   to	   survive	   in	   the	   highly	   competitive	  international	  market.	  Suwei	  Zhang	  has	  argued	  in	  an	  interview,	  that	  “Developing	  is	   the	   only	  way	   to	   benefit	   our	   country.	   Only	  when	   Sinosteel’s	   assets	  were	   five	  times	  larger,	  then	  we	  have	  the	  capability	  to	  support	  national	  strategy,	  otherwise,	  even	  a	  small	  and	  medium	  private	  company	  has	  more	  strength	  than	  ours.”	  (Deng,	  July	  2	  2011)	   	   	   	   	  
The	  case	  of	  Sinosteel	  in	  South	  Africa	  is	  one	  of	  failure	  for	  the	  Chinese	  enterprise,	  its	  local	  partners	  and	  the	  local	  community.	  In	  this	  case,	  China	  didn’t	  show	  much	  concern	   for	   the	   local	   black	   people,	   and	   instead	   it	   was	   involved	   in	   the	   mining	  business	   under-­‐the-­‐counter	   for	   the	   control	   of	   stakes.	   Unluckily,	   the	   Chinese	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company	   lost	   its	   interests	   as	   well.	   This	   reveals	   the	   gap	   between	   the	   central	  government’s	   grand	   strategy	   and	   the	   real	   difficulties	   at	   the	   micro-­‐level.	   It	   is	  unrealistic	  to	  expect	  a	  profit-­‐driven	  enterprise	  to	  either	  give	  up	  all	  its	  profits	  for	  the	   national	   interests,	   or	   to	   sacrifice	   its	   interests	   for	   international	   ethics.	   A	  corporate	  ethic	  exists	  in	  the	  form	  of	  its	  long-­‐term	  profits.	   	  
Although	   the	   BEE	   is	   designed	   to	   protect	   and	   benefit	   the	   majority	   black	  population	   it	  actually	   turned	  out	   to	  be	  a	  grab	   for	  resources	  among	  black	  elites,	  and	  made	   the	  market	   harder/riskier	   for	   foreign	   investors.	   It	   revealed	   the	   fact	  that,	  although	  China	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  the	  stronger	  country	  at	  the	  national	  level	  when	   facing	   its	   African	   counterparts,	   it	   has	   limits	   and	   constraints	   at	   the	   local	  enterprise	   level.	   Chinese	   enterprises,	   as	   newcomers	   on	   this	   continent,	   are	   still	  very	   weak	   compared	   to	   the	   traditional,	   Western	   multinationals.	   Without	   a	  sustainable	  operation,	  it	  is	  impossible	  for	  a	  company	  to	  talk	  about	  paying	  back	  to	  the	  local	  community,	  no	  matter	  how	  powerful	  its	  home	  country.	  Indeed,	  Beijing	  is	  an	  easy	  scapegoat	  for	  all	  Chinese	  behaviour	  in	  Africa,	  but	  to	  what	  extend	  it	  can	  control	  its	  own	  companies	  as	  well	  as	  the	  host	  country	  is	  questionable.	  When	  the	  entire	  continent	  is	  rushing	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  available	  Chinese	  funds,	  the	  key	  questions	  lie	  not	  in	  pushing	  China	  to	  invest	  more,	  to	  pay	  more	  assistance,	  or	  to	  transfer	  more	   technology,	   but	   rather	   it	   requires	   the	   African	   governments	   and	  enterprises	   to	   think	  about	  how	  to	   take	  advantage	  of	  China’s	  engagement,	   since	  this	  trend	  is	  inevitable.	  In	  terms	  of	  taking	  advantage	  of	  China’s	  engagement	  and	  the	  opportunities,	  the	  more	  developed	  South	  Africa	  didn’t	  offer	  any	  advantages.	  By	  contrast,	  South	  Africa	  is	  more	  like	  a	  competitor	  to	  China	  on	  the	  continent.	  The	  more	  sound	  political	  system	  and	  economic	  strength	  face	  Pretoria	  with	  a	  dilemma:	  on	  one	  hand,	  it	  criticises	  the	  negative	  impact	  of	  Chinese	  goods	  and	  labour	  force	  on	   its	   local	   industries,	  which	   implies	   it	   has	   equal	   relations	  with	   China.	   On	   the	  other	  hand,	  like	  many	  other	  African	  countries,	  it	  calls	  for	  China’s	  funds	  and	  aids,	  which	   indicates	   its	   willingness	   to	   gain	   from	   China.	   China’s	   approach	   to	   and	  strategy	   for	   the	   various	   African	   countries	   is	  mostly	   the	   same,	   it	   is	   in	   Africans’	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hands	  to	  turn	  it	  into	  a	  blessing	  or	  a	  curse.	   	   	  
	  
	  
8.5	  Conclusion	   	  Currently,	   South	  Africa	  and	  China	  have	  a	   close	   relationship	   in	   the	  political	   and	  economic	  fields.	  Zuma’s	  administration	  has	  shown	  support	  for	  cooperation	  with	  China	  in	  the	  international	  arena	  -­‐	  notably	  by	  refusing	  the	  Dalai	  Lama’s	  visa,	  and	  taking	   the	   same	   stance	   on	   sanctioning	   Libya	   and	   Syria.	   China	   has	   supported	  South	   Africa’s	   leading	   role	   in	   the	   continent,	   and	   welcomed	   the	   country	   into	  BRICS.	  However,	   the	  ANC’s	   opponents,	   civil	   activists,	   and	   researchers	   in	   South	  Africa	  have	  widely	  questioned	  South	  Africa’s	  political	  and	  economic	  alliance	  with	  China,	   and	   are	   concerned	   that	   it	   may	   undermine	   the	   hard-­‐won	   democratic	  achievements.	  In	  fact,	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  that	  Beijing	  intentionally	  affects	  South	  Africa’s	  democratic	  development	  through	  diplomatic	  pressure.	  As	  Witnesses	  18,	  22	   and	   24	   all	   pointed	   out,	   China	   has	   a	   different	   political	   system	   to	   that	   of	   the	  Western	  countries.	  It	  does	  not	  force	  African	  countries	  to	  follow	  it.	  It	  is	  the	  African	  countries	  who	  can	  choose	  the	  development	  path	  for	  themselves.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  ANC’s	  choice	  to	  occupy	  similar	  stances	  to	  China’s	  much	  more	  likely	  came	  out	  of	  its	  African	   identity,	   representation,	   and	  economic	  considerations.	  From	  China’s	  perspective,	   China’s	   approach	   to	   South	   Africa	   assistance	   was	   also	   challenged	  domestically,	  because	   the	  majority	  of	  people	  considered	  South	  Africa	  an	  ally	  of	  the	  North,	  rather	  than	  as	  an	  African	  state.	   	  	  Economically,	   South	   Africa	   has	   sought	   financial	   support	   for	   improving	   its	  infrastructure	   and	   value-­‐added	   industries,	   while	   China	   was	   interested	   in	   its	  mining	   industry	   and	   market.	   Due	   to	   them	   occupying	   a	   similar	   economic	  development	  level,	  the	  two	  countries	  have	  found	  it	  hard	  to	  gain	  mutual	  benefits	  if	   both	  are	   to	  pursue	   their	   economic	   interests.	  On	   the	  one	  hand,	   South	  Africa’s	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Chapter	  9	  Ethiopia	   	  Ethiopia,	  as	  one	  of	   the	   least	  developed	  countries	   in	  the	  world,	  has	  always	  been	  labelled	  as	  poor,	   landlocked,	  and	   lacking	   in	  resources.	  Yet,	  with	   lots	  of	   features	  that	  Beijing	  may	  be	  uninterested	  in,	  China-­‐Ethiopia	  relations	  have	  expanded	  and	  deepened	  in	  recent	  years	  both	  politically	  and	  economically.	  High-­‐level	  visits	  have	  been	  maintained	  for	  43	  years,	  ever	  since	  the	  two	  countries	  established	  bilateral	  diplomatic	   relations	   in	   1970.	   Emperor	   Haile	   Selassie,	   then-­‐President	  Mengistu	  Haile	   Mariam,	   and	   then-­‐Prime	   Minister	   Meles	   Zenawi,	   Prime	   Minster	  Hailemariam	   visited	   China;	   while	   then-­‐Vice	   Prime	   Minister	   Qian	   Qichen,	  President	   Jiang	   Zemin	   and	  Prime	  Minister	  Wen	   Jiabao	   have	   visited	  Ethiopia	   in	  return.	   The	   new	   president	  Mulatu	   Teshome	   even	   got	   his	   education	   in	   Beijing.	  Also	  Ethiopia	  is	  one	  of	  the	  top	  four	  African	  recipients	  of	  China’s	  investment	  in	  the	  infrastructure	  sector.	  The	  three	  other	  countries	  are	  all	  oil-­‐rich,	  including	  Angola,	  Sudan,	  and	  Nigeria	  (Raine	  2009,	  p.	  43).	  Calculated	  from	  the	  data	   from	  AidData,	  Beijing	  has	   invested	  more	   than	  US$3.5	  billion	   in	   infrastructure	   construction	   in	  Ethiopia	  between	  2000	  and	  2011,	  mainly	  focused	  on	  energy	  and	  water	  supplies,	  as	   well	   as	   transportation.	   In	   2007,	   the	   state	   was	   selected	   as	   one	   of	   the	   four	  countries	  (the	  others	  being	  energy-­‐rich	  Nigeria,	  Angola	  and	  the	  DRC)	  to	  receive	  soft	   loans	   for	   developing	   Africa’s	   infrastructure	   from	   China’s	   state	   financial	  institutions,	   including	   the	   Exim	  Bank	   (Thakur,	   2009).	   It	   is	   also	   significant	   that	  Ethiopia	  was	  chosen	  to	  host	  the	  second	  ministerial	  conference	  of	  the	  FOCAC,	  in	  December	  2003,	  and	  it	  was	  the	  co-­‐host	  of	  the	  China–Africa	  Summit	  in	  Beijing	  in	  2006.	  Dukem	  was	  selected	  as	  one	  of	  the	  five	  areas	  in	  Africa	  that	  will	  host	  one	  of	  China’s	   Overseas	   Special	   Economic	   Zones.	   Additionally,	   China’s	   bilateral	   trade	  with	   Ethiopia	   has	   been	   growing	   rapidly,	   largely	   due	   to	   China’s	   promotional	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measures.	  The	  figure	  jumped	  from	  just	  US$32	  million	  in	  1992,	  to	  US$100	  million	  in	   2002,	   and	   to	   US$1.83	   billion	   in	   2012	   (MOFCOM,	   2013a).	   There	   were	   580	  registered	   Chinese	   companies	   in	   Ethiopia	   in	   2010,	   with	   1,065	   investment	  projects,	   and	   operating	  with	   an	   estimated	   investment	   capital	   of	   US$2.2	   billion	  (Raine,	  2009,	  p.	  43;	  Ethiopian	  Herald	  2007).	  What’s	  more,	  China	  funded	  the	  AU	  headquarters	  located	  in	  Addis	  Ababa,	  which	  increased	  Ethiopia’s	  significance	  on	  the	  continent.	  Meanwhile,	  a	   large	  number	  of	  volunteers	  and	  medical	  assistance	  teams	  have	  been	  sent	   to	  Ethiopia,	  with	  an	  estimated	  number	  of	  between	  5,000	  and	  10,000	  skilled	  professionals	  (Gebre-­‐Egziabher	  2009,	  p.169).	   	  
All	   this	  evidence	  reveals	   that	  Ethiopia	   is	   the	  exception	   to	   the	  general	   rule,	   that	  “the	   designated	   countries	   reflect	   China’s	   commercial	   priorities	   in	   Africa”	   (P.	  Davies	  2007,	  p.143).	   In	   this	   case,	  Beijing	   seeks	   to	   gain	  political	   and	  diplomatic	  influence	   in	   Ethiopia,	   even	   if	   the	   state	   lacks	   political	   and	   economic	   strengthen	  when	  compared	  to	  other	  African	  countries,	  and	  sometimes	  even	  if	  in	  the	  sacrifice	  of	   short-­‐term	   profits.	   It	   reflects	   that	   China	   has	   interests	   beyond	   just	   making	  economic	  profits	  in	  this	  country.	   	  
9.1	  A	  brief	  background	  introduction	   	  Ethiopia	  was	  among	   the	   first	  wave	  of	  African	   countries	   to	   establish	  diplomatic	  relations	  with	  Beijing.	  Since	  then,	  China–Ethiopia	  relations	  have	  passed	  through	  three	  stages:	  the	  imperial	  period,	  the	  Dergue	  period,	  and	  the	  Ethiopian	  People’s	  Revolutionary	   Democratic	   Front	   (EPRDF)	   period.	   The	   contemporary	   bilateral	  diplomatic	   relations	   are	   conducted	   between	   Beijing	   and	   the	   EPRDF.	   Since	   the	  TPLF	   (abbreviation	   for	   “Tigrayan	   Peoples’	   Liberation	   Front”,	  which	   held	   office	  between	  1991-­‐1995)	  and	  OPDO	  (“Oromo	  Peoples'	  Democratic	  Organization”,	   in	  office	   between	   1995-­‐2001,	   and	   also	   from	   2013	   to	   the	   present)	  were	   different	  groups	  within	  the	  EPRDF,	  the	  EPRDF	  period	  will	  be	  divided	  into	  further	  sections.	   	  
The	  Imperial	  Period	  (1923–74)	  and	  the	  Dergue	  Period	  (1974–91)	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Modern	   bilateral	   communications	   started	   after	   Premier	   Zhou	   Enlai’s	   visit	   to	  Ethiopia	  in	  1964,	  and	  Emperor	  Haile	  Selassie’s	  visit	  to	  China	  in	  1971.	  However,	  for	   historical	   and	   ideological	   reasons,	   the	   two	   countries’	   relations	   remained	  stagnant.	   After	   a	   short	   period	   of	   initial	   contacts,	   a	   military	   group	   toppled	  Emperor	   Haile	   Selassie	   in	   1972,	   the	   new	   Dergue	   regime	   established	   an	  authoritarian	  socialist	  state	  allied	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  and	  hence	  was	  alienated	  from	  Beijing.	  However,	  even	  at	  a	  time	  when	  the	  two	  governments	  were	  not	  close,	  economic	  and	  trade	  contacts	  began.	  China	  and	  Ethiopia	  signed	  an	  Agreement	  for	  Economic	   and	   Technological	   Cooperation	   in	   1971	   and	   1976,	   and	   trade	  agreements	   in	   1984,	   1986	   and	   1988.	   China	   provided	   a	   series	   of	   assistance	  programmes,	   broadly	   ranging	   from	   building	   roads,	   to	   training	   and	   research	  support.	  As	  early	  as	  1974,	  Beijing	  sent	  a	  science	  team	  to	  conduct	  pharmaceutical	  research	   on	   and	   laboratory	   training	   in	   local	   herbs	   in	   Bahir	   Dar,	   a	   city	   located	  north-­‐west	   of	   Addis	   Ababa	   (Brautigam	   &	   Tang,	   2012).	   One	   year	   later,	   China	  provided	  a	  zero-­‐interest	  loan	  for	  the	  construction	  of	  Ethiopian	  roads	  that	  linked	  three	   agricultural	   regions	   in	   the	   north	   of	   the	   country	   (Wolfgang,	   1989,	   p.63).	  Other	   assistance	   projects	   during	   this	   time	   included	  water	   supply	   projects	   and	  power	   stations.	   The	   aid	   projects	   were	   limited	   in	   scale	   and	   value,	   yet	   showed	  many	  features	  of	  Chinese	  international	  aid.	  While	  bilateral	  communications	  were	  still	   in	   an	   infant	   stage,	   the	   military	   regime	   was	   overthrown	   in	   1991,	   by	   the	  EPRDF.	  After	  that,	  the	  country	  was	  governed	  by	  EPRDF,	  and	  remains	  so	  today.	  
The	  EPRDF	  Period	  (1991–Present)	  
In	  1991,	  a	   transnational	  government	   led	  by	  Meles	  Zenawi	  (Ethiopian	  president	  from	  1991	  to	  1995;	  Prime	  Minister	  from	  1995	  to	  2012)	  was	  established.	  At	  that	  time,	  the	  TPLF	  group	  within	  the	  EPRDF	  dominated	  the	  government,	  and	  adopted	  a	   constitution	   in	   1994.	   An	   election	   was	   held	   the	   next	   year.	   When	   the	   Meles	  Zenawi	   government	   came	   into	   power,	   bilateral	   relations	   got	   warmer	   with	  high-­‐level	   ministerial	   visits.	   Ethiopia	   expressed	   an	   interest	   to	   “learn”	   from	  China’s	   practice	   of	   market-­‐led	   socialism	   and	   agricultural	   development	   (Adem,	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2012).	   In	   1995,	   the	   Ethiopian	   prime	   minister	   visited	   China,	   following	   by	  President	   Jiang	   Zemin’s	   visit	   to	   Ethiopia	   the	   following	   year,	   which	   promoted	  China-­‐Ethiopian	   relations	   to	   new	   heights.	   Since	   then,	   the	   two	   countries	   have	  gradually	   developed	   better	   relations.	   In	   1998,	   the	   two	   countries	   signed	   the	  China–Ethiopia	   Joint	   Commission,	  whose	  major	   task	  was	   to	   review	   and	   assess	  the	  bilateral	  relationship	  every	  two	  years	  and	  recommend	  measures	  that	  would	  contribute	   to	   their	   further	   improvement/strengthening.	   As	   years	   passed,	  diplomatic	   ties	  between	  the	   two	  countries	  grew	  closer.	  Chinese	  Prime	  Minister	  Wen	   Jiabao	   visited	   Ethiopia	   in	   2003,	   and	   concluded	   an	   agreement	   covering	  various	   aspects	   of	   the	   relationship	   with	   his	   Ethiopian	   counterpart	   (Ethiopian	  Herald	  1996,	  2003).	  Ethiopia	  was	  selected	  to	  host	  the	  second	  and	  fifth	  FOCAC	  in	  2002	  and	  2005.	  (Kim,	  2013)	  
Ethiopia	   launched	   an	   economic	   reform	   programme	   as	   part	   of	   a	   structural	  adjustment	  in	  1992.	  Its	  successful	  implementation	  led	  it	  to	  qualify	  for	  debt	  relief	  under	   the	  Enhanced	  Heavily	   Indebted	  Poor	  Countries	   Initiative	  of	  2001,	  and	   in	  2005	  the	  IMF	  forgave	  all	  of	  Ethiopia’s	  debts	  (Thakur,	  2009).	  Economic	  progress	  brought	  little	  political	  reform	  however,	  and	  in	  2005	  the	  EPRDF	  managed	  to	  form	  a	   new	   government	   after	   a	   poor	   election	   performance,	   and	   the	   Parliament	  re-­‐elected	   Zenawi	   as	   prime	   minister	   for	   another	   five-­‐year	   term.	   But	   the	  crackdown	   on	   the	   opposition	   also	   generated	   considerable	   criticism	   and	  disapproval,	   particularly	   from	   the	  West,	   and	   resulted	   in	   the	   suspension	   of	   the	  World	  Bank’s	   new	   lending	   programs	   for	   Ethiopia	   (Adem,	   2012).	   It	  was	   in	   this	  context	  that	  Sino–Ethiopian	  relations	  entered	  their	  next	  phase.	  
In	   November	   2006,	   Zenawi	   visited	   China	   for	   the	   second	   time,	   and	   his	   trip	  promoted	   a	   lot	   of	   cooperation	   and	   assistance.	   China	   became	   the	  main	   trading	  partner	  of	  Ethiopia	  and	  bilateral	  trade	  rose	  from	  US$100	  million	  in	  2002,	  to	  $860	  million	  in	  2007	  (MOFCOM,	  2013a).	  The	  trading	  pattern	  was	  shaped	  in	  this	  period.	  China	   imported	   leather	   goods,	   coffee,	   and	   some	   other	   raw	   commodities,	   and	  exported	  clothing,	  machinery,	  food	  and	  electronics	  to	  Ethiopia.	  Similar	  to	  China’s	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experiences	  with	  other	  trading	  partners	  on	  this	  continent,	   there	   is	  a	  significant	  trade	   imbalance	   between	   these	   two	   countries:	   China	   exported	   US$284	  million	  worth	   of	   goods,	   and	   imported	   US$85.7	   million	   in	   2005	   (MOFCOM,	   2013a).	   In	  2007,	  China	  and	  Ethiopia	  reached	  an	  important	  agreement:	  the	  two	  governments	  worked	  together	  to	  create	  a	  special	  economic	  zone,	  30	  kilometres	  south	  of	  Addis	  Ababa	  (Geda	  &	  Meskel,	  2010).	   	  
Ethiopia	  held	  another	  general	   election	   in	  May	  2010,	   and	  also	   in	  October	  2013.	  The	  EPRDF	  or	  its	  affiliated	  groups	  won	  the	  elections	  and	  parliamentary	  seats.	  In	  the	  process,	  the	  EPRDF	  created,	  as	  one	  researcher	  described	  it,	  a	  “one-­‐party	  state”	  (Tronvoll	  2010).	  A	  similar	  political	  system	  and	  a	  shared	  stance	  on	  international	  affairs	  brought	  about	  friendly	  relations	  with	  Beijing.	  The	  data	  provided	  by	  China	  MOFA	   reveals	   that	   China	   accomplished	   19	   complete	   projects	   in	   Ethiopia	   since	  1971;	   including	   roads,	   animal	   hospitals,	   power	   stations	   and	   improvements	   to	  water	  supplies.	  Additionally,	   in	  2012,	  the	  bilateral	  trade	  value	  reached	  US$1.84	  billion,	  of	  which	  China	  exported	  US$153	  million	  and	   imported	  US$30.9	  million.	  This	  shows	  that,	  despite	  measures	  put	   in	  place	  by	  Beijing	   to	  encourage	  a	  more	  balanced	  trade	  structure,	  the	  asymmetry	  between	  the	  two	  countries	  remains.	   	  
The	   Chinese	   government	   in	   return	   provided	   lots	   of	   assistance	   to	   Ethiopia,	  including	  providing	  special	  or	  preferential	  treatment	  (duty-­‐free	  and	  quota-­‐free)	  for	   442	   commodities,	   which	   covers	   most	   of	   Ethiopia’s	   exports.	   China	   also	  assisted	  Ethiopia	  with	   infrastructure	  construction	  and	   low-­‐interest	   loans.	  From	  1988	  to	  2013,	  China	  has	  supported	  529	  Ethiopian	  students	  to	  get	  an	  education	  in	  China,	   and	   also	   sending	   large	   numbers	   of	   Chinese	   agricultural	   experts	   and	  volunteers	  to	  Ethiopia.	   	  
9.2	  Shaping	  China’s	  responsibility	  in	  Ethiopia	  
9.2.1	  China’s	  motivation	  Researchers	  tend	  to	  attribute	  China’s	  motivations	  in	  Africa	  to	  access	  to	  resources	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and	  commercial	  opportunities	  (Alden,	  2007,	  p.8;	  Taylor,	  2009,	  p.	  19,	  Brautigam,	  2010,	   p.	   64-­‐65).	   Ethiopia,	   as	   a	   resource-­‐poor	   state,	   does	   not	   produce	   oil	   nor	  other	  significant	  raw	  material	  for	  China.	  Its	  landlocked	  geographic	  position	  make	  it	   hard	   to	   act	   as	   a	   gateway	   for	  Chinese	   enterprises	   into	  other	  African	  markets.	  China’s	   trade	   value	   with	   this	   country	   remains	   small.	   Yet	   Beijing	   made	   great	  efforts	  to	  expand	  its	  engagement	  with	  this	  state	  with	  large	  amounts	  of	  financial,	  infrastructural	   and	  personnel	   assistance.	  The	  motivation	  behind	   this	   is	  beyond	  resource	   or	   business	   interests,	   because	   Ethiopia	   is	   attractive	   to	   China	   in	   the	  following	  ways.	  
Like	   any	   other	   African	   countries,	   political	   and	   diplomatic	   support	   is	   of	  significance	   to	   China.	   The	   leading	   party,	   EPRDF	  maintains	   a	   close	   relationship	  with	   Beijing	   and	   supports	   China’s	   positions	   in	   the	   international	   arena.	   Apart	  from	   the	   support	   of	   China	   in	   relation	   to	   Taiwan	   and	   Tibet	   issues,	   as	   a	   voting	  member	  of	  the	  UN	  Commission	  on	  Human	  Rights,	  Ethiopia,	  along	  with	  a	  coalition	  of	   other	   African	   states,	   have	   thwarted	   any	   attempts	   to	   censure	   China	   for	   its	  human	  rights	  record	  (Thakur,	  2009).	  Compared	  with	  China’s	  relations	  with	  other	  African	   governments,	   Ethiopian	   leaders	   have	   deeper	   and	   friendlier	   relations	  with	   Beijing.	   Former	   Prime	   Minister	   Meles	   Zenawi	   defended	   China’s	   African	  policy	  and	  China’s	  development	  path	  on	  many	  occasions.	  His	  speech	  “China	  is	  not	  looting	  Africa”,	  at	  FOCAC	  2006,	  argued	  that,	  “There	  are	  people	  who	  say	  the	  flood	  of	  Chinese	  goods	  will	  undermine	  Africa’s	  national	  industry,	  but	  I	  don’t	  think	  this	  is	   a	   problem…	   If	   you	   can’t	   compete	  with	   the	   global	  market,	   you	   have	   to	   get	   it	  from	  the	  global	  market.	  There	   is	  no	  alternative.	  That	   is	  globalization”	  (People’s	  Daily,	   October	   17	   2006).	   In	   an	   interview,	   Zenawi	   said	   that	   “Chinese	  transformation	  disproved	  the	  pessimistic	  attitude	  that	  ‘if	  you	  are	  poor	  once,	  you	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  poor	  forever’…	  the	  rise	  of	  China	  has	  a	  tremendous	  moral	  impact	  on	   Africa,	   and	   it	   is	   a	   lesson	   that	  many	   African	   countries	   can	   and	   should	   learn	  from	   China,”	   (People’s	   Daily,	   December	   22	   2008).	   New	   Ethiopian	   president	  Mulatu	   Teshome	   has	   spent	   14	   years	   in	   China	   and	   got	   his	   college	   education	   in	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Beijing.	  He	  has	  called	  China	  his	  second	  home.	  During	  an	  interview,	  he	  described	  China-­‐Ethiopian	   relations	   thus:	   “we	   have	   common	   aspirations,	   that	   are	   fast	  growth,	   prosperity	   for	   our	   nations,	   for	   our	   countries;	   prosperities	   for	   our	  peoples	  and	  peace	  and	   stability	   in	  our	   countries	   and	   in	  our	   regions	  and	   to	   the	  world	   at	   large.	   So,	  we	  have	   got	   a	   lot	   of	   common	  agendas,	   common	  aspirations	  and	   we	   have	   to	   work	   hard	   for	   that”	   (Xinhua	   News,	   October	   31	   2013).	   The	  presence	   of	   a	   pro-­‐Beijing	   government	   in	   Addis	   Ababa	   provides	   China	   with	   a	  supporter	  and	  defender	  in	  the	  international	  arena.	  It	  is	  representing	  a	  voice	  from	  Africa,	   which	   is	   opposite	   to	   the	   claim	   that	   China	   is	   a	   new	   coloniser,	   or	   that	  exploitation	  serves	  as	  the	  motivation	  behind	  China’s	  increasing	  assistance	  in	  this	  country.	   	  	  Ethiopia	  is	  a	  state	  that	  has	  long	  been	  marginalised	  by	  international	  society.	  After	  its	   two-­‐year	   border	  war	  with	   Eritrea,	   Ethiopia’s	   political	   situation	   has	   become	  more	   stable.	   The	   ruling	   EPRDF	   party,	   under	   the	   provisions	   of	   the	   current	  constitution,	   held	   an	   election	   in	   1994	   to	   elect	   the	   membership	   of	   local	  governments.	  After	   that,	  general	  elections	  have	  been	  held	   in	  1995,	  2000,	  2005,	  2010,	  and	  2013.	  Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  elections	  have	  been	  criticised	  as	  “unfair”	  by	   international	   society,	   and	   incidents	   of	   monitoring	   political	   activists	   or	  torturing	  and	  abusing	  political	  prisoners	  have	  happened	  recently,	  the	  Ethiopian	  government	   is	   not	   as	   notorious	   as	   some	   other	   African	   regimes,	   such	   as	   Sudan	  and	  Zimbabwe.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  close	  relation	  with	  such	  a	  government	  is	  also	  not	  a	   criticism	   targeted	   at	   those	   other	   controversial	   governments.	   Plus,	   due	   to	  Ethiopia’s	   underdeveloped	   status,	   giving	   assistance	   to	   this	   state	   will	   be	   less	  contentious	   and	   more	   internationally	   acceptable	   to	   Beijing.	   Furthermore,	  Ethiopia	   has	   political	   clout	   in	   Africa,	   due	   to	   its	   history	   as	   a	   symbol	   of	   black	  freedom	   and	   stimulator	   of	   pan-­‐Africanism.	   Ai	   Ping,	   the	   former	   Chinese	  ambassador	  to	  Ethiopia,	  said	  in	  his	  memoirs,	  “Ethiopia	  plays	  a	  very	  unique	  role	  in	  Africa,	  UN	  Economic	  Commission	  for	  Africa	  and	  Africa	  Union	  both	  established	  their	  headquarters	  in	  Addis	  Ababa,	  which	  placed	  the	  city	  as	  the	  political	  capital	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of	  Africa”	  (Ai,	  2005).	  Meanwhile,	  the	  location	  of	  Ethiopia	  is	  key	  to	  East	  Africa.	  As	  the	   source	  of	   the	  Nile,	   the	  country	  controls	   the	   lifeline	   for	  Egypt.	  This	   regional	  influence	   and	   power	   has	   been	   recognised	   by	   Beijing.	   China’s	   foothold	   in	   this	  country	  will	   help	   Beijing	   expand	   its	   influence	   and	   reputation	   from	  Ethiopia	   to	  the	   rest	   of	   Africa.	   This	   can	   be	   seen	   in	   China’s	   provision	   of	   finance	   for	   the	  construction	   of	   the	   African	   Union	   headquarters	   in	   Addis	   Ababa,	   at	   the	   cost	   of	  over	  US$200	  million.	  As	  former	  President	  Hu	  Jintao	  put	  it,	  “Ethiopia	  could	  play	  a	  pivotal	   role	   in	  enabling	  China	   to	  consolidate	   its	  cooperation	  with	  other	  African	  countries”	  (the	  Embassy	  of	  Ethiopia	  in	  China	  2013).	   	  
Beijing	  clearly	  recognised	  the	  fact	  that	  Ethiopia	  was	  not	  a	  major	  trading	  partner	  for	   China	   in	   Africa,	   and	   might	   not	   become	   one	   any	   time	   soon.	   The	   deep	  engagement	   strategy	   was	   more	   likely	   born	   out	   of	   political	   and	   diplomatic	  calculations.	  China	  as	  a	  rising	  player	  on	  the	  continent,	  its	  international	  image	  is	  key	   to	   China’s	   future	   agenda.	   As	   growing	   criticism	   about	   China’s	   presence	   in	  Africa	   has	   grabbed	   news	   headlines,	   Beijing	   has	   to	   change	   its	   negative	   profile	  within	  the	  continent	  and	  also	  worldwide.	  Ethiopia,	  with	  a	  stable	  government	  but	  a	  lack	  of	  resources,	  enables	  China	  to	  access	  the	  country	  less	  controversially.	  The	  positive	   feedback	   from	  Ethiopian	   leaders	  acknowledges	  China’s	  contribution	   to	  the	   country,	   and	   hence	   increases	   the	   credibility	   of	   the	   Chinese	   government	   in	  Africa.	   It	   revealed	   that	   China’s	   ambition	   in	   Ethiopia	   was	   beyond	   economic	  expansion	  and	  the	  quest	  for	  resources.	  China’s	  image	  and	  its	  responsibility	  as	  a	  rising	   power	   is	   of	   great	   significance	   to	   Beijing’s	   strategy,	   even	   at	   the	   cost	   of	  economic	  gain.	  
9.2.2	  Ethiopia’s	  demands	   	  According	  to	  the	  principles	  of	  Ethiopia’s	  foreign	  policy	  released	  by	  its	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	   Affairs,	   Ethiopia	   considers	   economic	   development,	   poverty	   reduction	  and	  good	  governance	  as	  its	  national	  strategy.	  As	  a	  result,	  “Ethiopia	  judges	  other	  countries	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   their	   preparedness	   to	   engage	   in	   a	   mutually	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advantageous	   partnership	   for	   economic	   cooperation,	   investment,	   trade	   and	  development,	  as	  well	  as	  for	  peace	  and	  security”	  (MOFED,	  2010).	  China,	  like	  many	  other	   countries	   and	   organisations,	   is	   expected	   to	   provide	   economic	  opportunities	  alongside	  political	  and	  diplomatic	  support.	   	  
The	   Ethiopia	   economy	   relies	   on	   agriculture,	   a	   sector	   that	   depends	   on	  weather	  conditions	  and	  cultivation	  practice.	  The	  Ethiopian	  government	  disclosed	  that	  85%	  of	  the	  population	  earns	  a	  living	  from	  agriculture	  (Diao,	  2010).	  Both	  food	  security	  and	   economic	   development	   require	   agricultural	   growth.	   Therefore,	   the	  government	   encourages	   labor-­‐intensive	   agriculture	   to	   increase	  productivity,	   to	  “diversify	  strategies	  in	  different	  ecological	  zones	  and	  [to]	  strengthen	  marketing	  system”	   (MOFED,	   2010).	   Based	   on	   a	   governmental	   strategic	   framework	   for	  2005-­‐2010,	   named	   a	   Plan	   for	   Accelerated	   and	   Sustained	   Development	   to	   End	  Poverty	   (PASDEP),	   poverty	   in	   Ethiopia	   was	   primarily	   found	   to	   be	   a	   rural	  phenomenon.	  Food	  security	  remains	  a	  fundamental	  concern,	  and	  poverty	  can	  be	  attributed	   not	   only	   to	   local	   factors,	   but	   to	   the	   declining	   terms	   of	   trade	   for	  Ethiopian	   agricultural	   products,	   such	   as	   coffee	   and	   tea,	   in	   the	   global	   economic	  system.	  PASDEP	  also	  mentioned	  a	  series	  of	  reasons	  for	  the	  poverty	  in	  Ethiopia,	  such	  as	  low	  income	  and	  investment,	  low	  levels	  of	  education,	  poor	  environmental	  conditions,	  and	  also	  low	  levels	  of	  peace	  and	  stability	  in	  Ethiopia	  and	  the	  region	  as	  a	  whole.	  As	   for	   the	  role	  China	  could	  play	   in	   this	  development	  path,	  Ethiopia	  was	  very	  realistic	  to	  suggest	  that	  “the	  country	  needs	  to	  maintain	  close	  relations	  with	  China,	  as	  a	  means	   to	  promote	   trade	  and	   investment	  while	  also	  securing	  a	  market	   for	   Ethiopian	   products	   in	   China”	   (Thakur,	   2009).	   To	   be	   specific,	   it	  required	   Chinese	   aid	   for	   infrastructure	   construction	   to	   create	   a	   better	  environment,	   investment	   and	   trade	   for	   economic	   growth,	   and	   technical	  assistance	   and	   vocational	   training	   to	   increase	   the	   quality	   of	   its	   labor	   force.	  Although	   they	   recognised	   China	   as	   a	   newcomer	   to	   the	   market,	   former	   Prime	  Minister	  Zenawi	  asserted	   that	   the	   “Chinese	  entrepreneurs	   could	  play	  a	   leading	  role	   in	   the	   construction,	   infrastructure	   and	   natural	   resources	   development	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endeavours	   of	   Ethiopia	   by	   diverting	   their	   capitals	   and	   introducing	   the	   easily	  adaptable	  Chinese	  technology”	  (Adem,	  2012).	   	  
Apart	  from	  the	  common	  requirements	  similar	  to	  those	  of	  other	  African	  countries,	  Ethiopia	   has	   an	   enthusiasm	   for	   China’s	   development	   path.	   China’s	   success	   in	  feeding	  a	   fifth	  of	   the	  world’s	  population	  with	  only	  8%	  of	   its	  arable	   land	   is	  well	  known.	   Chinese	   experiences	   of	   modernising	   its	   economy	   in	   a	   relatively	   short	  period	   are	   of	   interest	   to	   Ethiopian	   leaders,	   who	   are	   struggling	   to	   raise	   their	  country	   out	   of	   poverty.	   Furthermore,	   Ethiopian	   leaders	   believe	   that	   China	   and	  Ethiopia	  share	  similar	  social	  economic	  conditions.	  China’s	  one-­‐party	  government	  has	  maintained	  internal	  stability	  and	  dramatic	  economic	  growth.	  This	  aligns	  with	  EPRDF’s	  own	  priorities.	  These	  features	  are	  attractive	  to	  Ethiopian	  political	  elites,	  even	   if	   Beijing	   does	   not	   lobby	   for	   its	   development	   model	   in	   the	   Ethiopian	  government.	   During	   Ethiopian	   Prime	  Minister	   Hailemariam	   Desalegn’s	   visit	   to	  Beijing	   in	   June	  2013,	  he	  said	  to	  President	  Xi	   Jinping	  that,	   “China’s	  development	  has	   brought	   hope	   and	   opportunity	   for	   developing	   countries.	   Ethiopia	   is	  committed	  to	  achieving	  national	  modernisation,	  hopes	  to	  deepen	  party-­‐to-­‐party	  exchanges	   with	   the	   Chinese	   side,	   to	   learn	   from	   China	   for	   the	   successful	  experience,	  and	  to	  enhance	  cooperation	  with	  China	  in	  the	  fields	  of	  infrastructure	  construction,	   energy	   and	   resource	   exploitation,	   manufacturing	   and	   human	  resources	  training”	  (MOFA,	  June	  14	  2013).	   	  
As	  one	  of	  the	  least	  developed	  countries,	  Ethiopia	  is	  keen	  to	  get	  external	  support	  to	   help	   with	   its	   poverty	   reduction.	   Challenged	   by	   numerous	   developmental	  obstacles	  -­‐	  such	  as	  poor	  infrastructure,	   food	  insecurity,	   low	  illiteracy	  rates,	  and	  communicable	   diseases	   -­‐	   the	   state	   needs	   tangible	   contributions	   and	   assistance	  that	  could	  change	  its	  current	  status.	  As	  a	  result,	  China	  and	  its	  aid	  appeals	  to	  the	  appetites	  of	  the	  Ethiopian	  elites.	   	  
9.2.3	  Discussions	  for	  Shaping	  China’s	  responsibility	  in	  Ethiopia	   	  Ethiopia	   has	   long	   been	   marginalised	   on	   the	   international	   stage.	   As	   was	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mentioned	  above,	  China’s	   foreign	  aid	   to	   this	   country	   is	  more	  out	  of	  diplomatic	  consideration	   than	   political,	   economic	   and	   resource	   calculations.	   China’s	   large	  amount	  of	   foreign	  aid	  meets	  Ethiopia’s	  eager	  demand	  for	  developmental	   funds.	  And	   China’s	   economic	   development	   path	   also	   provides	   the	   country	   with	   an	  alternative	   choice.	   Hence,	   the	   case	   of	   China-­‐Ethiopia	   is	   less	   controversial	   than	  the	   other	   three	   cases.	   Not	   only	   does	   the	   country	   draw	   less	   international	  attention	   to	   itself,	   but	   also	   the	   bilateral	   relationship	   is	   based	   more	   on	  international	  ethics	  and	  benefits	  for	  Ethiopia.	  The	  following	  section	  will	  discuss	  the	   limitation	   of	   China	   as	   a	  model	   for	   Ethiopia,	   and	   further	   to	   analyse	   China’s	  impact	  on	  the	  country.	   	   	  
9.3	  China’s	  capability	  and	  limitation	  in	  Ethiopia	   	  
Relative	   economic	   strength	   and	   political	   clout	   of	   China	   and	   Ethiopia	   favours	  China.	  As	  a	  significant	  player	  in	  Africa,	  China	  has	  the	  motivation	  and	  willingness	  to	  find	  its	  place	  on	  the	  continent	  and	  the	  world	  scene.	  Ethiopia’s	  unique	  domestic	  situation	  provides	  China	  with	  a	   less	  controversial	   field	  to	  provide	  development	  aid	   and	   help	   with	   poverty	   reduction,	   hence	   the	   chance	   to	   establish	   a	   positive	  image	  for	  itself	  in	  Africa.	  Ethiopia	  views	  China	  as	  one	  of	  many	  partners	  that	  will	  help	  the	  country	  achieve	  its	  strategic	  and	  policy	  goals,	  development	  and	  poverty	  reduction.	   China’s	   successful	   economic	   development	   path	   presents	   Ethiopia’s	  political	   elites	   with	   an	   alternative	   choice,	   because	   China	   is	   more	   similar	   to	  Ethiopia	   than	   Western	   nations.	   The	   Chinese	   development	   path	   emphasises	   a	  strong	   centralised	   government	   and	   one-­‐party	   politics,	   while	   remaining	   deeply	  involved	  in	  and	  focused	  on	  economic	  growth.	  Even	  China	   itself	   is	   feeling	  (cross	  the	   river	   while	   feeling	   the	   stone	  摸着石头过河)	   its	   way	   through	   this	   kind	   of	  “authoritarian	   development”	   path,	   and	   its	   influence	   on	   and	   adaptability	   for	  Ethiopia	  needs	  further	  discussion.	   	  
No	  doubt,	  the	  dramatic	  economic	  growth	  of	  China	  and	  other	  Asian	  economies	  is	  attractive	   to	  Ethiopian	   leaders,	   and	   it	   at	   least	   provides	   hope	   for	   the	   continent.	  
	   265	  
Some	   comments	   and	   researchers	   have	   argued	   that	   the	   Ethiopian	   regime	   is	  following	  the	  model	  of	  Beijing’s	  a	  “authoritarian	  developmental	  state”,	   in	  which	  economic	   growth	   trumps	   all	   and	   is	   pursued	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   political	  development,	   democratisation,	   and	   justice	   (Adem,	   2012;	   the	   Economist,	   2010;	  Hackenesch,	   2011).	   Evidence	   of	   this	   is	   drawn	   from	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   Ethiopian	  government	   has	   adopted	   five-­‐year	   plans	   to	   give	   itself	   targets	   for	   economic	  development,	  which	  is	  similar	  to	  China’s	  own	  economic	  plans	  of	  every	  five	  years.	  Meanwhile,	   it	   has	   set	   up	   special	   economic	   zones,	   much	   as	   China	   did	   at	   the	  beginning	  of	   its	   economic	   reforms.	  The	  Eastern	   Industrial	  Parks,	   sponsored	  by	  China’s	   Ministry	   of	   Commerce	   and	   Trade,	   are	   set	   to	   encourage	   foreign	   direct	  investment	  and	  bolster	  the	  manufacturing	  industry.	  This	  was	  one	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	   the	   Chinese	   government	   led	   and	   fostered	   its	   own	   development.	  Furthermore,	   the	   Ethiopian	   government	   supported	   large-­‐scale	   infrastructural	  construction,	  notably	  the	  controversial	  Gilgel	  Gibe	  III	  Dam,	  which	  former	  Prime	  Minister	  Zenawi	  promised	  to	  complete	  at	  any	  cost,	  while	  critics	  pointed	  out	   its	  social	   and	   environmental	   impact	   on	   the	   indigenous	   people	   and	   communities.	  This	  project	  increased	  the	  concern	  that	  Ethiopia’s	  developmental	  path	  would	  be	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  political	  and	  environmental	  interests,	  as	  was	  Beijing’s.	   	  
Regardless	   of	  whether	   China’s	   development	   path	   is	   unique	   or	   not,	   China	   itself	  has	  experienced	  a	  period	  of	  transition.	  It	  has	  its	  own	  internal	  problems	  of	  human	  rights,	   democratisation,	   corruption	   and	   the	   huge	   gap	   between	   rich	   and	   poor.	  These	   side	   effects,	   along	   with	   one-­‐party	   government,	   means	   the	   state	   has	   no	  right	  to	  export	  its	  own	  political	  system,	  nor	  to	  criticise	  EPRDF’s	  leadership.	  Even	  if	   Beijing	   is	   not	   instinctively	   against	   good	   governance	   in	   Ethiopia,	  when	   it	   has	  struggled	   to	   tackle	   corruption	   issues	   at	   home,	   it	   lacks	   credibility	   to	   call	   for	  political	   reform	   in	   Africa.	   Ethiopia’s	   leaders	   also	   were	   reluctant	   to	   admit	   that	  their	   country	   was	   following	   China’s	   political	   example.	   In	   Prime	   Minister	  Hailemariam	  Desalegn’s	   interview	  with	   the	  BBC,	   he	   expressed	   a	  willingness	   to	  learn	  from	  China’s	  way	  of	  development	  by	  saying,	  “Chinese	  development	  has	  …	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some	   important	   lessons	   that	   we	   can	   learn.	   They	   have	   focused	   on	   human	  development;	   human	   capacity	   development	   and	   you	   know	   accumulation	   of	  human	   capital.	   And	   they	   have	   also	   focused	   on	   technological	   development	   and	  technological	   capability	   accumulation”.	   But,	   when	   asked	   about	   his	   political	  preferences,	   he	   has	   argued	   that	   they	   have	   actually	   learned	   from	   “the	   fast	  growing	   Asian	   tiger	   economies	   Korea,	   Taiwan,	   Singapore,	   Malaysia…”	   (Kassa,	  May	  21	  2013).	  Similarly,	  one	  official	  from	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  pointed	  out	   that,	   “Ethiopia	   is	  not	  necessarily	   interested	   in	   following	   the	  Chinese	  model	  per	  se;	  rather,	  the	  model	  to	  emulate	  is	  that	  of	  Taiwan	  and	  South	  Korea,	  which	  are	  ‘developmental	   states’	   and	   focus	   not	   only	   on	   economic	   growth,	   but	   also	   on	  uplifting	  the	  population	  economically,	  politically	  and	  socially”	  (Thakur,	  2009).	   	  
Although	  the	  so-­‐called	  “China	  model”	  provides	  a	  negative	  example	  for	  Ethiopia’s	  democracy,	   it	   is	  better	  to	  say	  Ethiopia’s	  internal	  one-­‐party	  leadership	  was	  born	  out	  of	   its	  domestic	  political	  needs,	  rather	  than	  the	  influence	  of	  Beijing’s	  African	  policy	  of	  aid	  with	  no-­‐strings.	  Ethiopia	  is	  currently	  going	  through	  a	  very	  difficult	  stage	   in	   its	   political	   development.	   Despite	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   government	   is	  claiming	   to	  democratize	   in	  all	   its	  official	  discourse,	   the	  political	   reforms	  within	  the	  country	  have	  a	   long	  way	  to	  go.	  The	  country	  has	  experienced	  2,000	  years	  of	  imperial	   rule,	   17	   years	   of	   military	   rule,	   and	   only	   about	   a	   decade	   of	   civil	  government.	   Additionally,	   the	   current	   administration	   has	   prevented	   the	  emergence	   of	   powerful	   independent	   economic	   actors	   that	   might	   be	   able	   to	  translate	  their	  economic	  power	  into	  political	  influence,	  through	  the	  strict	  control	  of	  land.	  With	  such	  a	  political	  history	  and	  status,	  the	  country	  lacks	  internal	  forces	  for	  democratisation.	  Furthermore,	  the	  opposition	  parties	  are	  not	  strong	  enough	  to	   compete	   with	   the	   EPRDF.	   During	   the	   2005	   election,	   the	   opposition	   parties	  united	  against	  the	  EPRDF,	  forming	  the	  Coalition	  for	  Unity	  and	  Democracy	  (CUD).	  After	   the	   election,	   however,	   personality	   conflicts	   and	   the	   lack	   of	   a	   shared	  strategy	  led	  to	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  political	  opposition.	  The	  government	  also	  made	  efforts	  to	  crush	  the	  CUD	  and	  other	  political	  opposition.	  After	  the	  2005	  election,	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there	  were	  no	  strong	  competitors	  for	  EPRDF	  for	  the	  elections	  in	  2010	  and	  2013.	  The	  lack	  of	  unity	  among	  the	  opposition	  reinforced	  the	  dominance	  of	  the	  EPRDF	  regime.	   Even	   if	   the	   government	   used	   the	   rhetoric	   of	   democracy	   promotion,	  respect	  for	  human	  rights,	  and	  poverty	  reduction,	  international	  society	  and	  NGOs	  pointed	  out	  that	  Ethiopia’s	  human	  right	  has	  sharply	  deteriorated,	  and	  many	  the	  scandals	   of	   unlawful	   imprisonment	   and	   punishment	   of	   political	   activities	   have	  been	  disclosed.	  
Ethiopia	  is	  a	  de	  facto	  one-­‐party	  state,	  and	  it	  is	  a	  centralised	  regime	  in	  which	  no	  balanced	   institutions	   exist;	   for	   example,	   a	   judiciary	   to	   monitor	   the	   current	  government.	   Opposition	   parties	   are	   only	   present	   in	   order	   to	   legitimatise	   the	  EPRDF	  regime,	  and	  give	  it	  the	  veneer	  of	  democracy.	  China	  does	  not	  intend	  to,	  nor	  does	  it	  have	  the	  capability	  to	  pressure	  Ethiopia	  for	  fundamental	  change.	  Indeed,	  China’s	  assistance	  on	  large	  infrastructure	  projects	  can	  easily	  be	  seen	  as	  support	  for	  an	  authoritarian	  regime	  that	  only	  pays	  lip-­‐service	  to	  open	  political	  space	  and	  good	  governance.	  However,	  the	  motivation	  for	  political	  space	  lies	  inside	  Ethiopia,	  with	   either	   a	   well-­‐organised	   opposition	   party	   or	   inner-­‐party	   competition,	   as	  Ethiopia	   has	   at	   the	   moment.	   Without	   assistance	   or	   an	   aid	   package	   beyond	  Ethiopia’s	   current	   social	   capability,	   it	   is	   easier	   to	   bring	   the	   poor	   country	   into	  chaos	  rather	  than	  real	  democracy	  and	  human	  rights.	  
9.4	  The	  Gap	  between	  China’s	  policy	  Ethiopia	  and	  its	  implementation	  Witness	  1	  said,	   	  	   “Currently,	  there	  are	  certainly	  some	  Chinese	  companies	  or	  some	  Chinese	  people	   in	   Africa	   whose	   conduct	   has	   triggered	   discontent	   in	   local	  populations.	   There	   are	   a	   variety	   of	   factors	   in	   this.	   One	   reason	   is	   that	  although	   China	   supports	   Africa,	   culturally	   the	   communication	   between	  China	   and	   them	   [Africans]	   is	   very	   limited,	   Africa	   does	   not	   understand	  China	  very	  much.”	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  As	  it	  is	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  sections,	  the	  motivation	  of	  China’s	  diplomacy	  in	  Ethiopia	  is	  different	  from	  their	  traditional	  economic	  and	  resource	  considerations.	  Its	   engagement	   in	   this	   country	   tends	   to	   be	   seen	   as	   a	   way	   to	   seek	   positive	  feedback,	  rather	  than	  short-­‐term	  profits.	  China	  is	  a	  large	  donor	  to	  Ethiopia.	  Since	  1995,	   the	   Chinese	   government	   has	   allocated	   US$24	   million	   to	   the	   Ethiopian	  government	   in	   the	   form	   of	   grants	   to	   help	   with	   the	   construction	   of	   low-­‐cost	  housing;	  rural	  school	  construction;	   the	  rehabilitation	  of	  roads	  and	  bridges;	  and	  vocational,	  agricultural	  and	  management	  training.	  Also,	  since	  1988,	  the	  Chinese	  government	  has	  provided	  US$82	  million	  in	  loans	  for	  mainly	  the	  construction	  of	  roads,	   flyovers	  and	  bridges,	  and	  also	  machinery	  acquisition.	   It	   should	  be	  noted	  that	  most	  of	   the	  assistance	   from	  the	  Chinese	  government	  comes	   in	   the	   form	  of	  conditional	  aid,	  as	  each	  loan	  and	  grant	  has	  stipulated	  that	  Chinese	  products	  must	  be	  purchased.	  In	  2006,	  China	  cancelled	  Ethiopia’s	  bilateral	  debt.	  (Thakur,	  2009)	  
Since	   Ethiopia’s	   major	   development	   challenges	   include	   the	   acceleration	   of	  economic	   growth	   and	   poverty	   reduction,	   the	   correlation	   between	   these	   and	  infrastructure	   developments	   and	   investment,	   trade,	   growth	   and	   poverty	  reduction	  has	  long	  been	  recognised.	  (Higgins	  &	  Prowse,	  2010)	  China	  considered	  infrastructure	   an	   especially	   important	   driving	   force	   for	   growth	   in	   its	   own	  development.	   As	   a	   result,	   China’s	   approach	   to	   accessing	   Ethiopia’s	  market	   has	  mainly	   been	   through	   economic	   assistance	   in	   terms	   of	   concessional	   loans	   and	  infrastructure.	  Indeed,	  China	  has	  its	  own	  interests	  in	  infrastructure	  construction.	  Meanwhile,	   Ethiopia	   can	   still	   enjoy	   the	   benefits	   from	   Chinese	   companies’	  economic	   engagement,	   for	   instance	   the	   provision	   of	   services	   to	   the	   Ethiopian	  people	  and	  the	  indirect	  benefits	  to	  other	  sectors	  and	  industries,	  thus	  to	  add	  value	  and	  spur	  growth.	  However,	  these	  original	  targets	  are	  to	  some	  extent	  marred	  by	  some	  side	  effects.	  
9.4.1	  Infrastructure	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The	   Gilgel	   Gibe	   III	   Dam	   is	   currently	   under	   construction,	   together	   with	   an	  associated	   hydroelectric	   power	   plant	   located	   on	   the	   Omo	   River,	   in	   southern	  Ethiopia.	   Since	   the	   launch	  of	   this	   project	   in	   2008,	   it	   is	   estimated	   that	   the	   total	  investment	  would	  reach	  16	  billion	  Ethiopian	  Birr	  (more	  than	  US$	  800	  million).	  Once	   installed	   (estimated	   to	  be	  complete	   in	  seven	  years	   time),	   it	  would	  have	  a	  capacity	   of	   about	   1,870	   Megawatts	   (MW),	   which	   would	   be	   the	   largest	  hydroelectric	   plant	   in	   Ethiopia,	   with	   a	   power	   output	   that	   would	   more	   than	  double	  Ethiopia’s	  total	  capacity,	  from	  its	  2007	  level	  of	  814	  MW.	  (News	  One,	  April	  17	  2011)	  It	  is	  expected	  to	  supply	  about	  half	  of	  its	  power	  to	  Ethiopia	  and	  export	  the	  other	  half	  to	  Kenya	  (500	  MW),	  Sudan	  (200	  MW),	  and	  Djibouti	  (200	  MW).	  (all	  Africa,	  July	  21	  2006)	   	  	  The	  World	  Bank,	   the	  African	  Development	  Bank	   and	   the	  European	   Investment	  Bank	  all	  considered	  funding	  for	  the	  Gibe	  III	  Dam	  in	  2009/10.	  In	  the	  end,	  none	  of	  them	  got	  involved	  in	  this	  project	  due	  to	  the	  possible	  negative	  environmental	  and	  social	   impacts.	   (Bosshard,	   May	   22	   2012)	   In	   August	   2010	   Ethiopian	   Prime	  Minister	  Meles	  Zenawi	   vowed	   to	   complete	   the	  dam	   “at	   any	   cost”,	   saying	   about	  critics	  of	  the	  dam	  that,	  “They	  don’t	  want	  to	  see	  developed	  Africa;	  they	  want	  us	  to	  remain	   undeveloped	   and	   backward	   to	   serve	   their	   tourists	   as	   a	  museum.”	   (the	  Guardian,	   March	   7	   2011)	   In	   the	   same	   year,	   the	   Ethiopian	   Electric	   Power	  Corporation	   EEPCo	   (one	   of	   the	   major	   funders	   of	   the	   project)	   and	   Dongfang	  Electric	   Machinery	   Corporation,	   a	   Chinese	   SOE,	   signed	   a	   memorandum	   of	  understanding	   to	   provide	   electrical	   and	  mechanical	   equipment	   for	   the	   project.	  The	  agreement	  was	  backed	  by	  a	  loan	  from	  the	  Industrial	  and	  Commercial	  Bank	  of	  China,	  covering	  85%	  of	  the	  US$495	  million	  cost.	  (Xinhua	  News,	  November	  28	  2011)	   Three	   NGOs	   –	   International	   Rivers,	   Friends	   of	   Lake	   Turkana,	   and	   Bank	  Track	  –	  wrote	  a	  letter	  to	  ICBC	  chairman	  Jiang	  Jianqing	  on	  May	  21	  and	  said,	  “the	  Gibe	   III	   Dam	   raises	   serious	   technical,	   economic	   and	   financial	   questions.”	   The	  Gibe	  III	  Dam	  is	  Africa’s	  most	  destructive	  power	  project.	  It	  will	  ravage	  the	  fragile	  ecosystems	  of	  the	  Lower	  Omo	  Valley	  in	  Ethiopia	  and	  Lake	  Turkana	  in	  Kenya,	  and	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the	  500,000	  poor	  indigenous	  people	  who	  depend	  on	  them,	  ”	  said	  Peter	  Bosshard,	  policy	  director	  of	   International	  Rivers,	   an	   international	  NGO	   focusing	  on	  dams.	  (South	   China	   Morning	   Post,	   June	   2nd,	   2011)	   Furthermore,	   the	   environmental	  damage	  could	  cause	  social	  conflicts	  as	  well.	  A	  study	  revealed	  Ethiopia's	  Gibe	  III	  Dam	   would	   cause	   humanitarian	   catastrophe	   and	   major	   cross-­‐border	   armed	  conflict	  in	  the	  trans-­‐border	  Region	  of	  Ethiopia,	  Kenya,	  and	  South	  Sudan	  (ARWG)	  (Shih,	   June	   2	   2011).	   In	   response	   to	   this	   criticism,	   ICBC’s	   first	   chief	   risk	   officer	  Wei	  Guoxiong	  said	  that,	  ICBC,	  as	  a	  global	  bank,	  will	  not	  support	  environmentally	  unfriendly	   projects,	   no	   matter	   whether	   at	   home	   or	   abroad,	   and	   he	   further	  explained	  that	  ICBC	  has	  employed	  Equator	  Principles,34	   or	  even	  stricter	  policy	  to	  evaluate	   its	   loans.	   (Ifeng,	   June	   30	   2010)	  Wei’s	   reply	   didn’t	   clearly	   answer	   the	  wide	   criticism	   of	   ICBC’s	   loans	   without	   transparent	   environmental	   and	   social	  evaluations.	  And,	  actually,	  the	  bank	  didn’t	  join	  the	  Equator	  Principles	  until	  2012,	  but	   the	   loans	   were	   pledged	   in	   2010.	   A	   controversial	   project	   without	   a	   sound	  explanation,	  ICBC’s	  reputation	  as	  China’s	  leading	  bank	  was	  violated.	  Ikal	  Angelei,	  chair	   of	   Friends	   of	   Lake	   Turkana,	   an	   NGO	   working	   with	   local	   people	   living	  around	  the	  lake,	  said:	  “ICBC	  is	  underwriting	  the	  destruction	  of	  our	  people.	  Their	  funding	   is	   a	   hideous	   gesture	   of	   the	   destruction	   Chinese	   funds	   can	   bring	   to	  Africa’s	  poorest	  communities.”	  (Hathaway,	  September	  17	  2010).	   	  	  In	   fact,	   the	   Chinese	   Ministry	   of	   Environmental	   Protection	   released	  Environmental-­‐Protection	   Policies	   in	   Chinese	   Foreign	   Investment	   to	   provide	  rules	   for	   Chinese	   projects	   of	   dam	   construction	   and	   oil	   exploration	   in	   Africa,	  which	  are	  frequently	  criticised	  by	  the	  West.	  Since	  2007,	  China	  has	  also	  imposed	  the	   Green	   Credit	   Policy,	   under	   which	   Chinese	   companies	   that	   violate	   China	   ’s	  environmental	   laws	   would	   be	   blacklisted	   and	   unable	   to	   receive	   future	   loans	  because	  of	  their	  pollution	  record.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  Zhang	  Hongli,	  vice	  president	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 	   The	   Equator	   Principles	   are	   a	   risk	   management	   framework,	   adopted	   by	   financial	   institutions	   for	  determining,	  assessing,	  and	  managing	  environmental	  and	  social	  risk	  in	  projects,	  and	  is	  primarily	  intended	  to	  provide	  a	  minimum	  standard	  for	  due	  diligence	  to	  support	  responsible	  risk	  decision-­‐making. 
	   271	  
of	   ICBC,	   said	   the	   bank	   imposes	   its	   Green	   Credit	   Policies	   on	   61	   sectors,	   which	  reduced	   70%	   (about	  US$7.4	   billion)	   of	   its	   loans	   to	   environmentally	   unfriendly	  industries	   in	  2008.	  (Xinhua	  News,	   July	  21	  2013)	  According	  to	   the	  comments	  of	  an	   American	   environmentally	   sustainable	   financial	   analyst,	   currently	   few	  governments	  have	  the	  capability	  or	  willingness	  to	  promote	  such	  a	  policy,	  but	   it	  brought	   about	   important	   progress	   in	   regulating	   economic	   policy	   in	   banking	  systems.	   The	   major	   deficiency	   lay	   with	   the	   transparency	   of	   the	   loans	   and	  financial	   trade	   in	  China’s	  banking	  sectors.	   (Matisoff,	   July	  26	  2010)	  The	  Chinese	  Banking	   Industry	  Environmental	  Record	  2010,	   released	  by	  nine	  Chinese	  NGOs,	  remarked	  that	  the	  ICBC	  made	  improvements	  to	  establish	  a	  Green	  Credit	  System,	  and	   offered/included	   data	   about	   its	   energy	   consumption	   and	   loans	   to	   energy	  inefficient,	  highly	  polluting,	  and	  environmentally	  friendly	  industries.	  (Friends	  of	  the	  Earth	  2010)	  It	  also	  introduced	  a	  strict	  “green”	  threshold	  for	  the	  management	  of	  loans	  to	  ensure	  the	  “green”	  allocation	  of	  loan	  resources,	  while	  applying	  “a	  veto	  with	   only	   one	   vote”	   for	   rejecting	   any	   application	   from	   enterprises	   that	   fail	   to	  meet	  the	  eco-­‐standards.	  (ICBC,	  April	  18	  2011)	  However,	  it	  didn’t	  disclose	  details	  of	   the	   implementation	   of	   these	   policies.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   Ethiopia’s	   Gibe	   III	  Dam,	  despite	   the	   controversial	   impact	   to	   the	   local	   community	   and	   criticism	   from	  international	   environmental	   NGOs,	   ICBC	   continued	   to	   provide	   loans	   for	   the	  project,	  which	  led	  to	  damage	  to	  its	  reputation	  as	  a	  socially	  and	  environmentally	  responsible	   lender,	   and	   also	   to	   a	   loss	   of	   capital	   for	   shareholders.	   As	   a	   leading	  bank	   in	  China,	   ICBC’s	   failure	   to	   follow	   the	   international	   standards	  and	  disclose	  its	   loan	   information	  with	   the	   public	   also	   violated	   Beijing’s	   reputation-­‐building	  strategy	  in	  Ethiopia,	  and	  thus	  its	  soft	  power	  efforts	  on	  the	  world	  stage.	   	  	  Well-­‐designed	   infrastructure	   projects	   could	   indeed	   contribute	   to	   poverty	  reduction	   and	   to	   the	   improvement	   of	   living	   conditions	   in	   Ethiopia,	   as	   well	   as	  provide	   new	   opportunities	   for	   trade	   and	   employment.	   As	   a	   country	   that	  went	  through	   many	   years	   of	   internal	   conflict	   that	   left	   it	   with	   insufficient	   and	  undeveloped	  infrastructure,	  Ethiopia	  is	  desperately	  in	  need	  of	  financial	  support	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to	  improve	  its	  infrastructure.	  In	  addition,	  the	  country	  has	  long	  been	  constrained	  by	   the	   lack	   of	   adequate	   finances,	   a	  weak	   capacity	   at	   both	   the	   government	   and	  corporate	   levels,	   ineffective	   local	   private	   sector	   investment,	   and	   a	   technically	  unskilled	  labour	  force.	  Chinese	  companies	  with	  better	  management,	  technology	  and	   financial	   support	   from	   national	   banks	   would	   complement	   Ethiopia’s	  deficiencies	   in	   these	   aspects.	   However,	   in	   reality,	   as	   Witness	   12	   pointed	   out,	  Chinese	   companies’	   major	   advantage	   is	   their	   low	   costs	   and,	   due	   to	   high	  competition	   in	   international	   markets,	   Chinese	   investors	   have	   to	   participate	   in	  the	  marginalised,	   risky	   or	   controversial	   projects	   abandoned	   by	   the	   traditional	  multinationals.	   Additionally,	   compared	   to	   the	   experienced	   trans-­‐national	  corporations,	   Chinese	   companies	   lack	   overseas	   experience	   and	   awareness	   of	  international	   standards.	   Environmental	   protections	   and	   local	   community	  relations	  have	  long	  been	  neglected	  by	  Chinese	  companies.	  During	  the	  interviews,	  many	   interviewees	   from	  Chinese	  enterprises,	  no	  matter	  whether	   from	  SOEs	  or	  private	   companies,	   tend	   to	   emphasize	   their	   commitment	   to	   economic	   growth	  and	   working	   opportunities,	   but	   neglected	   environmental	   protection	   in	   its	  responsibilities	  to	  local	  people.	  ICBC’s	  example	  revealed	  the	  environmental	  risk	  in	  China’s	  overseas	  operations.	  As	  for	  the	  overseas	  project,	  the	  operation	  process	  was	  watched	  by	   the	  whole	   international	   society	  and	  even	  with	   the	  approval	  of	  the	   host	   country,	   it	   still	   needed	   to	   consider	   the	   widely	   accepted	   international	  standards.	   	  
Another	   criticism	   of	   Chinese	   infrastructure	   projects	   included	   harm	   caused	   to	  local	   business.	   With	   regards	   to	   the	   issue	   of	   quality,	   most	   Ethiopians	   perceive	  Chinese	  infrastructure	  as	  being	  of	  poor	  quality.	  As	  one	  official	  stated,	  “if	  we	  have	  the	  Germans	  making	  our	  roads,	  it	  will	  last	  for	  50	  years;	  if	  the	  Chinese	  build	  our	  roads,	  we	  will	  be	  lucky	  if	  it	  lasts	  for	  even	  10	  years”.	  (Thakur,	  2009)	  What’s	  worse,	  some	  Chinese	  firms	  are	  known	  to	  submit	  bids	  below	  cost	   in	  an	  effort	  to	  secure	  the	   contracts,	   and	   because	   of	   this,	  many	  may	   have	   to	   forego	   quality.	   Also,	   the	  considerable	  involvement	  of	  Chinese	  companies	  has	  the	  potential	  of	  completely	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alienating	  domestic	  firms,	  which	  will	  be	  detrimental	  to	  Ethiopian	  growth	  in	  the	  medium	  and	   long	   term.	  Regarding	   this,	  Witness	  23	   said,	   “the	  multinationals	   in	  the	   world	   market	   have	   developed	   systematic	   CSR	   operating	   procedures,	   but	  Chinese	   companies	   considered	   CSR	   as	   building	   bridges	   and	   roads.	   Actually,	  Chinese	  entrepreneurs	  do	  not	  realise	  that	  a	  well-­‐established	  corporate	  culture	  is	  the	  best	  CSR	  to	  local	  community.”	  Witness	  7	  agreed,	  suggesting	  that	  even	  though	  the	  Chinese	  people	  always	  thought	  of	  Africa	  as	  a	  less-­‐developed	  continent,	  even	  if	   the	   economy	   of	   Africa	   is	   backward,	   Africans’	   awareness	   of	   international	  standards	   is	   much	   more	   developed	   than	   China’s,	   because	   they	   have	   inherited	  them	   from	   the	   colonist	   period.	   The	   distant	   awareness	   between	   Chinese	  entrepreneurs	  and	  Ethiopian	  people	  violate	  China’s	  reputation.	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
9.4.2.	  Agriculture	   	  With	  a	  primarily	  agricultural	  economy	  that	  accounts	  for	  more	  than	  46	  %	  of	  GDP	  and	  85%	  of	   the	   labour	   force,	   and	  with	   its	  major	  exports	   to	  China	  composed	  of	  agricultural	  products,	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  rural	  sector	  in	  Ethiopia’s	  economy	  is	  obvious.	  (Diao,	  Hazell,	  Resnick	  &	  Thurlow,	  2007)	  	  China	  has	  been	  engaged	   in	  Ethiopia’s	   agriculture	   sector	   since	  1970s,	  when	   the	  two	  countries	  established	  official	  diplomatic	  relations.	  Initially,	  the	  involvement	  was	   limited	   and	   one-­‐way,	   most	   of	   the	   projects	   were	   Chinese	   assistance	   in	  infrastructure,	  researching	  support	  and	  training.	  In	  1996,	  China	  joined	  the	  Food	  and	  Agriculture	  Organization’s	   (FAOUN’s)	   “South–South	  Cooperation	  Program.”	  Under	   this	   programme,	   China	   has	   sent	   more	   than	   700	   Chinese	   agricultural	  experts	  and	  technicians	  to	  seven	  African	  countries	  (Li,	  2011).	  Ethiopia	  was	  one	  of	  the	  earliest	  participants	  in	  the	  program.	  (China	  Daily,	  January	  15	  2014).	  Along	  with	   this	   engagement,	   the	   scope	   of	   agricultural	   cooperation	   expanded	   to	  concessional	   loans,	   volunteers,	   and	   agricultural	   technology	   demonstration	  centres.	  The	  first	  youth	  volunteer	  group	  was	  sent	  to	  the	  small	  Ethiopian	  village	  of	  Asossa,	   in	  2005.	  Apart	  from	  official	  assistance	  projects,	  a	  growing	  number	  of	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Chinese	  companies	  have	  invested	  in	  Ethiopia’s	  rural	  sectors,	  such	  as	  wind	  farms,	  leather	   factories,	   and	   sugar	  plantations.	  A	  notable	   example	   is	   leather	   company	  from	  Henan,	   which	   got	   45%	   of	   its	   equity	   from	   the	   CAD	   and	   opened	   a	   factory	  complex	  in	  Suluta	  that	  employed	  350	  local	  staff	  with	  20-­‐25	  of	  them	  directors	  or	  group	  managers,	  65%	  of	  them	  are	  women.	  (Sina,	  June	  11	  2014)	  	  It	   could	   be	   said	   that	   China	   entered	   Ethiopia’s	   agricultural	   industry	   at	   an	   early	  time	   in	   1970s.	  However,	   due	   to	   political	   and	   economic	   reasons,	  many	   Chinese	  companies’	   investment	   projects	   are	   still	   of	   a	   limited	   scale	   or	   in	   the	   planning	  stages.	   This	   is	   revealed	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   China	   sent	   the	   first	   group	   of	   Chinese	  technicians	  to	  Ethiopia,	  under	  FAO’s	  South-­‐South	  Cooperation	  Program	  in	  1998.	  (China	   Daily,	   January	   15	   2014)	   But,	   as	   progress	   was	   being	   made,	   the	  Ethiopia-­‐Eritrea	   war	   broke	   out,	   and	   the	   construction	   of	   two	   agricultural	  demonstration	  centres	  was	  suspended	  and	  Chinese	  experts	  had	  to	  be	  evacuated.	  Ultimately,	   the	  work	   restarted	   in	   the	  Amhara	  Region	   in	  2000,	   and	   in	  Tigray	   in	  2003.	  The	  FAO	  programmes	  in	  Ethiopia	  are	  conducted	  with	  the	  joint	  efforts	  of	  a	  tripartite	   co-­‐operation:	   FAO’s	   representative	   office	   in	   Ethiopia,	   Ethiopia’s	  Agricultural	   Ministry,	   and	   China’s	   Agricultural	   Ministry.	   The	   FAO	   programme	  budget	   was	   US$2.027	   million,	   with	   the	   Ethiopians	   contributing	   a	   further	  US$195,886.	  The	  FAO,	  China,	  and	  the	  government	  of	  Ethiopia	  shared	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  salaries	  of	  the	  Chinese	  participants.	  According	  to	  the	  recent	  report	  based	  on	  joint	   inspections	   by	   FAO	   representatives	   in	   East	   Africa	   and	   Ethiopia,	   officials	  from	   Ethiopia’s	   Agricultural	   Ministry,	   and	   Chinese	   experts,	   the	   demonstration	  centres	   in	  Amhara	   and	  Tigray	  made	   progress	   in	   practical	   assistance,	   including	  growth	  in	  rice,	  vegetable,	  and	  commercial	  crops,	  which	  met	  the	  demands	  of	  local	  partners.	   “In	   Amhara,	   the	   rice	   they	   introduced	   was	   greatly	   accepted	   by	   the	  community	  because	  the	  Chinese	  were	  right	  down	  there	  with	  them”	  (Brautigam	  &	  Tang,	  2012).	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In	   2008,	   China	   set	   up	   a	   trust	   fund	   with	   the	   FAO,	   donating	   US$30	   million	   to	  support	   agricultural	   improvements	   in	   developing	   countries,	  which	  made	   it	   the	  first	  strategic	  partner	  of	  FAO	  in	  financing	  South–South	  Cooperation	  (China	  Daily,	  January	   15	   2014).	   A	   new,	   US$1.5	   million,	   two-­‐year,	   South–South	   Cooperation	  Program	  is	  currently	  being	  finalised	  between	  China,	  Ethiopia,	  and	  the	  FAO,	  and	  should	  start	  early	  in	  2012	  (Brautigam	  &	  Tang,	  2012).	  According	  to	  the	  FAO,	  the	  new	   programme	   will	   be	   integrated	   in	   and	   complementary	   to	   Ethiopia’s	  Agricultural	   Growth	   Program,	   and	   focus	   on	   the	   high-­‐productivity	   areas	   of	  Oromia,	   Amhara,	   and	   Tigray.	   Currently,	   about	   30	   Chinese	   experts	   have	   been	  deployed	  in	  these	  three	  regions,	  and	  also	  the	  southern	  region,	  where	  the	  Chinese	  transfer	  knowledge,	  skill,	  and	  technology	  to	  Ethiopian	  experts	  (AllAfrica,	  October	  25	  2013).	  Among	  those	  centres,	  the	  Oromia	  demonstration	  centre	  has	  developed	  more	   quickly.	   In	   this	   centre,	   the	   Chinese	   experts	   are	   divided	   into	   four	   groups:	  agricultural,	  animal,	  machinery,	  and	   irrigation.	  They	  brought	  planting	  methods,	  prevention	   and	   treatment	   of	   animal	   diseases,	   agricultural	   production	   skills,	  machines	   and	   irrigation	   system	   designs,	   and	   technical	   support	   to	   the	   local	  people	   (Davis	   et	   al.,	   2010).	   These	   experts	   and	  professionals	   actively	   promoted	  agricultural	   techniques	   and	   assisted	   Ethiopia	   in	   increasing	   its	   agricultural	  productivity.	   In	   addition,	   the	   agricultural	   technology	   demonstration	   centres	   in	  Ethiopia	  have	  helped	  local	  people	  to	  acquire	  agricultural	  production	  and	  storage	  skills,	  and	  provided	  animal	  health	  laboratory	  equipment	  and	  planting	  machinery.	  China,	   with	   its	   experience	   in	   agricultural	   development	   at	   home,	   could	   make	  significant	  contributions	  to	  the	  Ethiopian	  rural	  sector.	  
At	   the	  moment,	  China’s	  engagement	   in	  Ethiopia’s	  agricultural	   industry	  remains	  in	  an	  early	  stage.	  According	  to	  the	  report	  from	  FAO,	  the	  Chinese	  experts	  merely	  developed	   detailed	   proposals	   and	   designs	   for	   a	   number	   of	   irrigation	   schemes.	  Other	  projects,	  such	  as	  agricultural	  technical	  and	  vocational	  training	  schools,	  are	  limited	   in	   number	   and	   scope.	   And	   the	   spread	   of	   technology	   needs	   time	   to	  properly	  evaluate	   its	   influence.	  The	  agricultural	   industry,	  as	  a	  slow	  sector,	  also	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needs	  more	  time	  to	  realise	  profits	  and	  effects.	  As	  for	  China,	  the	  official	  supported	  projects	   tend	   to	   concentrate	   on	   large	   infrastructure	   construction	   like	   roads,	  dams	  or	  power	  generation.	   It	   lacks	  more	  micro-­‐assistance,	   such	  as	   “promoting	  small-­‐holder	   subsistence	   agriculture	   or	   agro-­‐based	   manufacturing	   industries”	  (Thakur,	   2009).	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   although	   Ethiopian	   Minister	   of	   Agriculture	  Tefera	   Deribwe	   has	   emphasised	   that	   his	   country	   “is	   keen	   to	   …	   further	  strengthening	  cooperation	  between	  the	  two	  countries	  in	  the	  agriculture	  sector”,	  it	  lacks	  of	  initiatives	  to	  attract	  foreign	  private	  investment,	  because	  the	  Ethiopian	  government	   has	   “prevented	   the	   emergence	   of	   powerful	   independent	   economic	  actors	   that	   might	   be	   able	   to	   translate	   their	   economic	   power	   into	   political	  influence”	  through	  controls	  for	  land	  equality	  (Lavers,	  2011).	  In	  this	  way,	  foreign	  investment	   can	   hardly	   access	   the	   small	   agricultural	   business,	   nor	   provide	  tangible	  financing.	  It	  is	  estimated	  that,	  in	  2010,	  only	  4.3%	  of	  Chinese	  companies	  with	  projects	  in	  Ethiopia	  were	  engaged	  in	  the	  rural	  sector.	  Chinese	  assistance	  in	  rural	   sectors	   has	   been	   divided	   into	   two	   parts:	   national	   investors	   on	   large	  projects	   and	   training,	   but	   limited	   contributions	   to	   majority	   smallholders	   in	  remote	  and	  rural	  areas,	  like	  agricultural	  machinery	  equipment.	   	  
9.5	  Conclusion	   	  Generally,	   China’s	   involvement	   in	   Ethiopia	   is	   less	   criticised	   by	   international	  society	  and	  local	  people,	  since	  the	  country	  has	  neither	  large	  energy	  reserves,	  nor	  large	   consumption	  potential.	  As	   the	   least-­‐developed	  country,	  Ethiopia’s	   foreign	  policy	  towards	  China	  is	  focused	  on	  economic	  diplomacy:	  that	  is,	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  the	   country	  wants	   the	   experience	   of	   rapid	   economic	   growth	   and	   development	  witnessed	   in	  China;	  while	  on	   the	  other	  hand,	  Ethiopia	  also	  hopes	   for	   increased	  trade	  and	  investment	  with	  China.	  In	  this	  regard,	  Ethiopia	  remains	  positive	  about	  China’s	  presence.	  Additionally,	  China	  has	  pursued	  a	  non-­‐intervention	  approach,	  which	   is	   in	   contrast	   to	   the	   traditional	   donors’	   intervention	  measures.	   Ethiopia	  views	  China	  more	   like	   one	  of	   its	   development	  partners	   that	  will	   not	   hinder	   or	  prevent,	   but	   rather	   assist	   it	   in	   achieving	   its	   economic	   and	   development	   goals.	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Plus,	  China’s	  active	  support	  for	  Ethiopia’s	  infrastructure	  development,	  which	  not	  only	  provides	   the	  government	  with	  political	  achievements,	  but	  also	   facilities	   to	  Ethiopian	  people,	   and	  necessary	   conditions	   for	   economic	   growth.	  Also,	   China’s	  sharing	   its	   own	   experiences	   and	   technical	   skills	   will	   help	   Ethiopia	   develop	  strategies	   for	   poverty	   alleviation	   and	   sustainable	   production,	   especially	   in	   the	  agricultural	   industry.	   In	   addition,	   Chinese	   firms	   investing	   in	   the	   agricultural	  industry	   have	   helped	   to	   transfer	   technology	   and	   machinery.	   As	   a	   result,	   the	  Ethiopian	   government	   views	   China	   as	   a	   generous	   supporter,	   and	   ordinary	  Ethiopians	   can	   benefit	   from	   visible	   and	   symbolic	   projects	   such	   as	   dams,	  conference	  halls,	  and	  roads.	  
At	  the	  same	  time,	   it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	   large	  Chinese	  companies’	  presence	   in	  Ethiopia	  has	  brought	  negative	  impacts	  on	  local	  businesses,	  the	  environment	  and	  communities.	   As	   for	   the	   lack	   of	   transparency	   in	   SOEs’	   investment,	   risk	  management,	  and	  lack	  of	  corporate	  social	  responsibility	  awareness	  (the	  same	  for	  small-­‐	   and	   medium-­‐sized	   businesses),	   their	   aggressive	   competition	   has	  negatively	  impacted	  their	  vulnerable	  local	  counterparts.	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Part	  2	  Conclusion:	  discussion	  of	  Case	  Studies	   	  In	  the	  conceptual	  chapter,	  this	  thesis	  tried	  to	  indicate	  that	  there	  should	  be	  more	  criteria	  (from	  a	  developing	  countries’	  perspective)	  to	  consider	  whether	  China	  is	  a	   responsible	   player	   in	   Africa	   or	   not.	   It	   mentioned	   that	   traditional	   players’	  interpretations	   of	   “being	   responsible”	   are	   flawed	  when	  one	   considers	   China	   in	  Africa,	   because	   the	   relationship	   is	   different	   from	   that	   of	   the	   traditional	   OECD	  donors’	   relations	   with	   Africa.	   Whether	   China,	   itself	   a	   developing	   country,	   is	  responsible	   or	   not	   is	   dependent	   upon	   its	   capabilities	   in	   the	   host	   country.	   This	  Part	  2	  conclusion	  will	  include	  a	  general	  discussion	  of	  the	  case	  studies	  to	  answer	  hypotheses	   II	   and	   III,	   and	   then	   offer	   a	   supplementary	   note	   for	   responding	   to	  hypothesis	  I	  and	  evaluation,	  as	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  3.	   	  	  In	  Part	  1,	  it	  was	  argued	  that,	  although	  China	  holds	  a	  different	  political	  philosophy	  and	   approach	   to	   dealing	   with	   crises	   and	   development	   in	   Africa	   from	   the	  traditional	   players	   (mainly	   the	   OECD	   countries),	   it	   does	   not	   necessarily	   mean	  that	  China	  is	  irresponsible	  in	  Africa.	  Regarding	  the	  responsibility	  of	  an	  emerging	  country	  like	  China,	  there	  are	  other	  factors	  that	  could	  affect	  China’s	  ability	  to	  be	  a	  responsible	  actor	  in	  Africa.	  In	  Part	  1,	  this	  thesis	  mentioned	  the	  gap	  between	  the	  policy	   and	   implementation	   levels	   for	   the	   Chinese	   government	   and	   Chinese	  enterprises.	   Even	   though	   the	   central	   government	   has	   a	   clear	   strategy	   for	   the	  promotion	   of	   African	   development,	   the	   interests	   of	   influential	   players’	   are	  diverse,	  and	  that	  has	  affected	  the	  implementation	  of	  Beijing’s	  pledges.	  Thus,	  this	  thesis	  analysed	  the	  first	  layer:	  Chinese	  domestic	  players,	  which	  includes	  Chinese	  governmental	   branches	   and	   offices,	   as	   well	   as	   Chinese	   companies.	   At	   the	  governmental	   level,	   the	   three	   key	   actors	   are	  MOFCOM,	  MOFA	   and	   Exim	   Bank.	  Each	   of	   these	   has	   their	   own	   priorities	   and	   interests:	   MOFCOM	   highlights	   the	  interests	   of	   the	   national	   economy	   and	   budget,	   while	   MOFA	   has	   much	   more	  consideration	   for	  China’s	   reputation	   in	  African	   countries,	   and	  Exim	  bank	   cares	  more	   about	   the	   financial	   credibility	   of	   the	   host	  African	   country.	  With	   different	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concerns	   in	  mind,	   the	   implementation	  of	   the	  central	  governments’	  pledges	   is	  a	  compromise	  between	  these	  three	  actors.	  Furthermore,	  the	  implementers	  on	  the	  ground,	   Chinese	   companies	   operating	   in	   Africa,	   also	   have	   their	   own	   interests.	  Private	   companies	   focus	   on	   profit	   maximisation	   and	   seeking	   out	   profitable	  markets	  wherever	  they	  may	  be.	  By	  contrast,	  SOEs	  are	  subject	  to	  a	  more	  complex	  calculation	   involving	   the	   political	   interests	   of	   the	   central	   government.	   To	  summarise,	  Part	  1,	  especially	  Chapters	  4	  and	  5,	   focused	  on	  China’s	  perspective	  and	  responses	  to	  the	  first	  question	  of	  Hypothesis	  II	  and	  III.	  	  Part	   2	   mainly	   analysed	   the	   second	   layer,	   the	   particularities	   in	   each	   African	  country,	   in	   order	   to	   test	   the	   remaining	   parts	   of	   hypothesis	   II	   and	   III.	   Four	  featured	  case	  studies	  were	  selected	  to	  assess	  China’s	  engagement:	  Sudan	  (South	  Sudan),	  Nigeria,	  South	  Africa,	  and	  Ethiopia.	  The	  four	  cases	  represented	  different	  types	  of	  government,	  different	  levels	  of	  development,	  different	  attitudes	  towards	  Beijing,	  and	  different	  amounts	  of	  energy	  reserves.	   	   	  	  The	   four	   case	   study	   chapters	  were	   conducted	  with	   the	   same	   structure.	   In	   the	  beginning,	   each	   case	   started	  with	  a	  brief	   introduction	  of	  China’s	   relations	  with	  the	   host	   country,	   and	   the	   situation	   in	   that	   country.	   Secondly,	   based	   on	   the	  political,	  economic,	  and	  diplomatic	  environment	  in	  the	  host	  country	  and	  its	  ties	  to	   Beijing,	   each	   chapter	   then	   examined	   the	   possible	   motivations	   relevant	   for	  Chinese	  engagement	  there.	  Generally,	  the	  motivations	  could	  be	  summarised	  into	  three	   categories:	   China’s	   national	   interests,	   the	   host	   country’s	   demands,	   and	  international	   pressures.	   These	   three	   influential	   factors	   have	   shaped	   China’s	  responsibility	   in	   the	   host	   country.	   In	   some	   countries,	   where	   there	   is	   less	  international	   concern,	   the	   main	   factors	   come	   from	   just	   China	   and	   the	   host	  country.	  This	   section	   is	  designed	   for	  hypothesis	   II,	   and	  at	   the	  end	  of	   each	   case	  chapter	   there	  was	   a	   discussion	   of	   the	   compatibility	   of	   China’s	   interests	   in	   the	  host	   country	   with	   the	   external	   demands.	   The	   conclusions	   were	   that,	   in	   most	  circumstances,	   China	   has	   shared	   similar	   expectations	   with	   that	   of	   the	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international	  community	  and	  the	  host	  countries.	   	  	  Then,	   the	   second	   section	   for	   each	   case	   study	   discussed	   China’s	   capability	   and	  limitations	   in	   the	   host	   country.	   Often	   neglected	   in	   the	   current	   literature	   on	  China’s	   engagement	   with	   Africa	   is	   China’s	   own	   vulnerability.	   Not	   only	   does	   it	  remain	   a	   developing	   economy	   confronting	   immense	   challenges,	   but	   also	  although	   it	   seems	   that	   Africans	   lack	   much	   bargaining	   power,	   the	   Chinese	  companies	   that	  operate	   in	   the	  host	   country	  are	  actually	   largely	   constrained	  by	  local	   regulations,	   environment	   and	   communities.	   Additionally,	   international	  society,	   the	   host	   country’s	   government,	   local	   communities	   and	   NGOs	   have	  different	  expectations	  from	  China’s	  presence.	  Sometimes	  one	  may	  contradict	  the	  other,	  hence	  it	  increases	  the	  complexity	  of	  assessing	  China’s	  responsibility	  in	  the	  host	  country.	  Finally,	  each	  chapter	  highlighted	  the	  gap	  between	  China’s	  strategy	  in	   the	   host	   country	   and	   its	   implementation,	   in	   order	   to	   directly	   answer	  hypothesis	  III	  regarding	  whether	  China’s	  responsibility	  in	  the	  host	  country	  was	  tailored	  by	  local	  political	  and	  economic	  situations.	  	  
The	  influential	  factors	  that	  shaped	  China’s	  responsibility	  in	  Africa	   	  	  Based	   on	   the	   analysis	   in	   the	   theoretical	   chapter,	   China’s	   motivations	   and	  responsibility	  in	  Africa	  are	  shaped	  by	  three	  dynamic	  factors:	  a	  combination	  of	  its	  national	   interests,	   the	   host	   country’s	   demands,	   and	   international	   expectations	  and	   pressures.	   As	   for	   the	   four	   case	   countries,	   China’s	   responsibility	   is	   tailored	  according	   to	   the	   political	   and	   economic	   environment	   therein.	   Table	   1	  makes	   a	  comparison	  of	   these	   factors.	   It	   is	  worth	  noting	  that	   the	  three	   influential	   factors	  do	  not	  enjoy	  an	  equal	  role	  in	  the	  host	  countries.	  Instead,	  the	  significance	  of	  each	  factor	  differs	  from	  case	  to	  case,	  based	  on	  its	  situation.	   	  	  According	  to	  the	  dynamic	  influence	  of	  these	  three	  factors,	  China’s	  responsibility	  in	   the	   four	  case	  countries	  presents	   the	   following	   features:	   In	  Sudan,	  where	   the	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Table	   1:	   The	   comparison	   of	   three	   influential	   factors	   in	   shaping	   China’s	  
responsibility	  in	  four	  African	  states	  
Three	  influential	  factors	   	   Sudan	   Nigeria	   South	  Africa	   	   Ethiopia	  
China’s	  national	  interests	  
1.To	  safeguard	  its	  economic	  interests	  2.	  its	  international	  reputation	  
1.	  Oil	  interests	  2.	  Market	  3.political	  support	  
1.	  Political	  support	  2.	  Gateway	  to	  the	  region	  3.	  Economic	  interests	  	  
1.	  International	  reputation	  2.	  Chinese	  business	  expansion	   	  
Host	  country’s	  demands	  
1.	  Khartoum:	  to	  help	  controlling	  the	  crisis	  and	  protecting	  Bashir	  from	  ICC	  2.	  Juba:	  oil	  interests	  3.	  Darfur:	  international	  intervention	  
1.	  Balanced	  trade	  2.	  Financial	  support	  to	  its	  development	  3.	  Political	  support	  of	  its	  leading	  role	  in	  the	  continent	  	  
1.	  International	  support	  as	  an	  African	  leader	  2.	  Value-­‐added	  trade	  
1.	  Economic	  growth	  and	  poverty	  reduction	  	  2.	  China	  model	  
International	  expectation	   	   Jointly	  sanction	  and	  intervention	   Conditional	  investment	  and	  assistance	  
Not	  to	  violate	  the	  democracy	  and	  human	  rights	   	  
to	  respect	  international	  standard	   	  
Source:	  author	  
	  From	  Table	  1	  and	  the	  discussions	  of	  each	  country,	  China’s	  main	  principle	  is	  clear:	  non-­‐interference,	   yet	   the	   methods	   can	   be	   flexible.	   This	   characteristic	   can	   be	  found	  in	  Elizabeth	  J.	  Perry’s	  explanations	  for	  China’s	  policy:	  the	  principle	  should	  be	   strictly	   insisted	   upon,	   yet	   approaches	   should	   be	   planned	   and	   acted	   upon	  according	  to	  circumstances	  (Heilmann	  &	  Perry,	  2011).	  China’s	  motivation	  in	  the	  case	   of	   each	   country	   differs,	   yet	   to	   safeguard	   its	   economic	   interests	   and	  international	   reputation	   requires	   China	   to	   be	   more	   active	   in	   shouldering	   the	  responsibility	   of	   Africa’s	   development.	   Most	   African	   countries	   are	   anxious	   for	  financial	  assistance	  to	  fuel	  their	  economy.	  China’s	  funds	  and	  projects	  brought	  the	  continent	   sources	   of	   finance	   and	   tangible	   commitments,	   which	   are	   in	   Africa’s	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interests.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   China’s	   approach	   contradicts	   international	  expectations,	  but	  its	  aims	  are	  consistent	  with	  those	  of	   international	  society	  and	  leave	  the	  country	  space	  to	  be	  more	  cooperative	  with	  joint	  efforts.	  	  
The	   factors	  which	  effected	  China	  ability	   to	  be	   fully	   responsible	   to	  African	  
countries	  	  The	  elements	  that	  have	  affected	  China’s	  ability	  to	  be	  fully	  responsible	  to	  African	  countries	  are	  mainly	  from	  two	  sides.	  From	  China’s	  side,	  the	  conflict	  between	  the	  profit-­‐seeking	  nature	  of	  Chinese	  enterprises	  and	  the	  policy	  needs	  of	  the	  Chinese	  central	   government	  have	  become	  a	  major	  problem,	  which	   leads	   to	   an	   inability	  for	  China	  to	  be	  a	  responsible	  player	  in	  Africa.	  As	  for	  the	  African	  countries,	  there	  are	  various	  contexts	   -­‐	   like	  unstable	  domestic	  political	  and	  economic	  situations;	  policy	  flip-­‐flops;	  conflicts	  between	  political	  or	   interest	  groups;	  and	  inconsistent	  attitudes	   towards	   China	   between	   the	   government	   and	   the	   people	   -­‐	   that	   affect	  China’s	  ability	  to	  fulfil	  its	  responsibility	  in	  these	  African	  countries.	  	  Although	   most	   of	   the	   literature	   argues	   that	   China-­‐Africa	   relations	   are	  asymmetric,	  and	  African	  countries	  without	  a	  unified	  voice	  find	  it	  hard	  to	  bargain	  with	   China	   for	   their	   own	   benefit,	   in	   reality,	   Chinese	   companies	   operating	   in	  Africa	  are	  very	  vulnerable.	  Their	  operations	  are	  constrained	  by	  both	  the	  Chinese	  central	  government’s	  policy,	  which	  often	  contradicts	   their	  profit-­‐driven	  nature,	  and	  also	  the	  regulations	  of	  the	  host	  country.	  Table	  2	  (below)	  illustrates	  the	  major	  limitations	  preventing	  China	  from	  being	  responsible	  (or,	  the	  negative	  effects	  that	  are	   not	   the	   original	   intention	   of	   China’s	   African	   policy).	   In	   Sudan,	   China’s	  non-­‐intervention	   policy	   is	   intended	   to	   help	   Khartoum	   maintain	   stability	   and	  safeguard	  China’s	  economic	  interests	  there.	  However,	  as	  the	  crisis	  in	  Darfur	  and	  South	  Sudan	  became	  worse,	  Beijing	  realized	  that	  the	  Bashir	  regime	  was	  unable	  to	   control	   the	   worsening	   situation,	   and	   also	   that	   its	   non-­‐intervention	   stance	  largely	  affected	  its	  international	  role	  of	  being	  responsible.	  Therefore,	  it	  changed	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Table	  2:	  The	  influential	  factors	  of	  China	  not	  being	  fully	  responsible	  in	  the	  four	  
countries	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Country	   	  	  Elements	  	   Sudan	   Nigeria	   South	  Africa	   	   Ethiopia	  Chinese	  Domestic	   	  China’s	  large	  economic	  interests	  in	  Sudan	   	  	   Challenge	  of	  South	  Africa	  as	  recipient	  to	  Chinese	  assistance	  
The	  deficiency	  of	  China	  model	  
Host	  country	   1.	  The	  close	  relations	  with	  Khartoum	  2.	  The	  distrust	  of	  opposition	  in	  Darfur	  and	  South	  Sudan	  3.	  Lack	  of	  recognizing	  China’s	  evolving	  policy	  in	  international	  society	  
1.	  The	  changing	  electoral	  politics	  2.	  The	  gap	  between	  Nigerian’s	  ambitions	  and	  its	  underdeveloped	  market	  environment	   	  3.	  Corruption,	  mismanagement,	  oil	  violent	  and	  insufficient	  infrastructure	  
1.	  Incompetent	  as	  a	  representative	  and	  a	  leader	  of	  Africa	  2.	  The	  BEE	   	  3.	  Corruption	   	  
	  
Source:	  author	  	  These	   results	   demonstrate	   a	   clear	   message:	   various	   conditions	   within	   African	  countries	   -­‐	   like	   domestic	   conflicts	   and	   problems,	   political	   considerations,	  instability	   -­‐	   all	   affect	   China’s	   ability	   to	   fulfil	   its	   responsibility	   in	   Africa.	   These	  situations	  suggest	  that	  China’s	  role	  in	  fulfilling	  responsibility	  in	  these	  countries	  is	  decided	   by	   the	   conditions	   in	   the	   African	   countries.	   In	   the	   meantime,	   for	   the	  Chinese,	   its	  state-­‐led	  Foreign-­‐Aid	  decision	  model	  also	  cannot	   fulfil	   the	  needs	  of	  the	  actual	  implementing	  agents,	  Chinese	  businesses	  in	  Africa.	  These	  findings	  also	  support	   hypothesis	   III,	   that	   we	   cannot	   judge	   China’s	   responsibility	   in	   African	  without	  considering	  these	  contexts	  in	  Africa	  countries.	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Horizontal	  comparison	  of	  the	  four	  cases	  	  A	   state’s	   responsibility	   is	   a	   combined	   calculation	   of	   international	   expectations,	  national	  interests	  and	  the	  host’s	  impact.	  In	  order	  to	  assess	  China’s	  responsibility	  in	  Africa,	  this	  part	  is	  targeted	  against	  the	  three	  main	  criticisms	  of	  “China	  as	  a	  new	  coloniser”,	   “China’s	   scramble	   for	   resources	   in	   Africa”,	   and	   “China	   violates	   the	  human	  rights	  and	  good	  governance	  in	  Africa.”	   	  	  The	  four	  case	  countries	  represented	  different	  levels	  of	  energy	  reserves:	   	  	   	  1.	   	   Sudan	  and	  Nigeria	  have	  similar	  backgrounds:	  Both	  Sudan	  and	  Nigeria	  have	  oil	   reserves	   located	   in	   the	   southern	   region	   of	   the	   country,	   while	   the	   refinery	  factories	   are	   in	   the	   north.	   The	   governments	   are	   mainly	   controlled	   by	   the	  northern	  Muslims,	  which	  divides	  them	  from	  the	  Christians	  in	  the	  southern	  areas.	  Nigeria,	   with	   the	   second	   largest	   oil	   reserves	   and	   largest	   oil	   producer	   on	   the	  continent,	  produces	  2.28	  million	  barrels	  per	  day.	  As	  for	  Sudan	  and	  South	  Sudan,	  combined,	   they	  produced	  486,000	  barrels	  of	  oil	  per	  day	   in	  2011.	  Following	  the	  separation,	  75%	  of	   its	  oil	   reserves	  are	   located	   in	  South	  Sudan.	  China	   imported	  about	   20,000	  barrels	   per	   day	   from	  Nigeria	   (IBT,	   July,	   12th	   ,	   2013)	   and	  66%	  of	  Sudan	   and	   South	   Sudan’s	   oil	   production	  went	   to	   China	   in	   2011	   (Francis	   et.	   al,	  2012).	  Due	  to	  the	  separation	  of	  Sudan	  and	  South	  Sudan,	  South	  Sudan	  shut	  down	  the	  oil	  fields	  in	  July	  2013.	  (Reuters,	  July,20th	  ,	  2013)	   	  	  2.	   South	   Africa:	   It	   is	   the	   world's	   largest	   producer	   of	   chrome,	   manganese,	  platinum,	  vanadium	  and	  vermiculite.	  It	  is	  the	  second	  largest	  producer	  of	  ilmenite,	  palladium,	  rutile	  and	  zirconium.	  It	  is	  also	  the	  world’s	  third	  largest	  coal	  exporter.	  South	   Africa	   is	   also	   a	   huge	   producer	   of	   iron	   ore.	   In	   2012,	   it	   overtook	   India	   to	  become	  the	  world’s	   third	   largest	   iron	  ore	  supplier	   to	  China,	  who	   is	   the	  world’s	  largest	  consumers	  of	  iron	  ore.	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3.	   Ethiopia:	   The	   resource	   reserves	   in	   Ethiopia	   are	   very	   small,	   and	   have	   little	  significance	  to	  China’s	  resource	  supply.	  	  The	  four	  case	  countries	  represented	  different	  levels	  of	  democratic	  development	  and	  governance.	  	  1.	  South	  Africa	  is	  a	  parliamentary	  representative	  democratic	  country,	  which	  has	  been	  dominated	  by	  the	  African	  National	  Congress	  (ANC).	  The	  ANC	  is	   the	  ruling	  party	   in	   the	   national	   legislature,	   as	  well	   as	   in	   eight	   of	   the	   nine	   provinces.	   The	  major	   challenger	   is	   the	   Democratic	   Alliance.	   Other	   major	   political	   parties	  represented	   in	   Parliament	   include	   the	   Inkatha	   Freedom	   Party,	   which	   mainly	  represents	   Zulu	   voters.	   Also,	   South	   Africa	   has	   a	   sound	   legal	   system.	   The	  Constitution	  of	  South	  Africa	  asks	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  people’s	  freedom.	  It	  is	  the	  most	  stable	  democratic	  country	  in	  Africa.	  	  2.	   Nigeria	   is	   not	   a	   fully	   democratic	   country,	   but	   it	   has	   developed	   towards	   a	  democratic	  path.	  In	  1999,	  it	  conducted	  its	  first	  election	  and	  ended	  military	  rule,	  which	  marked	   its	   start	   on	   the	   path	   to	   democracy.	   Since	   then,	   the	   country	   has	  held	  four	  general	  elections,	  in	  1999,	  2003,	  2007,	  and	  20011.	  Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  the	   elections	   were	   condemned	   as	   unfair,	   Nigeria	   has	   shown	   marked	  improvements	   in	   its	   attempts	   to	   tackle	   government	   corruption	   and	   to	   hasten	  development.	   In	   the	   latest	   election,	   in	   2011,	   it	   unfolded	  much	  more	   smoothly,	  with	  relatively	  little	  violence	  and	  fraud.	  Currently,	  the	  dominant	  party	  is	  the	  PDP,	  who	  have	  won	  every	  election	  since	  1999.	  	  3.	  Ethiopia	  is	  a	  one-­‐party	  ruled	  state,	  with	  the	  EPRDF	  as	  the	  dominant	  party.	  In	  its	  most	  recent	  election	  in	  2010,	  the	  EPRDF	  marginalised	  the	  oppositions.	  Now,	  there	  is	  no	  major	  challenger	  to	  the	  EPRDF’s	  leadership.	  	  4.	   Sudan:	   The	   violent	   civil	   war	   and	   genocide	   in	   Darfur	   has	   drawn	   the	  world’s	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attention	   to	  Sudan.	   It	   is	  widely	   recognised	   that	   Sudan	   is	   an	  authoritarian	   state	  where	  all	  effective	  political	  power	   is	  held	  by	  President	  Omar	  al-­‐Bashir.	  Sudan’s	  legal	   system	   is	   based	   on	   Islamic	   Law,	   which	   applies	   to	   all	   residents	   of	   the	  northern	  state,	  regardless	  of	  their	  religion.	  	  The	  four	  case	  countries	  represented	  different	  levels	  of	  economic	  development.	   	  	  1.	  South	  Africa	  is	  the	  largest	  economy	  in	  Africa,	  accounting	  for	  24%	  of	  its	  gross	  domestic	  product,	  when	  adjusted	  for	  purchasing	  power	  parity,	  and	  is	  ranked	  as	  an	   upper-­‐middle-­‐income	   economy	   by	   the	   World	   Bank.	   South	   Africa	   has	   a	  comparative	   advantage	   in	   agriculture,	   mining,	   and	   manufacturing	   products	  related	  to	  these	  sectors.	  South	  Africa	  has	  shifted	  from	  a	  primary	  and	  secondary	  sector	  economy	  in	  the	  mid-­‐twentieth	  century,	  to	  an	  economy	  driven	  primarily	  by	  the	   tertiary	  sector	   in	   the	  present	  day,	  which	  accounts	   for	  an	  estimated	  65%	  of	  GDP	  or	  $230	  billion	  in	  nominal	  GDP	  terms.	  	  2.	   Nigeria	   is	   a	   middle-­‐income,	   mixed-­‐economy	   and	   emerging	   market,	   with	  expanding	   financial,	   service,	   communications,	   technology,	   and	   entertainment	  sectors.	  It	  is	  ranked	  30th	  in	  the	  world	  in	  terms	  of	  GDP	  (PPP)	  as	  of	  2013	  (40th	  in	  2005,	   52nd	   in	   2000),	   and	   the	   second	   largest	   economy	   in	   Africa	   (behind	   South	  Africa).	  It	  is	  on	  track	  to	  become	  the	  richest	  country	  in	  Africa	  in	  2014,	  when	  their	  new	  GDP	  rebasing	  result	   is	  published,	  and	  also	  when	   it	  becomes	  one	  of	   the	  20	  largest	   economies	   in	   the	   world	   by	   2020.	   Its	   re-­‐emergent,	   though	   currently	  under-­‐performing,	   manufacturing	   sector	   is	   the	   third-­‐largest	   on	   the	   continent,	  and	   produces	   a	   large	   proportion	   of	   goods	   and	   services	   for	   the	   West	   African	  region.	  	  3.	  The	  economy	  of	  Ethiopia	   is	   largely	  based	  on	  agriculture,	  which	  accounts	   for	  46.6%	  of	  its	  gross	  domestic	  product	  (GDP),	  and	  85%	  of	  total	  employment	  in	  the	  country.	   Despite	   recent	   improvements,	  with	   an	   exploding	   population,	   Ethiopia	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remains	  one	  of	  the	  poorest	  nations	  in	  the	  world.	  	  4.	   Sudan's	   economy	   is	   based	   on	   oil	   production,	   agriculture	   and	   foreign	   direct	  investment.	  The	  Darfur	   conflict	  and	   the	  civil	  war	  between	  north	  and	  south	   left	  the	   country	   with	   a	   lack	   of	   basic	   infrastructure	   and	   a	   large	   amount	   of	   its	  population	  living	  below	  the	  poverty	  line.	  The	  independent	  South	  Sudan	  is	  one	  of	  the	   World’s	   weakest	   and	   most	   underdeveloped	   countries,	   with	   little	   existing	  infrastructure	  and	   the	  highest	  maternal	  mortality	  and	   female	   illiteracy	   rates	   in	  the	  world.	   	  	  The	  four	  case	  countries	  present	  different	  characteristics.	  By	  comparing	  whether	  China	   has	   preferred	   to	   support	   pariah	   regimes	   or	   resource	   regimes,	   it	   can	   be	  ascertained	  whether	  China’s	  involvement	  in	  Africa	  has	  been	  a	  scramble	  for	  oil	  or	  intentional	  violation	  of	  the	  democratic	  development	  of	  the	  continent.	  The	  results	  of	  this	  comparison	  could	  also	  be	  a	  response	  to	  the	  common	  criticism	  of	  China	  as	  a	  new	  coloniser	  in	  Africa,	  and	  China	  being	  immoral	  in	  its	  pursuit	  of	  oil.	   	  
	  
Table	  3:	  The	  comparison	  of	  Chinese	  development	  finance	  in	  the	  four	  countries	   	  Country	   Sudan	   Nigeria	   South	  Africa	   Ethiopia	  Official	  finance	   Year	   	   2002-­‐2012	   2002-­‐2012	   2001-­‐2011	   2002-­‐2012	  Number	  of	  projects	   71	   46	   35	   90	  Amount	   More	  than	  US$6.3	  billion	   	   More	  than	  US$12.5	  billion	   More	  than	  US$	  3billion	   More	  than	  US$	  7.5	  billion	  Cancelation	  rate	   	   	   	   	  Non-­‐official	  finance	   Year	   2006-­‐2012	   2006-­‐2012	   2006-­‐2012	   2006-­‐2012	  Number	  of	  projects	   43	   17	   23	   17	  Amount	   More	  than	  US$	  1.4	  billion	   More	  than	  US$	  27.4	  billion	   More	  than	  US$	  33	  billion	   More	  than	  US$	  7.6	  billion	  Cancelation	  rate	   	   	   	   	  Military	   Number	   	   1	   	   2	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Data	  source:	  Aid	  Data	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Table	  4:	  The	  comparison	  of	  Chinese	  official	  finance	  in	  the	  four	  countries	  in	  
terms	  of	  sector	   	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Country	   	  Sector	   Sudan	   Nigeria	   South	  Africa	   Ethiopia	  Action	  relating	  to	  debt	   	   	   	   	  Agriculture,	  forestry	  and	  fishing	   3	   1	   	   	  Banking	  and	  financial	  services	   	   	   5	   	  Communications	   	   4	   	   1	  Education	   	   8	   2	   	   2	  Emergency	  Response	   4	   	   	   4	  Energy	  Generation	  and	  Supply	   1	   2	   5	   	  Government	  and	  Civil	  Society	   	   	   	   	   1	  Health	   13	   1	   	   	  Industry,	  mining	  construction	   16	   14	   17	   6	  Other	  multisector	   1	   1	   	   	  Other	  social	  infrastructure	  and	  services	   	   3	   	   2	   1	  Trade	  and	  tourism	   	   	   	   	  Unallocated	   3	   	   	   	  Water	  supply	  and	  Sanitation	   1	   	   	   	  Transport	  and	  Storage	   	   8	   	   	   	  
Data	  source:	  Aid	  Data	   	  (Some	  amounts	  cannot	  be	  identified	  because	  they	  are	  multinational)	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Table	  5:	  The	  comparison	  of	  Chinese	  non-­‐official	  finance	  in	  the	  four	  countries	  
in	  terms	  of	  sector	   	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Country	   	  Sector	   Sudan	   Nigeria	   South	  Africa	   Ethiopia	  Action	  relating	  to	  debt	   	   4	   1	   	   2	  Agriculture,	  forestry	  and	  fishing	   3	   3	   	   5	  Banking	  and	  financial	  services	   	   1	   1	   2	  Communication	   1	   8	   1	   	  
Education	   	   4	   2	   6	   12	  Emergency	  Response	   9	   1	   	   4	  Energy	  Generation	  and	  Supply	   10	   6	   	   8	  Government	  and	  Civil	  Society	   	   7	   	   5	   9	  Health	   4	   5	   1	   1	  Industry,	  mining	  construction	   2	   3	   6	   8	  Other	  multisector	   1	   4	   4	   6	  Other	  social	  infrastructure	  and	  services	   	   1	   1	   2	   	  Trade	  and	  tourism	   2	   1	   5	   2	  Transport	  and	  storage	   9	   3	   1	   10	  Unallocated	   9	   5	   1	   20	  Water	  supply	  and	  Sanitation	   5	   1	   2	   1	  
Data	  source:	  Aid	  Data	   	  (Some	  amounts	  cannot	  be	  identified	  because	  they	  are	  multinational)	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  In	  Table	  4,	  the	  comparison	  of	  Chinese	  official	  finance	  in	  the	  four	  case	  countries,	  one	   can	   see	   that	   Beijing	   has	   undertaken	   the	   largest	   number	   of	   projects	   in	  Ethiopia	  (91),	  followed	  by	  Sudan	  (71),	  then	  Nigeria	  (46),	  and	  finally	  South	  Africa	  (35).	  Of	  all	  the	  four	  countries,	  the	  largest	  number	  of	  officially-­‐supported	  projects	  were	  in	  the	  education	  sector,	  such	  as	  training	  and	  scholarship,	  the	  construction	  of	   schools	   and	   assistant	   teams	   of	   experts.	   The	   second	   largest	   sector	   was	  infrastructure,	   on	   power	   and	  water	   supply	   (South	   Africa	   is	   an	   exception).	   For	  example,	   loans	   for	   power	   and	   water	   infrastructure.	   Transportation,	   as	   an	  important	  sector	  within	  infrastructure,	  also	  accounted	  for	  a	  large	  percentage	  of	  China’s	  official	  development	  funds.	  In	  contrast,	  industry	  and	  mining	  construction	  was	  not	  a	  major	  sector	  for	  Chinese	  official	  finance.	  At	  the	  governmental	  level,	  aid	  tends	   to	   support	   the	   underdeveloped	   country.	   Among	   the	   four	   countries,	   the	  number	  of	  projects	  were	  in	  accordance	  with	  their	  levels	  of	  development,	  rather	  than	  related	  to	  their	  energy	  reserves	  or	  economic	  importance.	  The	  official	  funds	  were	   mostly	   invested	   in	   non-­‐commercial	   sectors,	   notably	   education,	   which	  implies	  that	  the	  central	  government’s	  funds	  in	  Africa	  were	  provided	  with	  much	  more	   consideration	   for	   expanding	   China’s	   influence	   and	   reputation	   than	  economic	  profits.	  	  Table	   5	   compares	   Chinese	   non-­‐official	   finance	   to	   the	   four	   host	   countries.	   It	  shows	  that	  Chinese	  companies	  have	  invested	  in	  the	  largest	  number	  of	  projects	  in	  Sudan	  (62),	  followed	  by	  South	  Africa	  (31),	  Nigeria	  (25),	  and	  then	  Ethiopia	  (18).	  The	  unofficial	   finance	  particularly	  focused	  on	  industry	  and	  mining	  construction	  sectors:	   for	  example,	   the	  purchase	  of	  oil	   stock,	   the	  construction	  of	  oil	  pipelines	  and	  refinery	  factories,	  and	  also	  the	  training	  of	  petroleum	  specialists.	  It	  revealed	  that	  Chinese	  companies	  have	  a	  particular	  concentration	  on	  the	  energy	  industry.	  The	  unofficial	  finance	  presented	  a	  different	  preference	  in	  countries	  and	  sectors.	  It	   tends	  to	  be	   invested	   in	  the	  energy-­‐rich	  countries,	  with	   less	  competition	  from	  the	  traditional	  multi-­‐national	  corporations.	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  In	   summary,	   China’s	   engagement	   with	   these	   four	   African	   countries	   has	   been	  driven	   by	   different	   motivations	   -­‐	   politically,	   economically	   and	   diplomatically.	  Generally,	   the	   Chinese	   government	   has	   conducted	   a	   similar	   approach	   to	   its	  involvement	   in	   Africa,	   which	   comprises	   unconditional	   foreign	   assistance	   and	  “energy	   for	   infrastructure”.	   At	   the	   governmental	   level,	   there	   is	   no	   obvious	  evidence	   that	   Beijing	   has	   preferred	   to	   support	   pariah	   regimes,	   intentionally	  working	   with	   undemocratic	   states,	   or	   instinctively	   against	   democratic	  governments.	   It	   has	   been	   more	   concerned	   with	   diplomatic	   strategy	   and	   its	  international	   reputation,	   rather	   than	   economic	   benefits.	   This	   result	   also	  responds	  to	  hypothesis	  II	  -­‐	  that	  both	  China’s	  and	  African	  countries’	  needs	  can	  be	  mutually	  beneficial,	  rather	  than	  incompatible.	  While,	  at	  the	  enterprise	  level,	  the	  investment	  has	  been	  more	  concentrated	  on	  energy	  supply	  and	  economic	  profits.	  There	   is	   a	   gap	   between	   Chinese	   officials	   and	   Chinese	   enterprises,	   which	   is	  mentioned	  in	  hypothesis	  III.	  	  
Summary	   	  	  To	   summarise	   Part	   2	   of	   the	   thesis	   and	   the	   discussions	   above,	   there	   are	  supplementary	  notes	  for	  considering	  China’s	  responsibility	  in	  Africa.	  	  Hypothesis	   II	   and	  Hypothesis	   III	   are	   authenticated.	   These	   results	   indicate	   two	  main	  supplementary	  notes	  as	  follows:	  	   (1) Beijing	   could	   find	   more	   common	   ground	   in	   China-­‐Africa	  engagement	  with	   African	   governments	   than	  with	   OECD	   countries,	  no	   matter	   its	   political	   system,	   economic	   development	   status	   and	  energy	  reserves.	  This	  is	  partly	  because	  African	  leaders	  turn	  a	  blind	  eye	   to	   China’s	   negative	   impact,	   in	   return	   for	   generous	   financial	  support.	   It	   is	  also	  partly	   reflected	   in	   the	   fact	   that	  China	  and	  Africa	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have	  similar	  grievances	  regarding	  colonisation	  and	  poverty,	  would	  be	   cautious	   towards	   international	   intervention,	   and	   would	  prioritise	   economic	   development	   over	   political	   and	   governmental	  development.	  (2) The	  western	  media	  tends	  to	  portray	  African	  countries	  as	  victims	  in	  international	   society.	   However,	   most	   African	   governments	   are	  capable	   enough	   to	   leverage	  between	   traditional	  OECD	  donors	   and	  new	  emerging	  donors,	  and	  gain	  benefit	  for	  themselves.	  They	  have	  a	  strong	  willingness	  to	  develop	  an	  African	  agenda,	  rather	  than	  that	  of	  either	   the	  West	   or	   China.	   It	   is	   the	   responsibility	   of	   the	   traditional	  players	   and	   China	   to	   facilitate	   this	   willingness,	   rather	   than	  undermining	  each	  other.	  In	  addition,	  due	  to	  their	  experience	  of	  the	  colonial	  period,	  most	  African	  people	  have	  a	  higher	  awareness	  of	  law,	  regulations	  and	  rules	  than	  their	  Chinese	  counterparts.	  Moreover,	  it	  is	   unrealistic	   to	   devalue	   the	   African	   people’s	   awareness	   of	   their	  right	   to	   self-­‐protection	   because	   of	   their	   economic	  underdevelopment.	   	  	  These	   results	   indicate	   that,	   when	   considering	   whether	   or	   not	   a	   country	   is	  responsible	   to/in	   African	   countries,	   there	   are	   more	   points	   that	   should	   be	  considered.	  	   (1)	  The	  receipt	  country’s	  demands.	  The	  receipt	  country’s	  needs	  and	  conditions	   are	   very	   important	   factors	   in	   the	   assessment	   of	  international	   responsibility.	   When	   evaluating	   China’s	   impact	   on	  Africa,	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   explore	  what	   African	   governments	   need,	  and	   what	   their	   government	   and	   people	   are	   capable	   of.	   Overload	  conditions	  may	  bring	  harm	  rather	  than	  benefit	  to	  a	  fragile	  country.	  	  (2)	   The	   donors’	   capability.	   Traditional	   north-­‐south	   aid	   patterns	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place	   the	   receipt	   country	   in	   a	   vulnerable	   position	   in	   which	   it	   is	  dominated	  by	   the	  donor.	  However,	   this	  unbalanced	  relationship	   in	  favour	  of	  the	  donor	  could	  not	  fully	  explain	  the	  relations	  between	  the	  emerging	  economy	  and	  the	  recipient	  country.	  Hence,	  the	  evaluation	  of	  China	   in	  Africa	  could	  consider	   the	   limitations	   for	   the	  donor	  and	  the	  constraints	  within	  the	  host	  country.	  	  From	   the	   summary	   of	   this	   section,	   I	   can	   confirm	   hypotheses	   as	   accurate/true.	  The	   concept	   of	   international	   reasonability	   is	   still	   developing,	   and	   as	   some	  developing	   countries	   become	   strong	   enough	   to	   support	   other	   countries,	   we	  cannot	   only	   use	   original	   standards	   to	   evaluate	   these	   developing	   supporters.	  There	   are	  more	   points	   that	   need	   to	   be	   considered,	   as	   has	   been	   argued	   in	   this	  summary.	  	  In	   the	   concluding	   chapter,	   this	   thesis	   will	   review	   the	   topic	   of	   the	   thesis,	   the	  summary	  of	  the	  thesis,	  and	  use	  a	  supplementary	  standard	  from	  Chapter	  3,	  which	  was	  also	  authenticated	  in	  discussions	  of	  Parts	  1	  and	  2,	  to	  evaluate	  whether	  China	  is	   a	   responsible	   power	   or	   not.	   Also,	   the	   significance	   of	   the	   thesis	   will	   be	  discussed.	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Chapter	  10	  Conclusion	  and	  Evaluation	   	  
10.1	  Restatement	  of	  the	  topic	  The	   evaluation	   of	   China	   in	   Africa	   is	   a	   broad	   topic	   and	   touches	   all	   elements	   of	  Africa’s	   interests:	   economic,	   diplomatic,	   political,	   technological	   and	  military.	   It	  also	   reveals	   a	   dynamic	   interaction	   among	   the	   interests	   of	   China,	   Africa	   and	  traditional	  players.	  This	  thesis	  does	  not	  explore	  (as	  most	  of	  the	  current	  literature	  has	   explored)	   the	   question:	   ‘are	   current	   Chinese	   actions	   in	   Africa	   converging	  with	   accepted	   international	   norms?’.	   Instead,	   based	   on	   the	   findings	   from	   the	  literature,	  it	  acknowledges	  the	  divergence	  between	  China	  and	  these	  norms,	  goes	  further	   to	   look	   at	   China-­‐Africa	   by	   complementing	   the	   norm	   of	   ‘international	  responsibility’	  with	  the	  developing	  countries’	  perspective,	  and	  sets	  new	  criteria	  for	  the	  assessment.	   	  The	   newly	   established	   criteria	   for	   China-­‐Africa	   responsibility	   acknowledge	   the	  close	   connection	   between	   the	   state’s	   national	   interests	   (and	  motivations)	   and	  ‘being	   responsible’.	   It	   argues	   that	   China’s	   interests	   in	   the	   continent	   are	  compatible	  with	  the	  African	  countries’	  demands,	  and	  there	  is	  space	  to	  cooperate	  with	  the	  traditional	  players.	   	  	  Meanwhile,	  the	  new	  standards	  have	  a	  full	  understanding	  of	  emerging	  countries’	  new	  role	  as	  donor.	  Traditional	  north-­‐south	  patterns	  could	  not	   fully	  explain	   the	  donor-­‐recipient	   relationship	   between	   China	   and	   Africa.	   It	   challenges	   the	  traditional	   assumption	   that	   considers	   Africa	   countries	   as	   a	   victim.	   In	   the	  China-­‐Africa	  political	  context,	  even	  if	  the	  national	  strength	  is	  in	  favour	  of	  China,	  it	  cannot	  be	  denied	   that	  China	   is	   a	  weak	  country	   in	   shouldering	   responsibility	   in	  the	   continent.	   This	   is	   partly	   caused	   by	   Beijing’s	   incapability	   of	   mobilising	   its	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overseas	  agency	  to	  adopt	  the	  central	  strategies	  effectively	  and	  smoothly	  within	  the	   fragmented	  authoritarianism	   framework,	  and	  partly	   caused	  by	   the	  political	  and	  economic	  environment	  within	  the	  host	  recipient	  country.	   	  Based	  on	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  framework	  part,	  and	  the	  case	  studies,	  the	  thesis	  has	  tested	   three	   hypotheses.	   This	   chapter	   will	   first	   restate	   the	   answers	   to	   each	  hypothesis,	   and	   then	  evaluate	  China’s	   responsibility	   accordingly.	  Finally,	   it	  will	  discuss	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  newly	  established	  criteria.	   	   	  
10.2	  Summary	  of	  the	  thesis	  and	  verification	  of	  Hypotheses	  As	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  the	  theory	  of	  international	  responsibility	  argues	  that	  a	  state’s	   responsibility	   policy	   is	   shaped	   by	   three	   influential	   factors:	   national	  interests,	   international	  expectations,	  and	  the	  recipient	  countries’	  demands.	  The	  second	   section	  of	   each	   case	   study	   confirmed	   the	   role	   of	   these	   three	   influential	  factors	   through	   discussing	   China’s	   policy	   towards	   the	   host	   country	   and	   its	  motivations.	   The	   case	   of	   Sudan	   demonstrated	   the	   role	   of	   international	  expectation	   in	   pressuring	   China	   to	   change	   its	   policy,	   and	   the	   case	   of	   Ethiopia	  illustrated	   how	   a	   host	   country’s	   demands	   can	   influence	   the	   of	   shaping	   China’s	  policy.	   These	   two	   cases	   and	   their	   findings	   refute	   the	   criticism	   that	   China’s	  behaviour	   in	  Africa	   is	  not	  responsible	  since	  China	  places	   its	  own	  economic	  and	  political	   interests	   ahead	   of	   the	   African	   societies’	   interest	   in	   development.	  Furthermore,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Nigeria,	  where	  China	  has	  oil	  interests,	  and	  in	  the	  case	  of	  South	  Africa,	  where	  China	  has	  economic	  and	  strategic	  interests,	  these	  two	  countries	   have	   little	   international	   attention,	   even	   if	   China’s	   policy	   in	   the	   host	  country	   is	  mainly	   a	  matter	   of	   China’s	   own	   interests,	   the	   policy	   is	   nevertheless	  designed	  to	  offer	  reciprocal	  benefits	  to	  the	  host	  country.	  	  Chapter	  4	  tested	  hypothesis	  II,	  in	  particular,	  and	  addressed	  the	  research	  problem	  of	   “the	   compatibility	   of	   China’s	   policy	   (and	  motivation	   behind	   it)	   and	   external	  requirements”.	   This	   chapter	   highlighted	   that,	   although	   China’s	   approach	   and	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philosophy	   are	   different	   to	   that	   of	   the	   OECD	   countries,	   it	   doesn’t	   instinctively	  work	   against	   the	   existing	   efforts	  made	   by	   both	   traditional	   players	   and	  African	  governments.	   Even	   the	   most	   controversial	   “non-­‐intervention”	   principle	   has	  evolved	   along	   with	   China’s	   expanding	   diplomatic	   interests.	   And	   Beijing	   has	  showed	   flexibility	   in	   interpreting	   this	   principle	   according	   to	   the	   changing	  situation.	  Apart	   from	  that,	   the	  ways	   in	  which	  China’s	  approach	  differs	   from	  the	  Western	   countries’	   mainly	   lies	   with	   the	   following	   three	   aspects:	   oil	   for	  infrastructure,	  aid	  with	  no-­‐strings	  attached,	  and	  China	  as	  a	  model	  for	  Africa.	  “Oil	  for	   infrastructure”	   was	   introduced	   to	   satisfy	   China’s	   growing	   oil	   thirst,	   while	  providing	  African	  countries’	  infrastructure	  which	  is	  necessary	  for	  their	  economic	  development.	   “Aid	   with	   no-­‐strings	   attached”	   was	   not	   intended	   to	   undermine	  Western	  efforts	  to	  promote	  good	  governance,	  because	  the	  Chinese	  aid	  focuses	  on	  infrastructure	   building,	   which	   means	   there	   is	   not	   much	   cash	   transfer	   to	   the	  African	   governments,	   and	   therefore	   less	   chance	   for	   poor	   aid	   distribution	   and	  corruption.	  Lastly,	  China	  has	  advocated	   that	  all	   the	  countries	   should	  be	   free	   to	  choose	  the	  best	  development	  path	  for	  their	  own	  situation.	  China’s	  development	  path	  only	  provides	  African	  countries	  with	  one	  choice,	  which	  is	  not	  an	  absolute	  or	  the	  only	  alternative	  to	  the	  Western	  way,	  nor	  is	  it	  compulsory	  for	  these	  countries	  to	  follow	  in	  China’s	  footsteps.	  It	   is	  the	  African	  governments’	  right	  to	  choose	  the	  way	  that	  best	  suits	  their	  situation.	  	  Generally,	  the	  policy	  level	  decisions	  are	  compatible	  with	  African’s	  demands,	  and	  do	   not	   always	   contradict	   international	   expectations.	   The	   following	   chapters	  mainly	  explored	  where	  China’s	   irresponsible	  behaviour	   comes	   from.	  Chapter	  5	  investigated	   the	   issues	   from	   China’s	   perspective.	   After	   reviewing	   China’s	  financial	  assistance	  to	  and	  business	  on	  the	  continent,	   it	  argued	  that,	  even	   if	  we	  assume	  China	  has	  a	  policy	  to	  support	  Africa’s	  development,	  one	  has	  to	  consider	  policy	  implementation	  through	  all	  levels	  of	  Chinese	  agencies	  and	  actors.	  In	  terms	  of	   China’s	   aid	   to	   Africa,	   the	   three	  major	  ministries,	  MOFA,	  MOFCOM	   and	   Exim	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Bank,	  each	  with	  separate	  agendas	  and	  priorities,	  have	  affected	  the	  aid	  projects.	  The	   foreign	   aid	   implementer	   (in	   most	   of	   the	   cases,	   this	   refers	   to	   a	   Chinese	  company),	  with	   its	  profit-­‐driven	  agenda	  often	  deviates	   from	   the	   central	  policy.	  Regarding	   Chinese	   business,	   the	   SOEs	   are	   not	   as	   tightly	   controlled	   by	   the	  government	   as	   one	   may	   expect.	   They	   tend	   to	   operate	   in	   the	   host	   country	  according	  to	  local	  situations,	  with	  economic	  considerations,	  rather	  than	  pursuing	  central	  political	  goals.	  The	  private	  companies,	  in	  most	  cases,	  referring	  to	  medium	  and	  small	  companies,	  only	  seek	  economic	  gains	  in	  Africa,	  sometimes	  sacrificing	  environmental	   protection,	   labour	   safety	   and	   welfare,	   and	   returns	   to	   the	   local	  community.	   Some	   small	   traders	   even	   affected	   local	   industry	   by	   exporting	  low-­‐quality	   Chinese	   products.	   In	   summary,	   the	   irresponsible	   behaviour	   of	   all	  these	  actors	   in	  Africa	  has	  had	  an	   impact	  on	  China’s	   international	  responsibility	  as	  a	  whole.	   	  	  In	   the	  case	  studies,	   the	   reason	   to	  China	  not	   fully	   responsible	   from	  African	  side	  was	  discussed.	  These	  chapters	  refuted	  the	  notion	  that	  China	  has	  an	  asymmetric	  strength	  in	  its	  relationships	  with	  African	  countries.	  Its	  responsibility	  in	  the	  host	  country	  is	   largely	  constrained	  by	  the	  political	  and	  economic	  context	  therein.	  As	  for	  Sudan,	   the	  deteriorated	  crisis	  and	   international	  criticism	  failed	  to	  recognise	  China’s	  efforts	  in	  mediation.	  The	  distrust	  from	  international	  society,	  South	  Sudan,	  and	  rebels	  from	  Sudan	  have	  placed	  Beijing	  in	  an	  uncomfortable	  position,	  which	  has	  limited	  its	  capability	  to	  facilitate	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  crisis.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Nigeria,	  the	  changing	  political	  agenda,	  mismanagement	  and	  corruption	  have	  constrained	  the	   tangible	   effects	   of	  China’s	   “oil	   for	   infrastructure”	   approach.	  The	   suspended	  and	   cancelled	   bilateral	   contracts	   have	   negative	   impacts	   for	   both	   Chinese	  companies	  and	  Nigerian	  infrastructure	  construction.	  Regarding	  South	  Africa,	  the	  country	  is	  much	  more	  like	  a	  competitor	  to	  China	  in	  the	  economic	  field.	  Although	  China-­‐South	  Africa	   relations	  enjoy	   close	  political	   cooperation	   in	   advancing	  and	  amplifying	   developing	   countries’	   voice,	   since	   the	   state	   has	   a	   limited	   role	   in	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representing	   the	   continent,	   and	   serves	   as	   a	   gateway	   to	   access	   other	   African	  countries,	   China’s	   contribution	   to	   the	   country	   is	   not	   as	   much	   as	   to	   other	  underdeveloped	  African	   countries.	   In	   contrast,	   in	   Ethiopia,	  where	   there	   is	   less	  international	   attention	   and	   not	   much	   in	   the	   way	   of	   resource	   reserves	   and	  economic	   opportunity,	   Beijing	   has	   provided	   considerable	   financial	   assistance	  and	  gained	  positive	  feedback	  from	  the	  host	  country.	   	  The	   discussion	   of	   the	   previous	   chapters	   has	   revealed	   that	   the	   evaluation	   of	  China’s	   responsibility	   should	   employ	   broader	   criteria,	   relating	   to	   China’s	  capability	   and	   Africa’s	   situation.	   It	   echoes	   the	   theoretical	   chapter’s	   argument	  that	   “the	   term	   ‘international	   responsibility	   is	   flawed	   because	   it	   does	   not	   take	  account	   of	   the	   developing	   countries’	   perspectives,	   such	   as,	   state’s	   capability	   in	  shouldering	   responsibility,	   and	   the	   varied	   character	   of	   states’	   interaction	   on	  economic	  development.”	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  assessment	  should	  be	  conducted	  on	  the	  basis	   of	   the	   criteria	   that	   reflect	   Chinese	   and	   African	   views	   as	   well	   as	   the	  perception	   do	   those	   in	   the	   West.	   It	   supplements	   the	   traditional,	   Western	  understanding	  of	  international	  responsibility,	  and	  provides	  for	  a	  more	  balanced	  understanding	  in	  the	  China-­‐Africa	  context.	   	  
10.3	  Evaluating	  China’s	  responsibility	  in	  Africa	   	  From	  the	  preceding	  discussion	  and	  verification	  of	   the	  hypotheses	  and	  research	  questions,	  the	  thesis	  has	  suggested	  that	  China	  and	  its	  subjects’	  capacity,	  African	  countries’	   various	   contexts	   and	   demands	   are	   indispensable	   factors	   for	  consideration	   when	   evaluating	   the	   question	   of	   whether	   or	   not	   China	   is	   a	  responsible	  player	  in	  Africa,	  or	  what	  extend	  China	  has	  been	  responsible	  to	  Africa,	  and	  to	  what	  extend	  it	  has	  not.	  Combing	  through	  the	  discussion	  in	  the	  framework	  part	  and	  case	  studies,	  the	  evaluation	  of	  this	  question	  will	  be	  conducted	  according	  to	  the	  five	  criteria	  analysed	  in	  Chapter	  3:	  1)	  good	  governance	  2)	  expression;	  3)	  capability	  and	  behaviour;	  4)	   consequences	  and	   impact;	  5)	   feedback.	  These	   five	  standards	   have	   been	   discussed	   in	   the	   preceding	   chapters	   in	   order	   to	   present	  their	  importance	  and	  the	  dynamics	  among	  each	  items.	  The	  following	  section	  will	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analyse	  the	  five	  criteria	  and	  place	  them	  in	  the	  political	  and	  economic	  context	  of	  China-­‐Africa	  relations.	   	  
10.3.1	  Good	  Governance	  The	  first	  criterion	  was	  the	  basic	  requirement	  of	  a	  ruling	  government.	  As	  a	  ruling	  party,	   the	   CCP’s	   legitimacy	  was	   believed	   to	   be	   built	   upon	   “an	   unwritten	   social	  contract	  between	  the	  party	  and	  the	  people,	  whereby	  the	  people	  do	  not	  compete	  with	  the	  party	  for	  political	  power	  as	  long	  as	  the	  party	  looks	  after	  their	  economic	  fortunes”	   (Breslin,	   2005:	   749).	   Chinese	   political	   discourse	   considers	   the	  successful	   poverty	   reduction,	   enhancement	   of	   Chinese	   people’s	   welfare,	  maintaining	  economic	  growth,	  and	  safeguarding	  sovereignty	  and	  territory	  as	  the	  basis	   of	   being	   responsible.	   However,	   in	   reality,	   the	   Chinese	   government	   has	  serious	   corruption	  and	   transparency	  problems,	   and	  a	  wealth	  gap	  between	   rich	  and	   poor,	   rural	   and	   urban	   areas,	   along	   with	   its	   economic	   growth.	   This	  unbalanced	  political	  and	  economic	  structure	  has	  brought	  China	  a	  dual	  identity	  in	  front	  of	  Africa:	  strong	  economic	  development	  and	  weak	  governance.	  As	  a	  result,	  even	   if	   we	   cannot	   deny	   the	   fact	   that	   China	   has	   already	   become	   an	   important	  player	  in	  this	  continent,	  there	  are	  always	  doubts	  about	  how	  China	  could	  benefit	  Africa	  without	  solving	  its	  own	  problems.	   	  On	   the	   other	   side,	   even	   if	   we	   assume	   the	   Chinese	   government’s	   economic	  performance	  shows	   that	   it	  has	  made	  commitments	   to	  Africa,	   it	  depends	  on	   the	  host	  country	  to	   fully	   take	  advantage	  of	   these	  efforts.	  However,	  the	  host	  African	  governments	  are	  not	  always	  responsible,	  as	  most	  of	  the	  governments	  have	  issues	  with	  legitimacy.	  Even	  as	  the	  most	  developed	  state	  on	  the	  continent,	  South	  Africa	  has	   suffers	   from	   serious	   corruption,	   violence,	   and	   an	   imbalanced	   national	  income	  distribution	  system.	   	  This	  criterion	  is	  not	  directly	  relevant	  to	  the	  evaluation	  of	  China’s	  responsibility	  in	  Africa,	  but	  it	  does	  provide	  a	  baseline	  to	  figure	  out	  China-­‐Africa	  problems	  and	  reveals	   that,	   since	   both	   the	   donor	   and	   the	   recipient	   	   country	   government	   are	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not	   always	   responsible,	   China’s	   capability	   to	   be	   responsible	   or	   not	   in	   Africa	   is	  largely	  affected	  or	  it	  could	  say	  this	  borne	  deficient.	   	  
10.3.2	  Expression	  Due	  to	  differences	   in	   their	  respective	  political	  systems	  and	   interests,	  China	  has	  held	   a	   different	   approach	   to	   that	   of	   the	   traditional	   players,	   when	   it	   comes	   to	  engaging	  with	  Africa.	  Even	  though	  it	  does	  not	  conform	  to	  some	  of	  the	  accepted	  criteria	   of	   international	   responsibility	   deployed	   by	   OECD	   states,	   it	   shares	   the	  similar	   goals	   of	   African	   development	   with	   international	   expectation,	   and	   also	  serving	  African	  countries’	  demands.	  To	  some	  extent,	   it	  can	  be	  an	  effective	  actor	  in	  promoting	  Africa’s	  development	  and	  a	  cooperator	  with	  international	  efforts.	   	  	   	  The	   crisis	   in	   Africa	   could	   be	   sorted	   into	   three	   categories:	   namely	   security,	  governance,	   and	   economy.	   In	   response	   to	   the	   security	   crisis	   in	   Africa,	   the	  traditional	   OECD	   countries	   employed	   sanctions,	   embargoes,	   and	   joint	   military	  intervention.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   Sudan,	   the	   Western	   countries	   have	   imposed	   a	  comprehensive	   trade	   embargo	   and	   blocked	   the	   Sudanese	   government’s	   assets.	  They	  called	  for	  international	  intervention	  in	  Sudan	  due	  to	  Khartoum’s	  violations	  of	   human	   rights,	   and	   international	   humanitarian	   law	   in	   Sudan’s	  Darfur	   region,	  and	   also	   the	   war	   with	   South	   Sudan.	   In	   contrast,	   China	   preferred	   to	   pursue	   a	  diplomatic	  and	  economic	  approach	  to	  protect	  its	  overseas	  assets.	  They	  hold	  that	  the	  ultimate	  reasons	  for	  Sudan’s	  crises	  are	  conflicts	  of	  interest.	  China	  preferred	  the	   provision	   of	   positive	   assistance	   over	   the	   imposition	   of	   sanctions.	   Beijing	  doubted	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   sanctions	   in	   solving	   the	   crisis	   in	   underdeveloped	  countries.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  China	  believed	  that	  the	  solution	  to	  the	  crisis	  lay	  with	  providing	   economic	   welfare	   to	   the	   local	   people,	   as	   Witness	   23	   and	   24	  emphasised.	   Considering	   the	   extent	   of	   poverty	   in	   Africa,	   the	   right	   to	  development	   is	   uppermost	   on	   Africa’s	   agenda.	   Government	   sanctions	   would	  harm	  the	  lives	  of	  its	  citizens.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  thought	  that	  neither	  military	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intervention,	   nor	   sanctions	  were	   the	   final	   solution.	   In	   order	   to	  maintain	   peace	  and	  stability,	  the	  people	  needed	  tangible	  progress.	  Witness	  3	  argued	  that	  China’s	  cautious	   approach	   towards	   international	   intervention	   and	   sanctions	   does	   not	  necessarily	   mean	   it	   placed	   its	   own	   national	   interests	   ahead	   of	   international	  responsibility,	  because	  peace	  and	  stability	  in	  Africa	  benefits	  China	  and	  all	  other	  countries.	  There	  is	  no	  strong	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  that	  intervention	  and	  sanctions	  could	   work	   in	   solving	   Africa’s	   crises.	   Instead,	   improper	   intervention	   has	   the	  danger	  of	  potentially	  leaving	  the	  poor	  country	  in	  a	  state	  of	  chaos.	   	  	  In	  terms	  of	  expression	  (policy)	  in	  Africa,	  China	  has	  a	  different	  foreign	  strategy	  to	  that	   of	  Western	   countries.	   It	   places	   economic	  development	   in	   front	   of	   political	  and	  governance	  improvement.	  Prioritising	  the	  economy	  is	  not	  necessarily	  being	  irresponsible	   towards	   African	   countries:	   it	   can	   bring	   effective	   and	   tangible	  achievements	   to	   the	   country,	   but	   it	  may	   also	   support	   corruption,	   dictatorship,	  and	   mismanagement,	   since	   the	   African	   countries	   themselves	   are	   not	   fully	  responsible	  states.	  To	  further	  explore	  China’s	  responsibility	  in	  Africa,	  one	  should	  recognise	  that	  the	  key	  to	  assessing	  China’s	  responsibility	  in	  Africa	  is	  not	  whether	  it	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  traditional	  donors,	  but	  instead	  one	  also	  needs	  to	  look	  at	  its	  impact	  on	  the	  host	  country.	   	  
10.3.3	  Capability	  and	  Behaviour	  When	  talking	  about	  China	  in	  Africa,	  we	  are	  actually	  talking	  about	  a	   fragmented	  China	  confronted	  by	  a	  diversified	  Africa.	  China	  has	  more	  national	  strength	  than	  the	  four	  case	  countries.	  However,	  economic	  strength	  cannot	  be	  fully	  transferred	  to	  shoulder	  responsibility.	  As	  Witness	  21	  said,	   	  “China’s	   activities	   in	   the	   host	   countries	   are	   strictly	   constrained	   by	   local	  regulation	   and	   environment.	   What	   if	   the	   host	   country	   itself	   is	   not	   fully	  responsible?”	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Therefore	  ,	  it	  requires	  analysis	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis,	  comparing	  capability	  and	  behaviour	   in	   the	   response	   to	   common	   criticisms.	   Generally,	   the	   criticisms	   of	  China’s	  engagement	  with	  Africa	  include:	   	  1 China’s	   “non-­‐interference”	   principle	   provides	   a	   shield	   for	   the	   dictators.	   It	  provides	  them	  with	  an	  alternative	  source	  of	  financial	  support	  and	  undermines	  Western	  countries’	  efforts	  to	  promote	  democracy	  and	  human	  rights	  in	  Africa.	   	  2 China	  has	  aggressively	  scrambled	  for	  energy	  and	  other	  resources	  in	  Africa.	  3 The	   overwhelming	   flood	   of	   Chinese	   products	   and	   Chinese	   businesses	   into	  certain	  countries	  has	  destroyed	  local	  industry,	  increased	  unemployment,	  and	  violated	   local	   environmental	   protections,	   labour	   force	   protections	   and	   also	  working	  conditions.	  4 China	  is	  not	  a	  good	  model	  for	  Africa’s	  development.	  	  The	  four	  case	  countries	  have	  evaluated	  the	  four	  main	  criticisms.	   	  	  1.“Non-­‐interference”	  Principle	   	  Sudan:	   China’s	   African	   policy	   is	   flexible	   and	   pragmatic	   in	   accordance	   with	  China’s	  national	   strategy	  and	  agenda	  as	  a	  whole.	  The	  Chinese	   interpretation	  of	  “non-­‐interference”	   is	   evolving	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   changing	   situation	   in	   other	  countries.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Sudan,	  China	  developed	  its	  “non-­‐interference”	  principle	  in	  response	  to	  the	  deteriorating	  situation	  in	  Sudan,	  and	  in	  the	  face	  of	  increasing	  international	   pressures.	   But,	   unfortunately,	   China’s	   capability	   in	   persuading	  Bashir	   regime	   is	   limited	   and	   the	  oppositions	   in	   Sudan	  and	   in	   the	   international	  community	  have	  failed	  to	  recognise	  China’s	  evolving	  stance.	   	  	  China’s	  attitude	  towards	  “non-­‐interference”	  principle	  reveals	  that	  the	  principle	  is	  no	   longer	   an	   obstacle	   to	   China	   shouldering	   international	   responsibility.	   The	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motivation	   behind	   the	   principle	   plays	   a	   more	   important	   role	   in	   determining	  China’s	   stance.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   Sudan,	   China’s	   primary	   concern	   is	   to	   protect	   its	  economic	   interests.	  On	  one	  hand,	   this	   inevitably	   requires	  a	   stable	  and	  peaceful	  environment.	  This	  aim	  is	  consistent	  with	  international	  expectations.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	   it	   is	  cautious	  to	  use	  sanctions	  on	  the	  host	  country,	  as	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  sanction	   is	  doubt.	  The	  second	  concern	   in	  Sudan	   is	   that	  of	  China’s	   international	  reputation:	   the	   international	   community	   expects	   China	   to	   be	   more	   active	   in	  pressuring	   the	   regime.	   As	   has	   been	   mentioned,	   China’s	   national	   interest	   of	  overseas	  economic	  safety	  requires	  peace	  and	  stability	  in	  the	  host	  country.	  But,	  it	  has	   a	   particular	   emphasis	   on	   the	   attitudes	   of	   the	   host	   country	   and	   regional	  organisations.	   It	   is	  worth	  noting	   that,	  when	  comparing	   the	   four	  case	  countries,	  China	   has	   not	   been	   particularly	   supportive	   of	   the	   undemocratic	   countries,	   nor	  the	  nations	  with	  bad	  human	  rights	  record.	  Its	  attitude	  towards	  African	  conflicts	  is	  based	  on	  a	  calculation	  of	  economic	  interests,	  international	  reputation,	  and	  the	  national	  strategy.	   	  With	  China’s	  growing	  connections	  with	  pariah	  governments,	  it	  is	  impossible	  for	  Beijing	  to	  escape	  from	  involvement	  in	  the	  resolution	  of	  local	  conflicts	  and	  crises.	  Such	   involvement	   is	   in	   the	   interests	   of	   both	   China	   and	   international	   society.	  Currently,	  China	  has	  showed	  progress	   in	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	   ‘non-­‐interference’	  principle,	  by	  pressuring	  dictators	  and	  sending	  a	  peacekeeping	   force.	  But	   it	   still	  has	  a	  long	  way	  to	  go	  towards	  being	  responsible	  in	  Africa.	  Even	  if	  we	  assume	  that	  China	   places	   Africa’s	   economic	   development	   in	   front	   of	   other	   aspects	   of	   its	  development,	   Beijing	   still	   needs	   to	   make	   a	   comprehensive	   evaluation	   of	   their	  financial	  flow	  and	  avoid	  the	  negative	  impact	  for	  local	  people.	   	   	  2.	  “Oil	  for	  infrastructure”	   	  Nigeria:	   China	   has	   conducted	   the	   “oil	   for	   infrastructure”	   approach	   in	   most	  energy-­‐rich	   countries.	   The	   approach	   was	   designed	   to	   secure	   China’s	   energy	  safety	   and	   to	   pay	   back	   African	   countries	   through	   infrastructure	   construction.	  Witness	  3	  has	   explained	   that,	   not	   paying	  money	   to	  African	   governments	   could	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prevent	  the	  abuse	  of	  oil	  income	  and	  improve	  conditions	  in	  African	  countries.	  The	  effectiveness	   of	   “oil	   for	   infrastructure”	   in	   African	   countries	   is	   determined	   by	  three	  criteria:	  the	  first	  is	  the	  host	  country’s	  capacity	  -­‐	  that	  is,	  to	  what	  extend	  the	  host	  country	  needs	  infrastructure.	  Considering	  the	  development	  status	  in	  Africa,	  most	   of	   a	   country’s	   economic	   development	   is	   constrained	   by	   insufficient	  infrastructure.	   Generally,	   the	   infrastructure	   agreements	   fulfil	   the	   demands	   of	  African	  countries.	  The	  second	  criterion	  relates	  to	  the	  distribution	  of	  oil	   income.	  In	   the	   case	   of	   Nigeria,	   the	   government	   has	   a	   changing	   agenda	   for	   using	   its	   oil	  income,	  Beijing	  is	  required	  to	  adjust	  its	  approach	  to	  meet	  the	  shifting	  demands	  of	  Nigeria’s	  oil	  distribution.	  The	  third	  criterion	  is	  who	  will	  enjoy	  the	  achievements.	   	  China’s	   foreign	  assistance	   concentrates	  on	   infrastructure	   construction,	   a	   sector	  in	  which	  traditional	  players	  are	  less	  interested	  and	  that	  is	  complementary	  to	  the	  foreign	   aid	   from	   OECD	   countries.	   Moreover,	   the	   projects,	   such	   as	   highways,	  railways,	  power	  supplies	  and	  public	  buildings,	  provide	  an	  African	  country	  with	  visible	  contributions	  and,	  to	  some	  extent,	  avoid	  the	  corruption	  that	  goes	  with	  a	  cash	  transfer.	  However,	   the	   turnkey	  projects	  make	   little	  effort	   to	   train	  Africans	  and	   build	   local	   capacity.	   There	   have	   been	   complaints	   that	   Chinese	   companies	  import	   an	   unskilled	   Chinese	   labour	   force	   from	   home	   to	   build	   their	   projects,	  rather	   than	   finding	  a	   local	  partner	  or	  hiring	   local	  people.	  Although	  the	  Chinese	  side	  have	  argued	  that	  these	  problems	  are	  due	  to	  the	  poor	  competitiveness	  of	  the	  African	   labour	   force,	   Beijing	   cannot	   escape	   from	   the	   responsibility	   of	   training	  African	  employees	  and	  providing	  them	  with	  good	  and	  safe	  working	  conditions.	   	  At	   the	   same	   time,	  providing	   infrastructure	  does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	   that	   it	   is	  possible	  to	  compensate	  for	  the	  negative	  effects	  of	  Chinese	  oil	  companies	  on	  the	  local	   community.	   As	   was	   discussed	   in	   Chapter	   5,	   China	   lacks	   an	   independent	  agency	   to	   evaluate	   its	   overseas	   projects,	   especially	   in	   the	   highly	   sensitive	   oil	  industry,	  where	  an	   improper	  decision	  may	  harm	  both	   the	   interests	  of	   the	   local	  community,	  and	  the	  safety	  of	  Chinese	  assets	  and	  workers.	  As	  China	  has	  become	  involved	   in	   oil	   fields	   that	   were	   considered	   too	   risky	   for	   western	   investors,	   it	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requires	  Chinese	  companies	  to	  be	  very	  cautious	  towards	  their	  actions	  in	  the	  host	  community.	   	  In	  short,	  “oil	  for	  infrastructure”	  itself	  is	  neither	  responsible	  nor	  irresponsible.	  It	  is	   designed	   to	   mutually	   benefit	   for	   both	   sides.	   In	   reality,	   it	   requires	   African	  governments	   and	   the	  Chinese	   government	   to	  work	   together	   to	   better	   evaluate	  infrastructure	  projects	  and	  ensure	  the	  programs	  benefit	  local	  people,	  rather	  than	  act	  as	  a	  vanity	  symbol	  for	  the	  government.	  	  3.“Chinese	  Overwhelming	  Presence	  to	  destroy	  local	  industry”	  South	   Africa:	   When	   considering	   Chinese	   businesses	   (mainly	   in	   the	  manufacturing	  industry)	  and	  Chinese	  labour	  force’s	  impact	  to	  local	  economy	  and	  working	  opportunity,	  one	  should	  first	  compare	  the	  host	  country	  with	  China.	  The	  Chinese	  could	  only	  replace	  the	   industrial	  supply	  chain	  of	  a	  host	  country	   if	   they	  have	   comparable	   manufacturing	   strengths.	   Similarly,	   people	   who	   can	   replace	  African	  workers	  must	   have	   the	   same	   capability.	   Therefore,	   in	   order	   to	   analyse	  whether	   a	   Chinese	   business	   has	   destroyed	   local	   industry,	   or	   if	   it	   has	   brought	  investment	   and	   work	   opportunities,	   one	   should	   have	   a	   look	   at	   whether	   the	  industry	   is	   competitive	  with	   its	   Chinese	   counterparts.	   Take	   South	  Africa	   as	   an	  example:	   the	   country	   has	   the	   most	   powerful	   capability	   in	   the	   continent.	   The	  country	  welcomes	  Chinese	  big	  multinationals,	  but	  remains	  concerned	  about	  the	  aggressive	   competition	   from	   medium	   and	   small	   businesses.	   South	   Africa	   is	   a	  typical	   example	   of	   an	   African	   country:	   they	   hope	   to	   receive	   more	   investment	  from	  China	  to	  fuel	  their	  economies,	  but	  are	  afraid	  of	  Chinese	  people	  stealing	  their	  jobs.	  With	  regards	  to	  this	  situation,	  Witness	  11	  said,	  regretfully,	  “We	   would	   like	   to	   hire	   more	   local	   employees,	   no	   matter	   in	   technical,	  management	   or	   labouring,	   because	   it	   is	   the	   most	   economic	   way	   for	   our	  company.	  But	  the	  quality	  of	  African	  working	  force	  is	  not	  as	  good	  as	  Chinese.	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In	   order	   to	   ensure	   the	   project	   finishing	   on	   time,	   we	   have	   to	   hire	   Chinese	  workers.”	  Witness	   20	   has	   also	   expressed	   willingness	   to	   transfer	   the	   supply	   chains	   to	  African	   countries,	   rather	   than	   importing	  Chinese	   goods	   from	  China,	   due	   to	   the	  labour	   and	   transportation	   costs.	   But	   he	   also	   complained	   that	   the	   backward	  infrastructure	  in	  Africa	  prevented	  Chinese	  companies	  from	  transferring	  their	  full	  production	  lines	  to	  local	  countries.	  To	  evaluate	  Chinese	  business’s	  impact	  on	  the	  host	  African	  countries,	  one	  should	  divide	   Chinese	   investment	   and	   Chinese	   goods.	   The	   investment	   is	   generally	  welcomed	   by	   the	   host	   country,	   and	   both	   the	   literature	   and	   interviewees	   have	  offered	  an	  optimistic	  expectation	  that	  Chinese	  investment	  would	  bring	  a	  “flying	  goose”	   model,	   which	   Would	   transfer	   its	   labour-­‐intensive	   industry	   to	   Africa,	  thereby	   increasing	   local	   employment	   opportunities	   and	   upgrade	   China’s	  industry.	   But	   the	   overwhelming	   flood	   of	   Chinese	   goods	   not	   only	   destroys	   the	  uncompetitive	   local	   industry,	   but	   also	   take	   away	   local	   people’s	   work	  opportunities.	   The	   case	   in	   South	   Africa	   reveals	   that,	   although	   Beijing	   has	  launched	   methods	   to	   promote	   cooperation	   between	   Chinese	   companies	   and	  African	  partners,	  while	  regulating	  the	  export	  of	   low	  quality	  products	  to	  African	  markets,	  the	  fundamental	  reasons	  for	  these	  problems	  have	  not	  been	  solved.	  The	  overwhelming	   Chinese	   business	   and	   products	   are	   caused	   by	   Beijing’s	   loose	  control	   of	   the	   illegal	   business	  practice	   of	   state-­‐own	  enterprises,	   and	   small	   and	  medium-­‐sized	  companies.	  As	  Beijing	  does	  not	  have	  a	  sound	  supervision	  system	  to	   monitor	   its	   enterprises,	   those	   enterprises	   have	   brought	   bad	   operation	  practices	   and	   low	   quality	   products	   to	   Africa.	   Moreover,	   it	   is	   Beijing’s	  responsibility	  to	  regulate	  its	  companies	  and	  avoid	  the	  negative	  impact	  on	  African	  markets.	   	   	  4.China	  as	  a	  model	   	  Ethiopia:	   China,	   with	   its	   successful	   economic	   achievements,	   has	   long	   been	  discussed	   as	   a	   developmental	   model	   for	   African	   countries.	   Most	   of	   the	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interviewees	  did	  not	  agree	  with	  the	  idea	  that	  China’s	  development	  path	  could	  be	  considered	  as	  a	  model.	  As	  Witness	  22	  said,	   	  “We	  do	  not	   attach	   conditions	   to	   finance	  African	   countries,	  we	   just	   provide	  them	  choices.	  The	  African	  people	  can	  choose	  the	  way	  they	  want	  and	  the	  way	  that	   suits	   them.	   They	   are	   free	   to	   learn	   the	   advantages	   of	   China’s	  development	  path	  while	  ignoring	  the	  disadvantages.”	  And	  Witness	  23	  holds	  that,	   	  “What	   African	   countries	   need	   is	   not	   only	   democratisation,	   but	   also	   state	  building,	   political	   system	   construction	   and	   stability	   to	   maintain	   the	  democracy.”	   	  China’s	  economic	  development	  is	  attractive	  to	  African	  countries	  and	  the	  African	  people,	   but	   the	   adaptability	   of	   the	   Chinese	   way	   to	   any	   Africa	   country	   is	  questionable.	  China	   itself	  has	  suffered	  from	  negative	  side	  effects	  resulting	  from	  its	  impressive,	  fast-­‐paced	  development.	  For	  the	  Chinese,	  they	  only	  recognize	  that	  their	  way	  of	  development	  provides	  a	  choice	  for	  Africa,	  but	  they	  would	  not	  force	  another	   country	   to	   follow	   their	   example.	   Nor	   would	   China	   favour	   another	  country	  who	  followed	  a	  similar	  developmental	  path	  over	  another	  who	  did	  not.	  It	  is	   African	   countries’	   responsibility	   to	   distinguish	   which	   way	   best	   suits	   their	  agenda	  and	  situation.	  
10.3.4	  Consequences	  and	  Impact	  Africa’s	   voice	   is	   always	   absent	   from	   the	   current	   literature	   on	   China-­‐Africa	  engagement.	   As	   the	   working	   paper	   Afrobarometer	   suggests,	   ‘the	   negative	  rhetoric	  emanating	  from	  much	  of	  the	  surrounding	  literature	  tells	  only	  part	  of	  the	  story’,	   (Gadzala	   and	   Hanusch,	   January	   2010)	   and	   African	   perceptions	   of	  China-­‐Africa	   are	   not	   equivalent	   to	   those	   they	   have	   of	   western	   countries.	  Generally,	  Africans	  hold	  positive	  views	  of	  China’s	  presence	   in	  Africa.	  According	  to	   a	   Pew	   Survey	   (Table	   10.1),	   although	   the	   data	   for	   the	   four	   countries	   is	  incomplete,	  the	  trend	  is	  that	  most	  African	  countries	  hold	  relatively	  more	  positive	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attitudes	   towards	  China	   than	   towards	   the	  US	  and	  France.	  However,	   along	  with	  China’s	   deep	   involvement,	   the	   number	   of	   people	   who	   are	   favourable	   towards	  China	  is	  declining	  slightly,	   	  	  
Table	  10.1	  Pew	  Survey	  for	  African	  countries	  opinion	  to	  China	  
Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable 
















 	   Spring 2007 19 48 22 6 5 67 28 
Nigeria 
 	   Spring 2013 38 38 7 4 13 76 11 
 	   Spring 2010 37 39 11 4 8 76 15 
S. Africa 
 	   Spring 2013 18 30 21 22 9 48 43 
 	   Spring 2008 10 27 21 30 12 37 51 
Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable 
opinion of... the United States [844] 
Ethiopia 
 	   Spring 2007 41 36 14 8 1 77 22 
Nigeria 
 	   Spring 2013 38 31 12 8 12 69 20 
 	   Spring 2010 49 32 9 5 5 81 14 
S. Africa 
 	   Spring 2013 43 29 10 10 7 72 20 
 	   Spring 2008 28 32 8 16 16 60 24 
 	   Summer 
2002 
31 34 9 19 8 65 28 
Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable 
opinion of... Japan [866] 
Ethiopia 
 	   Spring 2007 40 41 5 3 10 81 8 
S. Africa 
 	   Spring 2008 10 29 15 24 22 39 39 
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Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable 
opinion of... France [859] 
Nigeria 
 	   Spring 2013 14 37 13 12 25 51 25 
 	  
S. Africa 
 	   Spring 2013 14 30 19 18 19 44 37 
 Source:	  Pew	  Research	  A	   survey	   of	   250	   African	   university	   students	   and	   faculty	   in	   nine	   countries	  (including	  the	  four	  case	  countries)	  also	  illustrated	  this	  relatively	  positive	  attitude.	  Table	   10.2	   shows	   the	   results	   for	   the	   four	   case	   countries	   and	   the	   four	   targeted	  Chinese	  approaches.	   	  
Table	  10.2	  Africa’s	  attitudes	  towards	  China	  in	  Africa	  1)	  For	  Africa,	  China	  policy	  of	  “non-­‐interference”	  is	  
Country	   A	  good	  policy	  %	   Basically	  good,	  but	  with	  some	  problems	  %	  
More	  harmful	  than	  good	  %	   Quite	  harmful	  %	   Don't’	  know	  %	  
Sudan	   43.2	   33.6	   8.0	   4.8	   10.4	  
Nigeria	   17.3	   31.0	   14.7	   12.7	   24.4	  
South	  Africa	   12.2	   31.0	   19.8	   13.2	   23.9	  
Ethiopia	   14.3	   50.5	   16.3	   11.2	   7.7	  
2)	  Some	  people	  say	  China	  practises	  Neo-­‐Colonialism	  in	  Africa	  
Country	   Strongly	  agree	  %	  
Agree	  %	   Neutral	  %	   Disagree	  %	   Strongly	  disagree	  %	   Don’t	  know	  %	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Sudan	   5.2	   8.7	   19.4	   43.7	   16.7	   6.3	  
Nigeria	   5.1	   10.8	   28.7	   24.6	   5.1	   25.6	  
South	  Africa	   2.0	   4.1	   42.9	   29.1	   8.7	   13.3	  
Ethiopia	   6.2	   14.4	   25.8	   32.5	   13.4	   7.7	  
3)	   Satisfaction	   with	   Chinese	   companies	   that	   work	   on	   large	   projects	   in	   my	  country	  
Country	   Very	  satisfied	  %	   Satisfied	  %	   Neutral	  %	   Dissatisfied	  %	   Very	  dissatisfied%	  
Sudan	   23.1	   48.6	   17.1	   7.2	   4.0	  
Nigeria	   12.2	   44.4	   33.2	   9.2	   1.0	  
South	  Africa	   0.6	   19.3	   79.5	   0.6	   0	  
Ethiopia	   13.0	   54.4	   20.7	   9.3	   2.6	  
4)	  My	  view	  of	  Chinese	  Small	  Businesses	  in	  my	  country	  is	  that	   	  
Country	   Help	  with	  local	  Economic	  development	  %	  
Help	  but	  also	  a	  source	  of	  problems%	  
Are	  not	  helpful	  to	  local	  economic	  development	  %	  
Generally	  harm	  the	  interests	  of	  local	  people	  %	  
Don't’	  know	  %	  
Sudan	   38.7	   28.4	   14.0	   10.7	   8.2	  
Nigeria	   44.7	   28.4	   12.2	   8.1	   6.6	  
South	  Africa	   24.4	   51.3	   6.1	   5.1	   13.2	  
Ethiopia	   40.2	   40.7	   6.2	   7.7	   5.2	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Source:	  Sautman	  and	  Yan,	  2009	  The	  results	  of	  the	  survey	  refuted	  the	  idea	  that	  only	  a	  few	  members	  of	  the	  African	  political	  elite	  are	  positive	  about	  China-­‐Africa	  links.	  The	  majority	  of	  people	  hold	  a	  positive	   attitude	   towards	   China-­‐Africa	   political	   and	   economic	   connections.	   On	  the	   controversial	   topics	   (China’s	   non-­‐interference	   principle,	   China	   as	   a	  neo-­‐coloniser,	  the	  overwhelming	  Chinese	  business	  in	  Africa),	  African	  people	  hold	  a	  positive	  or	  neutral	  role,	  which	  differs	  from	  the	  criticism	  in	  the	  western	  media.	   	  	  If	  we	  make	  a	  comparison	  among	  the	  four	  countries	  considered	  as	  case	  studies	  for	  this	  thesis,	  the	  findings	  show	  that	  the	  four	  African	  governments	  welcome	  a	  close	  relationship	  with	  Beijing,	  and	  the	  Chinese	  investment	  and	  financial	  support	  that	  come	  with	   it.	  Their	  greatest	  concern	   is	   the	   impact	  of	  Chinese	  products	  on	   local	  industry.	   The	   more	   powerful	   the	   economic	   development	   status	   of	   the	   African	  country	  is,	  the	  more	  likely	  it	  is	  that	  China’s	  threat	  to	  local	  business	  raises	  anxiety.	  All	  governments	  welcome	  China’s	  ‘non-­‐interference’	  stance,	  but	  they	  do	  not	  have	  a	  romantic	  view	  towards	  China.	  As	  in	  the	  African	  views	  mentioned	  in	  the	  cases	  of	  Nigeria	   and	   Ethiopia,	   the	   officials	   have	   distinguished	   between	   China	   as	   an	  ‘economic	  model’	  and	  China	  as	  a	  ‘political	  model’.	  They	  expressed	  appreciation	  of	  China’s	  economic	  success,	  while	  rejecting	  China’s	  experience	  of	  development	  by	  sacrificing	  social	  fairness	  and	  political	  freedom.	   	   	  The	  public	   opinion	   survey	   reveals	   that	   the	   countries	  with	   a	   better	   governance	  performance	   and	   democratic	   system	   tend	   to	   have	   higher	   dissatisfaction	   with	  China’s	  presence.	  This	  shows	  that	  a	  close	  governmental	  relationship	  could	   lead	  to	  a	  friendlier	  attitude	  among	  African	  people.	  As	  Table	  10.1	  indicates,	  the	  African	  people’s	   satisfaction	   declines	   with	   China’s	   expansion.	   The	   Afrobarometer	   has	  given	  the	  answer	  to	  African	  people’s	  concerns,	  as	  Africans	  are	   ‘wary	  of	  Chinese	  influence,	   particularly	   when	   human	   rights	   and	   multi-­‐party	   elections	   are	   of	  concern’	  (Gadzala	  and	  Hanusch,	  January	  2010).	  In	  terms	  of	  the	  economic	  factor,	  it	   indicates	   that	   African	   people	   are	   at	   ease	   with	   China’s	   large	   projects	   and	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investment.	   What	   concerns	   them	   the	   most	   is	   similar	   to	   the	   findings	   of	   the	  existing	  literature:	  that	  is,	  China’s	  imports	  of	  Chinese	  labour	  and	  products,	  which	  are	   threatening	   the	   local	   industry	   and	  working	   opportunities	   that	   provide	   the	  livelihood	  of	  the	  majority	  of	  African	  people.	   	  
10.3.5	  International	  Feedback	  International	   society	   is	  not	  as	  optimistic	  as	  are	   the	  African	  people.	  They	  doubt	  the	   rhetoric	  of	  Chinese	  political	  propaganda	  regarding	   ‘non-­‐interference’	   and	  a	  ‘win-­‐win’	   situation.	   Kaplan	   argues	   that	   ‘China	   is	   refusing	   to	   be	   a	   responsible	  stakeholder	  in	  the	  international	  political	  system,	  cultivating,	  as	  it	  has	  been,	  good	  relations	   with	   some	   of	   the	   world’s	  most	   odious	   regimes’,	   and	   ‘acts	   like	   a	   free	  rider’	   (Kaplan,	   2010).	   Keet	   is	   concerned	   that	   ‘whatever	   good	   intentions	   the	  Chinese	   government	  may	   say	   it	   has,	   the	  objective	   and	   fundamental	   problem	   is	  that’	   China-­‐Africa	   economic	   relations	   ‘are	   based	   upon	   highly	   uneven	   levels	   of	  development	  and	  a	  very	  different	  capacity	  to	  benefit	  from	  such	  interactions	  and	  cooperation’	  (Keet,	  2008).	  Similar	  voices	  add	  that	  Chinese	  firms	  in	  Africa	  hire	  the	  largest	   percentage	   of	   workers	   from	   China	   and	   that	   managerial	   positions	   are	  filled	  by	  Chinese	  people.	   	   	  Some	  researchers	  hold	  a	  realistic	  attitude	  towards	  China	  in	  Africa.	  Etzioni	  argues:	  ‘China	  is	  surely	  not	  a	  responsible	  stakeholder,	  but	  then	  few	  nations	  are’	  (Etzioni,	  2011,	  p.	  553).	  Since	  it	  is	  inevitable	  that	  China	  will	  have	  a	  presence	  in	  Africa,	  it	  is	  useful	   to	  urge	  China	   to	  become	  a	  better	   co-­‐operator	   in	   the	   continent,	  with	   the	  recognition	  of	  its	  inner	  weakness	  and	  incapability	  in	  Africa.	   	   	  	  Finally,	  based	  on	  the	  former	  five	  standards,	  China	  is	  not	  a	  fully	  responsible	  actor	  in	   Africa.	   The	   fundamental	   reason	   for	   this	   is	   that	   China	   itself	   is	   not	   a	   fully	  accepted	   player	   in	   international	   society.	   It	   holds	   a	   very	   different	   approach	   to	  African	   countries	   from	   that	   of	   traditional	   players.	   Moreover,	   the	   fragmented	  authoritarianism	   reflects	  Beijing’s	  weakness	   to	   supervise	   its	   overseas	   agencies	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and	  actors.	  Meanwhile,	  African	  interests	  are	  not	  as	  genuinely	  shared	  as	  it	  might	  appear.	   They	   have	   different	   requirements	   and	   different	   capabilities	   in	   taking	  advantage	  of	  China’s	   commitments.	  Based	  on	   this	  understanding,	   the	   following	  section	  will	  discuss	  suggestions	  for	  policy.	   	   	   	  
10.3.6	  Summary	  and	  Policy	  suggestions	  From	  the	  five	  standard	  evaluations	  for	  assessing	  whether	  China	  is	  a	  responsible	  actor	  in	  Africa,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  China	  has	  commitments	  to	  the	  continent	  that	  are	  recognised	  by	  most	  African	  countries	  and	  their	  people.	  However,	  much	  evidence	  is	   revealed	  of	  China	  not	  being	   fully	   responsible.	  This	  section	  will	   focus	  on	  how	  China	  should	  improve	  to	  become	  a	  more	  responsible	  actor	  in	  Africa.	  The	  first	  is,	  as	   suggested	   in	   former	   chapters,	   policy	   implementation.	   We	   cannot	   deny	   the	  profit-­‐driven	   nature	   of	   Chinese	   entrepreneurs	   and	   bureaucrats:	   it	   is	   Beijing’s	  responsibility	   to	   regulate	   these	   overseas	   agencies.	   Currently,	   China	   does	   not	  have	  an	  independent	  agency	  to	  look	  after	  its	  projects	  and	  business	  in	  Africa.	  The	  projects	   were	   taken	   without	   a	   transparent	   and	   professional	   evaluation	   of	   its	  impact	  on	  the	  country	  and	  local	  community.	  China	  could	  establish	  an	  aid	  agency	  with	   specialists	   to	   monitor	   its	   enterprise,	   and	   to	   give	   a	   comprehensive	  assessment	  of	  their	  investment	  and	  projects.	   	  
Second,	   as	   argued	   in	   the	   former	   chapters,	   China	   shares	   similar	   interests	   in	   a	  stable	  and	  developing	  Africa	  with	  international	  society.	  In	  this	  case,	  China	  should	  be	   more	   cooperative	   with	   international	   efforts.	   Most	   of	   the	   cases	   reveal	   that	  China	  is	  incapable	  of	  dealing	  with	  the	  changing	  and	  risky	  situation	  in	  Africa.	  Its	  commitments	   to	   the	   continent	   are	   largely	   constrained	   by	   the	   political	   and	  economic	   situation	   there.	   In	   this	   situation,	   international	   support	   is	  much	  more	  important	  to	  Chinese	  companies.	   	  
10.4	  The	  significance	  of	  the	  thesis	  To	   consider	   whether	   a	   country	   takes	   international	   responsibility	   in	   a	   certain	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area	  is	  complex.	  Over	  the	  past	  few	  decades,	  developed	  countries	  have	  offered	  aid	  to	   developing	   countries	   and	   undereveloped	   countries.	   As	   Chapter	   3	   indicated,	  their	  emphasis	  has	  evolved	  from	  the	  principle	  of	  sovereignty,	  national	  diversity,	  and	  non-­‐intervention,	  towards	  one	  of	  mutual	  dependence,	  cooperation,	  and	  then	  to	  increasing	  attention	  on	  human	  rights	  and	  humanitarian	  intervention.	  Take	  the	  US	   for	  example:	   strengthening	  democratic	   institutions	   is	   the	  primary	  condition	  when	  the	  US	  offers	  aid	  to	  these	  recipient	  states.	  Nowadays,	  when	  more	  and	  more	  countries	   have	   the	   ability	   to	   offer	   aid	   to	   recipient	   countries,	   these	   standards	  from	  traditional	  players	  will	  be	  used	  to	  evaluate	  emerging	  donor	  countries.	  This	  thesis,	  although	  the	  main	  topic	  and	  cases	  focus	  on	  China	  and	  Africa,	  has	  also	  tried	  to	   indicate	   that	   if	   we	   only	   consider	   the	   standards	   from	   the	   original	   OECD	  countries,	  one	  cannot	  properly	  evaluate	  the	  actions	  of	  new	  up-­‐and-­‐coming	  donor	  countries.	   	  	  In	  the	  conclusion	  of	  Part	  2,	  this	  thesis	  indicated	  that	  there	  are	  several	  factors	  and	  actors	   that	   should	   be	   added	   to	   the	   equation,	   and	   that	   these	   factors	   and	   actors	  may	  apply	  to	  other	  cases	  and	  other	  regions,	  when	  considering	  whether	  a	  country	  is	  a	  responsible	  actor	  to	  other	  states.	  	   (1)	  State	  capacity	  of	  donor	  countries.	  As	  the	  case	  studies	  and	  conclusion	  to	   Part	   2	   demonstrated,	   it	   is	   hard	   for	   these	   new	   donor	   countries	   to	  demand	   that	   recipient	   states	   change	   their	   political	   systems	   or	   improve	  their	  governance	   in	  a	  short	  period	  of	   time.	  On	  one	  hand,	   the	  new	  donor	  country	   lacks	   the	  ability	   to	  pressure	   the	   recipient	   country;	  while	  on	   the	  other	   hand,	   the	   effect	   of	   using	   aid	   as	   a	   condition	   to	   pressure	   another	  government	  is	  limited.	  (2)	  Contexts	  of	  the	  recipient	  states.	  For	  most	  recipient	  states,	  there	  could	  be	   many	   reasons	   that	   result	   in	   their	   inability	   to	   develop	   into	   donor	  countries.	  For	  example,	   interest	  groups	   in	  Nigeria,	  civil	  war	   in	  Sudan,	  or	  South	   East	   Asia	   in	   late	   1990s	   with	   terrible	   financial	   motoring	   system.	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Appendix	  II	  	  Interviewees	  list	   	  	  No	   Interview	  Time	   Interview	  Location	   Background	   Category	  1	   Tuesday	   	  August	   21,	  2012,	  3:00-­‐4:00	   	  
CPIFA	   Vice	   president	   of	   CPIFA,	  former	   Chinese	   ambassador	  to	  Morocco	  
Chinese	  Official	  
2	   Thursday	   	  September	  13,	  2012,	  10:00-­‐11:00	  
CPIFA	   Former	   second	   secretary	   to	  Ghana	   	   Chinese	  Official	  
3	   Friday	   	  August	  24,	  2012	  5:00-­‐6:00	  
Headquarter	  of	  China.com	   Former	   Chinese	   Ambassador	  to	  Nigeria	  and	  Namibia	   Chinese	  Official	  
4	   Monday	  August	  5,	  2012	  10:00-­‐11:00	  
Beijing	  Academic	   of	  Social	  Sciences	  
Vice	   Principle	   of	   China	  Foreign	  Affairs	  University	   Chinese	  Official	  
5	   September	  27,	  2012,	  10:00-­‐11:00	  	  
CAPFA	   Secretary－General	  of	  the	  Chinese-­‐African	  People’s	  Friendship	  Association	  
Chinese	  Official	  
6	   Monday	  August	  5,	  2012	  1:30-­‐2:00	   	  
Guangming	  Daily	   Director	   of	   International	  News,	  Guangming	  Daily	   Chinese	  Official	  
7	   Friday	   	  August	  24,	  2012	  2:30-­‐3:30	  
CASS	   Research	  Professor	  of	  Asian	  and	  African	  Studies,	  CASS	   African	  studies	  researcher	  
8	   Tuesday	   	  August	  21,	   	  2012	  11:00-­‐12:00	  
CICIR	   Research	  Professor	  and	  Director	  of	  the	  Division	  of	  African	  Studies,	  Institute	  of	  Asian	  and	  African	  Studies,	  CICIR	  
African	  studies	  researcher	  
9	   Friday	   	  August	  24,	  2012	  11:00-­‐12:00	  
CASS	   Research	   Professor	   of	   Asian	  and	  African	  Studies,	  CASS	   African	  studies	  researcher	  
10	   Wednesday	   Peking	   Professor	   in	   the	   School	   of	   African	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August	  22,	   	  2012,	  9:30-­‐10:30	  
University	   International	   Relations	   at	   the	  Peking	   University	   director	   of	  the	  Center	  of	  African	  Studies	   	  
studies	  researcher	  
11	   Tuesday	   	  August	  21,	   	  2012,	  9:30-­‐10:30am	  
CICIR	   Research	   Professor	   of	   the	  Division	   of	   African	   Studies,	  Institute	   of	   Asian	   and	   African	  Studies	  
African	  studies	  researcher	  
12	   January	  25,	   	  2013	   Email	   Professor	   and	   director,	  Institute	   of	   African	   Studies,	  Zhejiang	  Normal	  University	  
African	  studies	  researcher	  13	   October	  11,	  2012	   Email	   Professor	   of	   Xiangtan	  University	  Law	  School,	  African	  law	   	  
African	  studies	  researcher	  14	   November	  7,	  2012	   Email	   	   Director	   of	   Center	   for	  Integrated	   Agricultural	  Development	   at	   Beijing	  Agricultural	  University	  
African	  studies	  researcher	  
15	   July	  25-­‐29	  2012	   Skype	   Project	   manager	   of	  Guinea-­‐Mali,	   China	   Geo	  engineering	  corporate	   	  
Chinese	   SOEs’	  employee	  
16	   January	  3-­‐5,	   	  2013	   Skype	   Project	  manager	  in	  Gabon,	  China	  Gezhouba	  Corporate	   Chinese	   SOEs’	  employee	  17	   July	  11	  2012	   Skype	   Engineer	  Nigeria,	  CNPC	   Chinese	   SOEs’	  employee	  18	   July	  15	  2012	   Skype	   Managing	   Director,	   Tianjin	  Branch	  of	  Sinopec	   Chinese	   SOEs’	  employee	  19	   January	   25	  2013	   QQ	   	   Manager	   assistance	   Huawei	  Telecommunication	  Company	  Gambia	  branch	  
Chinese	  private	  company	  employee	  20	   June	  17	  2012	   MSN	   Translator	  of	  a	  trade	  company	  in	  Nigerian	  China	  Town	   Chinese	  private	  company	  employee	  21	   November	  8	  2012	   Email	   School	   of	   Overseas	   Chinese	  and	  International	  Studies	  Jinan	  University	  
Chinese	   	  researcher	  
22	   June	  5	  2014	  10:00-­‐10:30	   School	   of	  International	  Studies,	   	  Peking	  University	  
School	   of	   International	  Studies,	   	  Peking	  University	  
Chinese	   	  researcher	  
23	   June	  5	  2014	   School	   of	   School	   of	   International	   Chinese	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3:30-­‐4:00	   International	  Studies,	   	  Renmin	  University	  
Studies,	   	  Renmin	  University	   researcher	  
24	   June	  12	  2014	  2:00-­‐2:30	   School	   of	  International	  Studies,	   	  Renmin	  University	  
School	   of	   International	  Studies,	   	  Renmin	  University	  



































	   346	  
Appendix	  III	  
	  Interview	   Transcript	   Sample	   (The	   interview	   is	   conducted	   in	   Chinese	   and	  translated	  by	  the	  author)	  	  1. Chinese	  official	  Interviewee	  No.	  1	  Interview	  time:	  Tuesday	  August	  21,	  2012,	  3:00-­‐4:00pm	  Interview	  location:	  Chinese	  People’s	  Institute	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  (CPIFA)	  Interviewee:	  Cheng	  Tao,	  vice	  president	  of	  CPIFA,	  former	  Chinese	  ambassador	  to	  Morocco,	  who	  has	  more	  than	  16	  years	  diplomatic	  working	  experiences	  in	  Africa	  countries,	  including	  Gabon,	  Mali,	  Benin	  and	  Morocco	   	  Q:	  What	  is	  your	  opinion	  towards	  China’s	  responsibility	  in	  Africa?	  A:	  Recently,	  I’ve	  been	  asked	  similar	  questions	  in	  an	  interview	  with	  People’s	  daily	  on	  FOCAC,	  “Why	  China	  pay	  so	  much	  attention	  to	  African	  poor	   friends,	   isn’t	   is	  a	  burden	   to	   the	   state?	   We	   are	   from	   developing	   country	   with	   many	   people	   in	  poverty.	  Why	  we	  provide	  so	  much	  finance	  assistance	  to	  Africa?	  It	  even	  draws	  lot	  of	   domestic	   criticism	   that	   in	   the	   recent	   fifth	   ministerial	   FOCAC,	   Chinese	  government	   will	   continue	   to	   expand	   its	   assistance	   to	   Africa	   and	   pledge	   to	  provide	  US$	  20	  billion	  concessional	  loans	  in	  terms	  of	  investment	  and	  commercial	  properties	  cooperation.	  I	  would	  say	  these	  people	  don't	  understand	  China's	  foreign	  policy.	  Our	  economic	  diplomacy	  acts	  as	  the	  servant	  of	  our	  foreign	  policy	  and	  foreign	  strategy.	  First	  of	  all,	  as	  a	  responsible	  developing	  country	  China's	  support	  of	  Africa	  is	  our	  international	   responsibility,	   international	   obligation	  and	   international	   common	  morality	  (gongde),	  and	  is	  an	  important	  component	  of	  a	  harmonious	  world.	  In	  the	  1960s,	   China	   has	   provided	   selfless	   assistance	   to	   Africa	   in	   terms	   of	   railways,	  roads,	  ports,	  dams	  and	  many	  meetings	  buildings,	  stadiums,	  schools	  and	  hospitals	  when	  Chinese	  government	  and	  people	  are	   in	  very	  difficult	  circumstance,	  which	  has	   gained	   its	   reputation	   and	   influence.	   China’s	   aid	   to	   Africa	  with	   no	   political	  conditions	   attached	   contrast	   with	   the	   western	   style.	   Chinese	   experts	   worked	  with	  African	  brothers	  gained	  local	  good	  impressions.	  It	  is	  still	  an	  intangible	  asset	  to	  us	  now.	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   China's	   support	   of	   Africa	   from	   the	   outset	   has	   been	   in	   the	  fundamental	   interests	   of	   the	   country.	  With	   China's	   development,	   the	   form	   and	  content	   of	   China-­‐Africa	   relations	   have	   changed	   considerably,	   but	   Africa's	  importance	  for	  China	  has	  not,	  Africa's	  place	  in	  the	  structure	  of	  China's	  diplomacy	  has	  not.	  Politically	  Africa	  is	  still	  an	  important	  strategic	  support	  in	  our	  diplomatic	  struggle,	   in	   the	   logistics	   of	   the	   overall	   foreign	   policy	   situation	   of	   realising	  peaceful	  development	  it	  is	  indispensable	  as	  a	  major	  support.	  From	  the	  economic	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perspective	  sustainable	  economic	  development	  can	  depend	  on	  Africa	  for	  energy	  and	  natural	  resource	  supplies	  and	  commodities	  and	  as	  an	  important	  market	  for	  investments.	   Good	   China-­‐Africa	   relations	   will	   bring	   benefits	   to	   the	   people	   of	  China	  and	  Africa.	  	  Our	   assistance	   to	   Africa	   is	  mutual	   beneficial.	   In	   the	   1960s	   and	   1970s,	   African	  countries	   strongly	   supported	   China	   to	   break	   western	   countries’	   containment,	  safeguard	  national	  sovereignty	  and	  territorial	   integrity.	  From	  the	  restoration	  of	  the	   lawful	   seat	   in	   the	   UN	   to	   defending	   Beijing	   on	   anti-­‐China	   human	   rights	  proposal;	  from	  Chinese	  campaign	  in	  many	  international	  organizations	  to	  China’s	  bidding	  for	  Olympics	  Games	  and	  World	  Expo,	  these	  are	  all	  inseparable	  from	  the	  support	  of	  African	  countries.	   	  	  In	   2008,	   the	   earthquake,	   Equatorial	   Guinea	   with	   2	   million	   populations	   has	  donated	  us	  2	  million	  euros.	   It	  equals	   that	  every	  Equatorial	  Guinean	  people	  has	  donated	  1	  euro.	  Congo-­‐Brazzaville	  government	  donated	  US$	  1	  million	  after	   the	  earthquake	  in	  Wenchuan	  and	  US$	  2	  million	  after	  the	  earthquake	  in	  Yushu	  for	  a	  boarding	   primary	   school,	   despite	   that	   fact	   that	   the	   state	   is	   a	   heavy	   debt	   poor	  country.	  	  China’s	  responsibility	  in	  Africa	  is	  not	  “doing	  thing	  beyond	  its	  means	  in	  order	  to	  be	  impressive”.	  China	  is	  a	  developing	  country	  richer	  than	  before.	  It	  is	  reasonable	  to	   increase	   its	   aid	   to	   Africa.	   Comparing	   to	   the	   western	   countries,	   the	   scale	   is	  limited,	  but	  the	  quality	  and	  effective	  is	  better.	   	  	  Q:	  Since	  you’ve	  mentioned	  the	  mutual	  benefit	  between	  China-­‐Africa,	  considering	  the	  asymmetric	  strength	  between	  China	  and	  African	  countries,	  how	  to	  realize	  the	  real	  mutual	  benefits	  and	  win-­‐win	  situation?	   	  	  A:	  I	  often	  say,	  the	  meaning	  of	  China-­‐Africa	  relations	  is	  not	  charity,	  is	  aid	  the	  poor,	  is	  not	  humanitarianism,	  it	  is	  internationalism	  and	  international	  justice.	  We	  are	  a	  great	  power	  which	  has	  great	  power	  responsibilities,	  aiding	  Africa's	  development	  is	  part	  of	  our	  construction	  of	  a	  harmonious	  world.	   	  	  Diplomacy	  in	  any	  country	  is	  not	  selfless.	  Our	  assistance	  principle	  is	  considering	  our	   interests	  and	  also	   considering	   the	  benefits	  of	  others.	  China-­‐Africa’s	  mutual	  benefit	   is	   not	   selfish.	   	   Africa	   is	   the	  world's	   resource	   base	   and	   rich	   in	  mineral	  resources.	   At	   the	   time	   that	   our	   enterprises	   invested	   in	   mining	   industry,	   our	  government	   has	   provided	   finance	   to	   support	   “oil	   for	   infrastructure”.	   Most	   of	  large	  and	  medium	  enterprises,	   such	  as	  CREC	  and	  CWIC,	  have	  strong	  connected	  with	  government.	  They	  were	   introduced	   to	   local	  host	  government	   through	  our	  embassy.	  Once	   these	  enterprises	  have	  problems	  or	  accidents,	  our	  embassy	  will	  shoulder	  the	  responsibility.	  Therefore,	  comparing	  to	  the	  western	  countries,	  our	  enterprises	  are	  more	  reliable.	  Additionally,	  the	  SOEs’	  projects	  in	  Africa	  are	  often	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supported	  by	  China-­‐Africa	  Cooperation	  development	  Fund,	  China	  Development	  Bank	  and	  China	  Exim	  Bank	  and	  to	  provide	  assistance,	  loans	  or	  buyer's	  credit	  to	  help	   African	   countries	   to	   implement	   aid	   projects.	   As	   a	   result,	   these	   Chinese	  companies	  have	  financial	  advantages.	  	  Africa	   now	   greatly	   resembles	   the	   early	   stages	   of	   China's	   reform	   and	   opening,	  China's	  support	  projects	  are	  aimed	  at	   increasing	  the	  capacity	   for	   independence	  of	  African	  countries.	  Through	  developing	  energy	  resources	  in	  Africa,	  we	  help	  to	  improve	   local	   infrastructure	   and	   to	   enhance	   the	   ability	   of	   these	   countries	   to	  sustainable	  development.	   	  	  Q:	  You’ve	  mentioned	  the	  embassy’s	  guarantee	  for	  SOEs,	  could	  you	  please	  further	  talk	  about	  local	  embassy’s	  support	  on	  Chinese	  enterprise?	  	  Generally,	  the	  dept.	  of	  political	  is	  responsible	  to	  collect	  local	  information,	  such	  as	  market	   and	   environment	   exploration	   and	  macro-­‐management,	   so	   as	   to	   ensure	  the	  advantages	  and	  disadvantages	  of	  local	  country	  before	  SOEs’	  “going	  out”.	  The	  Economic	   and	   trade	   office	   is	   responsible	   to	   get	   information	   on	   local	   demands	  and	  economic	  situations,	  then	  to	  contact	  Chinese	  relevant	  enterprises.	  The	  Dept.	  of	   Commerce	   is	   responsible	   for	   the	   implementation	   and	   coordination	   between	  local	   governments	   and	   Chinese	   enterprises,	   such	   as	   the	   loans	   and	  implementation	  of	  the	  projects.	  In	  addition,	  we	  hold	  regular	  meetings	  to	  release	  policy	   and	   investment	   opportunity	   while	   urging	   Chinese	   enterprises	   to	   abide	  local	  regulations	  and	  corporate	  social	  responsibility.	  	  Q:	  What	  factors	  do	  you	  think	  affect	  China	  to	  be	  responsible	  in	  Africa?	   	  	  A:	   Currently,	   there	   are	   certainly	   some	   Chinese	   companies	   or	   some	   Chinese	  people	   in	   Africa	   whose	   conduct	   has	   triggered	   discontent	   in	   local	   populations.	  There	  are	  a	  variety	  of	  factors	  in	  this.	  One	  reason	  is	  that	  although	  China	  supports	  Africa,	  culturally	  the	  communication	  between	  China	  and	  them	  (Africans)	  is	  very	  limited,	  Africa	  does	  not	  understand	  China	  very	  much.	  We	  are	  currently	  doing	  a	  lot	   of	   work,	   such	   as	   through	   cultural	   exchange	   about	   our	   thoughts,	   ideas,	  traditions,	   etc.,	   to	   give	   Africans	   better	   understanding.	   Western	   media	   is	  demonising	  Africa,	   demonising	  China.	  China-­‐Africa	   should	  do	   some	   real	   things,	  and	   not	   let	   some	   other	   people	   slander	   us.	   Rumor	   is	   not	   truth,	   but	   it	   confuses	  people.	   We	   want	   to	   strengthen	   our	   influence,	   voice	   and	   eliminating	   distorted	  propaganda.	  In	  the	  past,	  Chinese	  people	  do	  not	  pay	  attention	  to	  propaganda.	  In	  the	   case	   of	   Africa,	   it	   lacks	   communication	   with	   African	   people	   and	   the	   world,	  between	  Chinese	  enterprises	  and	  African	  employees.	  	  In	   addition,	   there	   are	   thousands	   of	   Chinese	   enterprises	   in	   Africa,	   they	   are	   far	  from	  the	  same.	  For	  example,	   I	  used	  to	  work	   in	  Morocco,	  where	   there	  are	  more	  than	  2,000	  Chinese	  enterprises,	  30-­‐50	  million	  Chinese	  people,	  while	  carrying	  out	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more	  than	  1000	  projects.	  They	  are	   in	  various	   levels	  with	  different	  background,	  but	   they	  are	  considered	   to	   represent	   “China”.	  Some	  of	   them	  pursue	  short-­‐term	  benefits	   in	   the	   sacrifice	   of	   labor	   conditions,	   safety	   and	   other	   aspects.	   Some	  companies	  pave	  their	  way	  through	  money	  and	  believe	  money	  can	  do	  everything.	  Some	   lack	   of	   awareness	   of	   national	   responsibility	   and	   bring	   the	   Chinese	   bad	  habits	   to	  Africa.	   This	   phenomenon	   is	  minority,	   but	   has	   very	  bad	   influence.	  We	  need	   to	  highlight	   our	   contribution,	   but	  not	   hide	  our	  problem.	  We	  have	   to	  deal	  with	   these	   problems.	   If	   the	   companies	   didn’t	   do	   well	   in	   Africa,	   they	   have	   to	  receive	  heavy	  fines	  and	  legal	  punishment.	  In	  this	  way,	  China-­‐Africa	  cooperation	  could	  be	  sustainable	  developing.	   	  	  Thirdly,	   some	   African	   countries	   and	   people	   have	   some	   misunderstanding	  towards	  China	  and	  its	  role	  in	  the	  host	  country.	  In	  the	  past,	  our	  assistance	  to	  the	  continent	   is	   governmental	   oriented,	   but	   nowadays	  most	   of	   bilateral	   economic	  activities	  are	  enterprise-­‐led.	   Some	  African	  countries	  may	   think	   that	   in	   the	  past	  China	  has	   sent	   experts	   and	  medical	   groups	  without	   any	  payment,	   but	  now	   the	  Chinese	   enterprises	   are	   investing	   into	  mining	   industry	   for	  money.	   In	   this	   case,	  China	  is	  not	  as	  generous	  and	  selfless	  as	  it	   in	  the	  past.	  In	  fact,	  our	  governmental	  assistance	  has	  never	  stopped	  and	  the	  enterprises	  are	  profit-­‐driven.	   	  	  Q:	   What	   do	   you	   think	   the	   criticisms,	   such	   as	   neo-­‐colonization,	   undermining	  western	  countries	  efforts	  and	  China	  model?	  	  The	  Western	   countries	   are	   envious	   and	   hostile	   to	   China-­‐Africa	   cooperation.	   In	  the	  past	  they	  had	  a	  monopoly,	  accounting	  for	  100%	  of	  Africa's	  natural	  resource	  exports,	   and	   now	   they	   can't	   prevent	   our	   cooperation	  with	   Africa,	   because	   our	  cooperation	   is	   mutually	   beneficial.	   We	   are	   not	   neo-­‐colonialists,	   we	   are	   not	  robbers,	   the	   colonialists	   came	   to	   Africa	   to	   plunder	   resources,	   and	   the	   African	  people	   hate	   them;	   in	   the	   past	   Africa	  was	   grateful	   to	   China	   politically,	   now	  we	  have	  found	  natural	  resources	  in	  Africa,	  and	  the	  West	  makes	  a	  fuss	  about	  China's	  attraction	  to	  African	  resources.	  It	   is	   inevitably	  that	  Africa	  has	  natural	  resources	  and	  China	  has	  funds	  to	  help	  them	  explore	  and	  turn	  the	  resource	  to	  development.	   	  
China	   and	  Africa	   are	   cooperating,	   helping	   them	   to	   experiment,	   to	   explore.	   The	  system	  is	  one	  that	  explores	  the	  path	  of	  development.	   It	  cannot	  be	   imposed,	  the	  national	   development	  path	   should	  be	  decided	  by	   their	   people,	   and	   at	   different	  stages	  of	  development	  it	  should	  be	  allowed	  to	  have	  a	  different	  form.	  Now	  some	  African	   countries	   learn	   from	   China's	   development	   experience,	   such	   as	   South	  Africa	  and	  Ethiopia,	  but	  China's	  approach	  should	  be	  in	  accordance	  with	  national	  conditions,	   China	   is	   neither	   exporting	   the	   Chinese	   model	   nor	   does	   it	   oppose	  learning	  from	  others.	  The	  recent	  FOCAC	  Beijing	  Declaration	  had	  the	  proposal	  "to	  increase	  the	  exchange	  of	  experience	  in	  national	  governance";	  this	   is	  the	  biggest	  difference	  with	  the	  previous	  sessions	  to	  which	  you	  should	  pay	  attention.	  At	  the	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same	  time,	  we	  need	  to	  admit	  that	  our	  development	  model	  has	  its	  own	  problems,	  such	  as	  incorrupt	  government,	  unbalance	  which	  need	  to	  deal	  with	  and	  overcome	  with	  African	  governments.	   	  	  	  	  	  2. Chinese	  employee	  in	  Africa	  	  Interview	  No.	  :	  15	  Interview	   time:	   July	   25-­‐29	   2012	   (due	   to	   the	   power	   supply	   in	   Guinea,	   the	  interview	  has	  lasted	  4	  days)	  Interview	  method:	  Skype	  Interviewee:	  Hu,	  Haowei,	  Project	  manager	  of	  Guinea-­‐Mali,	  China	  Geo	  engineering	  corporate	  	  Q:	  How	  is	  your	  company	  deciding	  the	  people	  assigned	  to	  Africa?	  	  A:	  Theoretically,	  1.	  The	   type	  of	  project;	  2.	  Specialty	  and	  quality	  of	  personnel	  3.	  The	  employee’s	  willingness.	  The	  company	  will	  conduct	  an	  interview	  for	  potential	  candidates	  and	  then	  the	  oversea	  manage	  will	  review	  the	  CV	  and	  conduct	  further	  telephone	   interview	   to	  decide	   the	   final	   candidate.	   In	   reality,	  most	  of	  people	  do	  not	  have	  strong	  willingness	  to	  work	  in	  Africa	  because	  of	  the	  hardship	  here.	  Some	  young	  people	  who	  are	  interested	  in	  often	  want	  to	  earn	  some	  extra	  allowance.	  But	  the	   problem	   is	   these	   people	   lack	   of	   overseas	   experience	   and	   need	   to	   adapt	   to	  local	  custom	  and	  life.	  After	  they	  gradually	  get	  used	  to	  Africa,	  their	  contract	  ends.	   	  	  Q:	  Please	  describe	  the	  project	  you	  have	  involved,	  its	  aims	  and	  scale.	  A:	  I	  am	  currently	  responsible	  for	  water	  supply	  expansion	  project	  in	  Guinea.	  The	  goal	   is	   to	  provide	  clean	  drinkable	  water	   for	   the	  capital.	  The	  project	   is	  US$	  273	  billion.	  Now	  we	  have	  about	  7	  sets	  of	  drilling	  rig	  (each	  set	  with	  5-­‐6	  trucks).	  	  Q:	   What	   are	   the	   sources	   of	   your	   project?	   Does	   central	   government	   or	   local	  government	  provide	  any	  support?	  	  A:	   The	   funds	   are	   Chinese	   governmental	   low-­‐interest	   loans	   applied	   by	   Guinean	  government.	   Local	   government	   has	   provided	   policy	   support	   for	   the	   project.	  National	   Bureau	   of	   Water	   Resources	   provides	   technical	   support	   and	   project	  quality	  supervision.	   	  	  Q:	  How	  do	  you	  think	  the	  project	  will	  impact	  local	  community?	  The	  project	  brings	  clean	  water	  to	  people	  in	  capital.	  What’s	  more,	  generally,	  when	  we	  finished	  the	  local	  projects,	  large	  equipment	  and	  machinery	  will	  not	  ship	  back	  to	   China,	   because	   the	   local	   international	   organizations,	   such	   as,	   UNICEF	   and	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International	   Red	   Cross	   will	   come	   to	   us	   for	   help.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   Chinese	  government	  may	  provide	   further	   assistant	   project	   from	   time	   to	   time.	   So	  when	  the	   project	   launched,	   it	   is	   a	   snowball	   project.	   As	   for	   water	   projects,	   or	   other	  kinds	   of	   economic	   assistance	   project,	   African	   governments	   are	   particularly	  strong	  support	  and	  welcomed.	  They	  give	  lot	  of	  policy	  support.	   	  	  Q:	  Comparing	  to	  domestic	  project,	  how	  the	  profit	  of	  your	  project	  in	  Africa?	  	  A:	  The	  profit	  of	  project	   is	  different	  case	  by	  case.	  Generally,	   it	   is	  higher	  than	  the	  profit	  in	  China.	  And	  if	  you	  take	  a	  comparison	  between	  our	  project	  in	  Guinea	  and	  other	   overseas	   projects,	   we	   will	   certain	   our	   profit	   will	   be	   ranked	   among	   top	  three.	   	  	  Q:	   In	   your	   project,	   how	   many	   African	   colleagues	   do	   you	   have,	   how	   Chinese	  people	  get	  along	  with	  them?	  	  A:	   The	   number	   of	   African	   employees	   is	  much	  more	   than	   Chinese.	   But	  most	   of	  colleagues	  in	  my	  level	  or	  the	  doing	  clerical	  work	  are	  Chinese,	  while	  manual	  labor	  work	  are	  African	  colleagues.	  I	  know	  lot	  of	  people	  may	  say	  the	  Africa	  people	  need	  to	   learn	   from	  Chinese	   for	   their	  hardworking.	  But	   in	   fact	   in	  my	  project,	  we	  pay	  extra	   allowance	   for	   overtime	   working,	   The	   African	   colleagues	   are	   positive	  towards	   overtime	   working.	   I	   think	   diligent	   is	   encouraged	   by	   establishment	   of	  praise	  system.	   	  	  As	   a	   project	  manager,	   I	   have	   lot	   of	   opportunity	   to	   deal	   with	   all	   kinds	   of	   local	  people.	   I	   found	   that	   in	   Africa	  money	   can	   do	   everything,	   sometimes	   even	   legal	  issues.	  The	   local	  governor	   is	  very	  sensitive	  to	   financial	   flows,	   for	  example,	   they	  will	   confirm	  repeatedly	  before	  signing	   the	  contract	  which	   is	  more	  serious	   than	  Chinese.	  And	  African	  people	  are	  very	  friendly	  to	  Chinese.	   	  	  Q:	  What	  do	  you	  think	  is	  the	  advantage	  and	  disadvantage	  of	  Chinese	  enterprises,	  comparing	  it	  with	  western	  companies?	  	  A:	   Advantages:	   Chinese	   government	   has	   provided	   financial	   support.	   Chinese	  people	  has	  paid	  more	  attention	  to	  effectiveness	  and	  efficiency.	  	  Disadvantage:	   labor	  protection,	  environment	  protection	   ,	   I	  didn’t	  mean	  Chinese	  enterprise	  do	  not	  pay	  attention	  to	  it,	  it	  just	  not	  as	  good	  as	  western	  companies.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  quality	  of	  western	  companies’	  equipment	  is	  more	  reliable.	  	  Q:	  What	  difficulties	  Chinese	  enterprises	  have	  encountered	  in	  Africa?	  	  A:	   Poor	  working	   environment,	   disease.	   Experienced	   and	   professional	   technical	  personnel	  often	  do	  not	  choose	  to	  come	  to	  work	  in	  Africa.	  In	  addition,	  corruption,	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government	   inefficiency	  makes	   China’s	   operation	   very	   difficult.	   Sometimes	   the	  local	  governor	  asks	  for	  bribe.	  	  And	  as	  more	   and	  more	  people	   entering	  Africa,	   our	  profit	   is	   lower	   than	  before.	  Most	  of	  market	  is	  dominated	  by	  western	  companies;	  the	  marginalized	  are	  left	  to	  Chinese	  enterprise	  which	  is	  hard,	  risky,	  competitive	  and	  low	  profit.	  	  3. Chinese	  private	  company	  employee	  in	  Africa	  	  Interview	  No.:	  20	  Interview	  time:	  June	  17	  2012	   	  Interview	  method:	  MSN	  Interviewee:	  Cao,	  Xiaobo,	  Translator	  of	  a	  trade	  company	  in	  Nigerian	  China	  Town	  	  Q:	  Why	  do	  you	  invest	  in	  Africa?	  	  A:	  My	  boss’s	  relatives	  have	  done	  business	  in	  Nigeria	  in	  1990s,	  at	  that	  time	  the	  profit	  is	  high.	  Everything	  that	  imported	  from	  China	  has	  been	  sold	  at	  a	  much	  higher	  price	  than	  in	  China.	  So	  my	  boss	  starts	  to	  sell	  plastic	  products	  in	  Nigeria	  China	  town.	  	  Q:	  What’s	  your	  opinion	  towards	  ―going	  global	  strategy	  and	  China’s	  Africa	  responsibility;	  do	  they	  have	  any	  influences	  in	  your	  daily	  operation	  in	  Africa?	  	  A:	  Responsibility	   things	  are	  viewed	   from	  government	   to	  government	   level,	  and	  Beijing’s	  policy	   is	  designed	   for	   large	  national	   enterprises,	   as	   far	   as	   I	   know,	   the	  reason	   for	   private	   company	   to	   invest	   into	   Africa	   is	   mainly	   out	   of	   economic	  consideration	   and	   since	   its	   company	   is	   still	   in	   a	   very	   small	   scale,	   they	   haven’t	  considered	   paying	   back	   to	   local	   society	   at	   the	   moment.	   We	   are	   struggling	   to	  survive	  ourselves.	  	  Q:	   What	   kinds	   of	   constraints	   have	   you	   experienced	   during	   your	   operation	   in	  African	  market?	  	  A:	  The	  hard	  life	  and	  competition	  in	  China	  town.	  And	  the	  local	  government	  is	  not	  nice	  to	  us.	  There	  is	  always	  someone	  asking	  for	  bribe,	  either	  African	  or	  Chinese.	  You	  have	  no	  other	  methods	  than	  bribing	  local	  governors.	   	  	  Q:	   Have	   you	   considered	   to	   expand	   business	   and	   invest	   into	   local	  manufacture	  industry	  rather	  than	  importing	  from	  China?	  	  A:	  No,	  transforming	  industrial	  line	  into	  Africa	  can	  save	  the	  cost	  of	  transportation	  and	  labor,	  but	  the	  electricity	  supply	  here	  is	  too	  poor.	  Like	  in	  China	  Town,	  there	  is	  limited	  hours	  to	  have	  power.	  And	  the	  environment	  is	  risky	  for	  transportation.	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  Q:	  Lot	  of	  criticisms	  is	  complaining	  the	  quality	  of	  Chinese	  products,	  what	  do	  you	  think?	  	  A:	  The	  reason	  I	  don’t	   like	   to	  receive	   interview	  is	   that	  you	  never	  been	  to	  Africa.	  You	   haven’t	   seen	   the	   hard	   life	   here.	   We	   have	   no	   other	   choice,	   the	   African	  middleman	   offered	   low	   prices,	   which	   leaves	   little	   profit	   to	   the	   Chinese	  manufactures,	   thus,	   the	   producers	   lowered	   the	   quality.	   And	   due	   to	   the	  mismanagement,	   smuggling	   is	   rampant	   in	   Nigeria.	   You	   cannot	   imagine	   how	  serious	  corruption	  is	  in	  Africa.	  Money	  can	  do	  anything.”	   	  	  Q:	  Have	  you	  received	  any	  help	  from	  local	  government,	  what	  is	  your	  suggestion?	   	  	  A:	   No.	   We	   do	   our	   own	   business	   here.	   I	   hope	   the	   embassy	   could	   help	   us	   to	  understand	  the	  local	  policy.	  We	  often	  confuse	  about	  Nigeria’s	  changing	  policy.	   	  	  4. Chinese	  researcher	  	  Interview	  No.:	  22	  Interview	  time:	  June	  5	  2014	  10:00-­‐10:30	  Interview	  location:	  School	  of	  International	  Studies,	  Peking	  University	  Interviewee:	  Zha,	  Daojiong	  School	  of	  International	  Studies,	  Peking	  University	  	   	  Q:	  What	  is	  your	  opinion	  towards	  China	  as	  a	  model	  for	  Africa?	  	  A:	  In	  a	  time	  of	  globalization,	  countries	  are	  free	  to	  learn	  what	  that	  suits	  them.	  We	  do	   not	   attach	   conditions	   to	   finance	   African	   countries,	   we	   just	   provide	   them	  choices.	  The	  African	  people	  can	  choose	  the	  way	  they	  want	  and	  the	  way	  that	  suits	  them.	  They	  are	   free	  to	   learn	  the	  advantages	  of	  China’s	  development	  path	  while	  ignoring	  the	  disadvantages.	  Our	  aim	  into	  Africa	   is	   to	  “hemopoiesis”	  rather	  than	  “transfusion”.	   	  	  Q:	  Lot	  of	  criticism	  is	  about	  China	  prefers	  to	  woo	  the	  undemocratic	  government	  and	   unstable	  market	   to	   satisfy	   its	   oil	   thirst,	   and	   its	   presence	   in	   the	   continent	  have	  affected	  local	  development,	  what	  do	  you	  think?	  	  A:	   Lot	   of	   people	   have	   talked	   about	   China	   choosing	   to	   invest	   in	   the	   high	   risky	  energetic	   area,	   it	   sounds	   as	   if	   we	   have	   a	   choice.	   The	   safe	   oil	   fields	   with	   good	  quality	  energy	  reserves	  have	  long	  been	  controlled	  by	  the	  western	  companies.	  As	  a	  latecomer,	  China	  has	  to	  start	  from	  these	  marginalized	  areas.	  Actually,	  as	  for	  the	  overseas	   companies,	   what	   they	   concern	   the	   most	   is	   the	   safety	   of	   employees.	  They	  are	  trying	  everything	  to	  ensure	  the	  safety	  of	  their	  employees.	  	  In	  response	  to	  these	  criticisms,	  there	  are	  only	  two	  ways,	  the	  first	  one	  is	  to	  expel	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all	   Chinese	   business,	   and	   the	   second	   one	   is	   to	   improve.	  Whether	   expelling	   all	  China’s	   presence	   in	  Africa	   is	   good	   to	   the	   continent?	  We	   as	   a	   late	   comer	   to	   the	  continent,	  it	  is	  inevitable	  to	  have	  problems,	  but	  we	  are	  improving	  and	  learning.	   	   	   	   	  	  Q:	  What	  do	  you	  think	  is	  the	  advantages	  and	  disadvantages	  of	  Chinese	  enterprises	  in	  Africa?	  	  A:	   The	   technicians	   and	   specialists	   are	   the	   biggest	   advantage	   of	   China	   in	  Africa	  and	  they	  have	  a	  completed	  procedure.	  In	  terms	  of	  energy	  industry,	  our	  technic	  is	  advance	  in	  dealing	  with	  poor	  quality	  oil	  and	  gas.	   	  	  The	   disadvantage	   is	  we	   are	   late	   comer	   to	   the	  market	   and	   Chinese	   companies’	  misbehavior	  in	  Africa.	   	  	  Q:	  What	  measures	   do	   you	   think	   the	   government	   could	   do	   to	   regulate	   Chinese	  companies	  in	  Africa?	   	  	  A:	   There	   is	   a	   huge	   gap	   between	   the	   government	   and	   Chinese	   companies.	   I’ve	  done	  fieldwork	  in	  lot	  of	  African	  countries.	  None	  of	  them	  have	  ever	  thought	  about	  China’s	  imagine.	  What	  they	  cared	  about	  is	  very	  practical,	  such	  as,	  when	  Chinese	  government	   could	   help	   to	   simplify	   the	   visa	   application	   process	   in	   African	  countries.	   	  
	  
